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EU Competition Law is generally believed to play a negligible role in protecting media 
pluralism. Three arguments are usually put forward to support this position. First, the application of 
EU competition law ensures market access, thereby potentially delivering an outcome that is of 
benefit to media pluralism, but this outcome is entirely dependent on the economic concerns the 
European Commission attempts to address in each individual case and hence (at best) coincidental. 
Second, precisely because it is driven by efficiency considerations, EU competition law is incapable 
of grasping the qualitative dimension of media pluralism. Third, when exercising State aid control, 
the Commission can (and must) play only a marginal role in the planning and implementation of aid 
measures aimed at promoting media pluralism.  
 
This thesis puts forward the claim that EU competition law has potential that remains 
unexplored by questioning the accuracy of the above three assumptions. To test this claim, it 
examines a number of traditional and new media markets (broadcasting, print and digital publishing, 
online search, and news aggregation) and competition law issues (concentrations, resale price 
maintenance agreements, online agencies, abuses of dominance, and State aids to public service 
media). The study demonstrates that if relevant assessments are conducted properly, that is, by duly 
taking account of the dimensions that drive competition in the media, including quality, variety and 
originality, and by making appropriate use of the tools provided by the applicable legal framework, 
EU competition law may go a long way towards safeguarding media pluralism without the need to 
stretch the limits of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Amidst a deregulatory 
trend towards the media and given that the likelihood that action with far-reaching implications 
under other branches of EU law is low, the normative suggestions put forward in this thesis possibly 
form the only realistic proposal on the contribution the EU can make to the protection of pluralism.    
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 Chapter 1  Introduction   
 
Digitization, the diffusion of broadband networks, and improvements in computing and 
wireless technologies are rapidly changing the media ecosystem as we know it. On the supply side, 
new distribution platforms have emerged, whereas spectrum shortages and large upfront investments 
have been replaced by unlimited space and the ability to set up an outlet at almost no cost. As a 
result, there has been a proliferation of content and sources with the era of technical and economic 
1 
.2 On the user side, these developments have brought individuals to a whole 
other level. Consumers can now access content anytime, anywhere and on any digital device from 
TV sets to tablets, from smartphones to laptops and desktops. Most importantly, web 2.0 may lead to 
unprecedented levels of engagement because citizens can actively participate in public discourse 
either by commenting on the content provided by mainstream media organizations or by creating 
their own outlets.  
 
The digital revolution has undoubtedly brought significant benefits to media pluralism. As new 
sources may now instantly and effortlessly reach the public, audiences may access immeasurably 
more information than they could in the analogue environment. But the changes brought about by 
digital technologies have by no means rendered outdated the discussion over how media pluralism 
can be effectively protected. To the contrary, alongside concerns that policymakers attempted to 
address in the past, such as a concentration of ownership and interference with editorial freedom, 
which remain relevant, new concerns posed by businesses that have emerged with the advent of the 
Internet, such as search engines and digital content stores, have arisen.  
 
More often than not, threats to media pluralism are not addressed in the domestic sphere. This 
is so for a number of reasons that may or may not be attributed to the Member States. For example, 
rk in order to advance national 
competitiveness vis-à-vis third countries. Where strict rules do apply, these cannot be enforced on 
media firms that are located outside the jurisdiction of the State the citizens of which they reach. In 
many cases, the shape of national media markets depends on action taken by the EU. For instance, 
concentrations of an EU dimension and the implementation of State aid schemes in support of media 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Keane, J. (1999). Public Life in the Era of Communicative Abundance. Canadian Journal of Communication, 24, 165-78 
2 Ellis, J. (2002). Seeing Things: Television in the Era of Uncertainty. London and New York: I.B. Tauris 
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What role, if any, should the EU play in safeguarding media pluralism in all the above cases? 
This issue has attracted wide attention in the scholarly literature, which offers several approaches to 
whether, and if so to what extent, the EU may act to protect this value. Avenues that have been 
explored thus far include human rights monitoring under Article 7 TEU, the enactment of a pan-
European instrument setting minimum standards, and the development of soft-law initiatives that 
may lead to sound policymaking at the national level. Yet, action that could be taken under the 
branch of EU law that has played the most decisive role in shaping the European media markets, 
namely competition law, has received little attention to date. This is arguably because there has been 
a great deal of misunderstanding about its likely contribution to pluralism. The objective of this thesis 
is to resolve this misunderstanding by identifying the unexplored potential of strict competition 
enforcement for promoting a pluralistic offer.  
 
1. Laying the groundwork: The Gordian knot of EU competence in the area of media 
pluralism  
 
The relationship between EU law and media pluralism has been a thorny one, not least for the 
complexities that arise in attempting to delineate competence boundaries. On the one hand, the Court 
protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
which is one of the fundamental principles guaranteed by the [EU] legal order 3 
However, because the Member States have had a general human rights competence since the 
inception of the European integration project, the endorsement by the Court of a principle that was 
construed as a manifestation of the exercise of a human right that received wide recognition among 
Member States was meant to ensure that the EU institutions would not develop policies that would 
 
Member States only when they applied EU law.4 This division of competences has remained intact 
after the most recent amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty; the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is now legally binding, however, it also explicitly provides that it does not afford new powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraph 23-29, and 
ECJ, Case C-353/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of the Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069, paragraph 30. 
While the EU has not acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights yet, all Member States are signatories to the Convention 
and, on some occasions, they have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights for violations of media pluralism. For an 
overview of this case law and a criticism of the relevant judicial mechanism see, for instance, Komorek, E. (2013). Media Pluralism 
and European Union, 61-81. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
4 Besson, S. (2011). The Human Rights Competence in the EU  The State of the Question after Lisbon, 39. In Kofler, G., Miguel 
Poiares Maduro and Pasquale Pistone (eds.). Taxation and Human Rights in Europe and in the World. Amsterdam: IBFD 
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or tasks for the Union in the field of human rights.5 Hence, even if Article 11(2) of the Charter 
 are still primarily 
responsible for protecting this value in their jurisdiction. 
 
On the other hand, the EU does not lack competence altogether to act in support of media 
pluralism. Article 7 TEU introduces a mechanism that equips the EU institutions with the means of 
liberty, democracy, equality, and the rule of law.6 More particularly, Article 7 establishes a procedure 
whereby the Council may determine whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach or whether there 
has been a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of one of the aforementioned principles.7 
Due to its deep-rooted relationship with freedom of expression, media pluralism is, inter alia, key to 
;8 media has 
the capacity to mold public opinion and, by exposing the citizens to diverse viewpoints, it allows 
them to make informed voting decisions. As a result, EU action against a Member State that engages 
in conduct harmful to media pluralism may rest on Article 7. 
 
 Moreover, media policies have traditionally been thought to form an integral part of the 
the key roles that media is expected to 
play in a democracy is to advance social cohesion9 by ensuring that the various linguistic, cultural, 
and ethnic minorities of a given society are fairly and diversely represented.10 Pursuant to Articles 
167(1) and 6(c) TFEU, the EU may carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement action 
taken at the national level in order to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States.11 Article 167(5) TFEU provides that, to fulfill the aforementioned objective, the EU may 
adopt incentive measures and recommendations,12 but not instruments that would harmonize national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2008] OJ C 115/19, Article 6 (1) and (2), and Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389, Article 51(1). Article 51(1) explicitly lays down that its provisions bind the 
Member States only when they implement EU law and that the EU institutions must observe the principles enshrined therein 
 
6 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2008] OJ C 115/19, Article 2 
7  For an overview of the actions that the Commission has undertaken in this field see: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l33500_en.htm  
8 European Commission (2007, January). Press Release IP/07/52. Media pluralism: Commission stresses need for transparency, 
freedom and diversity in Europe's media landscape 
9 On the link between social cohesion and democracy see, for instance, Henning, C. and Karin Renblad (2009). Perspectives on 
Empowerment, Social Cohesion and Democracy  An International Anthology. Jönköping: School of Health Sciences, Jönköping 
University 
10 Lefever, K., Ellen Wauters and Peggy Valcke (2013, July). Media Pluralism in the EU  Comparative analysis of measurements 
systems in Europe and US, 7. Retrieved from: http://www.steunpuntmedia.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Steunpunt-
Media_ICRI_Monitoring_D1D2.pdf 
11 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version) [2012] OJ C 326/47  
12 For more information on the initiatives the EU has developed in this area see http://ec.europa.eu/culture/calls/index_en.htm The 
most widely known incentive measure adopted under Article 167(5) TFEU is the MEDIA program which ran from 1991 until 2013. 
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media laws and regulations. The rationale that lies behind assigning the EU subordinate tasks in this 
domain is that the Member States are better placed to develop the relevant legal tools in accordance 
with their traditions, community needs, and specificities of domestic markets.  
 
Finally, the EU has extensive powers insofar as the economic aspects of this sector are 
concerned. More particularly, it has an exclusive competence to establish the competition rules that 
apply to undertakings that operate within the EU, thereby including domestic and international media 
firms, and a shared competence to adopt legally binding acts for the completion of the single 
market. 13  Of course, regulating this industry in order to achieve the desired level of economic 
integration more often than not entails the adoption of measures that may somehow affect non-
economic values. The Treaty itself acknowledges that tensions may arise as a result of the fact that 
14  (the so-called 
culture/commodity conundrum), which is why Article 167(4) TFEU establishes the duty of the EU 
institutions to take media pluralism into account under other provisions of the Treaties.   
 
As is clear from the above, the extent to which the EU may intervene in order to safeguard 
media pluralism is a labyrinthine, multi-layered competence matter that involves several types of 
action that may be taken under different branches of EU law. On several occasions, this different set 
of competences has created considerable uncertainty over how far the EU can go to protect this value, 
for it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate economic considerations from the social, cultural, and 
political functions that the media is expected to perform.   
  
2. Background, State-of-the-art, and Research Question  
   
As already mentioned, media pluralism as an issue of concern to the EU is a topic that has been 
extensively discussed in the scholarly literature, which has explored the potential and weaknesses of 
the relevant EU legal toolkit from numerous perspectives. The purpose of this section is to 
summarize the major findings in this area, examine whether these findings remain the same in light 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For more information see: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/media/index_en.php On the strengths and weaknesses of measures adopted under 
this provision see, for instance, Hitchens, L. P. (1994). Media Ownership and Control: A European Approach. The Modern Law 
Review 57(4), 585-601; Craufurd-Smith (2004). Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: the internal 
market, fundamental rights and European citizenship, European Law Review, 29(5), 668, and Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 185-
187 
13 Ibid., Article 4(2)(a) 
14 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L 332/27, Recital (5) 
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of recent market and legal/regulatory developments, and identify the gap in the knowledge in the 
current body of literature that this thesis shall attempt to fill.  
 
2.1 EU human rights law and media pluralism  
 
In the field of human rights, Craufurd-Smith discussed the role of Article 7 TEU in ensuring 
that the Member States provide an adequate level of protection of pluralism within their 
jurisdiction.15 As noted above, this provision enables the EU institutions to act against a Member 
State that either clearly risks breaching16 or has already committed a serious and persistent breach17 
of media pluralism. In the former case (e.g. where a Member State has enacted a law posing threats to 
journalistic freedom18
Member State concerned.19 In the latter case (e.g. where a law posing threats to journalistic freedom 
has already been implemented20), the Council may (but is not bound to) suspend certain of the rights 
deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question.21 Craufurd-Smith 
maintains that, in theory, Article 7 is a powerful instrument in the hands of the EU on the grounds 
that it may produce a deterrent effect.22 She acknowledges, however, that reliance on Article 7 to 
develop an EU policy that effectively protects media pluralism is problematic for many reasons: 
action under this provision is reactive in nature, suspension of Treaty rights may put in jeopardy the 
- Member State that is 
punished, and, perhaps more importantly, Article 7 has had limited to no practical significance 
because the political sensitivities surrounding its implementation are difficult to overcome.23 She 
illustrates this latter point by describing a process initiated by petitions made to the European 
Parliament in 2003 under Article 194 of the then EC Treaty (currently Article 227 TFEU24) regarding 
the level of concentration in the Italian broadcasting market.25 The primary aim of the petitioners was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Craufurd-Smith, R. (2004), supra n. 12, 659-663 
16 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2008] OJ C 115/19, Article 7(1)  
17 Ibid., Article 7(2)  
18 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - 
Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM/2003/0606 final, 7 
19 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2008] OJ C 115/19, Article 7(1) 
20 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - 
Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM/2003/0606 final, 8 
21 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2008] OJ C 115/19, Article 7(3) 
22 Craufurd-Smith, R. (2004), supra n. 12, 661 
23 Ibid., 659-662 
24 Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office 
in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association with other citizens or persons, a petition to the 
 
25 Petition 356/2003 by Federico Orlando and three co-
implementation of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union regarding the protection of freedom of information in Italy and Petition 
1256/2003 by Ornella Erminio and Petition 35/2004 by Marco Canepari and 3286 others on the breach committed by Italy of the 
freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed by Article 6 
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for the Italian problem to be considered by the Council under Article 7.26 Indeed, the European 
Parliament, having regard to Article 7, adopted a Resolution on the risks of violations, in the EU and 
especially in Italy, of freedom of expression and information.27 After referring to, inter alia, the 
repeated instances of governmental interference with the editorial freedom of public broadcaster 
RAI, 28  and the conflict of interest arising from the fact that (the then) Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi owned the most powerful private media group in Italy, the Parliament instructed its 
President to forward the resolution to the Council.29 Nevertheless, the Council did not take action 
under Article 7(1) in order to determine whether there was a clear risk of media pluralism violations 
in Italy.  
 
The point that the role of Article 7 TEU was, is and will most likely remain purely symbolic, 
even in cases of outright violations on behalf of the Member States,30 has often been raised by human 
rights scholars.31 A recent case involving the Hungarian authorities lends further support to the 
argument that there 32 In 
2010, Hungary adopted a controversial media law 33  that drew criticism from international 
organizations34 and the governments of other Member States alike.35 Media pluralism was found to 
be compromised, inter alia, because the law facilitated political interference with the appointment 
process of the members of the national media regulator and because it did not define abstract terms, 
d be misused to force journalists to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Craufurd-Smith, R. (2004), supra n. 12, 660 referring to the text of the petition 
27 European Parliament Resolution of April 22, 2004 on the risks of violations, in the EU and especially in Italy, of freedom of 
expression and information, P5_ TA-PROV (2004) 0373 
28 Ibid., paragraphs 55 and fol.  
29 Ibid., paragraph 88 
30 Pinelli, C. (2012). Protecting the Fundamentals. Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union and beyond, 6. Foundation for 
European Progressive Studies Working Paper. Note that, in addition to the tools provided by Article 7 TEU, Pinelli also explores the 
strengths and limitations of two further mechanisms that could contribute to the protection of human ri
-260 TFEU. 
Retrieved from: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/9a4619cf-1a01-4f96-8e27-f33b65337a9b/protecting%20the%20fundamentals.pdf 
31 See, for instance, de Búrca, G. and Paul Craig (2011). EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edition), 390. Oxford: OUP, and 
Müller, J-W. (2013). Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order, 17. Transatlantic Academy 
Paper Series 2012-2013, No. 3. For a general overview of the limitations of Article 7 TEU see, for instance, de Witte, B. and Gabriel 
N. Toggenburg (2004). Human Rights and Membership of the European Union. In Peers, S. and Angela Ward (eds.). The EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 59-82 
32 Williams, A. (2006). The indifferent gesture: Article 7 TEU, the Fundamental Rights Agency and the UK's invasion of Iraq. 
European Law Review, 31(1), 26  
33 European Commission. MEMO/11/89. Media: Commission Vice-President Kroes welcomes amendments to Hungarian Media Law. 
Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-89_en.htm  
34 See, for instance, Council of Europe (2011, February). 
legislation in light of Council of Europe standards on freedom of the media. Retrieved from: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1751289, and OSCE (2010). Analysis and assessment of a package Hungarian legislation and 
draft legislation on media and telecommunications. Retrieved from: http://www.osce.org/fom/71218?download=true  
35 See, for instance, Chorus of Criticism: Germany Denounces New Hungarian Media Law. Spiegel, 22 December 2010. Retrieved 
from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/chorus-of-criticism-germany-denounces-new-hungarian-media-law-a-736206.html, 
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disclose their sources.36 In an attempt to convince Hungary to introduce substantial amendments to 
the law in question, the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) embarked on a dialogue 
with the government,37 whereas the European Parliament adopted a Resolution calling upon the State 
authorities to restore independence of media governance and halt state interference with freedom of 
-regulation of the media is counterproductive, jeopardizing effective 
pluralism in the public sphere .38 In spite of the fact that the above extra-legal initiatives39 were not 
particularly fruitful, neither the Commission nor the European Parliament initiated proceedings under 
Article 7 TEU.40  
 
 Yet, despite the fact that Article 7 has not been used to stigmatize or penalize a Member State 
that posed a threat to or has indeed harmed media pluralism, it has served as a basis on which the EU 
has attempted to build a system of regular monitoring of respect for human rights.41 Perhaps the first 
notable example of this line of effort 42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 OSCE (2010, December). Hungarian media law further endangers media freedom, says OSCE media freedom representative. 
Retrieved from: http://www.osce.org/fom/74687  
37 European Commission (2011, January). Speech 11/6. Hungary's new media law. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-11-6_en.htm   
38 European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary P7_TA (2011) 0094, paragraph 7. Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN Note that, as 
opposed to the Resolution on the risks of violation, in the EU and especially in Italy, of freedom of expression and information (see 
supra n. 27, paragraph 83) to which I referred above, the Resolution on the media law in Hungary does not make any reference to the 
right of the European Parliament to initiate the Article 7 TEU procedure. It is further worth noting that the motion for a resolution 
uropean 
Parliament to initiate the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU in view of determining whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach by 
incorporated into the final text of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament. See Motion for a Resolution on Media Law in 
Hungary, tabled by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Rebecca Harms, Judith Sargentini, Helga Trüpel on behalf of the Greens/ European Free 
Alliance Group, B7-0103/2011 of 9.2.2011, paragraph 9. Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2011-103&language=EN  
39 Note that Article 7 TEU does not require the EU institutions that are competent to initiate proceedings under either Article 7(1) or 
7(2) to invite the Member State to submit observations. This step is taken only after the Council has decided to engage in determining 
whether a clear risk exists or a breach has been committed 
40 Note that in this case the EU institutions were entitled to initiate proceedings under Article 7(2) because the government appears to 
have used the law to engage in practices that aimed at suppressing information. For instance, the media regulator, which is in charge of 
regulating media content and granting broadcast licenses, cancelled the license of the leading independent radio station Klub Radio 
that has been critical of the ruling party. More particularly, Klub Radio was refused the renewal of its license because the tender issued 
by the media regulator for its frequency called for a station that would broadcast 60% music, explicitly laying down that bids for this 
rofile, 
which did not manage to get an approval decision. Furthermore, the findings of the Human Rights Watch research mission to Hungary, 
which was instructed to investigate the effects of the implementation of the media act, reveal that its entry into force was followed by 
political dismissals of journalists working for the public broadcaster as well as by an increase in political c
editorial policies. For more information see Human Rights Watch (2012, February). Memorandum to the European Union on Media 
Freedom in Hungary. Retrieved from: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/16/memorandum-european-union-media-freedom-hungary  
41 an 
Parliament are of the view that the provision opens the door to the establishment of such a mechanism. See, for instance, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - 
Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, 9-10, and Motion for European 
Parliament Resolution on the situation as regards fundamental rights in the European Union (2002) (2002/2013(INI)), points 3 and 4. 
On this issue see, for instance, von Bogdandy, A. (2000). The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and 
the Core of European Union. Common Market Law Review, 37(6), 1318, and de Búrca, G. (2004). Beyond the Charter: How 
Enlargement has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union. Fordham International Law Journal, 27(2), 713.  
42 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union - Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM/2003/0606 final, 9 
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Independent Experts with the task to prepare annual reports on the situation of fundamental rights in 
the EU. This Network was created in 2002 and produced a total of four reports.43 It was subsequently 
incorporated into the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (hereinafter the FRA)44 that was established in 
200745  in order to provide the EU and the Member States (when implementing EU law) with 
assistance and expertise on fundamental rights. Regrettably, mission is far more limited 
than originally envisaged. More particularly, while the Commission had initially suggested the 
creation of an agency that would systematically oversee the situation on the full spectrum of 
fundamental rights in the Member States of the EU,46 
would cover certain thematic areas 47  that would be defined in advance by a Multi-Annual 
Framework.48  studies, publishing 
reports, and networking with civil society.49 50 attributed to the Member 
51 was 
52 Furthermore, the FRA does not have the power to 
decide on the topics that it studies, for it is the Council that adopts the Multi-Annual Framework.53 
This arguably 54 
of human rights fully within the diplomatic realm allowing national government sensitivities to be 
55  
 
For our purposes, it bears noting that media pluralism has not been included in the Multi-
Annual Frameworks that have been adopted thus far (covering the periods 2007-2012 and 2013-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The Reports of the Network are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/document/index_en.htm along with the 
annual reports on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  
44 Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l33500_en.htm  
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights OJ 
[2007] OJ L 53/01 
46 European Policy Evaluation Consortium (EPEC) (2005). Preparatory Study for Impact Assessment and Ex-ante Evaluation of 
Fundamental Rights Agency Final Report, 42-43 
47 See Commission proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, COM (2005) 
280 final, 6. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0280en01.pdf, 6  
48 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights OJ 
[2007] OJ L 53/01, Recital (11)  
49 Ibid., Article 4(1) 
50 Amnesty International (2007, March). Press Release. EU Fundamental Rights: A long way to go. Retrieved from: 
http://www.amnesty.eu/en/news/press-releases/eu/human-rights-defenders/eu-fundamental-rights-a-long-way-to-go-
0296/#.VWzNzs2kOPU  
51 Pinelli, C. (2012), supra n. 30, 13 
52 Ibid.; Amnesty International (2007, March) supra n. 50, and Alegre, S. (2008). Human Rights and the Future of the European 
Union. A Justice Futures Paper, 12. Retrieved from: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/apr/eu-justice-human%20rights-and-future-
of-the-EU.pdf 
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights OJ 
[2007] OJ L 53/01, Recital (11) 
54 Milanova, N. (2011). EU Agency for fundamental rights (FRA): a reality check, 34-35. Report prepared for Human Rights Without 
Frontiers International. Retrieved from: http://www.hrwf.net/index.php/publications/107-policy-and-advocacy-papers 
55 Williams, A. (2010). The Ethos of Europe. Values, Law and Justice in the EU, 142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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2017).56 However, the EU has not deleted media pluralism from its human rights agenda. To the 
contrary, over the past eight years it has undertaken initiatives that were based on its commitment to 
the right to information and freedom of expression 
57 For example, the Commission has 
published a number of texts that range from Working Papers on the status of media pluralism in the 
Member States58 to Guidelines for EU support to media pluralism in enlargement countries.59 The 
Commission has further financed studies in order to make available to the Member States 
instruments that would allow them to identify lacunae in relevant laws and modify them 
accordingly. For instance, the Commission commissioned an independent study which delivered the 
Media Pluralism Monitor, a diagnostic tool for understanding risks to media pluralism.60 This tool is 
based on indicators that cover a range of legal, economic and socio-cultural dimensions in domains 
that are relevant to media pluralism, such as media ownership and control, safeguards for journalistic 
freedom, etc.61 Once this data is collected and processed by the software that was designed for its 
implementation, the Monitor may indicate a high risk, a moderate risk, or a low risk for media 
pluralism in the Member State concerned.62 The Commission also assigned a group of experts, 
known as the High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Media Pluralism, to analyze issues and 
provide a set of recommendations for the protection and support of media pluralism and freedom in 
Europe.63 The High-Level Group delivered a report that tackled several issues of concern to the 
competent policymakers, such as political and private interference with editorial independence, 
concentration of ownership, and the levels of funding received by public service broadcasters, and 
put forward a number of proposals to address the problems to which these issues give rise.64  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights OJ 
[2007] OJ L 53/01, Article 2. The remit includes information society but refers in particular to respect for private life and protection of 
personal data 
57 European Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32 
58 Ibid.. For additional documents the Commission has drafted in this area as well as Resolutions adopted by the European Parliament 
see footnotes 3 and 2 respectively of the Staff Working Document. See also European Commission (2005). Issues paper for the 
Liverpool Audiovisual Conference: Media pluralism   Brussels: DG Information Society 
and Media 
59 European Commission, DG Enlargement (2014). Guidelines for EU support to media freedom and media integrity in enlargement 
countries, 2014-2020. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/elarg-guidelines-for-media-freedom-and-
integrity_210214.pdf  
60 European Commission (2009). Independent study on indicators for media pluralism in the Member States: Towards a risk-based 
approach, ix. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/study/final_report_09.pdf  
61 Ibid., ix 
62 Ibid., 109 
63 High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (2013). A free and pluralistic media to sustain European democracy. Retrieved 
from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/HLG%20Final%20Report.pdf  
64 For more information on these and other initiatives undertaken by the Commission in this area see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/HLG%20Final%20Report.pdf 
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The above initiatives (including any studies dealing with media pluralism that may be carried 
out by the FRA in the future) undoubtedly advance the debate on the challenges facing media 
pluralism. Furthermore, they involve independent reviewers, allow endemic violations of media 
pluralism to be identified, and, broadly speaking, they ensure that relevant suggestions are suited to 
the needs and traditions of the Member State concerned.65 Yet, we cannot help but wonder whether 
studies commissioned by the EU institutions will produce any meaningful effects on the design of 
national media policies. The remark made by Craufurd-Smith regarding the potential impact of the 
reports prepared by the Network of Independent Experts appears to be relevant in the post-Lisbon 
era: Member States have occasionally been willing to disregard Court rulings66 and we should not 
expect that they will be eager to follow expert committee recommendations on how to safeguard 
media pluralism in their jurisdiction, no matter how well-formulated these recommendations are. An 
example illustrating this point is that no Member State has taken the initiative to implement the 
Media Pluralism Monitor to date.67 
 
2.2 Single Market and Media Pluralism  
 
Several studies discuss the impact of the completion of the single media market on media 
pluralism. This issue has been examined from two different perspectives, namely the desirability and 
legitimacy of adopting an instrument harmonizing national policies on media ownership that is based 
on one of the Treaty provisions related to the proper functioning of the internal market, and the 
effectiveness of existing instruments that primarily seek to facilitate the free movement of media 
services but also contain provisions that have as their objective the protection of media pluralism.  
 
2.2.1. An instrument specifically aimed at addressing ownership concentration  
 
The contribution that a pan-European legislative instrument addressing ownership 
concentration can make to the preservation of media pluralism is a long-standing debate that dates 
back to the early 1990s when the European Parliament called upon the Commission to propose a 
measure so as to introduce restrictions to media consolidation.68 Ownership of or control over media 
organizations has been subject to regulatory intervention both across and beyond the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Craufurd-Smith, R. (2004), supra n. 12, 661. The same conclusion may be drawn in respect of any recommendations made by the 
Council under Article 7(1) TEU, if the latter provision is ever implemented 
66 Ibid. 660-661 
67 The EU assigned a research center, the Center for Media Pluralism and Freedom, to conduct the implementation, which, at the time 
of writing is an ongoing project 
68 European Commission. Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: An Assessment of the Need for Community 
Action. COM (92) 480 final, 7 
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Union69 because it is generally believed that, due to the ability of the media to shape the political 
agenda and influence citizen behavior, accumulation of significant market power in the hands of a 
-
70  The means through which national laws aim at alleviating concerns over media 
concentration vary from one country to another. 71  For example, certain Member States impose 
limitations on the number of licenses that may be acquired by the same person or organization, 
whereas others impose thresholds on the audience shares that may be held by an individual or firm.72 
These measures, however, have one thing in common: broadly speaking, they regulate economic 
aspects relating to the degree of market power any given media undertaking may exercise, but their 
primary objective is to ensure that the role of the media in maintaining a well-informed citizenry is 
not undermined.73 As already seen, the Treaty does not provide the EU with a strong legal basis to 
enact an instrument that is solely or mainly concerned with achieving this latter objective. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that because the EU has the power to regulate the media as 
74 and because the European project has evolved in a way that encompasses, but is not 
limited to, economic integration, there would be scope for a supranational instrument if national 
measures and/or action on behalf of the Member States were inadequate or insufficient to address the 
cross-border concerns that arise from media concentration.75 Ariño puts forward two reasons why 
this may be the case. First, regulatory initiatives that sought to expedite the economic integration 
agenda allowed powerful media undertakings to expand into the markets of other Member States.76 
whereby only one Member State has jurisdiction over an audiovisual media service provider.77 On 
the basis of this principle, the provider may operate across the EU provided that it complies with the 
rules of the Member State from which it emanates with the receiving State not being entitled to 
exercise secondary control.78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Valcke, P. (2011), Looking For the User in Media Pluralism Regulation: Unraveling the Traditional Diversity Chain and Recent 
Trends of User Empowerment in European Media Regulation. Journal of Information Policy 1, 291. Retrieved from: 
http://jip.vmhost.psu.edu/ojs/index.php/jip/article/view/31 
70 European Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 5 
71  For an overview of the different systems see Valcke, P. (2009). From Ownership Regulation to Legal Indicators of Media 
Pluralism: Background, Typologies, and Methods. Journal of Media Business Studies 6(3), 19-42 
72 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 69, 291 
73  Note that certain Member States also impose qualitative requirements (e.g. requirements relating to management board 
representation). For a brief overview see ibid., 291-294 
74  
75 Ariño, M. (2005). Regulation and Competition in European Digital Broadcasting - A study of pluralism through access, 425-6. PhD 
thesis. Florence: European University Institute  
76 Ibid., 426 
77 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L 332/27, Recital (33-34) 
78 Ibid., Recital, (36). There are some exceptions to this rule which are laid down in Article 3 of the Directive 
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in activities that transcend national frontiers, such as direct broadcasts and the sale of program 
rights.79 The abolition of obstacles to intra-Union trade has also facilitated an intense process of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.80 The reasons for this latter development are manifold: the 
option to merge with or acquire a company operating beyond national frontiers may be appealing to 
media firms that seek to attract critical mass to their content, share investment risks, or because the 
national competition authority under the jurisdiction of which they fall did not let them fulfill further 
consolidation plans.81 As a result of the above, Ariño says, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the 
Member States to apply their anti-concentration laws to media organizations with transnational 
ownership structures, especially in cases where they deal with multinational corporations whose 
national affiliations are not strong enough to trigger the application of these laws.82 There have been 
cases that lend support to this argument. For example, the Greek competition authority cleared the 
acquisition by the Luxembourg-based media conglomerate RTL of one of the most popular generalist 
TV channels in Greece, Alpha TV, on the grounds that RTL had no other interests in the Greek 
media market and that Alpha TV did not control more than 35% of the affected market, which is the 
threshold set by Law 3592/2007 on media concentration.83  
 
Second, Ariño maintains that the Member States may refrain from establishing strict ownership 
rules or even engage in a race-to-the bottom regulatory competition in order to either attract 
profitable firms to their jurisdiction or provide them with the incentive not to move their operations 
to another State with less stringent regulation.84 Indeed, over the past number of years, there has been 
85 several Member States have 
either entirely abolished or significantly relaxed related restrictions.86 Illustrative in this regard is the 
statement made by the UK authorities during the consultation on media ownership rules that 
preceded the adoption of the Communications Act 2003:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See, for instance, European Commission Staff Working Document on Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, 
SEC (2007) 32, 9, and European Commission Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the 
Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraph 22 
80 European Commission Staff Working Document on Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, SEC (2007) 32, 
9 
81 Council of Europe Advisory Panel to the CDMM on media concentrations, pluralism and diversity questions (2004). Report on 
Transnational media concentrations in Europe, 10 
82 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 427 
83 Hellenic Competition Commission (2008). Decision 422/V/2008, RTL Central & Eastern Europe/Wakerock Limited, 13 and 19 
84 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 427 
85 Commissariat voor de media (2011). Media Monitor  The Dutch Media in 2010, 6. Retrieved from: http://77.87.161.246/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Mediamonitor-The-Dutch-media-in-20101.pdf  
86 See, for instance, Open Society Foundations (2012). Mapping Digital Media in the European Union - A Report for the High-Level 
Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, 2. Retrieved from: 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Mapping_Digital_Media_EU_20121217_0.pdf; Ofcom (2009). Report on 
Media Ownership Rules, pp. 21 et seq., and Freedom House (2013). Report on Spain. Retrieved from: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/spain#.VMJr_M016eY  
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deregulatory approach to media markets. From a commercial point of view, further 
liberalization would benefit existing and potential new investors, providing for further 
consolidation, greater efficiency, more scope for investment, and a more significant 
87  
Another example 
that arise from excessive concentration is that Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation,88 which lays 
down that if the European Commission decides to clear a media concentration that does not raise 
concerns as to its compatibility with the common market, the Member States concerned may take 
appropriate measures to ensure that the transaction in question does not damage media pluralism in 
the domestic sphere, has had no practical significance.89   
 
Even if there is convincing evidence supporting the argument that, for a number of reasons, the 
Member States are not in the position or willing to deal with media concentration, the question 
remains as to what would be the appropriate legal basis for a supranational instrument that establishes 
restrictions on media ownership. Many claim that the instrument concerned may rest on Article 114 
TFEU.90 This provision stipulates that:    
The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market . 
The Court has held that the EU may make use of Article 114 TFEU in situations where, in the 
absence of action at EU level, the laws and/or practices of the Member States raise obstacles to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See UK Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (2001). Consultation on Media Ownership Rules, paragraph 1.8. 
88 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation) OJ L 24/1 
89 For a detailed analysis of the role that Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation has played thus far see, for instance, Whish, R. and 
David Bailey (2012). Competition Law (7th edition), 852-4. Oxford: OUP, and Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 411. For our purposes 
here, suffice it to say that reference to media pluralism as a ground for application of Article 21(4) is made in two decisions, News 
Corp/BSkyB and Commission decision Newspaper Publishing Case No IV/M.423 [1994] OJ C 85/5. It is worth mentioning that in both 
cases the UK authorities ultimately gave the green light to the transactions. In Newscorp/BSkyB, the Secretary of Business, Innovation 
and Skills, who may intervene in mergers involving newspapers and/or broadcasting companies on public interest grounds, issued a 
e 
competent UK authorities, namely OFT and Ofcom. After several undertakings proposed by the parties to the deal, the Secretary of 
State was willing to give the green light to the proposed transaction. However, due to a phone hacking scandal in which Newscorp was 
found to be involved the same period of time that the deal was being negotiated, Newscorp ended up dropping its plans to take full 
ownership of BSkyB. For an overview of this case see, for instance, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/resources/dossier-media-
plurality/ Newspaper Publishing was not even referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199394/cmhansrd/1994-03-18/Writtens-5.html The legal framework which was 
applicable at the time was Article 58(3) of the Fair Trading Act, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/41 MGN, 
Prisa and Espresso were not successful in the bid. See: http://ketupa.net/espresso2.htm   
90 Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 663; Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 254-257. Craufurd-Smith and Barzanti have also explored 
the potential of a handful of Treaty provisions outside the realm of the internal market that could be used by the EU to regulate media 
pluralism, namely Articles 352 and 25 TFEU and Article 11 TEU. They both acknowledge, however, that any action under these 
provisions faces significant competence limitations and is unlikely to be backed by the Member States. See Craufurd-Smith (2004), 
supra n. 12, 664-666, and Barzanti F. (2012). Governing the European Audiovisual Space: What modes of governance can facilitate a 
European approach to media pluralism? EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2012/49, 19-20 
  
	   	   28	  
completion of the internal market.91 In the case at hand, it has been contended that the disparities in 
the various anti-concentration measures that apply throughout the EU may, inter alia, lead to a drain 
of investment from countries with stringent ownership rules to countries where relaxed or no rules 
apply, ultimately fragmenting the internal market.92 However, Komorek identifies certain limitations 
that the use of Article 114 would entail that cannot easily be overlooked. More particularly, she notes 
that, when assessing whether an instrument rests on the correct legal basis, the Court takes account of 
the primary objective that the instrument pursues, the principles that underlie it and its ideological 
premises.93 And she refers to the case where the Court was called upon to determine whether the 
correct legal basis for the Framework Directive on Waste was Article 192, which provides that the 
EU may adopt Directives that contribute to the preservation of the quality of the environment, or 
rather Article 114.94 In this case, the Court held that, from the preambles of the Directive, it could be 
inferred that the instrument sought to achieve a high level of environmental protection and that, by 
virtue of the obligation it established, namely the duty to take action in order to encourage the 
reduction of waste production, it had as its object the management of waste. 95  The Court 
96 as 
well as that some of the provisions of the Directive, in particular the introduction of a common 
definition of waste, could affect the functioning of the internal market,97 
Article [114] is not justified where the measure to be adopted has only the incidental effect of 
harmonizing market conditions 98 Komorek claims that the Court 
is highly likely to follow a similar approach if it is called upon to examine whether an instrument 
harmonizing media ownership rules should rest on Article 114.99 Indeed, as we have already seen, the 
anti-concentration laws of the Member States may regulate economic dimensions of the media, but 
the objective they seek to attain is a well-informed citizenry. It bears repeating that, contrary to 
environmental protection or any other area where the EU shares competence with the Member States, 
in the field of media the EU may solely take action to support national initiatives. In accordance with 
Article 167(5) TFEU, this action may not take the form of an instrument harmonizing national media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 ECJ, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, [2001] ECR I-07079 
92 Note that this is one of the justifications the Commission put forward in its Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in 
the Internal Market - An Assessment of the Need for Community Action. COM (92) 480 final, 87 et seq. 
93 Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 256 referring to Chalmers, D. Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (2006). European Union Law: Text 
and Materials, 212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This is an approach that the Court has followed consistently throughout 
its case law. See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-295/90, Parliament v. Council [1992] ECR I-4193, paragraph 13 and ECJ, Case C-300/89, 
Commission v. Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 10 
94 ECJ, Case 155/91, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, [1993] ECR I-00939 
95 Ibid., 8-10 
96 Ibid., 12 
97 Ibid., 18 
98 Ibid., 19 
99 Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 256-257 
  
	   	   29	  
laws and regulations. That is to say, as opposed to the Framework Directive on Waste referred to 
above, the EU institutions are not entitled to base an instrument on media ownership on Article 167 
TFEU alone. Along the same line, Harcourt points to the weak terms in which Article 167 TFEU is 
drafted, remarking 
an explicit Treaty statement from EU Member St .100 
 
 Leaving the issue of legal basis aside, we must also consider the feasibility of any proposals 
to enact pan-European rules on media concentration. In the late 1990s, the Member States rejected 
Directive101 that would set common rules 
on media ownership across the EU and there are no signs indicating that the tide may be turning. To 
the contrary, during the consultation the Commission conducted in 2013, with the aim to collect 
opinions on whether the EU should be considered competent to act in order to safeguard media 




2.2.2. Existing internal market instruments that include provisions specifically 
aimed at safeguarding media pluralism  
 
As already mentioned, certain studies focus on the effectiveness of existing Directives that 
primarily facilitate the free movement of media services but also contain provisions that seek to 
ensure that the single media market is not realized at the expense of media pluralism. While these 
provisions are a clear attempt to comply with Article 167(4) TFEU, there have been strong doubts 
raised over whether they make a meaningful contribution to that end. A good example illustrating 
that the duties the aforementioned instruments impose may not be appropriate or sufficient to 
where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works a majority 
proportion of their transmission time excluding the time allotted to news, sports events, games, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Harcourt, A. (2005). The European Union and the Regulation of Media Markets, 72. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
101  On this issue see, for instance, Doyle, G. (1997) 
. Journal of Information Law and Technology (3). Available online at: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_3; Michalis, M. (1999).  European Union Broadcasting and Telecoms Towards a 
Convergent Regulatory Regime? European Journal of Communication, 14 (2), 147-171, and Iosifides, Petros (1997). Pluralism and 
media concentration policy in the European Union. Javnost-The Public, 4(1), 85-104 
102 European Commission (2013). Public consultation on the Independent Report from the HLG on Media Freedom and Pluralism-Text 
of the consultation, 9. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-independent-report-hlg-media-
freedom-and-pluralism- -read-contributions  
103 Ibid., 2  
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advertising, teletext services and teleshopping
where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve 
least 10% of their programming budget, for European works created by producers who are 
main mechanism 
at EU level that is aimed at protecting pluralism104 on the grounds that it ensures that citizens will 
have access to content provided by firms that are not owned or controlled by the broadcasters bound 
by the rule, and that broadcasters established in the EU are not limited to the transmission of generic 
format programming produced by non-European, most notably, US, media conglomerates.105 The 
Member States have undoubtedly made significant progress since the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive, which first introduced this rule, entered into force. For example, while in 1994 several 
broadcasters of eight out of (the then) thirteen Member States did not broadcast the requisite 
proportion of European works,106 the most recent report on the implementation of the Directive notes 
that the quotas are widely respected and that the average broadcasting time for European works in 
2010 amounted to 64.3%.107 However, this latter figure and any other related figure occasionally 
arguably correctly, been treated with skepticism. Burri-Nenova, for instance, maintains that a high 
share of European productions is not a valid indication of a pluralistic offer for the reason that, for a 
originate in a Member State108 and that no further conditions, including and especially originality or 
quality requirements, need to be fulfilled.109 This definition, Burri-Nenova says, is not adequate to 
address the challenges facing diversity in the current broadcasting landscape, such as the growing 
homogenization of content and the steady decline in quality TV.110 As she so vividly puts it, a Big 
Brother  
work .111 It bears noting that the Directive provides that the Member States are allowed to adopt a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Burri-Nenova, M. (2007). The New Audiovisual Media Services Directive: Television Without Frontiers, Television Without 
Cultural Diversity. Common Market Law Review, 44(6), 1706 
105 Ibid., fn. 120 
106 European Commission. Report on application of Directive 89/552/EEC and proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (presented by the Commission). 
COM (95) 86 final, 14 
107 European Commission. First report on the application of Articles 13, 16 and 17 of Directive 2010/13/EU for the period 2009-2010. 
Promotion of European works in EU scheduled and on-demand audiovisual media services. COM (2012) 522 final, 9 
108 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L 332/27, Article 1(1)(n) 
109 Burri-Nenova, M. (2007), supra n. 104, 1707 
110 Ibid. 
111  
prevent the quotas being met by programs that are of poor quality and which do not therefore meet informational, educational and 
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transposed into national law the definition laid down in the Directive without establishing more 
stringent criteria.112 Another criticism concerns the exclusion of news programming from the quota 
mechanism. Harrison and Woods note that the decision of the EU legislator to exclude from the quota 
calculation content with journalistic elements is an attempt to address industrial policy concerns, that 
is to say, an attempt to ensure that an x amount of broadcast time is devoted to entertainment content 
113 rather than an effort to provide European citizens with more 
diverse programming, including and especially factual programming.114  
 
Another example is the Universal Services Directive, which forms part of the EU Telecoms 
Package115 and which provides that, under certain circumstances, the Member States may impose 
s providing electronic communications networks used for the 
distribution of radio and television broadcasts to the public.116 
carry certain channels that serve general interest objectives, which must be clearly defined by the 
Member State.117 These channels are often (but not necessarily) channels offered by public service 
broadcasting organizations which are financed through State resources and entrusted by the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Broadcasting Law and Policy, 247. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
112 Graham, D. and Associates (2009). Study on the application of measures concerning the promotion of the distribution and 
production of European works in audiovisual media services (i.e. including television programs and non-linear services), 77. 
Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/information_society/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/art4_5/final_report.pdf 
113 This is also a point raised by Burri-Nenova. See supra n. 104, 1707 
114 Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 110, 248. For a critical overview of other aspects of the quota rules see ibid., 249-
265; de Witte, B. (1995). The European Content Requirement  Five Years After. In Barendt, E. (ed.). Yearbook of Media and 
Entertainment Law, 101-127. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2001). Television Quotas: Protecting 
European Culture? Entertainment Law Review, 12(1), 5-14; Lupinacci, T.M. (1991). The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting 
Activities in the European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism? Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
24, 113-154; Katsirea, I. (2003). Why The European Broadcasting Quota Should Be Abolished. European Law Review, 28 (2). 190-
209, and Drijber, B. J. (1999). The Revised Television Without Frontiers Directive: Is It Fit For The Next Century? Common Market 
Law Review, 36(1) 87-122. For a more general discussion of the quota rules see Herold, A. (2009). The New Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive. In Pauwels, C., Harri Kalimo, Karen Donders and Ben Van Rompuy (eds.), Rethinking European Media and 
Communications Policy, 107-115. Brussels: VUB Press. Two other provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive that are 
related to the exercise of the right to information and hence, albeit indi
st to the 
public). For a critical overview of these provisions see Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 253-259; Lefever, K. (2012). New Media and 
Sport: International Legal Aspects, 225-291. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, and Helberger, N. (2006). 
and digital broadcasting  About monsters, invisible men, and the future of European broadcasting regulation. Entertainment Law 
Review, 17(2), 70-80 
115 For a comprehensive overview of the rules established by the Telecoms Package see Helberger, N. (2005). Regulating Conditional 
Access in Digital Broadcasting. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, and Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 
110, 115-145. For a brief overview of rules adopted by Member States to regulate Electronic Program Guides see, for instance, van der 
Sloot, B. (2012). Walking a Thin Line: The Regulation of EPGs. JIPITEC, 3, 138-147 
116 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/51, Recital (43), (2002 
USD), and Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 
nic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (Text with 
EEA relevance), Recital (48) (2009 USD) 
117 2009 USD, supra n. 116, Article 31(1) 
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authorities with safeguarding media pluralism by making available to the citizens a balanced and 
varied programming. The Directive explicitly states that Member States may determine appropriate 
remuneration for offering these channels, 118  but in practice these are usually provided free-of-
charge. 119   
integrated network provider has the ability and incentive to grant preferential treatment to its own 
channels, marginalizing competing content, including content that is created with the aim to advance 
important societal goals), their design and implementation have been far from perfect. A common 
only. The Directive 
explicitly lays down that undertakings providing content such as the offer for sale of a package of 
chain that succeeds network provision (commonly referred to as service providers), are not subject to 
 obligations.120 
usage of the facilities controlled by the service providers (on which accessibility for end-users to the 
content offered by the channel in question ultimately depends) on market terms. This, Varney and 
making effective use of [the must carry  rule 121 Indeed, if the objective of 
the duty is to establish a favorable regime for channels that bring an added value to the 
citizen, the exclusion of the service provider from the scope of the regime would appear to be a major 
obstacle to achieving this objective. This is particularly so, in cases where, even if the Member State 
carries the channels which are offered by the domestic service provider because the operator is 
established outside its jurisdiction. 122  Another criticism concerns the narrow approach the 
Commission has followed in relation to how the Member States 
objectives pursued by the channels 
initiatives on behalf of the Member States that sought to stimulate media pluralism by granting the 
privilege to new (commercially funded) channels.123 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 2002 USD, supra n. 116, Article 31(2) 
119 van Eijk, N. and Bart van der Sloot (2012). Must-carry Regulation: a Must or a Burden?, foreword. In European Audiovisual 
Observatory (ed.). Must-carry: Renaissance or Reformation? Iris plus 2012-5 
120 2002 USD, supra n. 116, Recital 45 
121 Feintuck, M. and Mike Varney (2010). Regulating Media Markets: The Need for Subsidiarity and Clarity of Principle, 169. In 
Birkinshaw, P. and Mike Varney (eds.). The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 
122 On the issue of jurisdiction see Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 168  
123 On this issue and for a general criticism of the must-carry rules see, for instance, Valcke, P. (2006). The Future of Must-Carry to a 
Concept of Universal Service in the Info-Communications Sector. Media Law and Policy, 15(2), 247-267  
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notable, examples of the type of legislative action the EU has taken to ensure that the single media 
market is not realized in ways that undermine media pluralism. Scholarly literature has put forward a 
number of reasons why the mechanisms the aforementioned rules establish have probably fallen foul 
of achieving that objective. Taking stock of the lessons learned, any legislative revisions would need 
to address the loopholes that have been left open. However, the following two points must be borne 
in mind: first, any future provisions attempting to protect media pluralism will always need to respect 
the division of competences between the EU and the Member States in this area. Second, and related 
to the above, the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Member States have decided not to 
legislator may not be very keen to develop initiatives so as to ensure that relevant mechanisms will 
reach their full potential.   
 
2.3. EU competition law and media pluralism 
 
The question of whether, and if so to what extent, EU competition law can protect media 
pluralism has been a somewhat more complex topic in that, even those who argue in favor of an 
expansive approach to EU competence in the field of media, adopt different and, in some cases, 
opposing perspectives. Broadly speaking, the studies that discuss the strengths and weaknesses of EU 
competition law can be divided into three categories.  
 
First, certain authors contend that EU competition law in general and merger control in 
particular can play a major role in preventing the accumulation of significant power in the hands of a 
few media owners, on the grounds that the compatibility of a concentration with the common market 
is assessed ex ante and that an increasingly large number of concentrations affecting the European 
124 However, according to 
these authors, to ensure that it leads to an outcome that is pluralism-friendly, the EU merger control 
Commission is called upon to scrutinize concentrations which are not problematic from a competition 
perspective (e.g. where the merging firms are active in separate geographic markets), but which raise 
concerns over media pluralism (e.g. where the acquiring firm engages in practices that undermine 
journalistic freedom). 125  Proponents of this approach suggest that an obligation to conduct an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 669; Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 405-412, and Komorek E. (2013), supra n. 3, 281-283 
125 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 384-385; Komorek E. (2013), supra n. 3, 136-137, and Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 669 
  
	   	   34	  
assessment of the effects of the concentration on media pluralism be incorporated into the Merger 
Regulation.126 And they recommend the establishment of a specialist body within the Commission, or 
even the creation of a European media concentration authority that would advise the Competition 
Directorate-General on the pluralism-specific issues to which the concentration in question would 
give rise.127 If this proposal materialized, EU merger control could indeed tackle problems that it 
cannot presently address. For example, currently, the Commission may check whether a merger will 
grant the involved firms the ability and incentive to foreclose competitors, thereby depriving 
consumers of a variety of choices.128 Yet, a merger assessment that further seeks to determine the 
impact on media pluralism would also entail an analysis of whether the merged entity would acquire 
significant opinion-forming power, thereby being capable of marginalizing different viewpoints.129 
However, as advocates of this approach acknowledge, the above proposal raises at least three issues, 
which might render it an unrealistic and possibly unattractive alternative to the status quo. First, 
given the (politically and culturally) sensitive nature of a pluralism review, it is questionable whether 
the Commission, that is, a supranational competition authority, is the most appropriate institution to 
decide relevant matters.130 Second, the proposal to establish a European body tasked with the duty to 
inform the Commission of the pluralism concerns that arise from media concentrations has in the past 
been turned down by the Commission.131 Third, and perhaps more importantly, the Member States 
would most likely be unwilling to support this idea in that integrating a pluralism assessment into the 
EU merger proceedings would probably be perceived as an illegitimate attempt to do indirectly what 
could not be agreed directly through the appropriate  regulatory procedures .132 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 European Institute for the Media (2004). The Information of the citizen in the EU: obligations for the media and the Institutions 
, 251. Retrieved from: http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-
ma/ep/04/pe358896-en.pdf; Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 669; Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 405-410, and Komorek E. 
(2013), supra n. 3, 281-283 
127 Ibid. 
128 See Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 8 and Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, paragraph 10 
129 See, for instance, Ofcom (2010). Report on Public Interest test on the Proposed Acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc 
by News Corporation, paragraph 1.18. Retrieved from: http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/OfcomPITReport_NewsCorp-
BSkyB_31DEC2010.pdf 
130 Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 670; Komorek E. (2013), supra n. 3, 281, and Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 405. Helberger 
takes the same position though she studies the application of EU competition law to media markets from a different perspective. See 
Helberger, N. (2005), supra n. 114, 190 
131 Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 670 referring to Palzer, C. and Caroline Hilger (2001). Media Supervision on the Threshold of 
the 21st Century - Structure and Powers of Regulatory Authorities in the Era of Convergence. European Audiovisual Observatory 8 
IRIS plus. Retrieved from: http://www.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/264571/IRIS+plus+2001en4LA.pdf/264dd63f-96f1-46f5-ab8e-
59ebb28aa514  
132 Craufurd-Smith (2004), supra n. 12, 670; Scheuer, A. and Peter Strothmann (2002). Media Supervision on the Threshold of the 21st 
Century What are the Requirements of Broadcasting, Telecommunications and Concentration Regulation?, 7. Retrieved from: 
http://www.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/264573/IRIS+plus+2002en1LA.pdf/32fb1b2a-fb83-44e8-a0d3-384f3999b599  
  
	   	   35	  
The second avenue that is explored 133  is based on the same premise, namely that EU 
competition law can make an important contribution to the protection of media pluralism, but follows 
a more modest approach, which does not involve legislative amendments. Proponents of this latter 
approach argue that the competition provisions of the Treaty cannot be applied in a vacuum, that is to 
say, detached from the non-economic values that the EU is bound to respect.134 As Article 167(4) 
TFEU dictates, so the argument goes, concerns over media pluralism that may arise in the context of 
competition proceedings must be duly considered and balanced against considerations of a purely 
economic nature. These studies primarily seek to determine whether the Commission may either 
permit restrictions of competition or sacrifice efficiency in order to ensure that media pluralism or 
any other non-economic value that is at stake is taken into account. For example, Van Rompuy 
maintains that, in deciding whether to grant an exemption to an anti-competitive agreement under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission should assess the restrictions of competition introduced by the 
agreement concerned against the efficiencies it may generate as well as against the contribution it 
may make to the enhancement of other public policy values.135 In the case of mergers, Ariño argues 
, 
solution is likely to endanger the democratic process.136 In other words, according to Ariño, the 
Commission should be determined to forgo to some extent economies of scale and scope that could 
be achieved as a result of the merger in order to benefit media pluralism.137 Advocates of this 
approach identify at least two weaknesses in attempting to apply competition law by reference to 
non-economic values. First, in cases where reconciliation between competition considerations and 
considerations relating to the non-economic value concerned is impossible, the former must 
supersede the latter, for otherwise the Commission would act in violation of the Treaties.138 Second, 
given that after Regulation 1/2003 entered into force national competition authorities are entitled to 
apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,139 the integration of non-economic considerations in relevant 
analyses may jeopardize legal certainty by leading to an inconsistent application of the competition 
provisions across the EU, possibly subjecting the latter to opportunistic and arbitrary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Note that certain authors explore both the first approach discussed above as well as the second approach discussed here. See, for 
instance, Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 400-412 
134 See, for instance, Van Rompuy, B. (2012). Economic Efficiency: The Sole Concern of Modern Antitrust Policy?, 283-404. Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International; Lefever, K. (2012). New Media and Sport: International Legal Aspects, 118-128. The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press (note that Van Rompuy and Lefever focus on broadcast rights to sports events); Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 
400-405, and Psychogiopoulou, E. (2006). The Cultural Mainstreaming Clause of Article 151(4) EC: Protection and Promotion of 
Cultural Diversity or Hidden Cultural Agenda? European Law Journal, 12, 585-591 
135 Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 133, 228-229 
136 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 402-403 
137 Ariño, M. (2004), Competition Law and Pluralism in European Digital Broadcasting: Addressing the gaps, Communications and 
Strategies 54, 118 
138 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75, 402 
139 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
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interpretation.140  
 
Finally, there are studies that ascribe a negligible role to EU competition law as a tool for 
guaranteeing media pluralism.141 Three arguments are typically put forward in the relevant literature. 
The first two are intertwined and concern the trend that has emerged in EU competition enforcement 
-
economic efficiency and consumer welfare are the guiding principles of EU competition policy142 
and that, as a result, concerns over other public policy values, including media pluralism,143 are 
expelled from competition assessments. While critical of this paradigm shift, studies falling under the 
category examined here appear to have accepted that the Commission is unlikely to rearrange its 
priorities in order to make allowance for non-economic considerations.144 And, on this basis, they 
identify the following two reasons why EU competition law is not adequate to safeguard media 
pluralism: first, the application of EU competition law ensures market access (e.g. by prohibiting a 
concentration that would grant the merging firms significant market power), 145  thus potentially 
delivering an outcome that is of benefit to media pluralism, but this outcome is entirely dependent on 
the economic concerns the Commission attempts to address in each individual case and hence (at 
best) coincidental. 146  Second, it is claimed that, precisely because it is driven by efficiency 
considerations, EU competition law is incapable of grasping 
. 147 That is to say, the narrowing of the objectives that 
competition law pursues makes it difficult, if not impossible, to embrace parameters other than cost 
reductions and lower prices. The third argument is related to competence limitations in the field of 
State aids. More particularly, it is pointed out that, when exercising State aid control the Commission 
can (and must) play only a marginal role in the planning and implementation of aid measures aimed 
at promoting media pluralism.148 This marginal role is attributed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 133, 403, and Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 110, 166  
141 Note that certain authors explore both the first approach discussed above as well as the third approach discussed here. See, for 
instance, Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 135-142 and 281-283 
142 See Lowe, P., Consumer Welfare and Efficiency  New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?, Speech given at the 13th 
International Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day, Munich, 27 March 2007 
143 See, for instance, Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006), Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media 
Sector. Research Papers in Law, 07/2006, Global Competition Law Centre, 26 
144 See, for instance, Barzanti, F. (2012), supra n. 90, 14-15 
145  Barzanti, F. (2012), supra n. 90, 14-15; Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 136-142; Ungerer, H. (2014). The Reasons For 
Intervention Trough Competition Policy, 405-426. In Donders, K., Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen (ed.). The Palgrave Handbook of 
European Media Policy. New York: Palgrave Millan. The Commission takes the same position. See, for instance, European 
Commission (2005). Issues paper for the Liverpool Audiovisual Conference: Media pluralism  
role?, 2. Brussels: DG Information Society and Media and Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member 
States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 7 
146 See Barzanti, F. (2012), supra n. 90, 14-15, and Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 136-142 
147 Barzanti, F. (2012), supra n. 90, 15. Harrison and Woods also appear to dismiss the idea that EU competition law may be applied 
by reference to qualitative considerations. See supra n. 110, 149-150 
148 See infra n. 166 
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design aid schemes as they deem appropriate, with the Commission being restricted to verifying that 
the monies dispersed do not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective the measures 
concerned pursue.  
 
While not entirely devoid of merit, the above three arguments raise strong doubts as to whether 
we should dismiss the idea that EU competition law can make a meaningful contribution to media 
pluralism, one that goes beyond the limits prescribed by the aforementioned studies. This is because, 
as opposed to all other suggestions that were examined above, the studies that belong to this category 
refer to the limitations without exploring the potential of strict competition enforcement. As a result, 
many questions remain unanswered. The loopholes the above three arguments leave open are 
examined in more detail below. 
 
First, with respect to access, several authors refrain from testing the hypotheses on which the 
Commission has based its practice in order to ensure that media markets remain open to 
competition. 149  For example, to protect undistorted competition in broadcasting markets, the 
Commission has been mainly concerned with imposing behavioral remedies on undertakings that 
own or control access to premium content, namely content that has the capacity to attract large 
audiences. 150  The overwhelming majority of studies have been limited to discussing how these 
remedies were designed. 151  Surely, access to premium content is a significant bottleneck in 
broadcasting markets and thus a topic worthy of discussion, but the issue of whether there are other 
e examined. 
Moreover, even if one insists that access must be ensured through commitments relating to the 
acquisition of premium content, we would still need to evaluate the effectiveness of the remedies that 
have been imposed thus far against how the markets evolved. Impact assessment based on empirical 
data is key to sound economic policymaking. Another example concerns resale price maintenance 
(hereinafter RPM) agreements in the print publishing sector. These arrangements usually fall foul of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Nikolinakos, N. (2006). EU Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT sectors, 138-
161. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International; Capito, R. and Moira Kettner (2008). Excursus: EC Merger Regulation, 188-
198. In Castendyk, O., Egbert J. Dommering and Alexander Scheurer. European Media Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International; Psychogiopoulou, E. (2008). The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law and Policies, 246-291. Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Ungerer, H. (2014), supra n. 144, 409-416, and Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 130-135. See 
also Lefever, K., (2012), supra n. 133, 135-157. Note, however, that she discusses the issue from a different perspective, that of the 
exercise of the right to information 
150 See, for instance, Commission Decision Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, Case COMP/M. 2050 [2000] C 311/03; Commission Decision 
NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73; Commission Decision BSkyB/Kirch Pay-TV Case COMP/JV.37, [2000] 
OJ C 110/45, and Commission decision SFR/Télé 2 France, Case No COMP M.4504 [2007] OJ L 316/57 
151 See supra n. 148 
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EU competition law, 152  however, they have traditionally been regarded as beneficial to media 
pluralism on the grounds that they facilitate the production and distribution of a wide variety of titles, 
including low-demand books. 153  The Commission has declared most of these agreements 
incompatible with the Treaty for the reason, inter alia, that they prevented booksellers from using 
low prices to penetrate the markets of other Member States.154 Studies that discuss the relevant 
decision-making are restricted to condemning the Commission155 for being unsympathetic to the non-
economic pluralism-specific objectives they sought to achieve. Yet, these studies do not assess the 
decisions concerned against the backdrop of economics literature in this area that has provided 
convincing evidence that it is only under certain conditions that RPM can deliver a pluralistic 
outcome.156 The above examples illustrate why, when we draw conclusions on the weaknesses of 
ensuring market access as a proxy for media pluralism, we need to discuss 
practice is well-founded.  
 
 The second premise, namely that competition is mainly about cost efficiencies, tells only part 
of the story. A number of policy documents rightly point out that in a competition assessment several 
other factors come into play. For example, the (Horizontal and Non-Horizontal) Merger Guidelines 
significantly increase the market power of firms, and explains that an increase in market power refers 
to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or 
quality of goods and services or diminish innovation  [emphasis added]. 157  In other words, 
competition has several non-price dimensions. Whether, and if so to what extent, these dimensions 
influence the outcome of a competition analysis will depend on the particular characteristics of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 ich, as 
such, results in the exclusion of the agreement from the scope of application of the Block Exemption Regulation. In cases where an 
RPM clause is contained in the agreement, that agreement is presumed to be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, but it is established case 
law that parties to any agreement may plead an efficiency defense under Article 101(3) TFEU in an individual case. See Commission 
Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 47 
153 For the Member States where RPM laws for books apply as a means to protect media pluralism see Joint Research Center (2012). 
Technical Report on Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and Content Industries: The Book Publishing 
Industry, fn. 198. Retrieved from: http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC76642.pdf 
154 See Commission decision 82/123/EEC of 25 November 1981 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428-
VBBB/VBVB) [1982] OJ L 52/36 and Commission decision of 12 December 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/27.393 and IV/27.394, Publishers Association - Net Book Agreements) [1989] OJ L22/12 
155 See, for instance, Everling, U. (1997). Book Price Fixing in the German Language Area and European Community Law, 112-118. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos; Sich, V. (2004, November). The system of fixed book prices in Germany-A short overview of the history, the 
regulations, and the impact of retail price maintenance. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tau.ac.il/~nirziv/FixedBookPricesinGermany1.pdf, and Psychogiopoulou, E. (2008), supra n. 148, 279-286;  
156 See, for instance, Appelman, M. and Marcel Canoy (2002). Horses for Courses: Why Europe should not harmonize its book 
policies. De Economist 150(5), 583-600, and Canoy, M., Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg (2005). The Economics of 
Books. CESifo Working Paper No. 1414, 12. Retrieved from: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_1414.html 
157 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 8 and Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, paragraph 10 
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market concerned and the importance that the consumers of the products or services offered by the 
undertakings under scrutiny attach to them. For example, in the market for recorded music, it is the 
quality of sound158 whereas in server operating systems, it is the security features built into the 
system that aim to protect the user against unauthorized access, viruses, etc.159 Similarly, in media 
markets, price is not necessarily the only or the most relevant parameter that drives competition. For 
example, demand for certain products, such as newspapers, is highly inelastic in price because it is 
160 In other cases, such as free-to-air television, it is the 
variety of content offered by the broadcasters or the availability of programming on catch-up TV.161  
 
The third and final limitation attributed to EU competition law concerns the narrow boundaries 
within which State aid control can be exercised. At the outset it bears noting that, indeed, compared 
limited. This is because, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, the Member States get to decide 
what sort of aids (if any) would satisfy the needs of a given society. State aid control is limited to 
ensuring that the measure does not allow the beneficiary of the aid to misuse the public funds it 
receives in order to harm competition. In examining mergers, agreements or abuses of dominance, 
the Commission can undoubtedly be more flexible in shaping the measures that, in its view, would 
best serve competition. It is due to the above competence restriction that it is either explicitly asserted 
or implied that the Commission can and must play only a minimal role in the design of aid schemes 
aimed at protecting media pluralism. Scholarly literature appears to have taken two different 
directions with respect to this issue. First, there are those who seek to answer the question of whether, 
and if so to what extent, EU competition law can safeguard media pluralism by focusing on merger 
and antitrust control, .162 
However, it is doubtful whether we can give a complete answer to the above question if we ignore 
how State aid decisions have impacted relevant national policies. This is because, even if the nature 
of competition intervention is different depending on whether the Commission is called upon to 
exercise antitrust, merger or State aid control (e.g. mergers and new aid schemes are subject to prior 
notification whereas action against abuses of dominance is reactive in nature) and even if the 
standards that are used in conducting the relevant assessments vary (e.g. in the case of anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Commission decision Universal Music Group/EMI Music, Case No. COMP/M.6458 [2012] OJ C 220/8, paragraph 127 
159 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-03601, paragraph 652 
160 Joint Research Center (2012). Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and Content Industries: The 
Newspaper Publishing Industry, 24. Retrieved from: http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=5380  
161 Csorgo, L. and Ian Munro (2011). Market Definition Issues for Audio and Audio-Visual Distribution Products and Services in a 
Digital Environment, A Report Prepared for the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. Retrieved from: 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/rp110215.htm#_ftn7 
162 See, for instance, Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 75 
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competitive agreements the restrictions to competition must be assessed against efficiencies and 
consumer welfare whereas with State aid the harm to competition must be balanced against social 
welfare163), the objective the Commission aspires to attain in all the above cases is the same, namely 
that competition is not unduly distorted. In seeking to achieve this objective, action under each pillar 
of competition will somehow impact media pluralism. For example, a relaxed approach towards a 
merger will increase media concentration, whereas a sloppy approach towards a State aid scheme 
may have the effect of foreclosing media service providers that compete with the beneficiary of the 
aid. In view of the above, in determining the degree to which EU competition law can protect media 
he practice 
developed in exercising merger and antitrust control. Second, there are studies that discuss the 
potential effects of State aid decisions on media pluralism. These focus on whether the Commission 
has exceeded its competence limits by imposing on the Member States concerned stringent 
requirements on how to design the aid measure, for example, by interfering with the definition of the 
mandate public service broadcasters are expected to discharge. However, the overwhelming majority 
of these studies have abstained from inquiring whether the Member States have indeed complied with 
the conditions set by the Commission and if so, whether compliance has produced any positive 
results.164 And yet examining this latter issue is essential to drawing conclusions on the actual impact 
of the outcome of State aid proceedings on media pluralism. The few authors that have assessed how 
-making influenced national media policies have a focus different from 
the one of the present study,165 or ignore to a large extent the question of how far the Commission 
can go to alleviate concerns in areas where it clearly has the power to act. For example, as regards 
this latter issue, it is established case law that the Commission may not carry out efficiency 
assessments when deciding whether aid schemes in support of public service broadcasters, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 s]ocial welfare takes 
also how welfare is distributed across countries and citizens. Social welfare thus integrates efficiency elements (i.e. by looking at how 
much wealth is created by affecting consume
wealth is divided between Member States and citizens). A social welfare standard takes into account all the effects that may be 
mission (not dated). Common Principles for an Economic Assessment of the Compatibility of 
State Aid Under Article 87(3). Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/economic_assessment_en.pdf  
164 See, for instance, Psychogiopoulou, E. (2008), supra n. 148, 293-332; Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 286-297, and Harrison, J. 
and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 110, 290-311; 
165 For example, Lefever examines the effects of State aid decisions on the exercise of the right to information on sports competitions. 
See supra n. 133, 172-177. Donders looks into whether and if so, to what extent State aid control obstructs the realization of the public 
broadcasting project and is driven by a one-size-fits-all approach towards national policies that are heterogeneous. See Donders, K. 
(2011). Public Service Media and Policy in Europe. New York: Palgrave Millan. Other studies with a different focus include: 
Donders, K. and Hallvard Moe (eds.) (2011). 
services across Europe. Göteborg: Nordicom; Donders, K. (2009). State Aid and Public Service Broadcasting. How future Proof is the 
Remit of Public Broadcasting Organizations?, 206. In Pauwels, C., Harri Kalimo, Karen Donders and Ben Van Rompuy (eds.), 
Rethinking European Media and Communications Policy. Brussels: VUB Press; Schulz, W. (2009). The Legal Framework for Public 
Service Broadcasting in Germany: Procrustean Bed or Hammock? Journal of Media Law, 1(2), 219-241, and Donders, K. (2011). 
Superficial Harmonization Versus One-Size-Fits-All: The Implementation of European State aid principles in Flanders and the 
Netherlands. Journal of Media Law, 3(2), 237-261 
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have traditionally been regarded as a vehicle for media pluralism, are compatible with the common 
market.166 In other words, the Commission may not judge public 
broadcasting services. The Commission can, however, conduct a proportionality assessment, that is, 
it can check whether the financing received by the broadcaster went beyond what was necessary to 
fulfill the public service mission. It would appear that the Commission has not always been diligent 
in exercising this proportionality control. For instance, in a decision concerning the Irish public 
broadcasting measures, the Commission noted that the procedure would not deal wit
disproportionate effects on competition related to the scope of sports rights acquired by RTÉ [the 
Irish public broadcaster 167 The Commission refrained from explaining why in the assessment of the 
legitimacy of the scheme it refused to examine whether the State funds allocated to the acquisition of 
sports rights were disproportionate. The Irish case illustrates that the Commission may have failed to 
act in cases where it was competent to intervene. This hands-off approach raises concerns over both 
competition and media pluralism: if public broadcasters empty the market for sports rights with 
public money, other providers are deprived of the ability to access a valuable input that drives 
competition in media markets. An excessive focus on sports content results in the public broadcaster 
not offering a balanced and varied programming to the citizens it is meant to serve. Authors that 
proportionality assessments should be conducted in relevant cases.168  
 
The above remarks indicate that the three assumptions on which the position that EU 
competition law can do little to nothing to protect media pluralism may be ill-founded. If so, EU 
competition law has potential that remains unexplored. The present study shall examine whether this 
is indeed the case by testing the accuracy of the above three claims. In doing so, it shall address two 
issues; the first is of a legal nature whereas the second is purely practical. First, ascribing a very 
limited role to EU competition law is partly responsible for how scholarly literature in this area has 
evolved. More particularly, this approach has led the vast majority of authors that have dealt with the 
topic to focus on initiatives that could be developed under other branches of EU law, the main 
instruments of which were discussed above. Still, the question of whether EU competition law is 
applied to media markets properly, that is, by duly taking account of the parameters that drive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See GCEU, Joined Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08, Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1), [2010] ECR II-
3397, paragraph 141 and Case T-275/11 Télévision française 1 (TF1) v. European Commission (not yet reported), paragraphs 130, 
133-4 and 138 
167 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, fn. 6 
168 See, for instance, Lefever, K., (2012), supra n. 148, 172-177, and Van Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2012). Competition Law, 
Sports, and Public Service Broadcasting: The Legal Complexity and Political Sensitivity of Measuring Market Distortion and Public 
Value, Journal of Media Law, 4(2), 223 
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competition in the media and by using the full toolkit the Commission has at its disposal, should 
precede any discussion over whether and if so, what type of further action should be taken by the EU 
to preserve this value. This is because, as already discussed, the vast majority of proposals that have 
been put forward thus far raise competence issues that cannot be ignored and may not enjoy the 
necessary political will to materialize. It bears repeating that the EU has exclusive competence to 
establish the competition rules that apply to media undertakings that operate within the EU. In light 
of the above, and even if opinions on what would be the best course of action to safeguard media 
pluralism at the EU level may pull in different directions, may we all agree that it is only after 
determining the point at which EU competition law exhausts its limits, we may ask what form of 
intervention, be it amendments to the Merger Regulation, soft law in the form of recommendations, 
or hard law in the form of instruments potentially stretching the Treaty boundaries, would address the 
issues that remain unresolved. Second, from a practical perspective, a discussion over the 
contribution EU competition law enforcement can make to media pluralism may have more to offer 
than discussions over action under other branches of EU law. For example, as already seen, Article 7 
TEU has never been applied, and only a handful of Member States have imposed stricter conditions 
recent years, the Commission has explicitly stated that a harmonizing instrument in support of media 
pluralism is not in the EU legislative agenda.169 Yet, at the time of writing, the Commission has 
adopted 1,374 competition decisions affecting this sector.170 It is not only the amount of cases that 
law on the structure of media markets. In implementing the EU competition policy, the Commission 
has dealt with numerous undertakings such as broadcasters, newspaper publishers, digital retailers, 
news aggregators and search engines whose practices may pose numerous threats to media pluralism. 
In light of the above, EU competition law has influenced media markets and, by extension pluralism, 
significantly more than other branches of EU law and there are valid indications that this is not likely 
to change in the near future. 
 
To sum up, the present study shall test the claim that, if properly applied, EU competition law 
has the potential to protect media pluralism in a way which does not fit into the either excessively 
narrow or excessively broad frame molded by the relevant literature to date. It shall do so by 
revolving around the following three questions that remain largely unanswered: has the Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See, for instance, Commission Staff Working Document on Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, SEC 
(2007) 32, 4 
170 Search by NACE code. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
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managed to prevent market foreclosure in the media sector? If not, what would be an alternative, 
proper application of the competition provisions of the Treaty to ensure that competition is not 
distorted? And would this alternative deliver an outcome that is more pluralism-friendly? This study 
is the first to adopt this novel approach to the application of EU competition rules to media markets 
and shall attempt to demonstrate that strict competition enforcement may go a long way towards 
protecting a non-economic value without stretching the Treaty limits.  
 
3. Research method  
 
3.1. An interdisciplinary approach 
 
A study exploring the contribution that strict competition enforcement can make to the 
protection of media pluralism cannot be approached from a legal standpoint only. In order to identify 
the challenges facing pluralism in the current media ecology and the lacunae 
decision-making, an in-depth understanding of relevant technological advancements and sector-
specific economics is required. How has digitization affected the architecture of media markets? Has 
it altered content consumption patterns? Has scarcity of frequencies been replaced by other, possibly 
artificial, forms of scarcity? How does the two-sided nature of advertising-based media impact a 
competition assessment? These questions illustrate that the legal issues examined throughout this 
thesis cannot be considered in a vacuum. Moreover, new business models for the sale of media 
content have surfaced (e.g. online agency agreements for the sale of news subscriptions), the 
relationship between the consumer and the media content provider has undergone significant changes 
change for personal data are 
becoming more and more common), and competition authorities are increasingly being called upon 
to assess practices whose effects are not entirely clear (e.g. algorithm manipulation), thereby finding 
themselves in unknown territory. In view of the above, it is only through an interdisciplinary 
approach, whereby the legal analysis is informed and shaped by market and technological 
developments, economic theory, and empirical evidence, that any meaningful normative proposal on 
how EU competition law must be applied to media markets can be put forward.  
 
3.2. The markets that will be examined: a dual (old/new) media perspective 
 
The studies that discuss the role of EU competition law in protecting media pluralism have 
  
	   	   44	  
mainly focused on broadcasting markets.171 The present study, however, adopts a wider approach. 
More particularly, in addition to decisions concerning television
practice in traditional print publishing as well as more recent cases dealing with new media markets, 
namely online search, news aggregation, and markets for the retail sale of e-content such as news 
apps and newspaper subscriptions. This dual (old/new media) perspective is driven by three 
considerations. First, in terms of use, traditional media still plays a major role in informing 
Europeans. For example, television remains their preferred source of news on political matters172 and 
more than one third of them read newspapers on a regular/daily basis. 173  However, alongside 
traditional media, entities that have emerged with the advent of the Internet, including and especially 
digital intermediaries, that is, firms that deliver content produced by third-party suppliers to online 
users,174 are now playing an important role in determining the amount and quality of information that 
citizens access and engage with. In several Member States search engines are the most popular means 
of discovering news online175 and news aggregators the second most popular.176 Second, and related 
to the above, in terms of policy, a discussion about the potential benefits to or dangers for media 
pluralism today cannot take place by focusing on one or the other type of media. For example, a key 
r vertically) 
integrated and which control traditional media markets, may still raise concerns over media 
pluralism. If this question is answered in the affirmative, does the new media environment, which 
makes available a vast amount of content, address the above concerns? Or do entities that operate in 
new media markets engage in practices that create additional risks for media pluralism? If so, could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 See, for instance, Komorek, E. (2013), supra n. 3, 95-142; Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 3, and Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), 
supra n. 110, 146-172. Note that more recent s
focused on the broadcasting sector. See, for instance, Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 133, 319-390; Ungerer, H. (2014), supra n. 
144; Donders K. and Hallvard Moe (2014). European State-Aid control and PSB: Competition Policy Clashing or Matching with 
Public Interest Objectives?, 426-441. In Donders, K., Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen (ed.). The Palgrave Handbook of European 
Media Policy. New York: Palgrave Millan; Van Rompuy, B. (2014). The Impact of EU Competition Policy on the Sale of Sports 
Media Right: Trends and Developments at the National Level, 442-460. In Donders, K., Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen (ed.). The 
Palgrave Handbook of European Media Policy. New York: Palgrave Millan, and Iosifidis, P. (2014). Pluralism, Media Mergers and 
European Merger Control, 461-478. In Donders, K., Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen (ed.). The Palgrave Handbook of European 
Media Policy  media are media introduced prior to the advent of the Internet, such 
terized, 
or networked information and communication technolog
news aggregators such as Google News. See Electronic Frontiers Foundation. Definition of media. IRM of 24/11/2009. This study uses 
to organizations that were established before the digital revolution commenced such as 
of the 
Internet such as blogs and wikis. The study, however, acknowledges that, as a result of technology convergence, this distinction is 
becoming increasingly blurred 
172 European Commission (2013). Media Use in the European Union, 5 and 9. According to the Commission, the average European 
watches up to 4 hours a day. See http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm 
173 Ibid., 11 
174 Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World  Report prepared for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 25 
175  See, for instance, Ofcom (2013). International Communications Market Report, Figure 1.58. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-reports/cmr13/international/icmr-1.58  
176  Ofcom (2013). International Communications Market Report, Figure 1.57. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/icmr/ICMR_2013_final.pdf  
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these latter risks be mitigated by granting State aids to a vibrant and independent public service 
media organization? To put it simply, any meaningful policy proposal on how to safeguard pluralism 
in the current media landscape cannot be formulated without carefully considering how perils posed 
by one type of media can be balanced against opportunities created by the other. Finally, from a 
competition law perspective -making in traditional media should not be 
studied in isolation from the practice it is currently developing in new media markets. For example, 
in cases dealing with free-to-air television, the Commission finds that the exercise of market 
definition should consist in identifying the effective alternative sources of supply for the advertisers, 
not the viewers.177 The Commission is of the opinion that a market for viewers need not be defined 
on the grounds that the latter do not pay for the content they receive.178 And yet, the opposite position 
would seem to find support in modern economic theory.179 The attention that this issue deserves 
becomes clear if we think of the abundance of undertakings operating in the information economy, 
such as online search engines and news aggregators, that offer content for free. Another example 
concerns the publishing sector: as already mentioned, the Commission has declared incompatible 
with the common market RPM agreements between publishers and brick-and-mortar retailers. 
Arrangements with RPM elements are making a comeback, but this time around they govern trade in 
digital content such as e-books and news apps. Was the approach to assessing RPM for traditional 
print titles based on a sound reasoning so that it can guide the Commission in digital content cases 
with a similar factual background? The above two examples illustrate that traditional and new media 
share certain characteristics (e.g. revenue model and pricing strategies) that are relevant for a 
than in new media markets, it is of utmost importance to assess the approach adopted in older cases 
in order to ensure that errors committed in the past are not incorporated into future decisions. 
 
3.3. Thesis Structure 
In explaining the reasons why it is essential that the present study a) adopt an interdisciplinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/3, 
paragraph 13. See, for instance, Commission decisions NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73 paragraph 24; 
NewsCorp/BSkyB, Case COMP/M. 5932 [2011] OJ C37/2 paragraph 97; SFR/Télé 2, Case COMP/M.4504 [2007] OJ L 316/57, 
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178 Ibid. 
179 See, for instance, Filistrucchi, L., Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme, E. and Pauline Affeldt (2012). Market Definition in Two-
Sided Markets: Theory and Practice. TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-009. Available through SSRN at: 
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markets, I posed the key questions facing the topic that I shall examine, namely whether, and if so to 
what extent, a proper application of EU competition law can protect media pluralism. To answer the 
above questions, I structured the thesis as follows: one of the first issues that is raised in discussions 
concerning media pluralism is whether, in light of the advancements that have taken place over the 
media landscape the citizen is given access to a wide range of information and countless 
opportunities to participate in public discourse. Through an analysis of how market, regulatory and 
technological developments have affected supply and consumption of media content, Chapter 2 
dismantles the argument that digital technologies have remedied concerns over media pluralism. In 
doing so, Chapter 2 exposes the reader to the main challenges confronting the realization of a 
pluralistic offer, such as a natural tendency of (traditional and new) media markets to concentration, 
content homogenization, and practices impairing the free flow of media content in the online 
universe.   
 
As already mentioned, at the EU level, cases that have raised pluralism issues have been mainly 
examined by the Directorate General for Competition. After establishing in Chapter 2 that media 
pluralism is (still) worthy of protection, Chapter 3 will inquire whether, and if so to what extent, EU 
competition law has been/can be applied in a pluralism-friendly manner. By pinpointing the 
loopholes the Commission has left open in a number of (antitrust, merger, and State aid) cases that 
touched upon a number of issues that arise in relevant competition investigations, such as access to 
valuable inputs (e.g. premium content), the role of the non-price dimensions of competition in market 
definitions and competitive assessments, and the boundaries within which State aid control can be 
exercised, the Chapter puts forward two claims: first, the practice that the Commission has developed 
in media markets has fallen short of protecting either competition or media pluralism. And second, 
EU competition law can be applied in a way which goes beyond  predispositions 
and which may lead to competition decisions that are more accurate and pluralism-friendly without 
giving rise to controversies over competence.  
 
Chapters 4-7 are concerned with testing the above two claims. They do so by attempting to 
encapsulate the main issues the Commission has encountered in older and more recent cases that 
raise both competition and pluralism concerns. The decisional practice the Commission has 
developed under each of the four pillars of competition law, namely merger control, Article 101, 
Article 102, and State aids will be examined by reference to a specific sector in a way that reflects a 
business strategy (e.g. consolidation), practice (e.g. algorithm manipulation), pricing model (e.g. 
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RPM), or revenue mechanism (e.g. financing of broadcasting activities through State resources) that 
has been a major (competition and media) policy matter in the market concerned.  
 
More particularly, Chapter 4 will explore the parameters against which the Commission 
exercises merger control in cases concerning broadcasting markets. In this sector, mergers and 
acquisitions have had a broad appeal due to the significant economies of scale and scope that 
broadcasters can achieve by integrating with other firms that operate at the same (horizontal 
integration) or at different levels of the supply chain (vertical integration). For our purposes, it bears 
noting that, from a competition perspective, a concentration may, inter alia, increase the ability and 
incentive of the merging firms to crowd out competing content suppliers, whereas from a pluralism 
perspective a concentration may allow the individuals controlling the merged entity to marginalize 
opposing viewpoints.  
 
Consolidation has not been as popular in the publishing sector as it has been in television. In 
the publishing industry, as indicated above, a popular strategy has been RPM, whereby the publisher 
sets the retail prices of the titles it produces and the retailer is not permitted to offer discounts or any 
other form of promotion unless the publisher explicitly grants its authorization. For this reason, 
Chapter 5 examines how the Commission has applied/may apply Article 101 TFEU to agreements 
with RPM elements governing the sale of newspapers and books. Depending on market conditions, 
RPM may promote competition for titles and/or encourage small publishers to penetrate the market. 
The analysis seeks to identify these conditions.  
 
With respect to news aggregation and online search, a recent case that deals with a number of 
potentially anti-competitive practices in which the entity leading these markets engages, namely 
Google Search, is particularly relevant for the purposes of this study. More particularly, the 
Commission is currently investigating complaints that Google has abused its dominant position in 
(general and vertical) online search and news aggregation.180 As mentioned above, by acting as 
intermediaries between content providers and the audiences, search engines and news aggregators are 
gradually playing an important role in determining the amount and quality of information that 
consumers access and engage with. It will be seen in greater detail in Chapter 2 that there are several 
areas in which the activities they develop may impact undistorted competition and pluralism, 
including the control they exercise over what may be regarded as distribution bottlenecks through 
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which users access content, the editorial-like judgments they perform in selecting the content they 
link to or carry, and their role in shaping future economic models for news provision.181 Google 
Search is a vivid illustration of the above issues. For example, insofar as news economics is 
concerned, one of the complaints has to do with the copying and display of parts of news articles 
182  Does 
scraping affect the ability of news providers to generate (advertising and subscription) revenues? If 
so, are the effects positive or negative? If the effects are negative, can news providers rely on Article 
102 TFEU to prevent Google from using their content? A complaint that exemplifies the role of an 
intermediary as a distribution bottleneck 
providers that object to the use of their stories on the Google News website are excluded from 
 results.183 To what extent does this practice 
deprive users of discovering news online? Could this conduct be regarded as abusive tying for the 
purposes of Article 102 TFEU? Finally, with respect to editorial-like judgments, allegations have 
been made that Google has been deliberately demoting competing websites whilst ensuring 
prominent display for its own content.184 Does this practice affect the range of content to which users 
U competition law? 
The above issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, which, building around the issues that have 
arisen throughout the Google Search investigation, will examine how Article 102 TFEU may be 
applied to digital intermediaries that engage in conduct introducing artificial forms of information 
scarcity.   
 
Chapter 7 deals with the remaining pillar of EU competition law, namely State aid control. The 
Chapter focuses on State aid decisions concerning advantages granted to public service broadcasters 
for mainly three reasons. First, compared against other media undertakings that receive public 
funding, public service broadcasters are by far the most generously funded. 185  Second, the 
overwhelming majority of State aid decisions the Commission has adopted in the media sector 
concern public broadcasters.186 In other words, State aid control in public service broadcasting is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 173, 6-7 
182 For an overview of the complaints that are currently being investigated by the Commission see European Commission (2014, 
February). Memo. Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialized search rivals - Frequently asked 
questions. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-87_en.htm?locale=en 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Compare the amount of money dispersed in support PSBs against, e.g., those in support of newspapers. The State aid measures 
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dominant policy issue insofar as the application of State aid rules to media markets is concerned. 
Finally, the granting of aid in support of public broadcasters has become an issue of major concern to 
undertakings other than commercial broadcasters. Public broadcasters are increasingly expanding 
into new media markets, providing a variety of services from mobile news apps to catch-up TV to 
online advertising space. Therefore, they now directly compete with a wide range of content 
producers and distributors, including newspapers and IPTV providers. In light of the above, the 
likelihood that unlawful aid in support of certain media organizations will harm competition and  to 
the extent that they prevent market entry  media pluralism seems to be greater in cases of aid 
measures supporting public broadcasters than in cases of schemes supporting other media.  
 
The main theme that cuts across Chapters 4-7 is control over an asset or factor that may 
somehow affect competition and pluralism in the affected markets. For example, in broadcasting, it is 
control over premium content or infrastructure; in publishing, it is control over price; in online 
search and news aggregation, it is control over a vastly popular online platform through which users 
access information, and in the case of a publicly funded undertaking operating offline and online, it is 
control over State resources. 
 
A final remark on the topics that will be covered: naturally, in addition to the business 
strategies/practices, pricing models, and revenue mechanisms that were described above, traditional 
and new media entities may affect competition and media pluralism in an abundance of ways that, 
given how complex the structures of the relevant markets and companies are, are difficult if not 
impossible to identify in an exhaustive manner. However, this study does aspire to expose the reader 
to the main issues that have arisen thus far in competition cases concerning the most widely used 
addressed under all four pillars of competition law. 
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Chapter 2  Media pluralism and the myth of communication abundance 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the midst of the changes brought about by digital technologies, policymakers from across 
Europe have started rethinking the status of media pluralism as a fundamental communications policy 
principle. More particularly, as already mentioned in Chapter 1, the argument that media pluralism is 
to a large extent a natural outcome of the digital revolution is gaining ground. This argument is based 
mainly on two assumptions that are increasingly being reflected in media policies. First, digital 
technologies are believed to have remedied concerns relating to concentration of ownership. The fear 
that significant opinion-forming power may end up in the hands of a few is said to have diminished 
on the grounds that currently, alongside well-established media organizations, there are many other 
sources providing information as well as several platforms through which marginalized viewpoints, 
which would not have found their way to the audiences in the analogue environment, may reach the 
public. Second, citizens are believed to use the media in ways that strengthen citizenship. The 
abundance of information they can now access, the control they can exercise over content, and the 
ability to create and distribute content on matters of common concern are considered to create ideal 
conditions for exposure to diverse ideas and active participation in public discourse. 
 
The objective of this Chapter is three-fold. First, to explain the approach of the present study to 
media pluralism as a normative concept in light of the aforementioned developments (Part 2). The 
aim here is not to propose a new legal definition, but to illustrate that the evolution of communication 
technologies and markets has had implications for media pluralism as a policy goal. Second, to 
discuss whether policy intervention to protect and promote media pluralism is still needed by 
examining whether the above two assumptions, on which modern media policymaking is being built, 
are well-grounded. For that purpose, I shall analyze the conditions that reflect the current state of 
European media markets and inquire whether these assumptions are supported by empirical evidence. 
More particularly, Part 3 examines whether concerns regarding concentration of ownership have 
indeed subsided whereas Part 4 focuses on the demand side, discussing habits that have emerged with 
the advent of new media. Third, through the study of (old and new) supply and consumption patterns 
and sector-specific economics, to lay the groundwork for subsequent Chapters, which will discuss the 
characteristics of traditional and new media markets that the European Commission must take into 
consideration when it is called upon to assess a merger, anti-competitive agreement, unilateral 
conduct or State aid scheme.  
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2. The legal definition of media pluralism: Is it still about what the market has to 
offer?   
 
Media pluralism is widely perceived as a prerequisite for democracy, inter alia, on the grounds 
that access to a broad range of information strengthens citizenship and advances social cohesion. Yet, 
in spite of the broad respect it generates for these merits, a definition of media pluralism does not 
exist in international statutory law.1 The lack of a definition of media pluralism in international legal 
texts is largely attributed to the fact that this value has been thought to be better conceptualized by 
reference to the specific political, social, cultural and economic conditions of a given State on the 
basis of a number of criteria, such as the presence of linguistic and/or ethnic minorities2 and policy 
approaches to the media industry. As any description of media pluralism involves choices about the 
types of content that should be provided to the audiences, as well as choices about the parameters that 
g of 
the when drafting an international legal document that touches upon this issue has proven to 
be an insurmountable goal.3 As regards the European Union, several legal texts, including primary 
EU law such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service 
Broadcasting,4 refer to media pluralism. These texts, however, do not go so far as to describe its 
nature, scope or meaning.5 In addition to the heterogeneity characterizing the media landscapes of the 
various Member States,6 this definitional lacuna itations in the 
field of media, which were extensively discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore, the Member States have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Valcke, P. (2011), Looking For the User in Media Pluralism Regulation: Unraveling the Traditional Diversity Chain and Recent 
Trends of User Empowerment in European Media Regulation. Journal of Information Policy 1, 288. Retrieved from: 
http://jip.vmhost.psu.edu/ojs/index.php/jip/article/view/31    
2 For instance, the preservation of linguistic diversity would not play a major role in the Netherlands, a linguistically homogeneous 
country, as opposed to Belgium which has three official languages  
3 Karpinnen, K. (2007). Making a difference to media pluralism. A critique of the pluralistic consensus in European media policy, 21. 
In Cammaerts, B. & Nico Carpentier (eds.). Reclaming the Media. Bristol: Intellect Books  
4 gh 
Contracting Parties, considering that the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, 
social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism, have agreed upon the following interpretive 
provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: The 
provisions of the Treaties shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the funding of public service 
broadcasting and in so far as such funding is granted to broadcasting organizations for the fulfillment of the public service remit as 
conferred, defined and organized by each Member State, and in so far as such funding does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Union to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the realization of the remit of that public 
 
5 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1. On secondary EU law which refers to media pluralism see, for instance, Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive [2010] OJ L 332/27, Recitals 8, 12, 34, 48 and 94; Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service 
broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraphs 2, 11, 14-16 and 47, and Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, 
Article 21(4) 
6 European Commission (2009). Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States  Towards a Risk-based 
Approach, 1. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf  
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been free to give form to this value in accordance with national traditions and the peculiarities of 
domestic media markets. However, a description of media pluralism is not to be found in national 
law either. For example, while throughout their case law national constitutional courts have 
established that media pluralism is a value inherently related to the exercise of freedom of 
expression and, as such, a necessary condition for the well functioning of a democratic society, they 
have refrained from providing a precise definition of the term.7 National legislators from across 
Europe have adopted the same approach.8 
 
 Nonetheless, descriptions of media pluralism can be found in numerous policy texts.9 Most 
comprehensively, the concept of media pluralism has been elaborated by the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and its advisory committees.10 Among other documents of a non-legally binding character, the 
Explanatory Memorandum of Recommendation No. R (99) 1 on Measures to Promote Media 
Pluralism, which was adopted by the  Committee of Ministers in 1999, refers to media 
pluralism as  
diversity of media supply, reflected, for example, in the existence of a plurality of 
independent and autonomous media (generally called structural pluralism) as well as a 
diversity of media types and contents (views and opinions) made available to the 
 [emphasis added].11  
The Memorandum correctly makes a distinction between diversity of media supply and diversity of 
media types and contents. This is because in media markets the former does not automatically 
guarantee the latter. 12  In other words, even if there are many structurally separated media 
organizations operating in a given market, this does not necessarily mean that these organizations 
will ensure that the audience members will have access to diverse ideas and/or that the needs of niche 
audiences will be catered to. One example that illustrates why diversity of supply should not be relied 
upon to achieve diversity of content and type is commercial free-to-air TV, which is mainly funded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. e law as well as the relevant case law of the 
Council of Europe see references in ibid., footnote 2.  
8 All Member States of the EU have adopted regulatory instruments that aim at safeguarding media pluralism. In some cases, the 
Constitution explicitly refers to media pluralism. Yet, to my knowledge, neither regulation nor the Constitutions in question define 
media pluralism  
9 For an EU perspective see, for instance, European Commission. Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market - An 
Assessment of the Need for Community Action. Green Paper COM (92) 480 final, and Commission Staff Working Document on Media 
Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32  
10 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 288 referring to Klimkiewicz, B. (2009). Is the Clash of Rationalities Leading Nowhere? Media 
Pluralism in European Regulatory Policies, 46. In Czepek, A., Melanie Hellwig, and Eva Nowak, Press Freedom and Pluralism in 
Europe: Concepts and Conditions. Bristol: Intellect 
11 Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (99) 1 on Measures to Promote Media Pluralism. Retrieved from: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=ExpRec(99)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&
BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383  
12 Empirical research has not provided definitive evidence on the relationship between supply and content diversity. However, 
traditional media regulation in support of media pluralism has used supply diversity-related measures as a proxy for content diversity. 
For more information on this issue see, for instance, Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 294-5 and Napoli, P. M. (1999). Deconstructing the 
Diversity Principle, Journal of Communication 49(4), 7-34 
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by advertisers. As free-to-air broadcasters depend on ad revenues, they usually opt for distributing 
programs that appeal to the masses with a view to attracting advertisers.13 This means that in practice 
they tend to either offer programming similar to what has already proven successful for a competitor 
or they recycle a program which received high audience ratings in the past, rather than invest in 
original programming with highly uncertain demand or programming which serves the needs of 
cultural or linguistic minorities and which attracts too small an audience to generate cost recovery 
revenues. As a result, companies in a competitive broadcasting market may be conducive to filling 
the same middle ground,14 in which case an anomaly may arise whereby a considerable amount of 
broadcasters does not lead to a varied offer, but rather to program duplication.15 Diversity of supply 
is therefore distinguished from diversity of types and contents because the relationship between the 
number of media organizations active in a given market and the range of content that is made 
available to consumers is not necessarily causal.16  
 
The dichotomy between supply and content diversity has not been the epicenter of the relevant 
standard-setting work of the Council of Europe only; 17  policymakers, 18  media regulators, 19 
competition authorities20  and constitutional courts 21  from across Europe have adopted the same 
distinction.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ariño, M. (2005). Regulation and Competition in European Digital Broadcasting - A study of pluralism through access, 58. PhD 
thesis. Florence: European University Institute 
14 Prosser, T. (2005). The limits of competition law: Markets and Public Services, 209. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
15  Craufurd-Smith, R. (2004). Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: The internal market, 
fundamental rights and European citizenship. European Law Review, 29(5), 653  
16 On the relationship between supply and content diversity see Part 3.a. 
17 See, for instance, Council of Europe. Recommendation No. R (99) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on measures to 
promote media pluralism; Recommendation No. R (2000) 23 on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the 
broadcasting sector and its Explanatory Memorandum Pluralism in the multi-channel market: suggestions for regulatory scrutiny 
(MM-S- PL(1999) 012def); Recommendation No. R (96) 10 on the guarantee of the independence of public service broadcasting and 
its Explanatory Memorandum, and Recommendation No. R (94) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on measures to 
promote media transparency 
18 This distinction has influenced media policy and law making in, for instance, Germany, Greece, Denmark and Belgium. See German 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), Articles 25(1) and 26(2); ELIAMEP (2010). MEDIADEM background 
information report on media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of European countries, the European Union and the 
Council of Europe: the case of Greece, 23; Greek Law 3592/2007 on media concentrations and licensing rules applicable to media 
organizations, Article 3(3); ELIAMEP (2010). MEDIADEM background information report on media policies and regulatory 
practices in a selected set of European countries, the European Union and the Council of Europe: the case of Denmark, 18 and 20; 
ELIAMEP (2011). MEDIADEM Case study report: Does media policy promote media freedom and independence? The case of 
Belgium, pp. 22 et seq. On a supranational level, see, for instance, Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the 
Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 5 
19 See, for instance, Ofcom (2010). Report on Public Interest test on the Proposed Acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc 
by News Corporation, paragraph 1.18. Retrieved from: http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/OfcomPITReport_NewsCorp-
BSkyB_31DEC2010.pdf  
20 See, for instance, UK Competition Commission (2007). Report on the Acquisition by BSkyB plc of 17.9% of the shares in ITV Plc 
sent to Secretary of State (BERR) of 14 December 2007, paragraph 30 
21 For a discussion of the relevant case law in a selected set of EU countries (France, Italy, Germany) see, for instance, Valcke, P. 
(2004), Digitale Diversiteit  Convergentie van Media-, Telecommunicatie- en Mededingingsrecht (Digital Diversity  Convergence of 
Media, Telecommunications and Competition Law), 127-148. Brussel: Larcier  
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However, this definition of pluralism, albeit accommodating certain particularities of the media 
markets (see above example of how advertising affects the diversity of content broadcast), is 
incomplete because it only takes account of the supply side.22 In other words, it is concerned with 
what media organizations provide, but not with what individuals really read and watch. Yet, if one 
accepts that the ultimate goal of any policy intervention to support media pluralism is at least23 
-informed decision-
making that is central to the democratic notion of effective self- 24 media pluralism 
cannot be properly conceptualized without regard to the amount and type of content that audiences 
access and engage with. This is simply because the diversity of sources and content actually 
consumed, also referred to as exposure or use diversity, may be different from the diversity of 
sources and content that is made available in the market.25 Actually, empirical studies show that the 
diversity provided does not coincide with the diversity consumed.26  
 
 The integration of exposure diversity considerations in media policies has always been 
important. As an economic policymaker needs to know how consumers react to price changes, a 
communications policymaker needs to know how audiences react to changes in their media system.27 
If not, there is the risk that a given regulatory instrument that seeks to safeguard (or otherwise 
affects) media pluralism is based upon false assumptions. In spite of the above, exposure diversity 
has largely been ignored thus far. This is so mainly for two reasons. First, traditional media 
policymaking has been based on the passive consumption theory according to which audiences are 
powerless to resist the persuasive messages that media carry.28 Second, in the past, due to high entry 
barriers relating to, inter alia, spectrum shortages and large upfront investments, the sources and 
content that found their way to the audiences were scarce.29 Hence, individuals were expected to 
consume most of what was offered.30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Klimkiewicz (2009), supra n. 10, 46 
23 Helberger notes that policy intervention in support of media pluralism may go 
sure 
diversity as a policy goal see Helberger, N. (2011). Diversity Label: Exploring the Potential and Limits of a Transparency Approach 
to Media Diversity. Journal of Information Policy, 1, pp. 345 et seq.  
24 Napoli, P. (2001, October). Diversity and Localism: A Policy Analysis Perspective, 4. Paper presented at an FCC Roundtable on 
Media Ownership. Retrieved from: http://transition.fcc.gov/ownership/roundtable_docs/napoli-stmt.pdf  
25 Ibid., 3-4  
26 See, for instance, Cooper, C. and Tang Tang (2009). 
An Empirical Integration of Active-Audience and Structural Theories. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 53(3), 400-418; 
Webster, J. G. (2005). Beneath the Veneer of Fragmentation: Television Audience Polarization in a Multi-Channel World. Journal of 
Communication 55(2), 366-382, and Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens the Gap in 
Political Knowledge and Turnout. American Journal of Political Science 49(3), 577-592 
27 Napoli, P. (2001), supra n. 24, 4 
28 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 304 
29 Helberger, N. (2011). . Journal of Information Policy 1, 242  
30 Goodman, E. (2004). Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets. 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 19, 1457 
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However, exposure diversity can no longer be marginalized. As a result of technological 
developments, there exist plenty of sources and content which individuals may now access, including 
pay-per-view services, blogs, wikis and online newspapers that operate alongside well-established 
media organizations. It is therefore becoming increasingly important to determine how audience 
members behave in an environment where content and sources are abundant. For example, do 
consumers continue to concentrate around a few familiar brands or do they actively look for diverse 
content? Has consumption of news content increased? If so, do new information sources play an 
important role in the public opinion-formation process? In addition, digital technologies allow 
citizens to comment on the content provided by mainstream media and/or establish their own outlets. 
The question then arises whether audience members use the media in order to actively engage in 
public discourse. If citizens indeed search for diverse information, consult with several sources and 
produce and distribute content on matters of common concern, then regulating the media to guarantee 
source and content diversity would not seem to be as important as it once was.  
 
 There is evidence that policymakers are increasingly starting to consider exposure diversity. 
For example, in its Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration of 1992, the European 
Commission (hereinafter the Commission), clearly focusing on the supply side, noted that diversity 
of informatio editorial content of the broadcasts or the press, 
according to the number of channels or titles, and according to the number of media controllers or 
owners 31  However, in its Staff Working Document Media Pluralism in the 
Member States of the EU, published in 2007, the Commission adopted a broader approach that 
arguably encompasses demand-
pluralism of ownership is important, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring media 
Ensuring media pluralism, in our understanding, implies all measures that ensure 
 to a variety of information sources, opinion, voices etc. in order to form their 
added].32  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 19 
32 Ibid., 5. Similar to the Staff Working Document, the Independent Study that followed it noted that pluralism is a multi-layered 
diversity of media supply, use and distribution, in relation to 1) ownership and control, 2) media types 
and g
exposure diversity-related indicators that the Independent Study 
online media for posting content relevant for political debate and the level of influence on political and public debate by bloggers. 
See European Commission (2009). Independent study on indicators for media pluralism in the Member States: Towards a risk-based 
approach, 5 and 106. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/study/final_report_09.pdf 
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Similar remarks can be made with respect to the approach followed by national policymakers. 
For example, in its 2010 report on the status of the Dutch media, media regulator Commissariat voor 
share per independent supplier is considered 
sources consumers consult. Even though there is an incredible amount of information available, 
actual exposure to a wide range of sources is not guaranteed  [emphasis added]. The report 
exposure diversity should also be measured for the 
news market  [emphasis added].33  
 
 This change of direction is welcomed because it (at least) seeks to ensure that media pluralism 
as a normative concept is adapted to the conditions that characterize the modern media ecosystem 
(whether the mere ability to get exposed to various sources and content has been used to justify (de-
)regulatory reforms that were not well-grounded will be discussed in more detail below). Similarly, 
this thesis, scripta in anni 2010-2015, acknowledges the importance of taking account of all three 
components, that is, diversity of suppliers, diversity of content and type, and diversity of exposure.  
 
These three components have been defined and further broken down into sub-components by 
Napoli and Valcke. More particularly, drawing on the goals that have been (or should be) pursued by 
the competent policymaker in the US, Napoli distinguishes between source, content and exposure 
diversity, and sub-categorizes each of these three dimensions as follows:  





1. Format/Program Type 
 
1. Horizontal 
2. Workforce 2. Demographic 2. Vertical 
 3. Idea/Viewpoint  
Source: Napoli (2001:2), Figure 1     
 
 
employed by the US media regulator, the Federal Communications Commission.34 The concept of 
source diversity is defined in terms of both outlet and content ownership.35 Indeed, outlet and content 
ownership do not necessarily coincide. For example, a TV channel may choose to distribute content 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Commissariat voor de Media (2011). MEDIAMONITOR  The Dutch Media in 2010, 90-91. Retrieved from 
http://www.mediamonitor.nl/dsresource?objectid=11689&type=org See also Ofcom (2012). Measuring Media Plurality, paragraph 1.3 
a) ensuring there is a diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across and within media 
enterprises and b) preventing any one media owner or voice having too much influence ov
[emphasis added]. Ofcom then referred to several parameters that would characterize an ideal plural outcome, including a variety of 
independent news media voices across all platforms and active multi-sourcing, that is, the consumption of a range of different news 
sources (see paragraph 3.22)  
34 Napoli, P.M. (2001), supra n. 24, 3  
35 Ibid.  
  
	   	   58	  
the broadcast rights of which it purchased from a film studio. Workforce diversity is defined in terms 
. 36  The second component, 
content diversity, is defined in terms of diversity of ideas/viewpoints, which refers to the diversity of 
political, social and cultural perspectives represented within the media, diversity of programs/types 
(e.g. drama, comedies, news programs, talk shows, etc.),37 and demographic diversity, which refers to 
the gender and ethnic composition of those represented in media content. 38  Finally, horizontal 
exposure diversity refers to the distribution of viewers/readers/users across all available content 
options whereas vertical exposure diversity refers to the diversity of content consumption within 
individual audience members.39 
 
Valcke identifies the same components, but makes a further distinction between a quantitative 
and qualitative sub-component in each of these three elements. 40  In 
quantitative refers to a simply numerical assessment of diversity whereas qualitative diversity of 
suppliers, product and use is determined by parameters such as religion, ethnicity, program type, 
etc.41 Listed below are some examples of how Valcke sub-categorizes each component: 
Source/Supplier/Provider 
Diversity 
Product/Content Diversity Exposure/Use Diversity 
Quantitative: How many 
independent owners are active in a 
given market? 
Quantitative: How many book 
titles are available in the market? 
Quantitative: How many news 
sources do online users consult on a 
daily basis? 
Qualitative: Are politicians 
prevented from owning media 
organizations? 
Qualitative: Does the State 
entrust a public service broadcasting 
organization with the task to offer 
programming that serves the needs of 
linguistic minorities? 
Qualitative: Can online users 
critically evaluate media content?  
  
distinction is particularly useful here because one of the main arguments put forward herein is that 
EU competition law, as applied to media markets, must be concerned with quantitative and 
uably 
relevant to a competition analysis. Take a merger between two competing free-to-air generalist TV 
channels by way of example. We assume that, post-merger, both channels continue to operate and 
that their programming remains the same. However, the merging firms decide to increase the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., 4. See also Napoli, P. M. (2011). Exposure Diversity Reconsidered. Journal of Information Policy 1, 247 
37 Napoli, P. M. (1999), supra n. 12, 18 and 22 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 5 
40  Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 291. Note that Valcke refers to source diversity, supplier diversity, and provider diversity 
interchangeably. She does the same with the notions of content diversity and product diversity on the one hand, and exposure diversity 
and use diversity on the other hand 
41 Ibid. 
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advertising/content ratio in their news programs. For the avoidance of confusion, we assume that, 
following this change, the amount of time devoted to different viewpoints post-merger is 
redistributed proportionately to reflect representation prior to the increase in the advertising/content 
ratio. 42  
representation remain essentially unchanged, the merger does not appear to adversely affect content 
diversity. However, if the amount of time devoted to the transmission of advertisements is a quality 
indicator that determines demand-side substitutability, the increase in the advertising/content ratio 
d as a decrease in qualitative content diversity. 
the EU. As a result, it takes account of policies, including and especially fixed book pricing 
mechanisms (aspect of quantitative content diversity) and State aid schemes in support of public 
broadcasting organizations (aspect of qualitative content diversity), which have not played an 
important normative role in the U.S. system. The policies that the Commission has developed vis-à-
vis fixed book pricing arrangements and State aid measures in support of public broadcasters will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 5 and 7 respectively. Given the focus of this thesis on EU competition 
law, the reader will be able to better understand where the Commission positions itself in respect of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For example, before the merger, left wing politicians would get a 5 minute coverage whereas right wing politicians a 10 minute 
coverage. Post-merger, left wing politicians get a 2.5 minute coverage whereas right wing politicians a 5 minute coverage 
43 Ofcom (2012), supra n. 33, 9 
44 Ibid., 9-10 
  






Having explained what my approach to media pluralism as a normative concept is, I will now 
examine whether policy intervention to support this value is still needed.  
 
3. Assumption no. 1: Media concentration is no longer a problem  The market 
will provide   
  
Media policymakers and commentators alike are increasingly putting forward the argument that 
the proliferation of sources and content that citizens can now access and engage with resolves the 
problems originating from a concentration of ownership that were pervasive in the traditional media 
landscape. With the amount of information that citizens now have at their fingertips, they say, rules 
aimed at addressing concentration of ownership are becoming obsolete. This view is progressively 
being integrated in media regulation, the most blatant example being the trend towards relaxation (or 
abolition) of ownership restrictions that has emerged over the past few years. This part discusses 
whether digital technologies have indeed rendered concerns about media concentration superfluous. I 
first explain the economic and political reasons why traditional media markets in Europe are 
concentrated as well as the implications of concentration for pluralism. After introducing the reader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. See also Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) (2013). European Union Competencies in Respect of Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom, 13. Retrieved from: http://cmpf.eui.eu/Documents/CMPFPolicyReport2013.pdf 
46 See Craufurd-Smith, R. and Damian Tambini (2012). Measuring Media Plurality in the United Kingdom: Policy Choices and 
Regulatory Challenges. Journal of Media Law, 4(1), 54: although news is centrally important for the democratic process and plays a 
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to the main issues related to concentration of ownership, I 
 such as TV broadcasters and newspapers, has indeed taken place and if not, whether 
communicative abundance in the digital environment ensures a balance of opinion-forming power.  
 
3.1. Why are traditional media markets in Europe concentrated?  
 
Traditional media markets have a natural tendency to concentration. This has been confirmed 
by empirical studies that have examined the structure of the media industry in Europe and beyond.47  
 
The reasons why traditional media markets have high concentration ratios 
are manifold and strongly linked to an array of obstacles that make it difficult for 
new businesses to break through and compete effectively with well-established media organizations. 
ay of example: launching a TV channel requires compliance 
with sector-specific rules that determine the number of competitors in a given market. More 
particularly, television broadcasting has traditionally been subject to a licensing regime; due to 
spectrum shortages, governments across the European Union have adopted laws regulating how 
much of the usable frequency shall be used for broadcasting as well as the broadcast power and 
locations of broadcast licenses.48 Moreover, the new entrant needs to make an exceptionally large 
investment to set up operations and pay start-up losses.49 This initial investment includes investment 
in premium content, that is, content that has the capacity to attract mass audiences (e.g. Hollywood 
blockbusters and major sporting competitions). Purchasing premium content is a daunting task and 
may amount to an entry barrier not only because the rights holders usually charge the licensees 
excessive prices, but also because the content in question is often controlled by already existing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, for instance, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (2012). Indagine conoscitiva sul settore della raccolta pubblicitaria 
(Allegato A alla delibera 551/12CONS). Retrieved from: http://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/1/document/bd184d98-cdcd-41e1-
b141-9864dcfba8d6, and Ward, D.,  (2004). Mapping Study of Media Concentration and 
Ownership in Ten European Countries. Retrieved from: http://77.87.161.246/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/A-Mapping-Study-of-
Media-Concentration-and-Ownership-in-Ten-European-Countries.pdf In addition to the above, other studies that examine the 
phenomenon of media concentration are, for instance: Open Society Institute (2005). Television across Europe - Monitoring Report; 
Council of Europe (2002). Media Diversity in Europe. Report prepared by - Advisory Panel to the CDMM on media concentrations, 
pluralism and diversity questions. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/H-APMD(2003)001_en.pdf; 
European Federation of Journalists (2005). Media power in Europe: The big picture of ownership. For the study of the phenomenon of 
media concentration in non-European markets see, for instance, Mastrini, G. and Martin Becerra (2011). Estructura, concentración y 
transformaciones en los medios del Cono Sur latinoamericano. Scientific Journal of Media Literacy, 36, 51-59, and Noam, E.M. 
(2009). Media ownership and concentration in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
48 Picard, R. G. and Bum Soo Chon (2004). Managing Competition Through Barriers to Entry and Channel Availability in the 
Changing Regulatory Environment. The International Journal on Media Management 6(3), 168-170. See also Communication on the 
application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraph 1 
49 See, for instance, European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 115 
and y 
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broadcasters through long-term exclusive agreements.50 Competition authorities have attempted to 
address foreclosure concerns relating to exclusivity by imposing remedies, most notably by requiring 
the broadcasters involved in the transaction under scrutiny to reduce the duration and/or scope of 
exclusivity. 51  However, these attempts have largely failed to ensure that the market for the 
acquisition of premium content remains open to competition.52 Another barrier to market entry is the 
presence of public broadcasting organizations. The activities of these organizations are generously 
supported by State funds, an advantage which commercial startups do not enjoy.53 The amount of 
discourage a potential competitor from launching a channel. The mechanisms several Member States 
have set up in order to ensure that public service broadcasters do not misuse State funds are not 
entirely transparent or fair vis-à-vis commercial providers, and State aid proceedings before the 
European Commission take several years to complete.54 
switching costs, that is, costs incurred as a result of changing suppliers, is another obstacle difficult to 
overcome. For example, in the case of satellite TV, if existing operators do not provide 
interoperability, consumers may refrain from changing to a new channel aggregator in order to avoid 
buying a new set-top box (the satellite receiver). 55  Switching costs can also be psychological; 
audience members have long-established content consumption habits that are strongly associated 
with existing providers. For example, in the case of a broadcaster, this may be a popular soap opera 
or a trusted anchorman. In the case of newspapers, one of the main factors determining customer 
loyalty is family heritage.56 This makes the creation of new viewing and reading patterns a slow 
process that may demand years of unprofitable wait.57  
 
In addition to the above, media content has high first-copy 
costs (e.g. labor costs, purchase of equipment, promotion and 
brand-development costs, etc.). 58  But, once the provider has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 These agreements usually include holdback and pre-emption rights. For a detailed analysis of the entry barriers relating to premium 
content acquisition see Geradin, D. (2005). Access to content by new media platforms: A review of the competition law problems. 
European Law Review 30(1), 68-94 
51  See, for instance, Commission decision Joint Selling of the Media Rights of the FA Premier League (FAPL) (Case 
COMP/C.2/38.173) [2006] OJ L 176/104, paragraph 16 and Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ 
L 110/73, paragraph 225 
52 For a detailed analysis of access to premium content-related remedies see Chapter 3, Part 2.a. and Chapter 4, Parts 3.b. and 4.c. 
53 Spector, D. (2007). The economic policy of State aids: The assessment criteria. In Vivier, X. (ed.). Competition Policy in the EU-
Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome, 179-180. Oxford: OUP 
54 For a critical analysis of how the State aid rules have been applied to the broadcasting sector see Chapter 7 
55 OECD (2003). Policy Roundtable on Media Mergers, 22 
56 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 231 
57 Picard, R. G. and Bum Soo Chon (2004), supra n. 48, 171 
58 OECD (2003), supra n. 55, 21. See also Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 30 1433-4. For example, in 2009, the New York Times 
reportedly spent $63 million per quarter on raw materials and $148 million on wages and benefits. See Carlson, N. Printing The NYT 
Costs Twice As Much As Sending Every Subscriber A Free Kindle. 30 January 2009, Business Insider. Retrieved from: 
High production costs + low 
distribution costs=Economies of 
scale=Integration 
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produced the content, the incremental cost to an additional consumer is low.59 For example, in the 
case of newspapers, costs incurred in newsgathering, and the acquisition and preparation of the 
printing mechanism are necessary to create even one copy. However, the next copies may be 
produced at negligible marginal costs (e.g. the paper and ink to print an additional newspaper).60 The 
fact that media content is very expensive to create but fairly cheap to deliver incentivizes media 
companies to expand into every possible distribution platform and succeeding and/or preceding 
levels of the supply chain61 because it gives them the opportunity to exploit large economies of scale 
and scope. By enabling established firms to rationalize resources, reduce transaction costs and spread 
the related risks, large economies of scale and scope stimulate horizontal (expansion at the same level 
of the supply chain, e.g. television broadcaster merges with television broadcaster), vertical 
(expansion at different levels of the supply chain, e.g. television broadcaster acquires film studio) 
and/or diagonal (diversification into new business areas, e.g. newspaper diversifies into magazine 
publishing)62 integration.  
 
 Another element that reinforces the tendency of traditional media 
markets to concentration is their two-sided nature. A two-sided market is generally 
or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of 
63 Two-sided platforms arise in cases in which there are externalities and in which transaction 
costs do not allow the two sets of agents to address the externality directly.64 The platform is the 
intermediary that solves the externality by minimizing the costs that a transaction between entities 
belonging to these groups of agents would entail.65 The type of two-sided markets in which several 
types of traditional media are active is advertising-based media. Advertising-based media use the 
content they provide to attract audiences and then sell access to these audiences to advertisers.66 
Therefore, in order to generate profit, they must engage both the audience members (through the 
provision of attractive content) and the advertisers (through the provision of a large pool of audience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/printing-the-nyt-costs-twice-as-much-as-sending-every-subscriber-a-free-
kindle?IR=T#ixzz3PXgJfaiY 
59 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 30, 1432-1434 
60 Norton, S. W. and Will Norton Jr. (1986). Economies of Scale and the New Technology of Daily Newspapers: A Survivor Analysis. 
University of Nebraska  Lincoln College of Journalism & Mass Communications, Working Paper 6 
61 Doyle, G. (2002). Media Ownership: The Economics and Politics of Convergence and Concentration in the UK and European 
Media, 4. London: Sage Publications 
62 Ibid., 4-5 
63 Rysman, M. (2009). The Economics of Two-sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3), 125 
64 Evans, D.S. and Richard Schmalensee (2007). Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms. Competition Policy 
International 3, 154 
65  OECD (2009). Policy Roundtable Report on Two-Sided Markets, 11-12. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf  
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members to whom advertisers can address their ads). The relationship between these two sets of 
agents is characterized by indirect network effects67 
68 This means in practice that the broadcaster with the largest audience 
base or the newspaper with the highest circulation will tend to attract more advertisers. The more 
revenues decline. The fewer advertisers the latter attract, the less resources they have at their disposal 
to produce or acquire attractive content. This leads to a decline in audience which causes a further 
drop in advertisers. Charging less for ad space is not the solution to the problem because advertisers 
are not so interested in paying lower prices as in reaching as many viewers/readers as possible. As a 
result of the above, smaller firms find themselves in a downward spiral, which, if it does not 
eventually crowd them out, at least results in one or very few providers enjoying significant market 
power.69  
 
It bears noting that the relationship between each of the above characteristics and concentration 
varies from medium to medium. For example, compared against newspapers and television, 
magazines and radio have low first-copy costs.70 Moreover, producing a TV series is more expensive 
than producing a newspaper, but distributing a newspaper is more expensive than distributing a TV 
series.71 However, these differences cannot be relied upon to draw definitive conclusions regarding 
which sector is more concentrated than others. For example, radio has lower first-copy and lower 
distribution costs than newspapers, but newspaper markets in the Netherlands and Italy are less 
concentrated than radio markets.72 This means that a policymaker that seeks to address concerns 
relating to (mono- and cross-media) concentration of ownership, including market foreclosure and 
threats to pluralism, needs to understand the role that each of the above parameters plays in the 
market under scrutiny in order to be able to select the best course of action (e.g. what are the most 
appropriate remedies in a merger transaction, how should a regulatory instrument be designed in 
order to lower entry barriers, etc.).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 OECD (2003), supra n. 55, 21 and 26. Network effects arise in situations where the size of one group of agents has an impact on 
another group of agents. See OECD (2012), Policy Roundtable on Market Definition, 54. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf For instance, the number of audience members that watch a given 
channel has a positive impact on the advertisers in that more audience members increase the possibilities that their ads will be watched 
thereby possibly leading to a profitable transaction 
68 Caillaud, B. and Bruno Jullien (2003). Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers. RAND Journal of 
Economics 34(2), 309 328 
69 OECD (2003), supra n. 55, 21 
70  Bardoel, J. and Jan van Cuilenburg (2008). Strategic Media Management. In Fourier, P. J. (ed.). Media Studies  Policy, 
Management and Media Representation (2nd edition), 176. Cape Town: Juta & Co. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ward, D., Armo (2004), supra n. 47, 8 and 13 
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Besides the economic rationales 
movement for consolidation, a series of national and supranational 
policies have facilitated, if not encouraged, media concentration across the EU. First, in 1989, the 
Television Without Frontiers (now Audiovisual Media Services or AVMS73) Directive74 was adopted 
with the aim to liberalize the broadcasting (and, after the AVMS Directive entered into force, 
audiovisual media) markets. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, pursuant to the Directive, for an 
audiovisual media provider to operate across the whole of the EU, it suffices that it complies with the 
rules of the Member State from which it emanates (country of origin principle).75 This rule has 
played a major role in the expansion of media undertakings into other countries. While less than 
eighty-five cross-border television channels existed in 1989, by November 2008, at least 650 
channels targeted the market of a Member State other than the country of establishment.76 Combined 
with the increasing acceptance of generic formats such as reality TV programs and comedy series, 
which has reduced cultural barriers, liberalization allowed (formerly purely national) media groups to 
grow significant business outside their primary markets.77 The expansion of media undertakings into 
the markets of other Member States has also been facilitated by a wave of deregulation. National 
governments have gradually been abolishing or relaxing ownership rules in order to attract new 
investors and ultimately become more competitive vis-à-vis third countries.78 Deregulation is also the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L 332/27 
74  Council Directive 89/442/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (Television Without Frontiers 
Directive) [1989] OJ L 298/23 
75 See Audiovisual Media Services Directive, supra n., 73, Articles 2 and 3 
76 European Commission, Seventh report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the , 3 
COM (2009) 309 final 
77 Council of Europe (2004). Transnational media concentrations in Europe. Report prepared by the Advisory Panel to the CDMM on 
media concentrations, pluralism and diversity questions, 7. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.org.rs/REPOSITORY/133_-
aapmd2rev5.2004--report-transnational-media-concentrations_205-.pdf On this issue see also Commission Staff Working Document 
on Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, SEC (2007) 32, 9; Communication on the application of State aid 
rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraph 22, and Harcourt, A. (2004). 
Institution-driven competition: The regulation of cross-border broadcasting in the EU. European University Institute Working Papers, 
RSCAS No. 2004/44, 1. Retrieved from: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/04_44.pdf   
78 Since the early 1980s, the governments of several European countries such as the UK, Finland, Greece, Italy and Bulgaria have been 
promoting deregulation in the media industry. For more information on the process of liberalization and deregulation see, for instance, 
ELIAMEP (2010). MEDIADEM background information report on media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of 
European countries, the EU and the Council of Europe. Retrieved from: http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/BIR.pdf For example, during the consultation on media ownership rules that preceded the adoption of the 
are 
committed to a deregulatory approach to media markets. From a commercial point of view, further liberalization would benefit 
existing and potential new investors, providing for further consolidation, greater efficiency, more scope for investment, and a more 
significant international pr Consultation on Media Ownership 
Rules
rules might hinder European c Commission Staff Working Document on Media pluralism in 
the Member States of the European Union, SEC (2007) 32, 9 
Liberalization/Deregulation 
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outcome of initiatives which supranational policymakers undertook throughout the 1990s with a view 
79  the denationalization of the processes of media 
production and distribution was largely pushed by the International Monetary Fund and other 
international regulatory bodies. 80  Finally, the European Commission, which has exclusive 
competence to decide whether a concentration of a Union dimension is compatible or not with the 
common market,81 has adopted a very tolerant approach to the expansion plans of undertakings, 
including U.S. firms that provide media services across the EU. Since the Merger Regulation entered 
into force, only six concentrations affecting the traditional media sector were prohibited, 82 out of a 
total of 161 operations that sought regulatory approval.83 In some cases, the Commission has gone so 
far as to clear transactions in spite of the fact that clearance would lead to a near-monopoly in the 
affected markets.84  
 
3.2. What is the impact of media concentration on pluralism? 
 
Diversity of ownership or control over media organizations is the dimension that has received 
the most attention 85  in regulation supporting media pluralism, both across 86  and beyond 87  the 
European Union. Ensuring that significant opinion-forming power is not concentrated in the hands of 
a few has been (or, at least until recently, was) a priority because of the presumed negative effects of 
concentration on media pluralism.88 To quote Lord MacIntosh of Haringey, former UK Minister for 
is that it would be 
dangerous for any person to control too much of the media because of his or her ability to influence 
opinions and set the political agenda 89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Doyle, G. (2002), supra n. 61, 2 
80  See Arsenault, A.H. and Manuel Castells (2008). The Structure and Dynamic of Global Multi-Media Business Networks, 
International Journal of Communication, 2, 708 711 
81 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation) OJ L 24/1, Article 4(1) 
82  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result Note that this list has omitted Commission 
decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1  
83 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
84 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 140 
85 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 291  
86 The relevant measures that the EU Member States have adopted vary. For instance, some Member States impose limitations on the 
number of licenses that may be held by the same person whereas others impose limitations on the total amount of audience, capital, or 
market shares that a single person, natural or legal, can control. For an overview of the different systems see Valcke, P. (2009). From 
Ownership Regulation to Legal Indicators of Media Pluralism: Background, Typologies, and Methods. Journal of Media Business 
Studies 6(3), 19-42  
87 For instance, media ownership is regulated in the U.S. and Australia. For an overview of the U.S. rules see the website of the 
Federal Communications Commission, at: http://www.fcc.gov/guides/review-broadcast-ownership-rules whereas for an overview of 
the Australian framework see the website of the Parliament of Australia, at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/mediareg
ulation  
88 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 291  
89 Ofcom (2010), supra n. 19, 17 
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Saying that every media concentration is always only harmful to pluralism is not accurate. 
Depending on the circumstances, a concentration may have some positive effects on media pluralism. 
For example, if a mainstream publisher acquires a niche publisher that is on the verge of bankruptcy, 
or headed for some serious financial difficulties, an outlet that offers alternative content survives. 
Similarly, a merger between two local newspapers that keep their editorial departments separate post-
merger may enhance pluralism if the advertising market is so small that it cannot sustain both 
newspapers.90 A merger between two local broadcasters may lead to the creation of a strong national 
player with a program offer that is different from the generic programming of competing 
multinational broadcasters.  
 
However, experience shows that a concentration is highly likely to have negative consequences 
for pluralism.91 From a purely economic perspective, a concentration increases the incentive to crowd 
out competing content suppliers. Take vertical mergers affecting broadcasting markets for example  
in several cases where competition authorities found that the merged entity would enjoy significant 
power in the upstream market for the purchase of premium content, they imposed upon the involved 
firms the obligation to sublicense the acquired content to competitors post-merger.92  However, in the 
vast majority of cases, the merged entities deprived other broadcasters of the ability to effectively 
compete in the downstream market for TV audiences. 93  Equally ineffective were sublicensing 
mechanisms establishing the duty to grant access to infrastructure that is essential to competition but 
cannot feasibly be duplicated (e.g. a cable network).94 These examples illustrate that a vertically 
integrated firm with access to a valuable input will do everything within its power to foreclose the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 8. Note that in the U.S. 
this is encouraged under the Newspaper Preservation Act, U.S. Code, Title 15, Chapter 43 
91 The examples here concern the impact of an individual operation on media pluralism. As regards the impact of a concentrated 
market structure, there are studies that found that the more concentrated the sector, the less pluralistic the media landscape. See, for 
instance, Humphreys, P. (1996). Mass media and media policy in Western Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Einstein, 
M. (2002). Media Diversity: Economics, Ownership, and the FCC. New York: Routledge, and La Porte Alfaro, M. T. and Teresa 
Sabada (2001). Globalization of the Media Industry and Possible Threats to Cultural Diversity  A Study prepared for the European 
Parliament. Final Study. Working document for the STOA Panel. There are also studies that did not manage to identify a relationship 
between ownership concentration and media pluralism, especially content diversity, in quantitative terms. See, for instance, Berry, S. 
and Joel Waldfogel (2001). Do mergers increase product variety? Evidence from radio broadcasting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
116, 1009-1025 and Ward, D. (2006). Final Report on the Study Commissioned by the MC-S-MD - The Assessment of Content 
Diversity in Newspapers and Television in the Context of Increasing Trends Towards Concentration of Media Markets, MC-S-MD 
(2006) 001, 4. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.  However, even in the latter case, there are qualitative parameters, and in particular 
parameters that determine whether the power that goes with ownership is used to direct editorial decisions, which are key to 
understanding whether concentration harms pluralism (e.g. are politicians prevented from owning a media outlet? Does the owner 
promote a self-censorship approach to the issues journalists working for the outlet cover?). These parameters have been the subject of 
other studies (see infra n. 103) 
92 For an analysis of sublicensing mechanisms imposed by the European Commission see Chapter 3, Part 2.a. and Chapter 4, Part 3.b. 
For an analysis of sublicensing mechanisms imposed by national competition authorities see Ofcom (2009). Wholesale must-offer 
remedies: International examples 
93 Ibid. 
94 On this issue see Chapter 4, Part 4.c. 
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market to other content providers, potentially harming supply diversity. An integrated media 
organization may also negatively impact content diversity, most notably through decisions relating to 
same content across all titles held in common ownership in order to reduce the costs incurred in the 
newsgathering process.95  
 
From a non-economic perspective, concentration may have adverse effects on pluralism when 
individuals controlling several (and/or popular) media seek to promote a certain political agenda; 
history is full of examples of media moguls, often linked to political parties, that have used the 
opinion-forming power of their outlets in order to protect their own interests, rather than to expose 
the audiences to opposing viewpoints or inconvenient truths.96 These individuals have interfered with 
journalistic autonomy either directly (by literally making day-to-day editorial decisions) or indirectly 
(e.g. by appointing only like-minded people or by creating a spirit of obedience that leads to self-
censorship).97 Practices undermining the editorial independence of the media are facilitated by a 
number of lacunae in the applicable legal framework of several Member States, including the 
absence of transparency rules requiring media firms to publish their ownership structure98 and/or the 
absence of rules preventing political parties from holding broadcast licenses or running newspapers.99  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Doyle, G. (2002), supra n. 
(2005:431) not
Brand loyalties: rethinking content within global corporate media, Media, Culture & Society, 27(3), 415 435 
96 ions 
e
only that there was a bigger swing to the right (3.5 percent more) among Berlusconi viewers than in the electorate in general, but also 
that this swing could not be explained by the fact that viewers of Berlusconi channels were already more right wing. Viewers of these 
channels were found to be middle of the road and only shifted their voting after Owen, B. 
(2006). The tragedy of broadcast regulation, 82. In Hassan, R. and Julian Thomas (eds.), The New Media Theory Reader. Berkshire 
UK: Open University Press. Berlusconi won these and subsequent elections with numerous supranational initiatives stressing that Italy 
was (and still is) in desperate need of effective regulation addressing the conflict of interest that arises in cases where a politician may 
own shareholdings in media organizations. See, for instance, EU Network of Independent Experts on Human Rights (2003). Report on 
the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002, 110; European Parliament Resolution of 
April 22, 2004 on the risks of violations, in the EU and especially in Italy, of freedom of expression and information (2003/2237(INI)). 
Similar remarks can be made when an owner uses the outlet to promote a certain corporate agenda. A good example is the following: 
Until recently, UK newspapers the Times and the Sun, which belong to media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, had a favorable attitude 
n return approval to acquire the 61% of the stock 
that he did not already own in BSkyB. Both newspapers changed attitude though after Cameron announced his decision to appoint a 
judge to investigate a phone hacking scandal involving another Murdoch newspaper, News of the World. For more information on this 
case see, for instance, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/resources/dossier-media-plurality/ See also Burns, J. F. and Alan 
Cowell. Cameron Defends Handling of Murdoch Bid to Take Over Sky Broadcasting. New York Times, 25 May 2012. Retrieved 
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/world/europe/e-mail-shows-murdoch-bid-maneuvering.html?_r=0; Holton, K. UK's 
Cameron defends role in Murdoch takeover deal. 25 May 2012, Reuters. Retrieved from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/25/britain-hacking-cameron-idUSL5E8GP7PN20120525, and Simons, N. Rupert Murdoch 
Uses Twitter To Attack David Cameron Over Donor Row. 26 March 2012, The Huffington Post. Retrieved from: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/03/26/rupert-murdoch-turns-on-david-cameron-over-cash-for-access-
allegations_n_1379057.html  
97 Doyle, G. (2002), supra n. 61, 19-20 
98 OSCE (2003). The Impact of Media Concentration on Professional Journalism, 56 
99 Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 6-7  
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3.3. Is concentration in traditional media markets still a concern? 
 
The concern that traditional media organizations may impair the fair and free flow of 
information is still pervasive in the EU. This is so for the following three reasons.  
 
First, as discussed above, because the economics of media markets encourages, if not dictates, 
concentration, and because policymakers have become more permissive vis-à-vis ownership 
restrictions, traditional media markets in Europe are already concentrated. Evidence suggests that a 
shift to disintegration is unlikely to occur: In 2014, the European Commission alone received (and 
approved) thirteen merger notifications in the traditional media sector.100 This is approximately 30% 
more than the (traditional media) merger transactions that sought EU regulatory approval in 2013.101 
On a national level, over the past five years, several Member States (e.g., the UK, Spain, the 
Netherlands, etc.) have further relaxed their mono- and cross-media ownership rules. 102  These 
developments cannot be expected to reduce the ability and incentive of powerful media organizations 
to engage in practices undermining journalistic autonomy. To the contrary, as a result of this 
tolerance towards concentration, there has reportedly been a rise in political ownership -in some 
cases clandestine- as well as a resurgence of .103 
 
most popular medium in the EU and radio the second most popular.104 In terms of use, written press 
comes fourth (after the Internet), but a considerable percentage of Europeans (33%) continue to read 
newspapers every day, or almost every day.105 For the purposes of this study, it bears noting that 
: 
t
affairs.106 Moreover, recent qualitative research showed that television continues to have the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Search by NACE Code, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
101 Ibid., see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
102 See Open Society Foundations (2012). Mapping Digital Media in the European Union - A Report for the High-Level Group on 
Media Freedom and Pluralism, 2. Retrieved from: 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Mapping_Digital_Media_EU_20121217_0.pdf; Ofcom (2009). Report on 
Media Ownership Rules, pp. 21 et seq., and Freedom House (2013). Report on Spain. Retrieved from: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/spain#.VMJr_M016eY  
103 Open Society Foundations (2012), supra n. 102, 2. Similarly, the 2012 MEDIADEM Report found that, in their effort to be loyal to 
. See 
ELIAMEP (2012), MEDIADEM Comparative Report on Media freedom and Independence in 14 European countries, 146-147. 
Retrieved from: http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/D3.1.pdf  
104 European Commission (2013). Media Use in the European Union, 5 and 9. According to the Commission, the average European 
watches up to 4 hours a day. See http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm 
105 Ibid., 11 
106 Ibid., 37 and 41 
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impact on public opinion due to its immersive audiovisual qu 107 The 
popularity of this medium combined with the great influence it may exert on viewers has 
underpinned the methodologies that media regulators have designed and employed in recent years to 
measure media pluralism; TV is (arguably correctly) assigned far greater weight than other media.108  
 
Third, as the analysis below will demonstrate, the new media environment has not created a 
a outlets. 
Put simply, new media have not yet fully addressed the concerns relating to the excessive opinion-
 
 
3.4. The advent of digital media: Is concentration no longer a problem?  
 
Among the many developments that have occurred over the past few years, two technologies 
have had a particularly significant impact on the media marketplace, namely the introduction of 
Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) and the Internet.109 Digital television is a new broadcasting 
technology that is gradually replacing the traditional analogue model. In analogue broadcasting, the 
signal takes the form of a continuous wave whereas digital technology converts analog signals into a 
binary code of zeros and ones.110 One of the main advantages of digital broadcasting is that it releases 
spectrum, the so-called digital dividend; due to advanced compression, the technology may transmit 
eight digital TV channels using the same amount of spectrum needed to transmit one analogue TV 
channel. As for the Internet, not only does it provide unlimited space, but it also allows the 
production and distribution of content at (almost) no cost.111   
 
These technologies have marked the beginning of the end of the spectrum scarcity era and 
significantly lowered the barriers that new providers need to overcome in order to penetrate the 
market. 112  As a result, new information sources have proliferated. Despite the fact that both 
technologies are relatively new (the Internet started an expansion to Europe less than fifteen years 
ago and most of the Member States have only recently completed the digital switchover, that is, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 See, for instance, Ofcom (2012), supra n. 33, 14 
108 Ibid. See also Ofcom (2010). supra n. 19, 
media. For an overview and criticism of the methodology see, for instance, Hill, B. C. (2006). Measuring media market diversity: 
concentration, importance, and pluralism. Federal Communications Law Journal, 58, 169-194 
109 CMPF (2013), supra n. 35, 27, and Council of Europe (2002), supra n. 47, 26, paragraph 101  
110  European Commission (2006). Digital Interactive Television: Frequently Asked 
Questions, Memo/06/60. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-06-60_en.htm  
111 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 5 
112 CMPF (2013), supra n. 35, 27 
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transition from analogue to digital broadcasting113), relevant figures are impressive: in the period 
2003-2004, when the first major steps for the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting were 
made, 860 channels with potential national coverage were broadcast across Europe,114 whereas in 
2010, according to the Commission, there were 7,500 broadcasters available across the EU.115 As 
regards the Internet, raw data merely gives us an idea of the amount of information that may be found 
online. For example, the Report on User-Created-Content: Supporting a Participative Information 
Society notes that over 160 billion videos were produced and shared by Internet users in 2012 
alone.116 
 
This revolution has sparked a polarized debate about whether the long-standing concern over 
concentration of ownership has subsided.117 
who are enthusiastic about the effects of new technologies on media pluralism, argue that, since the 
fear that certain players will take advantage of technical or economic scarcity to dominate the 
marketplace has diminished, the circumstances for the creation of a pluralistic media environment are 
more favorable now than ever before. Digital media, the media optimists say, have made access to 
the audiences easy and cheap118 whereas new horizontal networks, the development of which was 
prompted by the Internet, facilitate the multimodal exchange of interactive messages from many to 
many.119 According to the optimists, due to accessibility, affordability and interactivity, cultural and 
social boundaries are increasingly dissolving, 120  and insurgent politics can now intervene more 
decisively in the new communication space.121 These changes, they believe, will ultimately dismantle 
the power held by the traditional media system where news production is defined by the interaction 
-mainstream 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 While the European Commission suggested that that the beginning of 2012 be agreed for switch-off in all Member States, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria were expected to complete digital switchover by 2014 whereas Romania is scheduled to complete the 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24223a_en.htm with links to related documents 
114 European Commission. Fifth Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions , SEC 
(2006) 160, 4. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0049&from=EN 
115 European Commission. First Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
 COM (2012) 203 final, 3 
116 Helberger, N., Guibault, L. and Janssen E. H. (2012). User-Created-Content: Supporting a Participative Information Society. 
Understanding the Digital World. Final Report 2008 Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-32, 80-81 
117 For a comprehensive overview of the arguments put forward by media optimists and those supported by media pessimists see 
Karppinen, K. (2009). Rethinking media pluralism and communicative abundance. Observatorio Journal 3(4), 151-169 
118 Compaine, B.M. and Douglas Gomery (2000). Who owns the media? Competition and concentration in the mass media industry, 
575. Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates  
119 Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. International Journal of Communication 1, 
247  
120 McNair, B. (2006). Power in a Globalized World, 6. London: Routledge 
121 Castells, M. (2007), supra n. 119, 248 
  
	   	   72	  
political actors can set the political agenda.122 
digital media have fallen short of resolving issues relating to concentration of power in the hands of 
very few gatekeepers. New technologies, they say, are stuck in old hierarchies that still determine the 
amount and type of content ultimately reaching the citizens. 123  These hierarchies use new 
technologies either to protect and promote certain political interests124 or, taking advantage of the 
increasing acceptance of generic format content, to maximize profit.125 The pessimists also distrust 
new media businesses which are increasingly playing a major role in finding and selecting content 
that is (or should be) of interest to the user; they believe that these businesses create new silos of 
information instead of breaking down the old ones.126  
 
Regulatory reforms that took place over the past decade suggest that the optimists have greatly 
influenced modern media policymaking. For example, in 2003, the Federal Communications 
Commission approved new media ownership rules that allowed TV broadcasters to reach 45% of the 
national audience, an increase of 10% from the previous restrictions.127 The document outlining the 
have more 
choices, more sources of news and information, and more varied entertainment programming 
via the Internet, Americans can access virtually any 
gatekeepers 128 Similarly, in its report on the status of Dutch media in 2010, Commissariat voor de 
 wave of deregulation in ownership rules seems to go through Europe. This also 
applies to the Netherlands where the Temporary Act Media Concentration was repealed as of the first 
of January 2011. The increasing amount of news sources is one of the reasons why concerns about 
media diversity gradually seem to move away from measures which aim to secure a minimal number 
of players in a market added]. 129 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Williams, B. A. and Michael X. Delli Carpini (2004). Monica and Bill all the time and everywhere: The collapse of gatekeeping 
and agenda setting in the new media environment. American Behavioral Scientist, 47(9), 1213  
123 Hindman, M. (2008). The Myth of Digital Democracy, 18. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
124 Braman S. (2004). Where Has Media Policy Gone? Defining the Field in the Twenty-First Century. Communication Law and 
Policy, 9(2), 153-182 
125 Council of Europe (2004). supra n. 77, 25-26; Fenton, N. (2010). Drowning or Waving? New Media, Journalism and Democracy. 
In Fenton, N. (ed.), New Media, Old News. Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age, 3-16. London: Sage 
126 Verhulst, S. (2007). Mediation, Mediators and New Intermediaries. Implications for the Design of New Communications Policies, 
113-137. In Napoli, P. M. (ed.). Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
127 For an overview and critical analysis of these changes see, for instance, Miller, D. S. (2004). Limits on Media Ownership: Should 
the FCC Curb Its Reliance on Deregulation? U. ILL. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y, 2, 345-367. For an overview of the currently applicable rules 
see: http://www.fcc.gov/guides/review-broadcast-ownership-rules  
128 Federal Communications Commission (2003). Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 03-127, points 3 and 4 
129 Commissariat voor de media (2011), supra n. 33, 6. See also Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the 
Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 4 and 15-16: The European Commission has taken the stance that the adoption of pan-
European media ownership rules would not be appropriate, inter alia the Internet [allows] licensed media and unlicensed 
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The assumption on which the aforementioned regulatory reforms are based is arguably not 
well-grounded, for a numerical increase in sources and content has not made concerns relating to 
media concentration disappear with a magic yardstick. I am certainly not saying that the media 
ownership rules that were repealed or relaxed were well-designed and effectively implemented and 
that therefore they should continue to apply. Nevertheless, and without undermining the role that they 
may play (or have already played) in reducing the power held by old gatekeepers, I am skeptical 
about whether, in the absence of ownership restrictions,130 digital media can indeed reach their full 
potential. Evidence on supply and demand patterns in digital television and Internet markets suggests 
that new technologies have not remedied the communicative inequalities that result from media 
concentration. This is so mainly for two reasons: first, traditional media organizations still hold 
significant opinion-forming power because they have managed to reposition and establish a very 
strong presence in digital content markets. Second, new media businesses that have emerged with the 
advent of the Internet, most notably digital intermediaries, may have engaged in practices that hinder 
the fair and free flow of information, introducing artificial forms of scarcity. Each of these two issues 
is examined separately below.  
 
3.4.1. Traditional media organizations repositioning in digital broadcasting 
markets: The wolf changes its fur, but not its nature 
  
The introduction of digital television has not made market entry easy for new content suppliers, 
or at least not as easy as originally anticipated. This may be inferred from recent research that shows 
that the European audiovisual marketplace remains highly concentrated 131  and that the most 
already well established before the digital revolution commenced.132 There are several reasons that 
can explain why new entrants have been unable to challenge older competitors that started off as 
traditional broadcasters.  
 
First, the positive impact that lower production and distribution costs may have on diversity has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
media to compete on the web using a mixture of text, gr
barriers inherent in broadcast or traditional print media  
130 Or alternatively, with very tolerant ownership restrictions  
131 See supra n. 47 
132 See, for instance, European Audiovisual Observatory (2009). Video on demand and catch-up television in Europe 
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arguably been exaggerated. As Owen co 133 while 
establishing a media outlet is not as expensive as it once was, costs incurred in the creation of 
attractive content that manages to generate the advertising134 or subscription revenues135 that will 
ensure the longevity of the outlet remain high.136 For example, in the U.S., none of the twenty-five 
most-watched TV shows of the 2012-2013 season was produced and/or distributed by a new 
provider.137 The same holds true for the fifty most-watched TV shows of the 2013-2014 season.138 
The Big Bang 
Theory (first in the 2013-2014 list) are each paid $1 million per episode.139 The Walking 
Dead (fourth in the list) reportedly costs $2.8 million per episode. 140  TV series produced by 
companies 
For example, the BBC reportedly spent £800,000 for the pilot of its mini-series Sherlock Holmes.141 
The  spent to create a first copy combined with the high audience ratings the above 
series achieve may be the digital media outcome to which Baker refers to as the 
142 Baker expects that the ability to create and deliver content at less or almost no cost will 
have two implications for diversity.143 First, it will lead to a numerical increase in commercial and 
non- 144 Second, it will incentivize 
existing providers to invest more in first copies.145 This latter effect, which corresponds to the major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Owen, B. M. (2004, April). 
Mass Media and Online Services. - Empirical, Business and Policy 
 
134 See, for instance, the TV series of which suppliers secured the highest advertising revenues in 2013: De Moraes, L. 
-Series Ad Price Survey. Deadline Hollywood, 14 October 2013. Retrieved from: 
http://deadline.com/2013/10/nbcs-the-blacklist-tops-annual-new-series-ad-price-survey-610874/  
135 Note that consumers are more willing to bear the extra cost of new hardware or subscriptions if the new product is provided by 
recognizable brands. This is so, because consumers seek to avoid psychological discomfort, which they experience when switching to 
providers with which they are not familiar. See Murray, S. (2005), supra n. 95, 431 and Picard, R. G. and Bum Soo Chon (2004), 
supra n. 48, 170  
136 Karppinen, K. (2009), supra n. 117, 158  
137 See Schneider, M. America's Most Watched: The Top 25 Shows of the 2012-2013 TV Season. 10 June 2013, TV Guide. Retrieved 
from: http://www.tvguide.com/news/most-watched-tv-shows-top-25-2012-2013-1066503/  
138 See Schneider, M. America's Most Watched: The Top 50 Shows of the 2013-2014 TV Season. 06 June 2014, TV Guide. Retrieved 
from: http://www.tvguide.com/news/most-watched-shows-2013-2014-1082628/ It is also worth noting that a staggering 48% of the 
programs included in the latter list is distributed by CBS, a television network that was established in 1928. See 
http://www.cbscorporation.com/portfolio.php?division=93 
139 Savage, M. More buck for your Big Bang Theory: What justifies a $1 million pay packet? BBC News, 05 August 2014. Retrieved 
from: http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-28658258  
140 Rowles, D. Which TV Shows Comm   21 
October 2013, Uproxx. Retrieved from: http://uproxx.com/tv/2013/10/tv-shows-command-highest-ad-prices-much-amc-make-
walking-dead/  
141 Heritage, S. Sherlock Holmes's smarter brothers: the best pilots that never made it to air. The Guardian, 28 May 2010. Retrieved 
from: http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2010/may/28/sherlock-holmes-best-pilots-never  
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will result in the concentration of the audiences around the 
products of established firms, ultimately leading to a decrease in the diversity of sources and contents 
actually consumed.146  
 
Second, there are indications that lower technical barriers to entry have not enhanced supply 
diversity; the possibility of increased efficiency from economies of scale makes it fairly easy for 
traditional media companies to expand and solidify their presence in neighboring media markets. 
More particularly, while the switch-off of analogue television releases spectrum, instead of creating 
opportunities for new entrants, it may well favor existing media conglomerates that have both the 
147 The 
UK market is a good example to illustrate how (communicative and market) power is distributed in 
digital television: In the UK, which completed the digital switchover in 2012, 689 international, 
national and regional channels are currently available.148 All of these channels are delivered by a 
handful of well-known groups such as the BBC, ITV, CBS and Viacom.149 BSkyB alone provides 
seventy-four channels.150 It is therefore important to make a clear distinction between entry barriers 
and economies of scale; it may be less complicated to enter the market now than it was in the past, 
but this does not make efficiencies irrelevant. Noam, who studied the evolution of information 
markets, found that when entry barriers drop and economies of scale rise, a U-shaped effect is created 
whereby there will initially be more operators but ultimately fewer survivors, those that benefit from 
large economies of scale.151 In view of the above, and given that the digital switchover has only 
recently been completed in most Member States, it remains to be seen how many of the thousands of 
channels which are now available in the European audiovisual space152 and which do not belong to 
powerful media organizations will continue to exist in the next few years.  
 
Third, and related to the above, previously different communication infrastructures now use the 
same transport protocols. This means that television broadcasts can currently be delivered on 
multiple platforms with significantly less cost.153 For example, besides terrestrial, direct-to-home 
satellite and cable networks, TV programming is also available on Internet Protocol television, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid., 102 
147 European Federation of Journalists (2005), supra n. 47, 5-6 
148 See http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=14 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Noam, E. M. (2009), supra n. 47, 37 
152 European Commission (2012), supra n. 115 
153  Pavlik, J. (2005). Understanding Convergence and Digital Broadcasting Technologies for the Twenty-First Century. NHK 
Broadcasting Studies. Retrieved from: https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/pdf/05_no4_08.pdf  
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offered by telecommunication providers over managed network with high quality of service, and 
Over-The-Top (OTT) television, provided by the content owners themselves (e.g. the BBC iPlayer, 
Hulu, YouTube,154 etc.) without the ISP or network operator controlling viewer access.155 As a result, 
the same content can be delivered on multiple devices (e.g. traditional TV set, tablets and 
smartphones) and in several formats (e.g. linear transmission, catch-up and on-demand). This feature, 
one of the many facets of convergence, incentivizes media companies to distribute the same content 
across all new platforms.156 Doyle studied the impact of this practice on the new media offer. More 
particularly, Doyle studied the strategy that UK television suppliers are increasingly employing to 
-
stages, decisions on what type of content to invest in are determined by t
generate revenue through multiple platforms. 157  Doyle concludes that this practice undoubtedly 
improves the use of resources,158 but that it also results in established media outlets recycling those 
themes and genres that appeal to the masses.159 One of the messages that this empirical research 
conveys is that, to the extent that and as long as existing media firms rely on tried recipes to 
reposition in neighboring content markets, the emergence of distribution platforms may have a 
chilling effect on content diversity.  
 
3.4.2. Concentration online and digital intermediaries (aka the new information 
gatekeepers) 
 
Alongside traditional media organizations, businesses that have emerged with the advent of the 
Internet, most notably digital intermediaries, are increasingly determining the amount and quality of 
information that citizens can access and engage with. For the purposes of this study, digital 
intermediaries may be defined as undertakings which bring content from third-party suppliers to 
users using a variety of digital software, channels, and devices 160  Broadly speaking, digital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 YouTube, which started as a peer video upload website, now provides access to programming posted by mainstream broadcasters. 
See OECD (2013). Competition Issues in Television and Broadcasting, 2  
155 Ibid., 9-10. For more information on technology convergence and how it affects broadcasting see, for instance, EBU (2013). Reply 
to the European Commission Green Paper  Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation and Values. 
Retrieved from:  
http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Knowledge/Initiatives%20-
%20Policy/Topical%20Issues/Hybrid/EBU_reply_to_Green_Paper_convergence_final.pdf  
156 For example, BBC news program Question Time is available on linear TV via BBC One, and on-
(through which it can be streamed, watched on catch-up TV and downloaded). Video highlights of the program are made available on 
the BBC iPlayer, the BBC News and the BBC One websites. Finally, a text summarizing the content broadcast accompanies the video 
highlights. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006t1q9; http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b04v85qt/question-time-
11122014; http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/categories/news/highlights, and http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006t1q9 
157 Doyle, G. (2010). From Television to Multi-platform: Less from more or more for less? Convergence: The International Journal of 
Research into New Media Technologies, 16(4), 432 
158 Ibid., 444 
159 Ibid., 446 
160 Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World  Report prepared for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 25 
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intermediaries can be classified into four groups: search engines like Google and Bing, news 
aggregators like Yahoo, social media like Facebook, and digital stores like Apple.161  
 
The markets in which digital intermediaries operate are highly concentrated162 for largely the 
same reasons traditional media markets have high concentration ratios. For example, the market for 
online search has high entry barriers, relating to, inter alia, hardware acquisition, web-indexing costs, 
IP patents and costs incurred in the development of algorithms.163 Moreover, several, if not most, 
intermediaries operate as advertising-based media; the indirect network effects that are created as a 
result of their acting as two-sided platforms usually results in 
operators.164 Entry barriers are higher in cases where a popular intermediary imposes long-term 
exclusivity agreements on its advertising partners. 165  Switching costs vary depending on the 
intermediary, but these also can prevent market entry. For example, if users have bought an iPad 
-
such as news apps and e-books. This in turn creates lock-in effects.166 Finally, the products that 
associated with the development of innovative technologies) and low distribution costs. As already 
seen, this characteristic encourages concentration because it allows the merged entity to reap 
to acquire control of online ad services provider Doubleclick,167 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Ibid., 6 
162 For example, Google controls well above 90% of the general online search and general search advertising markets in the vast 
majority of Member States. See European Commission, Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address 
competition concerns  questions and answers, MEMO/13/383, 25/04/2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-383_en.htm I
Ofcom (2014). Communications Market Report, 277-8. This was in March 2014. The figure on active audience reach refers to 
 
163 Reference to these factors is made in Commission decision Microsoft/Yahoo!, Case COMP/M.5727 C (2010) 1077, paragraph 111. 
As for the total cost, Microsoft submitted in its comments that the capital expenditure required to enter the market is approximately 
USD 1 000 million in hardware and USD 1 000 million in human capital and several billions of dollars to develop and update the 
algorithm  
164 See Commission decision Google/Doubleclick Given that online 
advertising is a two-sided market characterized by network effects, scale and access to user data are important ingredients of success. 
Through the foreclosure strategies, the merged entity would deny sufficient scale and liquidity or, in other words, the ability to find 
easily and quickly a counterpart with which to trade , to competing networks which would consequently be weakened. As the network 
of the merged entity would become larger and "information-richer", it would attract more publishers and more advertisers up to the 
point where the market would "tip" in favour of the network of the merged entity, enabling it to raise the price of its offer
text of the decision is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf  
165 Google has entered into exclusive agreements with its ad partners. See, for instance, European Commission (2014, February). 
Statement on the Google investigation (made by former Competition Commissioner Almunia). Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm   
166 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 32 
167 Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6 
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product designer Beats 168  
communications app Whatsapp.169  
 
Broadly speaking, digital intermediaries do not create content as traditional media 
organizations do.170 Nor are they yet generating significant advertising revenues for news providers, 
which means that we (still) cannot establish a direct and causal relationship between intermediaries 
and high-quality investigative journalism.171 However, in an environment where content is abundant 
and attention scarce, the process of discovering content is becoming increasingly challenging. Digital 
intermediaries play a major role in facilitating this process. For example, news aggregators and 
search engines provide access to a wide range of news material from an abundance of different 
sources that could not have easily been consulted in the analogue landscape.172 Social media may be 
used as a source of news traffic.173 Digital stores create new opportunities for news providers which 
may develop and make available on these platforms applications that offer access to their packages of 
branded news and commentary.174 However, these benefits can be realized if intermediaries are 
indeed used as a tool to search for alternative sources and if they indeed facilitate wide and open 
access to content, two assumptions that can be questioned.  
 
In respect of the role of digital intermediaries in facilitating exposure to diverse sources and 
ideas, Hindman asks: are digital intermediaries autonomous 
they 175 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168  Commission decision Apple/Beats, Case COMP/M.7290, [2014] OJ C 260/8, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7290_20140725_20310_3804651_EN.pdf  
169  Commission decision, Case COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/Whatsapp [2014] OJ C 417/2, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
170 Foster (arguably correctly) draws a distinction between news aggregators and the other three types of digital intermediaries. He 
 of old, 
the latter position themselves as gateways to an almost unlimited amount of content from many different suppliers. While the former 
present plurality challenges which are similar to those associated with established media, the latter are rather different animals with 
Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 28 
171 Ibid., 24 
172 Ibid., 18 and 26. For an example of the positive impact of the consumption of a range of different news sources, also known as 
multi-sourcing, on media pluralism see p. 20. However, the figures to which Foster refers must be interpreted with caution. For 
example, on several occasions, Ofcom found that the news websites UK citizens consult belong to the traditional media organizations 
that citizens consult in the offline world. See infra n. 174. As Foster himself notes, in a 2010 report, Ofcom showed that, in terms of 
share of page views and minutes, the top 50 news sites belong to old media news brands. See Ofcom (2010), supra n. 19. Moreover, 
using two or more online news sources is not an improvement if the news websites consulted are owned by the same provider. As 
already discussed above, in many Member States it is difficult for citizens to check whether this is the case because media companies 
are not required to publish their ownership structure 
173 For examples see ibid., 20. However, Foster correctly notes that the news stories shared on these outlets mainly originate from 
mainstream sources. For example, according to Ofcom (2012). Communications Market Report, the three most popular news sites 
whose stories were shared on Facebook and Twitter were the online versions of The Daily Mail, The Guardian and BBC News (see pp. 
275-6) 
174 Ibid., 27 
175 Hindman, M. (2008), supra n. 123, 80 
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media pluralism.  
 
Starting from their role 
undoubtedly make a significant contribution to the creation of a media environment where diverse 
information can be easily identified and accessed. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
citizens have taken advantage of the (theoretically) endless opportunities these platforms offer: 
Recent research shows that online users are inclined to consume content produced by established 
media organizations instead of actively looking for online content that may complement their 
traditional media experience. For example, Ofcom found that, in 2014, the three most popular news 
websites among laptop and desktop audiences in the UK were the websites of traditional media 
organizations (The Daily Mail, The Guardian and BBC News).176 Similar remarks can be made with 
regard to online news consumption on a global level: according to data published by comScore, while 
644 million people worldwide accessed online newspaper sites in October 2012 (this is nearly half of 
the total internet population), the most read online newspapers were the online versions of The Daily 
Mail, The New York Times and The Guardian.177 These figures must be considered against the fact 
that content delivered by non-mainstream media, including and especially websites for political 
178 The conclusion to draw here is that, as long as established providers control the 
market for news provision,179 alternative content may drown in the ocean of content abundance.180 
Therefore, to the extent that audiences are prone to concentrate around the online content provided by 
 rather than serving as 
platforms used to discover new sources.  
 
Foster identifies four broad areas in which their activities may have negative consequences for 
pluralism: a) Their control of what may be considered as distribution bottlenecks through which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176  Ofcom (2014). Communications Market Report, 282. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr14/2014_UK_CMR.pdf  
177 Radwanick, S. Most Read Online Newspapers in the World: Mail Online, New York Times and The Guardian. The Guardian, 12 
December 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2012/12/most-read-online-newspapers-in-the-world-mail-online-
new-york-times-and-the-guardian/  
178 Hindman, M. (2008), supra n. 123, 80-81 
179 Arsenault, A.H. and Manuel Castells (2008), supra n. 80,719 
180 Hindman, M. (2008), supra n. 123, 18. Baker discusses the influence that blogs may exercise and notes respectively that 
traditional news and cultural media continue to dominate, as they do now, in performing (even if inadequately) their traditional roles, 
Baker, C.E. (2007), supra n. 
142, 100 
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users, especially younger generations, access content; b) The editorial-like judgments they make 
about the content they link to or carry (e.g. they select and display 
query, decide which sources of news to feature prominently, etc.); c) Their role in shaping future 
economic models for news provision (e.g. they enable disaggregation of news content, which makes 
it increasingly difficult for news providers to generate ad revenues), and d) Their inclination and 
ability to set the political agenda (e.g. when they invest in media in their own right). 181  This 
classification grasps the main areas where pluralism concerns re
have arisen thus far.  and news content by way of example. Search engines 
in general and Google in particular play a key role in channeling news to Europeans: search is the 
dominant usage on the Internet,182 general search engines seem to be the intermediaries that citizens 
use the most to find news stories,183 and Google controls over 90% of the general online search 
market in most Member States.184 Starting from its role as a distribution bottleneck, several news 
providers maintain that Google exercises excessive control over the way in which they reach online 
users. More particularly, news providers that operate pay walls claim that, unless they agree to some 
of their content being made available for free via Google Search, they automatically lose visibility in 
185 If this is indeed the case, then Google artificially limits the number of 
sources that are actually available in the market. This practice could also be a concern if pay walls 
become essential for the economic viability of news provision.186 An issue related to the above is 
how integration between intermediaries can affect diversity. For example, Italian newspaper and 
magazine publishers alleged that Google aggregator, Google News, was free-riding on their 
content and that, if they extracted their publications from the aggregator, they would be excluded 
from Google Search altogether.187 To the extent that they prevent news providers from directing 
traffic to their websites or deprive them of the ability to generate ad revenues, such 
practices may harm pluralism in the long run. Elements of editorial-like judgments made by search 
engines are present in, for instance, the presentation of their search results or the design of their 
algorithms.188 For example, a search engine may sell high positions on the list of search results or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 6-7 
182 Helberger, N. et al. (2012), supra n. 116, 50 
183 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 24. See also European Commission. Digital Agenda for Europe - Scoreboard 2012, 104, according 
to which the European Internet audience using a search platform to obtain information amounts to 71%. The Scoreboard is available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/KKAH12001ENN-PDFWEB_1.pdf 
184 See supra n. 160 
185 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 31  
186 Ibid., 39 
187 
concerns is available at: http://www.agcm.it/stampa/news/5194-a420-as787-antitrust-accetta-impegni-di-google-e-chiede-al-
parlamento-di-adeguare-le-norme-sul-diritto-dautore.html 
188 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 34 
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priority-index the pages of partners so that the latter rank higher than non-partner sites.189 As a result, 
visibility is ensured for the news providers that paid, but not necessarily for those that may be 
providing more accurate or higher quality content. Search engines also make editorial-like judgments 
when they decide how to profile their own services vis-à-vis the services offered by their 
competitors.190 For example, search engines may decide to downgrade search results of competing 
services and grant preferential treatment to their own services. This issue is currently being examined 
by the Commission in the context of an antitrust investigation into how Google displays search 
results of websites competing with it in neighboring search markets. 191  This case concerns the 
possible exclusion of competing price comparison websites from general online search, in other 
words, websites providing content that is not essential to consume in order to make informed 
decisions about who to vote. However, Google, among other intermediaries, has been expanding into 
content markets,192 thereby having the incentive to downgrade competing news services. Moreover, 
given that there exist substantial information asymmetries between search engines and online users, 
and because users believe that searching through search engines is reliable,193 Google arguably also 
has the ability to reduce visibility of competing news services. The impact of downgrading on 
competition is still not clear. However, were this practice to produce exclusionary effects, it could 
harm pluralism. Finally, an experiment that was recently conducted by Epstein and Robertson shows 
that were search engines to promote a certain political agenda, downgrading could prove as harmful 
as interfering with the editorial policies of a newspaper; the experiment in question shows that 
 and may ultimately affect election 
results.194  
 
The above analysis makes clear that the proliferation of sources and content does not 
automatically ensure pluralism. It is against the background of off- and on-line concentration, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 van Eijk, N. (2009). Search Engines, the New Bottleneck for Content Access, 141-156. In Preissel, B., Justus Haucap and Peter 
Curwen (eds.), Telecommunication Markets: Drivers and Impediments. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 
190 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 34 
191 See European Commission. Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google. Press Release IP/10/1624. 
Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en 
192 For example, Yahoo has its own news service, Google owns the most popular news aggregation service on the web and America 
On Line (AOL), a U.S. search portal, acquired control of The Huffington Post, a popular news blog. See, for instance, 
AOL/Huffington Post. AOL Agrees To Acquire The Huffington Post. 7 February 2011, The Huffington Post. Retrieved from: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/07/aol-huffington-post_n_819375.html, and Peters, J. Y. and Verne G. Kopytoff. Betting on 
News, AOL Is Buying The Huffington Post. 7 February 2011, The New York Times. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07aol.html?_r=0   
193 On this issue see Rainie L. and Jeremy Shermak (2005). Search Engine Use November 2005, Technical report. Washington, D.C.: 
PEW Internet & American Life Project 
194  Epstein, R. and Ronald E. Robertson (2013, May). Democracy at Risk: Manipulating Search Rankings Can Shift Voting 
Preferences Substantially Without Voter Awareness. American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology Working Paper 
Series/Summary of a paper presented at the 25th annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, Washington, D.C. 
Retrieved from: http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/politics/epstein_robertson_2013.pdf  
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may weaken democracy in many ways (some of which are already known and studied, whereas 
others are new and still shady), that arguments on the decreasing importance of powerful media 
organizations in the public opinion formation process must be carefully considered. Accordingly, 
policymakers should 
the distribution of communicative power and political voice obsolete, but only reconfigures them in a 
.195  
 
4. Assumption no. 2: The citizens will act (consume diverse content) and interact (create 
and distribute content that strengthens democracy) 
 
As previously mentioned, traditional media policymaking is rooted in the passive consumption 
theory according to which audiences are powerless to resist the persuasive messages that media carry. 
In the linear age, the consumer was thought of as an impotent receiver whose ability to choose was 
196 However, related regulation 
is currently undergoing significant changes. For example, as discussed above, the relaxation of 
ownership restrictions that took place in several Member States has largely been based on the wide 
array of content that consumers may now access.197 This is probably the most blatant example, but 
certainly not the only sign suggesting that the tide has turned. For example, in its 2011-2013 Strategy 
Statement, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland notes that new technologies herald a new era in 
critique broadcasting content 198 
control over content by consumers
[emphasis added].199 In the same vein, in its 2010 Annual Report, the Dutch media regulator states 
finding their way in the media landscape and 
consulting different voices 200 These statements are indicia that there is a gradual 
shift to a regulatory model that is assigning more duties to the individuals. However, without 
suggesting that traditional media regulation is (always or still) appropriate to address pluralism 
concerns relating to exposure diversity, the conditions for this shift to take place have arguably not 
matured yet. This is so mainly for three reasons: first, content may be abundant, but attention is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Karppinen, K. (2009), supra n. 117, 160 
196 Valcke, P. (2011), supra n. 1, 304 
197 Open Society Foundations (2012), supra n. 102, 2 
198 Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (2010). Strategy Statement 2011-2013, 22. Retrieved from: http://www.bai.ie/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/BAI_Strategy_2011-13_v2ENG.pdf  
199 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 5 
200 Commissariat voor de media (2011), supra n. 33, 91 
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scarce. This reality distorts the communication process and deeply affects the quality of content that 
media organizations produce. Second, the ability to control what type of content they are exposed to 
allows individuals to create a private information universe. This may impair the free flow of 
information and eventually weaken social cohesion. Third, Europeans do not create content that 
contributes to better public governance, at least not as much as was originally anticipated.  
 
Before I discuss the above three issues, it is important to point out that, for Europeans to 
consume content that is made available online and to engage actively in public discourse that takes 
requirement has not been met yet. Achieving exposure diversity naturally presupposes access to the 
content that media outlets have to offer. While in the traditional media environment access per se is 
easy in that, broadly speaking, it only requires buying a newspaper or switching on the TV or the 
radio, access to online information is far more complicated because it depends on various parameters, 
including the motivation to use a computer, access to the Internet and skills to look for and choose 
content of interest. Entering the communicative abundance era does not mean that citizens are ready 
to benefit from the variety of output that may be found online. To the contrary, recent data published 
by Eurostat shows that new technologies may have caught many off-guard; almost 20% of Europeans 
have never used the Internet, while in eight Member States this amount is close to or exceeds 30% of 
the population.201 It is also worth noting that only 12% of those Europeans who do use the Internet 
have a high level of basic Internet skills.202 It is clear from the above considerations that to achieve 
other, more challenging conditions, including the ability to work with the necessary hardware and 
software, identify and process information, and ultimately engage in online political activity, there is 
still a long way to go. But, for the 
have access to and use the Internet. Does this mean that they automatically choose to be exposed to 
diverse content or produce content to interact with others in ways that strengthen citizenship?  
 
4.1. The citizens will act responsively by consuming diverse content 
 
 4.1.1. Content abundance = Attention scarcity  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201  I refer to Croatia, Italy, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, Portugal and Romania. See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tin00093&plugin=1 The same statistical 
findings also point out that there are 62 regions across the European Union where only 55% or fewer individuals are regular users of 
the Internet. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Information_society_statistics_at_regional_level 
202 Meaning that they have carried 5-6 of the following Internet related activities: use a search engine to find information; send an e-
mail with attached files; post messages to chat rooms, newsgroups or any online discussion forum; use the Internet to make telephone 
calls; use peer-to-peer file sharing for exchanging movies, music etc.; create a web page. See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdsc470&language=en 
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Levels of exposure diversity were undoubtedly higher in the analog landscape than in the 
digital media environment. As discussed above, in traditional media markets, output was scarce and 
203 This 
is no longer the case, for in the digital media ecosystem content is abundant and attention scarce. This 
reality has created two effects. The first relates to how much attention audiences pay to the content 
they are (voluntarily or involuntarily) exposed to and the second has to do with how the market 
 
 
On the demand-side, starting from how much attention we pay to the content we are exposed 
to, one of the most striking examples about media consumption today is that the use of one medium 
is not inversely proportional to the use of others. More particularly, while regular Internet usage has 
been increasing across Europe,204 TV usage has not decreased.205 How is that possible? Audiences 
are engaging in media multi-tasking: 
watching TV.206 Simultaneous media use must be considered alongside the fact that almost 70% of 
online activity is not related to the TV program that is being watched.207 This online activity includes 
emailing, general web surfing, social networking, watching other video content and reading the 
news. 208  This means that the vast majority of multi-taskers do not complement their viewing 
experience by gathering more information about the content being broadcast but rather engage in a 
different media experience. It goes without saying that media multi-tasking distorts the 
communication process, the effectiveness of which depends not only on whether the message that is 
being transmitted is received, but also on whether the receiver has actually made sense of the 
message in question and reflected on its content. In other words, simultaneous media use leads to an 
209  
 
However, even when consumers use only one medium, this does not ensure exposure to diverse 
content. In an environment where content is scarce and attention abundant, more content increases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 30, 1457 
204 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tin00091&plugin=1  
205 European Commission (2013), supra n. 104, 5  
206 And 16% of all time spent watching TV is done while using the Internet. In some countries such as France and the UK, the figures 
on simultaneous media use exceed 60%. For more information see Simultaneous media use rises in Europe. Warc.com, 01 June 2012. 
Retrieved from: http://www.warc.com/Content/News/Simultaneous_media_use_rises_in_Europe.content?ID=fed4dca7-bca7-44b6-
b42a-dbf941b155c2  
207 IAB (2013). Mediascope Europe 2012 Pan-European Launch Presentation Summary, pp. 16 et seq. Retrieved from: 
http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/6713/8720/0955/MEDIASCOPE_2012_PAN-
EUROPEAN_SUMMARY_LAUNCH_PRESENTATION_public.pdf  
208 Microsoft (2009). -taskers, 6 
209 Stevenson, N. (1995). Understanding Media Cultures. Social Theory and Mass Communication, 157. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications 
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the diversity of items individuals are aware of. 210  Once information becomes abundant though, 
attention is essentially drawn to a smaller set of sources. But, as information is an experience good 
and may therefore be evaluated only after it has passed the perceptual filter, the items that are chosen 
to form part of this smaller set of sources are not selected on the basis of the content they contain, but 
on the basis of the content users think they contain.211 -rich 
212  
 
On the supply-side, how does attention scarcity affect the content offer? First, it creates entry 
barriers. As long as content is scarce and attention abundant, a content creator who has an original 
mind.213 These chances are significantly reduced in a content abundant-attention scarcity market 
214 Second, content abundance results in price 
reductions (simple economics of supply and demand where prices fall when the supply curve shifts 
outward).215 Attention, however, is becoming scarce and hence more and more valuable.216 In other 
words, competition focuses less on price (evidence of this is the amount of content that is now made 
To pass the perception filter, media 
217 
or by forcing the audiences to relate to their brands (read: excessive investments in brand promotion 
and star power).218 News providers in particular, no longer having the luxury of spending time 
applying themselves to additional fact-gathering or explaining the facts more critically, favor fast 
exposure over refined analysis.219 This makes it difficult for audiences to absorb and reflect on the 
news content they consume.220 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210  Falkinger, J. (2005). Attention Economies. CESifo Working Paper, No. 1079, 26. Retrieved from: 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_1079.html  
211 Ibid., 26 
212 Ibid., 27 
213 Ibid., 26 
214 Ibid.  
215 Bardoel, J. and Jan van Cuilenberg (2008), supra n. 70, 130-131 
216 For more on the attention economy see, for instance, Simon, Herbert A. (1971). Designing Organizations for an Information-rich 
World. In Greenberger, M. (ed.), Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest, 38-52. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. (Cited 
after reprint in: Simon, H.A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality. Volume 2: Behavioural Economics and Business Organization, 
Cambridge/Massachussets: MIT Press). For more on the attention economy see, for instance, Hargittai, E. (2004). The Changing 
Online Landscape: From Free-for-All to Commercial Gatekeeping, 66-76. In Day, P. and D. Schuler (eds.), Community Practice in 
the Network Society: Local Actions/Global Interaction. New York: Routledge 
217 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 30, 1460 
218  See Haque, U. The Attention Economy. 08 November 2005, Bubblegeneration.com. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bubblegeneration.com/2005/11/attention-economy-across-consumer.cfm As H
 
219 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 30, 1460 
220 Ibid. 
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What about the content which consumers choose to be exposed to when they engage in a more 
meaningful media experience? I mentioned above that one of the main changes brought about by 
digital technologies and to which policy and regulatory texts are increasingly referring is the ability 
to exercise control over content. The freedom to determine what type and how much content to 
consume is one of the two reasons (the other reason being content abundance) why the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive establishes a lighter regulatory regime for on-demand services vis-à-vis 




ith each item selected in 
advance.222 The use of personal video recorders, pay-per-view television, news aggregators and other 
similar services that aim to deliver tailored information223 
personalize as much as possible the content they consume on a daily basis.224 This habit creates a 
culture of content customization that dis-incentivizes citizens from discovering content which they 
did not originally seek and which does not necessarily fit their existing dispositions. Critical of this 
the world [...] leads to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge 
number of isolated issue publics mphasis added]. 225  Following the same line of reasoning, 
only read and 
listen to things that completely reinforce what you believe in 226 In other words, 
new technologies create the conditions for a private information universe that may facilitate exposure 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, Recital (58) 
222 Sunstein, C. (2007). Republic.com 2.0, 4. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, referring to Negroponte, N. (1995). Being 
Digital, 153. New York: Knopf 
223 nd company-
specific news and information uniquely personalized to deliver better targeted, better customized and more relevant news and 
http://www.individual.com/odc/h_idc.html  
224 For more examples on personalized consumption of media products see Sunstein, C. (2007), supra n. 220, 1-18 
225 Habermas, J. (2006). Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The 
Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research. Communication Theory, 16(4), 423  
226 Carpentier, N. and B. Cammaerts (2006). Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism, and Journalism. An Interview with Chantal Mouffe. 
Journalism Studies 7(6), 968. For a different view on the impact of new media on democracy see, for instance, Rogers, R. (2004). 
Information Politics on the Web. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, and McNair, B. (2006). 
Power in a Globalised World. London: Routledge 
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at 
interests her the most and share her opinions with others that have similar viewpoints, she can go 
-reaching effects on pluralism and ultimately democracy. These 
effects become clear if we think of how social cohesion, a prerequisite for democracy,227 relates to 
exposure to different opinions: It has long been acknowledged that a society that aspires to be 
cohesive must not seek to transform heterogeneity into homogeneity but to embrace diversity in all 
its facets (e.g. religious, ethnic, cultural, political etc.).228 Rather than a meeting of the minds, social 
cohesion refers to the creation of a de facto solidarity that is built among the various members of a 
community. As Dahrendorf et al. 
229 In this sense, 
social cohesion has been proven to be strongly linked to better public service delivery, financial 
accountability, political stability, educational attainment and economic prosperity.230 Therefore, in 
order to ensure the well-being of its members, a society must work towards creating a framework 
which reduces disparities, avoids social fractures231 and establishes strong social ties among the 
groups that form it.232  
 
The relationship between media and social cohesion can be seen from two different angles: 
m 233 If 
the effect of new technologies is indeed the creation of an information micro-mundus at the expense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 On the link between social cohesion and democracy see, for instance, Henning, C. and Karin Renblad (2009). Perspectives on 
Empowerment, Social Cohesion and Democracy  An International Anthology. Jönköping: School of Health Sciences, Jönköping 
University  
228 In West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), the US Supreme Court stroke down a state law demanding 
children to salute the American flag on the grounds that 
gra VGT Vereiniginggegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (2), which dealt with the question whether the refusal to broadcast a 
provocative commercial on industrial animal production and animal experiments violates freedom of expression as enshrined in 
 received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of 
ECtHR 28 June 2001, VGT Vereiniging 
gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, paragraph 66. 
229 Dahrendorf, R., F. Field and C. Hayman (1995). Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society (the Dahrendorf 
Report), 34. London: Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion  
230 Foa, R. The Economic Rationale for Social Cohesion: Cross-Country Evidence, 1. Paper presented at the International Conference 
on Social Cohesion and Development, 20 and 21 January 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46908575.pdf See also 
Sarikakis, K. (2007). Mediating Social Cohesion: Media and cultural policy in the European Union and Canada. European Studies, 
24, 68 
231 Council of Europe (2008). Report of high-level task force on social cohesion in the 21st century - Towards an active, fair and 
socially cohesive Europe. TFSC (2007) 31E 
232 For a comprehensive overview of the notion of social cohesion see Noll, H.H. (2009, December). The Impact of Cultural and 
Citizenship Education on Social Cohesion. Input Statement The Impact of Cultural and Citizenship Education on Social Cohesion: 
Chances  Challenges  Changes, Vilnius, Lithuania 
233 McQuail, D. (2010).  (6th edition), 90. London: Sage (summary of academic debates on the 
relationship between media and social order)  
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s poisons one of the 
main functions that media are expected to perform in and for a democracy, namely to expose the 
views of and the problems facing each and every group of the society they are meant to serve and to 
advance a culture of common understanding.234 Failure to perform this function results in what 
Sunstein calls group polarization,235 
236 Customized 
media consumption may then become an instrument used by radical groups to breed hostility towards 
those with conflicting opinions.237  
 
By pointing out that content personalization may have a negative impact on democracy in order 
to illustrate that the ability to control our own media universe does not necessarily lead to exposure 
diversity, I do not seek to undermine the contribution digital media can make to the advancement of 
social cohesion. To the extent that they bring together people who share the same beliefs, digital 
media may also serve as a platform through which views that would otherwise not have found their 
way to the audiences manage to reach the public. To quote the EU High Level Group on Media 
e part and parcel of the overall social fabric of society and 
may either help or hinder communication and mutual understanding between different parts of it, 
238 
Dail 239  whereas the findings of relevant 
empirical research are either inconclusive240 or interpreted in opposing ways.241 Therefore, we cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 A free and plural the High Level Group on Media 
Freedom and Pluralism called upon the Member States to have independent media councils with a politically and culturally balanced 
and socially diverse membership. See p. 7. The report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-
agenda/files/HLG%20Final%20Report.pdf  
235 Sunstein, C. (2003). Why Societies Need Dissent, 111-144. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press  
236 Sunstein, C. (2007), supra n. 220, 46-96 
237 See Hamelink, C. (1997). Media, Ethnic Conflict and Culpability. In Servaes, J. & Lie, R. (eds.). Media in Transition. Leuven/ 
Amersfoort: Acco 
238 High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (2013), supra n. 232, 11 
239 See, for instance, Pariser, E. (2011). The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You. New York: Penguin Press, and 
Berners-Lee, T. Long Live the Web: A call for continued open standards and neutrality. 22 November 2010, Scientific American. 
Retrieved from: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/long-live-the-web/ Both Pariser and Berners-Lee believe that personalized 
search has an adverse effect on exposure to conflicting ideas. Compare their views against Foster, R. [(2012) (supra n. 158, 22)] who 
argues that personalization does not prevent users from seeking a diversity of voices  
240 See, for instance, Boukes, M., Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Marjolein Moorman and Claes H. De Vreese (2014). News With an Attitude: 
Assessing the Mechanisms Underlying the Effects of Opinionated News. Journal of Mass Communication and Society 17(3), 354-378 
241 See, for instance, how the results of the 2012 on the State of the News Media Report that was prepared by the Pew Research Center 
Project for Excellence in Journalism concerning, inter alia, the role of social media in facilitating exposure to diverse sources/ideas 
have been Much has been said about the use of social networks as a major driver of news, 
but recent research in the US has shown that this is not the case as only 9% of adults get news very often through social networks and 
the large majority of them still go to news websites, use keyword search or get news through a news organizing web site or 
or not: 
e used 
 71% of 
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draw safe conclusions as to the extent to which personalized communication has created 
marginalization.242 It is true, however, that we have already witnessed cases that show how audience 
polarization may be used to cultivate fanaticism and anarchy as well as the potential it has to destroy 
the social tissue. In Europe, for instance, extremist groups have been using new media to recruit 
members or advance their propaganda 243  
discrimination against communities of different ethnicities and religions, and segregation.244 These 
examples illustrate why concerns relating to the personalized content consumption paradigm may not 
have been exaggerated after all. 
 
4.2. The citizens will interact (create and distribute content that strengthens democracy) 
 
As previously noted, digitization and improvements in computing and wireless technologies 
have heralded a new era in which the role of the individual in the communication process is 
undergoing significant changes. The citizens may now set up outlets such as blogs and wikis, and 
influence and/or comment on the content provided by well-established media organizations by giving 
feedback to editors via, for instance, emails, test screenings and focus groups. Individuals are no 
longer powerless eyeballs, but may actively participate in the dissemination of information on issues 
of public concern, a function that was, until recently, reserved to professional journalists. Indeed, 
user-generated or user-created content (UGC and UCC respectively), that is, content produced and 
made available over the 245 may promote a 
more diverse and transparent media system; users may, for instance, create content that complements 
or even questions the accuracy of the content provided by mainstream media.246  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
e 
European Commission (2012), Digital Agenda for Europe  Scoreboard 2012, 28 and Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 158, 22 
242 Karppinen, K. (2009), supra n. 117, 163 
243 For an overview of examples of online extremist narratives see, for instance, Radicalization Awareness Network (2012). Proposed 
Policy Recommendations for the High Level Conference. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-high-level-conference/docs/proposed_policy_recommendations_ran_at_en.pdf    
244 See, for instance, Dimitrova, S. EC recommends measures to curb violent extremism. SETimes, 04 February 2013. Retrieved from: 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/02/04/feature-01 See also Gaydazhieva, S. Link 
between Internet and extremism, say experts. 29 January 2013, New Europe. Retrieved from: http://www.neurope.eu/article/link-
between-internet-and-extremism-say-experts  
245  OECD (2007). Participative Web: User-Created Content, 4. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/38393115.pdf 
246  Newman, N. (2009). The rise of social media and its impact on mainstream journalism: A study of how newspapers and 
broadcasters in the UK and US are responding to a wave of participatory social media, and a historic shift in control towards 
individual consumers. Oxford Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism Working Paper, 5 (summarizing the literature regarding the 
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In certain cases, UGC has had extreme democratic significance. One of the most prominent 
examples is the Arab Spring movement: Facebook and Twitter allowed citizen journalists to 
communicate the atrocities of suppressive regimes in the Arab World, spread awareness about and 
publicize protests aiming to bring down longtime political systems, even when leading media 
organizations were blocked.247 The Arab Social Media Report, prepared by the Dubai School of 
Government, shows that the primary purpose of social media use during the uprisings for 55% of the 
population of the Arab world was to spread information around the globe about the uprisings, 
whereas for 66% it was to raise awareness inside the country on the causes of the revolutions.248 
Another striking example of citizen journalism is Wikileaks. Started by Australian activist Julian 
Assange, WikiLeaks operates as an online, not-for-profit organization that publishes leaks of 
confidential information of interest to the public, among which are included classified documents 
relating to wars, detention and torture, spying and (counter-) intelligence and government and 
corporate conspiracies. 249  Engaging in discovering and reporting on corporate and political 
mishandlings transforms individuals into community-serving citizens, a transformation which, in the 
absence of new media, could not easily occur.250 However, in the EU, UGC has not reached its 
democratic potential yet. In a report which was published in 2012 and which deals with, inter alia, 
Internet usage in the 
Spring, only 10% of Europeans participated in online consultations and voting to define civic or 
political matters.251 Engagement in online political activities does not seem to have increased since 
2011; to the contrary, according to Eurostat, in 2013, only 8% of Europeans used the Internet to take 
part in online consultations and voting.252  Equally disappointing were the findings of empirical 
research on user involvement with media production in national markets.253 For instance, a study 
prepared by the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies showed that, in the period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 For the role of social media in the organization of the Arab Spring protests see, for instance, Huang, C. Facebook and Twitter key to 
Arab Spring uprisings: report. The National, 06 June 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/facebook-and-
twitter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report 
248 Dubai School of Government (2011). Arab Social Media Report, Vol. 1 No. 2, 8  
249 See http://wikileaks.org/About.html Wikileaks became internationally famous for detailing correspondence between the U.S. State 
department and its diplomatic missions around the world, numbering around 250,000 cables. For more information see, for instance, 
Stein, S. Gibbs On Legal Action Against WikiLeaks: 'I Wouldn't Rule Anything Out'. 29 November 2010, The Huffington Post. 
Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/29/gibbs-on-legal-action-aga_n_789311.html and Fantz, A. See yourself as 
the next Assange? Good luck. 30 June 2012, CNN. Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/29/world/future-leaking-
online/index.html WikiLeaks is placed among many other similar initiatives, for instance, www.opensecrets.org, the website of the 
Center for Responsive Politics, a nonprofit research group that tracks money in politics and its effects on elections and public policy 
and the POGO project (Project on Government Oversight, www.pogo.org), a non-partisan non-profit organization which investigates 
and exposes systemic abuses of power, mismanagement and subservience by the U.S. government to powerful special interests 
250 For more examples on the impact of UGC on politics see OECD (2007), supra n. 243, 36-37 
251  European Commission (2012). A vibrant single market, 28. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-
agenda/files/KKAH12001ENN-chap2-PDFWEB-2.pdf  
252 Retrieved from:  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tin00129&plugin=1  
253 For an overview of relevant empirical studies that have been conducted thus far see Milioni, D., Konstantinos Vadratsikas and 
Venetia Papa (2012). . Observatorio (OBS) 
Journal, 6(3), 24-26 
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2007-2008, only 4% of the British public contributed content to a news media website.254 Another 
study f
enriched content by providing original, unreported information to mainstream media, and that on 
very few occasions users broadened the media agenda through their comments.255  
 
The above must be considered alongside the findings of the Report on User-Created Content: 
Supporting a Participative Information Society, which reveals that the three main reasons why users 
are registered with social networking sites are to message their friends, upload their photos and listen 
to music.256 Naturally, this type of usage determines the nature of UGC, whose impact on culture and 
democracy has been discussed by many contemporary social thinkers.257 Keen, for instance, is of the 
view that: 
is an infinite gallery of amateur movies showing poor fools dancing, singing, eating, 
washing, shopping, driving, cleaning, sleeping, or just staring into their comp
In a flattened, editor-free world where independent videographers, podcasters, and 
bloggers can post their amateurish creations at will, and no one is being paid to check 
their credentials or evaluate their material, media is vulnerable to untrustworthy content 
of every stripe 258 
observations point to the main issues that must be taken into account when arguing (or, even worse, 
basing a regulatory instrument on the assumption) that the ability to create and distribute content has 
transformed the passive consumer into a perfectly conscious citizen. First, UGC may take different 
 cannot be 
expected to contribute to the mission of the media to provide content that advances self-development, 
an essential ingredient for effective citizenship and in general for behaviors that strengthen 
democracy.259 Second, where UGC indeed feeds established media organizations with important 
unreported information, it may only complement rather than replace the latter which verify the 
accuracy of the content.260   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Wardle, C. and Andrew Williams (2008). ugc@thebbc. Understanding its impact upon contributors, non-contributors, and BBC 
News. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. The final report is available at: 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/UserGeneratedContent_ClaireWardle.pdf  
255 Milioni, D., et al. (2012), supra n. 251, 35 
256 Helberger, N., et al. (2012), supra n. 116, 67 
257 See, for instance, Baker, C.E. (2007), supra n. 142; Sunstein, C. (2007), supra n. 220, and Carr, N.G. (2010). The Shallows: What 
the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains. New York City: W. W. Norton & Company 
258 Keen, A. (2007). The cult of the amateur, 5, 16 and 19. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing 
259 Chickering, A. R. (2008). Strengthening democracy and personal development through community engagement. New Directions 
for Adult and Continuing Education, 118, 87-95 
260 Newman, N. (2009), supra n. 244, 2. Newman conducted empirical research discussing the impact of UGC on British media and 
reports that in many cases traditional media organizations received a significant amount of false information which was deliberately 
posted to influence coverage of the events or the debate they generated 
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The extent to which audience empowerment advances pluralism is still difficult to define. More 
research is undoubtedly needed to examine this phenomenon in order to define relevant policy 
priorities.261 What the above analysis makes clear, however, is that it is not reasonable to believe that 
the individual has been mutated from a set of powerless eyeballs in a fully enlightened and vigilant 
-advised is the idea that governments can simply shift the 
responsibility for qualitative and diverse information away from 
262  
 
 5. Conclusions 
 
While the discussion concerning the extent to which the effects of digital technologies on 
media pluralism have been positive is still unsettled, the above analysis makes clear that concerns 
over its protection have by no means been rendered obsolete.  dominate the 
European marketplace, both because traditional media still occupy a central position in media 
consumption and because existing firms have managed to reposition and solidify their presence in 
digital content markets. Technological developments may have lowered entry barriers, but money, 
reputation and the large customer base that goes with them are still important to attract eyeballs. 
Moreover, new businesses that have emerged with the advent of the Internet, including and especially 
digital intermediaries, operate in ways that may disrupt the fair and free flow of information by 
introducing artificial forms of scarcity. In view of the above, a numerical increase in diversity has not 
remedied communicative inequalities resulting from concentration of ownership. To the contrary, the 
ways in which off and online concentration are now mingled to affect the amount and type of content 
to which citizens are exposed are more difficult to define which in turn makes the concerns that arise 
more challenging to address. 
 
Furthermore, it was seen that the wide array of information citizens now have at their fingertips 
or the ability to exercise control over content does not guarantee that they will choose to be exposed 
to diverse ideas. Individuals are increasingly engaging in simultaneous media use, a consumption 
pattern that prevents them from meaningfully engaging with the messages they receive. They may 
also be creating a private information micro-mundus where they speak only with others that think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 edia by the audience, 
which is changing with the new technologies, and examine if it is nowadays enough to offer what has traditionally been considered 
important information for a democracy Council of Europe (2009). Methodology for monitoring media 
concentration and media content diversity. Report prepared by the Group of Specialists on Media Diversity (MC-S-MD), 13 
262 Helberger, N. (2008), From Eyeball to Creator  Toying with Audience Empowerment in the Audiovisual Media Service Directive. 
Entertainment Law Review 6, 134-5 
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alike. To the extent that it isolates other viewpoints, control over content cannot be expected to 
advance pluralism. As to whether European audiences use digital media in ways that strengthen 
citizenship, this is hardly supported by empirical evidence.  
  
To sum up, it is not safe to assume that media pluralism is an almost natural outcome of the 
digital media environment. Instead of gradually adopting a hands-off approach, policymakers, each 
within its field of competence, should carefully reflect on the threats that both old and new 
gatekeepers pose to pluralism and create a framework within which marginalized viewpoints reach 
the audiences and audiences become more responsive to diversity.  
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Chapter 3  EU Competition Law and Media Pluralism: Is pluralism a market access 
equivalent, a restriction of competition, or maybe something else?   
 
1. Introduction  
 
The previous Chapter examined whether digital technologies have rendered concerns over 
media pluralism obsolete. Having analyzed the conditions that reflect the current state of European 
media markets, the Chapter concluded that, alongside issues that policymakers attempted to remedy 
in the past such as concentration of ownership, which remain pervasive, new perils posed by 
undertakings that operate in the online universe have emerged. At the EU level, cases that have given 
rise to pluralism concerns have traditionally fallen under competition law. This is so for the following 
three reasons, which have been discussed in Chapter 1. First, Article 7 TEU, which entitles the EU to 
take action in cases where there is a clear risk of a serious breach or a serious and persistent breach of 
media pluralism has had no practical significance. Equally negligible has been the role of Article 
21(4) of the Merger Regulation,1 which allows the Member States to take appropriate measures to 
protect media pluralism in cases where a concentration that has been cleared by the Commission 
raises the concern that the involved undertakings may hold significant opinion-forming power post-
merger. Finally, due to competence limitations in the media domain, no pan-European sector-specific 
legislation applies to concentrations which do not pose threats to competition but which are likely to 
harm media pluralism. 
 
What can or must the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission do if it is called 
upon to examine a case that raises concerns over media pluralism? Primary EU law neither explicitly 
excludes the possibility that pluralism may impact the application of the EU competition rules nor 
remains silent on the issue; Article 167(4) TFEU provides that the Commission must take media 
pluralism into account in the definition and implementation of the EU competition policy and Article 
11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU imposes on the Commission the duty to 
 
balanced against pluralism considerations in cases of conflict.  
 
As a result of the above, the relationship between EU competition law and media pluralism has 
been rather uneasy. The Commission itself has supported contradictory ideas about whether and if so, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation) OJ L 24/1 
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how the application of the former may safeguard the latter. Over the past twenty years, it has moved 
media companies which might endanger the existence of a wide spectrum of views and opinions in 
2 to openly rejecting a conception of competition law that is concerned with 
pluralism considerations.3 
lacking consistency. Moreover, whether the Commission has indeed disregarded pluralism in recent 
cases is debatable, for some of the decisions it has adopted suggest otherwise.   
 
This Chapter will explore whether, and if so to what extent, EU competition law, as interpreted 
and applied by the Commission, has contributed to maintaining media pluralism. To this end, I shall 
Commission seems to have adopted two different approaches: it has regarded media pluralism either 
as an almost spontaneous result of unhindered market access, or as a value the protection of which 
would require restrictions of competition that it believes is not entitled to allow. The Chapter argues 
that these two approaches, which will be discussed in Parts 2 and 3 respectively, are not solid and 
have fallen short of protecting both competition and pluralism. But, applying EU competition law in 
a way that delivers pluralism-friendly results may go beyond the C  existing 
predispositions. Part 4 identifies a third approach to the relationship between competition and 
pluralism which appears to have more potential than the other two, for it may lead to competition 
decisions that are more accurate and pluralism-friendly without giving rise to controversies over 
competence.  
 
2. Media pluralism as a result of unhindered market access 
   
On several occasions, the Commission has taken the stance that media pluralism is an almost 
spontaneous result of the undistorted functioning of the markets. For example, in the Issues Paper for 
ensuring market access for new entrants. Thus
competition policy can make an important contribution to maintaining and to developing media 
pluralism 4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the future of European audiovisual regulatory policy, COM (2003) 784 final, 8 
3 Commission decision NewsCorp/BSkyB, Case COMP/M. 5932 [2011] OJ C37/2, paragraphs 306-309 
4 European Commission (2005). Issues paper for the Liverpool Audiovisual Conference: Media pluralism  What should be the 
, 2. Brussels: DG Information Society and Media 
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f Working Document on Media Pluralism in the 
Member States of the EU5 and, as a policy priority, it is reflected in several merger and antitrust 
decisions. These decisions can be divided into two categories. First, there have been decisions where 
the Commission was limited to noting that, since the transaction under scrutiny did not raise any 
foreclosure concerns, diversity could not be harmed. 6 Second, there have been cases where the 
Commission found that the involved undertakings would have the ability and incentive to foreclose 
the affected markets, but instead of adopting a prohibition decision, it attempted to address related 
7 In these decisions, which concerned traditional and emerging 
(e.g. Internet Protocol television, Over-The-Top content markets, etc.
that is, content that has the ability to attract mass audiences such as box-office blockbusters and 
major sports events.8 The implications of the first category of decisions for pluralism have already 
been examined in Chapter 2 where I discussed extensively why it is not correct to assume that 
keeping the markets open to competition will produce a pluralism-friendly outcome; traditional and 
new media markets have high entry barriers and, even if diverse suppliers do enter the market, this 
cannot be expected to automatically guarantee content and exposure diversity. 9  Therefore, the 
analysis below will focus on the reasoning adopted in decisions falling under the second category. 
More particularly, I shall study whether the commitments that were made legally binding on 
undertakings marketing rights to premium content have indeed facilitated market access as well as 
the relationship between these remedies and media pluralism.  
 
2.1. Ensuring access to premium content as a means to protect undistorted competition  
 
Premium content is undoubtedly a valuable input, for its transmission may generate significant 
advertising revenues on which the survival of media firms largely depends. For example, sports 
programming is of high value to advertisers and hence to content distributors because it is 
particularly appealing to men who are in the age groups of 16 to 20 and 35 to 40; compared to other 
consumer groups, young men have a less fixed spending pattern and are therefore more likely to try 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Commission Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism in the Member States of the EU, SEC (2007) 32, 7 
6 See, for instance, Commission decision Bertelsmann/Planeta/Circulo, Case COMP/M.5838 [2010] OJ C 228/3, paragraphs 16, 39, 
49, 57 and 59; Commission decision HBO/ Ziggo/ HBO Nederland, Case No COMP/M.6369 [2012] OJ C 72/2, paragraph 53, and 
Commission decision Bertelsmann/KKR, Case COMP/M.5533 [2009] OJ C 240/01, paragraph 79 
7 These access remedies will be discussed below in Part 3 as well as in Chapter 3, Part 3 and Chapter 6, Part 5 
8 s. 
This applies to infrastructure, platforms and devices (satellite, cable and terrestrial networks, TV sets, PCs, mobile devices
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/overview_en.html  
9 Chapter 1, Part 3 
  
	   	   98	  
new products and services.10 More particularly, football, a mass attractive sport with high viewing 
figures, seems to be the most effective tool to address this group of the population which does not, as 
a rule, watch much television.11 There are several examples illustrating how the possession (or lack 
thereof) of this type of content may affect market structures. For example, in the early 1990s, after 
acquiring the exclusive rights to the English Premier League, Sky was transformed from a loss-
making company to a very profitable one.12 
13 has dominated the UK pay-TV market ever since. In December 2005, Premiere, the 
German media group, lost 42% of its market value and a large part of its subscriber base after it 
released a statement that it had not managed to purchase the rights to the Bundesliga whereas the new 
Bundesliga licensee Unity/Arena attracted over 900,000 subscribers within a few months.14 Likewise, 
seven years of growth turned to a substantial decrease in subscriber numbers for TPS in France upon 
losing its broadcast rights to Ligue 1 matches.15  
 
While in theory ensuring access to premium content seems appropriate to address some of the 
issues undercutting competition in the media markets, such as the indirect network effects created by 
exclusive transmission and the resulting downward spirals that lead to quasi-monopolistic or 
interventions have done little to nothing to protect undistorted competition. Three problems seem to 
have arisen. First, the Commission has made choices that have fallen short of rendering access to the 
market for the acquisition of premium content easier. Second, in implementing these choices, the 
Commission seems to have moved beyond what is permissible under EU competition law. Third, the 
16 of rights to premium 
content is based on erroneous assumptions. I shall attempt to demonstrate the above by examining the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 73. See also 
Commission decision Eurovision pay-TV broadcasters, particularly in France, 
the United Kingdom and Spain have discovered that having attractive sporting events is an enormously motivating factor in recruiting 
 
11 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 74 
12 Ariño, M. (2005). Regulation and Competition in European Broadcasting. A study of pluralism through access, 222. PhD thesis. 
Florence: European University Institute 
13 Gibson, O., Premier League lands £3bn TV rights bonanza from Sky and BT, published on The Guardian on 13/06/2012, available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/13/premier-league-tv-rights-3-billion-sky-bt  
14 Hatton, C., Christoph Wagner and Hector Armengod (2007). Fair Play: How Competition Authorities have Regulated the Sale of 
Football Media Rights in Europe, European Competition Law Review, 28(6), 346  
15  Ofcom (2009). Pay TV Phase Three Document: Proposed Remedies, paragraph 3.31. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/third_paytv/summary/paytv_condoc.pdf  
16 On the practice the Commission developed in the area of joint acquisition of rights to premium content see, for instance, Van 
Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2013). 
Unfinished Competition Business. Competition Law Review, 9(1), 7-28; Van Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2012). Competition 
Law, Sports, and Public Service Broadcasting: The Legal Complexity and Political Sensitivity of Measuring Market Distortion and 
Public Value. Journal of Media Law 4(2), 213-228, and Herold, A. (2002). Rules Governing the Acquisition by Third Parties of 
Television Rights for Sporting Events under Eurovision in Breach of the European Competition Law. 7 International Journal of 
Communications Law and Policy, 1-9 
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f joint selling of broadcast rights to sports events and 
in particular football.17  
 
remedies facilitated market access? 
 
In the Netherlands,18 Spain19 and Portugal,20 broadcast rights to football matches are sold by the 
football clubs individually. But the general trend across Europe has been the implementation of a 
joint selling model, whereby a national association/federation is assigned by the various clubs the 
task of selling the rights to the matches of the competition for the national championship concerned.21 
International competitions such as the UEFA Champions League22 and the World Cup23 are also 
controlled by single entities that trade the rights on behalf of the participants.  
 
The first case in this area that was examined by the Commission concerned the central 
marketing of broadcast rights to the UEFA Champions League.24 Initially, the Commission refused to 
grant a negative clearance as well as an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU because UEFA would 
sell all the free and pay-TV rights on an exclusive basis to a single broadcaster per territory for a 
period lasting several years.25 This commercial policy was found to reduce output and eliminate price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It should be noted that access to a valuable input in general and access to premium content in particular is a cross-cutting theme in 
this thesis. The access to premium content remedies the Commission has imposed on media undertakings that acquire exclusive rights 
from football associations and then sell them to competing content providers will also be discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 which discuss 
the relevant decisional practice in the areas of merger and State aid control respectively and which reach similar conclusions regarding 
the ineffectiveness of access remedies. In this Chapter we focus on joint selling by football associations, that is, concentration at the 
rights holder (not the licensees) level. As will be seen in greater detail below 
towards concentration at the upstream level adversely affected competition in downstream broadcasting and neighboring content 
markets.  On the practice the Commission developed in the area of access to premium films see, for instance, Ariño, M. (2005), supra 
n. 12, 261-271 
18 ed to 
sell the rights to the matches played at its stadium. Dutch football clubs have been employing this model since the national competition 
authority considered that joint selling should be regarded as a price-fixing arrangement which does not qualify for an exemption. See 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) (2008). Informe sobre la competencia en los mercados de adquisición y explotación de 
derechos audiovisuales de fútbol en España, fn. 58 
19 Ibid., see in particular pp. 22 et seq. In Spain, the visiting club must grant an authorization to the home team for the rights to the 
game to be sold to a media provider 
20  See Peeters, T. Competitive balance in European football leagues. 14 August 2012, Football Perspectives. Retrieved from: 
http://footballperspectives.org/competitive-balance-european-football-leagues  
21 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 233. For example, the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) is responsible for selling the rights 
to the Italian Campionato, the Football Association Premium League (FAPL) sells the rights to the UK Premium League, the Deutsche 
Fußball Liga GmbH is the federation charged with selling the rights to the German Bundesliga whereas rights to the French Ligue are 
sold by Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP). Note that in Italy, it is the legislator that has introduced collective trading. Before 
2007, the rights to the Italian Campionato would be marketed on an individual basis 
22 See, for instance, UEFA Champions League (2014). Media content rights sales: UEFA Champions League/UEFA Super Cup. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Publications/competitions/Marketing/01/96/76/90/1967690_DOWNLOAD.pdf  
23 http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/tv/salesdistribution.html  
24 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25 
25 European Commission (2001, July). Commission opens proceedings against UEFA's selling of TV rights to UEFA Champions 
League. Press Release IP/01/1043. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-1043_en.htm?locale=it  
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competition. 26  Following negotiations with the Commission, UEFA introduced changes to its 
collective selling scheme that were considered appropriate to address the concerns the Commission 
had identified throughout its investigation. These changes can be summarized as follows:  
- The media rights were split into fourteen smaller packages; 
- Contrary to the previous arrangement, the individual clubs would have the right to exploit   
deferred rights as well as certain rights that were previously sold exclusively by UEFA; 
- All media rights would be made available, including those rights UEFA was reluctant to sell 
such as Internet and UMTS rights, and 
- The media rights contracts would be awarded for a period not exceeding three years through a 
public bidding procedure.27  
 
The same approach was adopted in the German Football League (Deutschen Fußball Liga, 
DFL) 28  and in the English Football Association Premier League (FAPL); 29  the Commission 
exempted the agreements upon the condition that rights would be broken down into several packages 
that could only be acquired on the basis of a transparent and non-discriminatory bidding procedure, 
previously unexploited rights would be made available on the market, contracts with media operators 
would not exceed three seasons, and individual clubs would retain the right to sell certain rights.30  
 
The above remedies proved to be ineffective. For example, FAPL segmented the rights for the 
2004-2007 seasons into four packages, all packages, however, were ultimately acquired by Sky.31 A 
similar scenario has recently emerged in Germany. In January 2012, the Bundeskartellamt accepted 
one package.32 Yet, this did not prevent Sky 
Deutschland from purchasing the exclusive rights to the Bundesliga for pay-TV, IPTV and mobile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 European Commission (2002, June). Comm
League, Press Release IP/02/806. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-806_en.htm?locale=it  
27 Ibid. 
28 Commission decision, Joint Selling of the Media Rights to the German Bundesliga (Case COMP/C-2/37.214) [2005] OJ L 134/46 
29 Commission decision, Joint Selling of the Media Rights of the FA Premier League (Case COMP/C.2/38.173), [2006] OJ L 176/104  
30 European Commission (2003, July). New marketing system for Bundesliga broadcasting rights. Press Release IP/03/1106. Retrieved 
from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-1106_en.htm?locale=it; Commission decision, Joint Selling of the Media Rights to the 
German Bundesliga (Case COMP/C-2/37.214) [2005] OJ L 134/46, Annex, paragraphs 2.1. et seq.; Notice published pursuant to 
Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453, Joint selling of the media rights of the FA 
Premier League on an exclusive basis [2004] OJ C 115/02, paragraphs 16 et seq. On the practice the Commission developed in the 
area of joint selling rights and in particular on whether the relevant decision-making has benefited the consumer see Lefever, K. and 
Ben Van Rompuy (2009) Ensuring Access to Sports Content: 10 Years of Intervention. Time to Celebrate? Journal of Media Law, 
1(2), 243-268 
31 Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453, Joint 
selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis [2004] OJ C 115/02, paragraphs 10 and 11  
32  European Competition Network. Brief 02/2012. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/02_2012/brief_02_2012.pdf p. 6 
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Stricter remedies have also failed to achieve this goal. For example, because Sky acquired all of 
the Premier League packages for the 2004-2007 seasons 
FAPL further undertook to specify in the invitations to future tenders that no single operator would 
be entitled to acquire all of the live audiovisual packages (no single buyer obligation).35 The no single 
buyer obligation may have resulted in Setanta entering the market, but this was of little value. Sky 
won the rights to five of the six packages (the maximum available to a single bidder) whereas Setanta 
36 
Moreover, Setanta did not manage to exert effective competitive constraints on Sky; in June 2009, it 
went into administration and its rights were awarded to ESPN, which concluded a wholesale deal 
37 As a result, Setanta customers 
were ultimately forced to buy a Sky subscription.38 The above examples illustrate why concerns over 
distortions of competition in traditional broadcasting markets that arise from joint selling agreements 
are not likely to be addressed through unbundling obligations.39  
 
The 
opening up of neighboring broadcasting markets either.40 For example, UEFA Champions League 
may choose to provide ntent themselves 
or via ISPs,41 thereby leaving it up to the parties to the agreement to decide whether or not to offer to 
other suppliers the rights for online transmission. Moreover, the decision stipulates that, if either 
UEFA or the clubs sell the rights to other providers, the video content concerned can be distributed 
one and a half hours after the match ends, that is to say, as from midnight of the night of the match.42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  See Briel, R. Sky Deutschland wins all live Bundesliga rights. 18 April 2012, Broadband TV News. Retrieved from: 
http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2012/04/18/sky-deutschland-wins-live-bundesliga-rights/  
34 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 171 
35 Commission decision, Joint Selling of the Media Rights of the FA Premier League (Case COMP/C.2/38.173), [2006] OJ L 176/104, 
paragraph 3.2. 
36 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 15, paragraph 2.53  
37 Ibid., paragraph 1.17., fn. 42  
38 Ibid., paragraph 12.40 
39 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 242 
40 supra n. 
clubs to develop some of the rights with their fan base and will give an impulse to the emerging new media markets such as the 
In  
41 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 42 
42 Ibid., paragraph 40  
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These time limitations, which clearly favor traditional broadcasters,43 discourage new firms from 
penetrating emerging content markets because they devalue the acquired input; sports events may 
attract large audiences only if their result remains unknown, i.e. if the competition is broadcast live.44 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, even if the Commission designs access remedies on a 
platform neutral basis, premium content is very expensive. Put simply, antitrust intervention does not 
necessarily guarantee that a new entrant, which has not built a loyal customer base yet, will have the 
financial resources to successfully bid for the rights. This may go partway towards explaining why, 
with very few exceptions, the vast majority of media companies that acquired the rights to the UEFA 
Champions League for the seasons 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 are well-established broadcasting 
organizations.45  
 
competition law?  
 
input which competitors cannot duplicate feasibly or economically and access to which is necessary 
in order to effectively compete. For example, in Vivendi, the Commission noted that the 
attractiveness of pay-TV depends on the availability of sports rights, thereby making access to this 
essential ,46 whereas in Newscorp/Telepiu stand-alone 
driver for pay- 47  The remedies imposed upon exclusive 
acquirers/broadcasters, most notably the obligation to sublicense, also suggest a application of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Note that, with respect to Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) operators, the decision provides that video 
content must be made available five minutes after the action has taken place (see paragraph 44). This distinction between other online 
providers and UMTS operators is unjustified and arguably violates the platform neutrality principle. The Commission seems to have 
acknowledged the shortcomings of this approach in FAPL where it imposed the same embargo on both UMTS and Internet providers. 
See Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453, Joint 
selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis [2004] OJ C 115/02, paragraphs 26 and 28. Note also that 
er, it is well-known media 
organizations that have traditionally acquired access to these rights. See infra n. 45. On more information on the rationales for and 
, Lefever, K. (2012). New Media and 
Sport: International Legal Aspects, 145-
instance, Schaub, A. Sports and Competition: Broadcasting rights for sports events, 6. Speech delivered in Madrid, 26 February 2002. 
Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_008_en.pdf  
44 See, for instance, Agcom (2010). Libro bianco sui contenuti Gli eventi sportivi, infatti, pur essendo a utilità immediata 
( giati come i 
film) sono in grado di valorizzare la programmazione televisiva favorendo il confezionamento di palinsesti e offerte a pagamento ad 
elevata audience Retrieved from: http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?message=visualizzadocument&DocID=5558  
45  See UEFA (2012). Media content rights sales: UEFA Champions League/UEFA Super Cup. Retrieved from: 
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Publications/competitions/Marketing/01/55/41/62/1554162_DOWNLOAD.pdf 
46 Commission decision Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, Case No COMP/M.2050 [2000] OJ C 311/3, paragraph 21 
47 Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 66. Similarly, in BiB, it stated that an 
entrant into the pay-  the basics around which other 
cha British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, Case 
IV/36.539 [1999] OJ 312/1, paragraph 72 
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the refusal to supply line of case-law .48 However, an analysis of this case law will demonstrate that 
the treatment of the exercise of broadcast sports rights on an exclusive basis as an abusive refusal to 
deal stretches the limits of competition law in an unreasonable manner.  
 
Probably the first case concerning a refusal to supply is Commercial Solvents where the Court 
ruled that a firm in a dominant position in the market in raw materials and which, with the object of 
reserving such raw materials for manufacturing its own derivatives, refused to supply a customer that 
itself was a manufacturer of these derivatives, acted in violation of Article 102 TFEU.49 The Court 
followed the same approach in Télémarketing.50 Yet, these two judgments did not clarify whether, 
and if so under what conditions, the duty of a dominant firm to deal could be extended to a duty to 
license in cases where the firm in question held an Intellectual Property Right (IPR) entitling it to 
exclusive exploitation.51  
 
This issue was first tackled in Volvo52 concerning the refusal by the proprietor of a design right 
covering car body panels to license third parties to sell products incorporating the protected design. 
In this case, the Court ruled that in the primary market for which a dominant undertaking has a 
monopoly owning to its own IP, the exclusive right to produce or sell should be fully respected.53 
However, the ways in which the IPR is exercised in secondary markets may, in certain exceptional 
circumstances, be an abuse.54 The boundaries beyond which the exercise of exclusive IPRs may 
violate EU competition law were dealt with in more detail in Magill, a case concerning the refusal of 
three Irish broadcasters to license their program listings to a weekly TV guide.55 In Magill, the Court 
held that, for the refusal to supply a competitor operating in an ancillary market to be regarded as an 
abuse under Article 102 TFEU, the following three requirements must be met cumulatively.56 First, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006). Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers 
in Law, 07/2006, Global Competition Law Centre, 20 
49 ECJ, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] ECR 223, 
paragraph 25. In this case, the manufacturer of a raw material for ethambutol, a pharmaceutical product used to treat tuberculosis, 
refused to supply a long-standing customer which depended on the material for commercial survival as a producer of the drug 
50 ECJ, Case 311/84, Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion 
(CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB) [1985] ECR 3261. In this case, a television station subjected the sale of broadcasting 
time for any telemarketing operation to the use of the telephone number of an exclusive advertising agent belonging to the same group 
thereby excluding other telemarketing undertakings 
51 Anderman, S. and Hedvig Schmidt (2011). EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights  The Regulation of Innovation 
(2nd edition), 95. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
52 ECJ, Case 238/87 Volvo v. Veng (UK) [1988] ECR 6211 
53 Ibid., paragraph 8 
54 Ibid., paragraph 9. The Court gave three examples of conduct that may be viewed as abusive: a. the arbitrary refusal to supply spare 
parts to independent repairers; b. the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level, and c. a decision no longer to produce spare 
parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model are still in circulation 
55 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Comission [1995] ECR I-743 
56 Ibid., paragraph 2 
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the refusal must prevent the appearance of a new product which the dominant firm does not offer and 
for which there is potential consumer demand.57 This requirement is fulfilled if there is no actual or 
potential substitute for the new product and the raw material which the dominant firm possesses is 
indispensable for its creation.58 Second, there must be no objective justification for the refusal.59 And 
third, the refusal must result in excluding potential competition in the secondary market.60 
 
As regards football associations, the problem that arises from the application of the above case 
law to their decision to exploit the event on an exclusive basis does not have to do with the fact that 
broadcast sports rights are not IPRs; it has long been accepted that Coditel II, where the Court ruled 
that a contract involving an exclusive license to exhibit a film (or any other assignment of copyright) 
is not a per se infringement of EU competition law,61 applies to arrangements governing the granting 
of exclusive rights to sports events whereby a third party (the broadcaster) is allowed to access land 
or property (the stadium). 62  Moreover, Oscar Bronner, which concerned a refusal to access a 
nationwide newspaper home-delivery scheme, left the door open for an application of the Magill test 
to cases where no IPRs are involved. However, from Commercial Solvents to Magill to Oscar 
Bronner
competition in secondary markets. In the case at hand, these would be the downstream broadcasting 
markets for audiences and advertisers where football associations are not, as a rule, active.63 In view 
of the above, the duty to divide the rights into several packages and the no single buyer obligation 
imposed on these undertakings seem to go beyond what is permitted by the relevant case law.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., paragraphs 52-54 
59 Ibid., paragraph 2. See also paragraphs 39 et seq. The mere possession of an IPR is not an objective justification for exclusionary 
behavior. Examples of acceptable justifications include poor creditworthiness, safety, etc. See Anderman, S. and Hedvig Schmidt 
(2011), supra n. 51, 104 
60 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Comission, [1995] ECR I-743, paragraphs 54-56 
61 ECJ, Case 262/81 Coditel SA and others v. Ciné-Vog Films SA and others [1982] ECR 3381. The Court ruled that the exercise of a 
film 
distribution to an appreciable degree or to distort competition on the cinematographic market, regard being had to the characteristics of 
 
62 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006), supra n. 48, 3 referring to Wachtmeister, A. M. (1998), Broadcasting of sports events and Competition 
law. Competition Policy Newsletter, 2, 23 
63 While this is gradually changing as a result of convergence and the lower costs that the distribution of sports content entails, football 
federations and clubs are not full-fledged competitors of companies operating in broadcasting markets. For example, federations or 
matches, etc. However, very few associations or clubs have launched their own channels and, even in these cases, they continue to sell 
the rights to the matches concerned to media companies. For more information on the expansion of federations and clubs into media 
markets see Lefever, K. (2012), supra n. 43, 12-20  
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As regards exclusive acquirers/broadcasters and their obligation to sublicense, 64  the first 
question that arises is whether the above case law applies in cases where the competitive advantage 
of the firm is not the result of its own IP.65 This can be answered in the affirmative mainly for three 
reasons. First, a duty to deal would not facilitate free riding, for the sub-licensees pay the 
broadcaster/licensee a large amount of money to acquire the rights concerned. 66  Second, 
broadcasters/licensees may be equated with the rights owners for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU 
because the licensees are the entities with which competitors in the downstream markets enter in 
negotiations in order to conclude an access agreement. Finally, denying access to content that has 
been acquired in the primary (upstream) market for the acquisition of free and pay-TV rights may 
create distortions of competition in the secondary (downstream) markets for audiences and 
advertisers. In other words, the alleged abuse may adversely affect ancillary markets. This is in line 
with Volvo.  
 
If it is accepted that the refusal to supply case law may indeed apply to broadcasters that 
possess content which they themselves have not produced, the question arises as to whether the new 
product condition67 set by Magill is met here. This is a requirement that the Court has interpreted in a 
rather flexible manner. For example, in Microsoft, the company claimed that it could not be 
compelled to share interface information on the grounds that, instead of providing a new product, 
competitors would be merely replicating MS Windows server operating systems. The Commission, 
however, argued that competitors could use the interface information to develop advanced versions 
of their own products. The Commission provided convincing evidence demonstrating that, absent the 
with respect to, inter alia, the reliability/availability of the system and the security included in the 
server operating system, two characteristics to which consumers attached particular importance.68 
follow- 69 which is caught by Article 102(b) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This remedy was imposed by the Commission in, e.g. decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73 (see 
paragraph 225). The impact of the remedies imposed in NewsCorp/Telepiù on the development of the Italian market will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3. For an overview of the sublicensing mechanisms that were imposed by national competition authorities 
across the EU see Ofcom (2009). Wholesale must-offer remedies: International examples  
65 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006), supra n. 48, 22 
66 d arguments even in cases involving products the creation of which was 
based on extensive R&D efforts. See, for example, Commission decision 84/233/EEC of 18 April 1984 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.849 IBM personal computer) [1984] OJ L 118/24 
67 There is still some confusion as to whether this requirement must be met in the first place. In IMS Health, the Court held that, in the 
of dominant 
had taken place thereby implying that other tests may also apply. See ECJ, Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC 
Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] ECR I-5039, paragraphs 37-38 and 48-49 
68 CFI, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-03601, paragraph 652 
69 Ibid., paragraphs 630 et seq.  
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TFEU.70 In cases involving exclusive broadcast rights, and in particular in its assessments of whether 
the exercise of these rights may reduce product variety or adversely affect innovation, the 
Commission has not been as diligent as it was in Microsoft. The Commission has repeatedly taken 
the stance that ensuring access to premium content automatically results in more choice for the 
viewer.71 Yet, as already explained in Chapter 2, transmission of premium content and the resulting 
advertising revenues do not necessarily lead to the production and/or distribution of more original 
emerge. 
 
Moreover, as already mentioned, in Magill, the Court established that preventing the creation of 
a new product is abusive on condition that there is no actual or potential substitute for the product 
and that the raw material the dominant firm possesses is indispensable.72 There are strong doubts as 
to whether premium sports content fulfills these two criteria. First, as regards non-substitutability, 
even if there is sports content with highly inelastic demand such as the Wimbledon finals, the 
Olympic Games and the World Cup finals,73 this does not mean that every popular sports event has 
such unique attributes that excludes other competitions as attractive alternatives. This is particularly 
so when there is more than one event that may achieve high viewing figures, reach an identifiable 
audience targeted by the same advertisers, and develop a certain brand image. 74  As regards 
indispensability, in Oscar Bronner the Court explained that this condition is satisfied if there are no 
technical, legal and economic obstacles of making it impossible or even unreasonably difficult for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid., 
determines whether a refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable of causing prejudice to consumers within the meaning 
of Article [102(b) TFEU]. As that provision states, such prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not only of production or 
 
71 For example, in Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 48. Similarly, in TPS 
acknowledged that films and sporting events are the two most popular pay-TV products. It is necessary to have the corresponding 
rights in order to put together programs that are sufficiently attractive to persuade p
1999/242/EC  TPS [1999] OJ L 90/6, paragraph 34  
72 It is worth noting that in Tiercé Ladbroke, which concerned the request by a Belgian owner of betting shops to be granted access to 
televised transmissions o
refusal to supply the applicant could not fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 86 [now Article 102] unless it concerned a 
product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in question, in that there was no real or potential substitute, 
or was a new product whose introduction might be prevented, despite specific, constant and regular potential demand on the part of 
-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923, paragraph 131. Note also that in Oscar 
Bronner the Court does not refer to the new product requirement, but only to the indispensability and the substitutability requirements. 
See ECJ, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others 
[1998] ECR I-7791, paragraph 41. Thus, depending on how one reads the above judgments, these requirements may either 
complement or replace the new product condition 
73 See, for instance, Commission decision Eurovision, Case IV/32.150 [2000] OJ L151/18, paragraph 42 and Commission decision 
2001/478/EC UEFA Broadcasting Regulations [2001] OJ L 171/12, paragraph 28 
74 Toft, T. (2003). Football: joint selling of media rights. Competition Policy Newsletter, 3, 49  
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another to replicate the product or service under consideration.75 In our case, it would indeed be 
impossible to duplicate a certain match. However, it is questionable whether such a strict 
interpretation is desirable in competition assessments in media markets where almost every product, 
from a TV series to a film to an interview of a particular artist, would qualify as a product 
 
 
2.1.3. The efficiencies joint selling agreements are believed to create: Has the 
Commission got it all wrong?  
 
That the remedies the Commission imposed in order to reduce the scope and duration of 
exclusivity seem to move beyond what is permissible under EU competition law, combined with the 
fact that these remedies fell short of ensuring access to the rights concerned, is a strong indication 
that the concerns that should be addressed by a competition authority are not those relating to the 
exclusive terms of exploitation, but those arising from a concentrated wholesale market.76 Hence, 
instead of dealing with the issue at a later stage by establishing legally questionable and ineffective 
obligations, the Commission should rather consider re-adjusting its approach to joint selling 
agreements.  
 
There are valid reasons to believe that joint selling agreements do not really generate the 
efficiencies based on which the Commission has granted exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU. For 
example, in terms of improvements in the distribution of the content concerned, the Commission 
found that collective bargaining might result in more operators, including smaller providers, 
purchasing the rights to the content concerned.77 Yet, it was seen above that the joint selling model 
has not prevented Sky from acquiring the most attractive or all of the FAPL and DFL packages in the 
UK and Germany respectively. The Commission has also argued that collective selling improves 
distribution on the grounds that it creates a single point of sale, thereby reducing transaction costs.78 
It is, however, doubtful whether the creation of a single point of sale outweighs the harm to 
competition in the affected markets, for the concentration of the bargaining power in the hands of the 
federations has led to excessive pricing and to an increase in media concentration.79  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ECJ, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others [1998] 
ECR I-7791, paragraph 44 
76 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 277 
77 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 171 
78 Ibid., paragraphs 148-9 
79 Parlasca, S. and Stefan Szymanski (2002). The Negative Effects of Central Marketing of Football Television Rights on Fans, Media 
Concentration and Small Clubs. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 4, 83-104 
  
	   	   108	  
As regards benefits to the consumers, the Commission has repeatedly taken the stance that, 
under an individual selling scheme, the viewers would need to subscribe with more than one pay-TV 
operator in order to watch the entire competition.80 However, there is no guarantee that consumers 
will not have to incur this additional cost under a joint selling model. A good example is the no single 
buyer obligation imposed on FAPL which forced Sky customers to purchase the Setanta subscription 
at a price of at least GB £9.99 per month in order to be able to access all of the FAPL matches.81  
 
With respect to improvements in production, an argument which is usually put forward in these 
cases is that football federations employ the financial solidarity model whereby revenues are 
redistributed to finance the poorer teams.82 It is thought that cross-subsidization of weaker clubs 
facilitates the purchase of new players, thereby making these clubs more competitive vis-à-vis their 
stronger rivals.83 Yet, a financial solidarity model may also apply to individual selling arrangements. 
In such a scenario, the commercialization of the media rights on a club-by-club basis does not hinder 
the competitive balance of the sport. 84  The Commission has further claimed that the fact that 
collective bargaining aggregates the media products of football clubs into one media product 
covering the league as a whole establishes the reputation of a brand because a homogeneous 
presentation increases the attractiveness for both the viewer and the clubs.85 But, individual selling 
agreements have also managed to create powerful brands, the most prominent example being La Liga 
Española. In the 2011-12 season, La Liga had an average attendance of 30,275 for league matches, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 172. This is also an 
assumption made by national competition authorities. See, for instance, CNC (2008), supra n. cordarse que en nuestro 
país, a diferencia de los modelos de venta centralizada, con respecto a cada jornada de Liga el 100% de la oferta audiovisual de 
partidos en directo de Primera División es accesible para el consumidor a través de, como mucho, la suscripción a la plataforma vía 
satélite, y el 90% de ella en caso de que el consumidor se suscriba a otra de las plataformas. La explotación individual y la 
segmentación por paquetes, en un contexto de explotación de los mismos en exclusiva, implica que el consumidor no puede acceder a 
la oferta futbolística (ni a los mejores partidos de la jornada) mediante la suscripción a una sola plataforma en los mismos términos que 
 
81 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 15, paragraph 12.40  
82 For more details on the financial solidarity model see European Professional Football Leagues (2010). Financial Solidarity at 
Leagues and European level. Retrieved from: http://www.epfl-
europeanleagues.com/files/EPFL_Financial_Solidarity_at_Leagues_and_European_Level.pdf  
83 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraphs 164-165; Commission 
(2007). White Paper on Sport COM 391 final, 17; European Commission (1999). Report from the Commission to the European 
Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community 
framework (the Helsinki Report on Sports), 9. Retrieved from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0644:FIN:EN:PDF  
84  Tonazzi, A. (2002). Competition Policy and the commercialization of sport broadcasting rights: the decision of the Italian 
Competition Authority. International Journal of the Economics of Business 10(1), 17-34. See also Falconieri, S., Frederic Palomino 
and Joszef Sakovics (2004). Collective versus Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports. Journal of the European Economic 
Association 2(5), 833-862. Falconieri et al. have compared the welfare effects of collective and individual selling by analyzing the 
impact on bargaining power, prices and the scope of potential free-riding by the poorer teams, and conclude that under certain 
circumstances, individual selling can be more profitable 
85 Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraphs 154 et seq. 
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which is the third-highest of any professional association football league in the world.86 Moreover, 
the first division (Primera División) of La Liga is currently first in the UEFA rankings of European 
leagues in terms of performances in European competitions over a five-year period, ahead of the 
English  Bundesliga.87 With respect to income generated by media 
rights 709.6 million for the season 2012-13, beating Bundesliga, the rights to 
which, as already seen, are sold on a collective basis.88 
 
The Spanish example indicates that individual selling may benefit a sports competition. 
Moreover, if competition is not eliminated in the upstream market, there is the likelihood that an 
increased number of operators will successfully bid for the broadcast rights: to my knowledge, Spain 
is currently the only case of a large European market where rights to the major national football 
competition have been acquired by three media companies, two pay-TV operators and one free-to-air 
broadcaster (Digital+, GolT and Cuatro). In the UK and Germany, one provider clearly dominates the 
market for the acquisition of premium sports content. More particularly, in the UK, Sky was a 
monopsonist for nearly twenty years and only recently another firm, BT, managed to win certain 
rights to FAPL matches.89 In Germany, as previously mentioned, Sky Deutschland secured the live 
rights to all Bundesliga games in pay-TV, IPTV and mobile, whereas in the free-to-air segment, 
public broadcaster ARD acquired the rights to only seven live matches per season.90  
 
It should be borne in mind that dismantling collective selling schemes is not a panacea. This 
solution does not fully remove the concern that broadcast sports rights will be acquired by one or a 
handful of powerful media firms. However, if considered alongside the analysis carried out above, 
which concluded that prohibiting the exercise of rights to premium content on an exclusive basis is a 
rather intrusive option for EU competition law, it is strongly doubted whether the 
access to premium content policy may indeed protect and promote competition, both in traditional 
broadcasting markets and in emerging content markets.  
 
2.2 Ensuring access to premium content as a means to protect media pluralism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Pudasaini, P. Top 10 Sports Leagues With the Highest Attendance Per Game. 21 March 2014, The Richest.com. Retrieved from: 
http://www.therichest.com/sports/top-10-sports-leagues-with-the-highest-average-per-game-attendance-in-the-world/5/ For more 
details see Soccer STATS 2014/2015 at: http://www.soccerstats.com/attendance.asp?league=spain  
87 http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/club/  
88 See Sports Media Consumption Data. 10 December 2013, SportBusiness.com. Retrieved from: http://www.sportbusiness.com/tv-
sports-markets/sports-media-consumption-data  
89 Sky retained most of the rights, securing 116 matches per season from 2013-14 against BT which won the rights to 38 games. See 
Gibson, O. (2012), supra n. 13 
90 See Briel, R. (2012), supra n. 33 
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questionable, not only from a competition but also from a pluralism perspective. First, premium 
content, be it an UEFA Champions League match, the World Cup finals or a Hollywood film, is the 
same irrespective of whether it is provided by a well-established media organization or a new entrant. 
Second, ensuring that more than one company acquires this content does not necessarily incentivize 
the provision of more original or marginalized content that has the capacity to advance democracy. 
For example, it was a sports broadcaster (Setanta) that managed to purchase the license to exploit 
certain football rights as a result of the no single buyer remedy imposed on FAPL.91 Third, and 
related to the above, the argument that the acquisition of premium content allows providers to 
promote their overall program, thereby leading to the exposure of the audiences to content that 
strengthens citizenship, is weak. As Ladeur observes somewhat cynically
spectator may acquire an interest in political background information by watching top sporting events 
92 Finally, as already mentioned, even if the Commission intervenes 
to limit the scope and duration of an exclusive contract between the rights holder and a media 
provider, this does not mean that a smaller competitor has at its disposal the financial resources to 
successfully bid for the rights after the contract in question expires. Hence, ensuring access to 
premium content does not necessarily guarantee media pluralism. Where it indeed allows new 
entrants or established firms to build or maintain a customer base respectively, it may cater to supply 
diversity. However, the connection with content and exposure diversity is far more uncertain.  
 
In light of the above, the practice the Commission has developed in the media sector to ensure 
market access seems to be, from a competition perspective, ineffective and, from a pluralism angle, 
theoretically unfounded.  
 
3. Media pluralism as a restriction of competition   
 
As previously noted, the Commission has occasionally stated that, in applying EU competition 
law, its greatest contribution to addressing pluralism concerns consists in its interventions to ensure 
that market access is not hindered. But, what position has the Commission taken in cases where it 
found that keeping the affected markets open to competition would not necessarily remedy these 
concerns? This part will explore whether the Commission has attempted to reconcile competition and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 15, paragraph 2.53 
92 Ladeur, K. H. (2004). 
Programmes in Multimedia Conditions, German Law Journal 5(8), 915 
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media pluralism in cases of conflict and whether, and if so to what extent, pluralism can justify 
restrictions of competition. Where appropriate, I will refer to cases that do not involve pluralism-
specific concerns.  
 
Recent decisional practice shows that the Commission has been keen to distance itself from 
values which, in its view, are irreconcilable with the value of undistorted competition and which 
could be harmed as a result of a transaction it examined. For example, in NewsCorp/BSkyB, the 
Commission scrutinized a concentration by which News Corporation93 would acquire sole control of 
BSkyB.94 In addition to the possible anti-competitive effects it was likely to create,95 the proposed 
concentration also raised major pluralism concerns. More particularly, it was feared that, if the 
transaction were approved, it would give media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch a dangerous level of 
control of the UK media.96 The Commission was limited to noting that relevant issues are for the UK 
authorities to address under Article 21(4)97 of the Merger Regulation98 and decided to approve the 
concentration on the grounds that it did not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
common market.99 The Commission followed a similar approach in Google/Doubleclick, which dealt 
with the acquisition by Google of rival online advertising services provider Doubleclick.100 In this 
case, several market participants and civil society groups voiced concerns about the combination of 
the databases held by Google and Doubleclick.101 
privacy could be undermined because the combination of the databases in question would increase 
the power of the merging firms to track customer online behavior and use it for advertising 
purposes. 102  The Commission cleared the concentration for the reason that it was not likely to 
significantly impede effective competition in the common market and that, irrespective of the 
approval of the merger, the merging parties were obliged to respect in their day-to-day business EU 
and national privacy regulation.103  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 3 
94 Ibid., paragraphs 1 and 4 
95 Ibid., paragraph 28 
96 See, Ofcom (2010). Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News 
Corporation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78516/OfcomPITReport_NewsCorp-
BSkyB_31DEC2010.pdf  
97 See Chapter 1, fn. 89 
98 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 309 
99 Ibid., paragraph 310 
100 Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraph 1 
101  Brockhoff, J., Bertrand Jehanno, Vera Pozzato, Carl-Christian Buhr, Peter Eberl, and Penelope Papandropoulos (2008). 
- horizontal merger guidelines, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2, 59 
102 Ibid.  
103 Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraph 368 
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The Commission has not always disassociated competition from other public policies. To the 
contrary, in the past, non-competition policy considerations have significantly influenced the 
outcome of competition decisions.104 For example, agreements were granted an exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU105  on the grounds that the anti-competitive concerns they raised could be 
outweighed by, inter alia, their contribution to employment stabilization106 or pollution reduction.107 
A similar reasoning can be traced to old decisions in the media sector. 108  For instance, in 
EBU/Eurovision, the Commission decided that the agreement entitling the members of the European 
Broadcasting Union, a professional association of broadcasting organizations, to participate in a 
system of joint acquisition of television rights, justified an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU on 
 a broader range of sports programs, including 
minority sports and sports programs with education, cultural or humanitarian content, that they 
109  Another notable example is a series of 
concentrations in the broadcasting sector that were blocked throughout the 1990s.110 Embedded in the 
relevant prohibition decisions is the belief that the strict application of competition rules may not 
 to maintaining plurality 
111  
 
Newscorp/BSkyB and Google/Doublick are illustrative of the process of modernization of EU 
competition law. This modernization process, which started almost twenty years ago and which was 
largely influenced by changes in the U.S. antitrust policy prompted by a general acceptance of the 
law 112  includes two components. 113  The first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For instance, Tonwley estimates that, between 1993 and 1 May 2004, when Regulation 1/2003 on the modernization of the rules 
implementing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU started to apply, non-economic considerations were decisive in over 32% of formal 
Commission decisions that were adopted under Article 101(3) TFEU. See Townley, C. (2009). Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 5-6. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing 
105 For a comprehensive overview of how public policy concerns were taken into account by the Commission in the application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU see Monti, G. (2002). Article 81 EC and Public Policy. Common Market Law Review 39(5), 1057-1099  
106 See, for instance, Decision of the Commission of the European Communities of 15 December 1975 relating to a procedure under 
Article 85 of the EEC treaty (IV/847  
ECJ, Case 26/76, Metro-SB Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission of the European Communities [1977] ECR 1875, paragraph 
43. The same approach was followed in Commission decision of 12 December 1983, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty [1983] OJ L 376/22. The Court upheld the Commissio Case 42/84, Remia and others v. Commission 
[1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 42 
107 See, for example, Commission decision Philips/Osram, IV/34.252 [1994] OJ L 378/37, paragraph 27 and Commission decision 
CECED, 2000/475/EC [2000] OJ L 187/47, paragraphs 47-51 and 55-57 
108 For a comprehensive overview of the Commission decisions in the media sector where non-economic concerns were decisive see 
Arino, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 139-144 
109 Commission decision 93/403/EEC EBU/Eurovision system (Case IV/32.150) [1993] OJ L 179/23, paragraph 62. This decision was 
subsequently annulled by the Court. See CFI, Joined Cases T-528, 542, 543 & 546/93 Métropole télévision SA and others v. 
Commission [1996] ECR II-649 
110 These decisions will be analyzed in Chapter 3 
111 Harcourt, A. (2005). The European Union and the Regulation of the Media Markets, 51. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
112 Anderman, S. (2007). The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, 7. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
113 Gerber, D. J. (2008). Two forms of Modernization in European Competition Law. Fordham International Law Journal 31(5), 1247  
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involves a narrowing of the objectives of competition law; the new conception of competition law 
posits that economic efficiency and consumer welfare, as understood by neoclassical economics, are 
the guiding principles of EU competition policy.114 The second, which follows from the first, posits 
that formal economic methodology is the central organizing structure for applying competition 
law. 115  Together, these two components a
116 
 
There is already a large body of literature discussing the objectives of EU competition law in 
general and the shift to a more economic approach in particular.117 While conflicting views pull in 
many different directions, broadly speaking, at one end of the spectrum are those that argue that 
interference from other policies that have thus far influenced competition law should be eliminated 
altogether.118 EU competition law, they say, should be allowed t
119 As regards media pluralism specifically, it is not clear, so the argument goes, 
Commission seems to have r 120 At the other 
end of the spectrum are those that maintain that competition law should be enforced by reference to 
media pluralism. Advocates of this latter view suggest that an obligation to conduct an assessment of 
the effects of the concentration on media pluralism be incorporated into the Merger Regulation.121 
They recommend the establishment of a specialist body that would advise the Competition 
Directorate-General on the pluralism-specific issues to which the concentration in question would 
give rise.122 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 See Lowe, P., Consumer Welfare and Efficiency  New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy? Speech given at the 13th 
International Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day, Munich, 27 March 2007 
115 Gerber, D. J. (2007), supra n. 113 
116 Ibid.  
117 See, for instance, Akman, P. (2009). Consumer Welfare and Article 102 EC: Practice and Rhetoric. World Competition 32, 71-90; 
Akman, P. (2009). Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2), 267-303; Andriychuk, 
O. (2010). Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process. European Competition 
Journal 6(3), 575-610; Drexl, J., Kerber, W. Podszun, R. (eds.) (2010). Competition Policy and the Economic Approach  Foundations 
and Limitations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Lovdahl-Gormsen, L. (2007). The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer 
Welfare in the Modernization of Article 82 EC. European Competition Journal 3(2), 329-344; Odudu, O. (2010). The Wider Concerns 
of Competition Law, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(3), 599-613, and Zimmer, D. (ed.) (2012). The Goals of Competition Law, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
118 See, for instance, Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Section 
1.3., and Bishop, S. and Mike Walker (2002). The Economics of EC Competition Law (2nd edition) 23-27. London: Sweet and 
Maxwell 
119 Amato, G. (1997). Antitrust and The Bounds of Power  The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market, 116. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing 
120 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006), supra n. 48, 26 
121 See, for instance, Craufurd-Smith (2004). Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: the internal 
market, fundamental rights and European citizenship, European Law Review, 29(5), 669; Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 405-410, and 
Komorek, E. (2013). Media Pluralism and European Union, 281-283. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
122 Ibid. 
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These opposite views are arguably equally problematic. On the one hand, competition law 
cannot be solely concerned with efficiency and welfare considerations. From a teleological 
perspective, competition has never been referred to in the EU Treaties as an objective in its own 
right. To the contrary, competition was embedded in primary EU law right from the start as one of 
the key instruments towards the objective of European integration in general and the completion of 
the single market in particular.123 That competition is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, 
continues to hold true in the post-Lisbon era.124 The Court of Justice has repeatedly favored this 
teleological interpretation, holding that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be implemented in light of 
the overall objectives of the Union.125 A literal interpretation of the Treaties leads to the same 
conclusion. More particularly, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union includes several 
- 126  provisions that establish that non-economic considerations relating to 
environmental 127  and consumer protection, 128  employment, 129  human health, education, adequate 
social protection, social exclusion, training,130 development cooperation,131 welfare of animals,132 
economic, social and territorial social cohesion133 and, of particular relevance for this study, cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2014). EU Competition Law - Texts, Cases and Materials (5th edition), 35-40, Oxford: OUP 
124 It bears noting that neither the Treaty on European Union nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union replicate Article 
3(f) of the Treaty of Rome which established that one of the main activities through which the Community should fulfill the objectives 
laid the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted
In the context of the amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of undistorted competition was transferred to a 
Protocol (Protocol No. 27 on the Internal market and Competition [2008] OJ C 115/309 and Article 3 TEU now lays down in broad 
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 Treaties. 
The Court of Justice has also ruled that moving the principle of undistorted competition to a Protocol has no legal consequence (see 
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527. However, the fact that the Protocol repeats almost 
verbatim Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome corroborates the view that competition continues to be a means to serve the internal 
market 
125 Van Rompuy, B. (2012). Economic Efficiency: The Sole Concern of Modern Antitrust Policy?, 219. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, referring to ECJ, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission of the 
European Economic Community [1966] ECR 299, 340; ECJ, Case 32/65, Italian Republic v. Council and Commission [1966] ECR 
234, 405; ECJ, Joined Cases 41 and 44/70, NV International Fruit Company and others v. Commission [1971] ECR 411, paragraphs 
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23-24; ECJ, Case 229/83, Leclerc/Au blé vert [1985] ECR 1, paragraph 8, and ECJ, Case 26/76, Metro-SB Großmärkte GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Commission of the European Communities [1977] ECR 1875, paragraph 20 
126 Monti, G. (2002), supra n. 105, 1069 noting that this term is used mostly by German scholars (see fn. 48) 






130 policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to 
the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and prot
 
131 shall be conducted within the framework of the 
 
132 d 
technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full 
regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member 
States relatin  
133 nal 
market shall take into account the objectives  
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diversity,134 
Union policies and activities, including EU competition enforcement. Article 7 TFEU, introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty, solidifies this need for coherence by establishing a general obligation of the EU to 
tives into account and in 
cross-sectional clauses impact the application of the EU competition rules is not clear.135 It can be 
noted that the wording of some cross-sectional provisions is stronger than others.136 For example, 
under Article 168(1) TFEU, in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, the Union is obliged 
 Union is 
integration than the one required by the former.137 However, Article 167(4) TFEU, albeit loosely 
drafted, cannot be rendered devoid of any mandatory effect. In other words, the duty it enshrines 
cannot be disregarded altogether when applying the EU competition provisions of the Treaty; Article 
167(4) TFEU and similar cross-sectional clauses require compromise.138 The Court of Justice has 
traditionally supported this interpretation, corroborating the position that the EU competition policy 
cannot be implemented in a vacuum, that is to say, completely detached from other EU values.139 On 
the other hand, rendering undistorted competition dependent on the protection of media pluralism is 
not appropriate either. Article 167 TFEU lacks both a strong wording to support the counter-
argument and direct effect.140 Competition rules, however, are directly applicable and in a higher 
position in the hierarchy of the prior
141 Even under the 
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135 Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 125, 220 
136 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 141. For a detailed comparison of these clauses, including the different ways in which they were 
implemented, see Psychogiopoulou, E. (2008). The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law and Policies, 61-84. Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
137 Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 125, 225 
138 Ibid. referring to Kingston, S. (2010). 
Special. European Law Journal, 16(6), 789; Casey, D. (2009). Disintegration: Environmental Protection and Article 81 EC, European 
Law Journal 15(3),  367; Townley (2009), supra n. 104, 55, 62-63; Schweitzer, H. (2007). Competition Law and Public Policy: 
Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship. The Example of Article 81, 5. EUI Working Paper, No. 2007/32; Psychogiopoulou, E. (2006). 
The Cultural Mainstreaming Clause of Article 151(4) EC: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity or Hidden Cultural 
Agenda? European Law Journal, 12(5), 585; Lafferty W. M. and Eivind Hovden (2003). Environmental Policy Integration: Towards 
an Analytical Framework. Environmental Politics 12(1), 16, and Sevenster, H.G. and Hans Vedder (2000). Integreren or 
concurrenen? De rol van niet-mededingingsbelangen, in het bijzonder milieubescherming, in het kartelbeleid, Tijdschrift voor 
Europees en Economisch Rect 2(1), 4-5. For a different view see, for instance, Komninos, A. P. (2005). Non-competition concerns: 
Resolution of Conflicts in the Integrated Article 81 EC. The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working 
Paper, No. 08/05, and Odudu, O. (2006). The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81, 158-174. Oxford: OUP 
139 Townley, C. (2009), supra n. 104, 55-86. Note that the Commission has been severely criticized for supporting in its Guidelines on 
Article 101(3) TFEU an interpretation that seeks to marginalize non-competition policy considerations, which clearly goes against this 
case-law 
140 Van Rompuy, B. (2012), supra n. 125, 225 
141 Ibid. referring to Cruz, J. B. (2002). Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of the European 
Community, 63-66. Oxford: Hart Publishing 
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broadest reasonable interpretation, concerns over media pluralism cannot override competition 
considerations in cases of conflict. Hence, the proposal to build into the Merger Regulation a 
requirement to conduct a fully-fledged analysis of the effects of a transaction on media pluralism, 
with a view to prohibiting concentrations which are posing pluralism concerns but which are not 
likely to distort competition, seems to go beyond what EU law sanctions.  
 
An interpretation that would seem sound in terms of law and policy is in between the two 
extremes outlined above, a position which many have already advocated.142 As regards the question 
of whether, and if so to what extent, the Commission should take into account non-economic 
considerations when deciding whether an anti-competitive agreement qualifies for an exemption 
an agreement which contributes to a 
but an agreement which results in increased efficiency and which contributes to other Community 
goals is exempted because the combination of these two benefits outweighs the restriction of 
143 Monti and other commentators144 convincingly contend that under this interpretation 
neither unnecessary restrictions of competition are accepted nor are the cross-sectional clauses 
rendered devoid of any legal effect.145 But, many, including those same commentators that argue in 
favor of a moderate approach, 146  have expressed skepticism about whether the above proposed 
interpretation applies to the cross-sectional clause on culture. More particularly, it has been asserted 
read as a renvoi to the laws of the Member States. 147  -existent 
competence to regulate culture, so the argument goes, the only plausible interpretation of Article 
148  While competence 
limitations cannot be overlooked,149 this argument is not ultimately conclusive. Even if the stronger 
wording of other cross-sectional clauses allows for the non-economic goals they pursue to be 
weighed more heavily against undistorted competition, there is arguably some room for cultural, 
including media, policy considerations to be taken into account in the application of the EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See, supra n. 138 
143 Monti, G. (2002), supra n. 105, 1070 
144 See, for instance, Wesseling, R. (2000). The Modernization of Antitrust Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, and Van Rompuy, B. 
(2012), supra n. 125, 403 
145 Monti, G. (2002), supra n. 105, 1070-1 
146 Ibid., 1084 
147 Schmid, C. U. Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National Regulation  A Conflict of Laws, 
Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing. European Review of Private Law, 8, 164 
148 Ibid.  
149 As already discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Article 167(5) TFEU explicitly excludes the adoption of a harmonizing instrument 
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supplement and coordinate the actions taken by the Member States 
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competition rules: in several instances, the Court has been asked to rule on the compatibility with the 
internal market of national measures that aimed at safeguarding media pluralism. In these cases, the 
Court refused to read media pluralism within one of the narrowly interpreted grounds for justification 
laid down in Article 52 TFEU.150 It has, however, acknowledged that a media policy may constitute 
an overriding requirement relating to the general interest, thereby justifying restrictions on the 
freedom to provide services.151 In other words, in interpreting the provisions on free movement, the 
Court has attempted to strike a balance. It should also be noted that the Note from the Praesidium that 
drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU explains that Article 11(2), which establishes 
luralism, is to be 
interpreted in light of the aforementioned case law152 which, as already seen, implies that the conflict 
must be resolved by compromise. The question then arises as to whether we should adopt a different 
approach to the interpretation of restrictions on competition introduced by arrangements that could 
potentially enhance media pluralism. The Treaties would not seem to support this, for free movement 
and competition are equally important for the achievement of the internal market.  
 
The main conclusion to draw from the above analysis is that a teleological and literal 
interpretation of the Treaties may support the argument that media pluralism concerns can justify 
restrictions of competition. However, it should be borne in mind that the extent to which pluralism 
concerns can affect the outcome of a competition decision is fairly limited. Article 167(4) TFEU has 
no direct effect and post-Lisbon the EU continues to have limited competence to regulate this area.153 
As a result, the legal basis for the resolution of any conflict by compromise, albeit existent, remains 
rather thin.   
 
4. Media pluralism considerations as an integral part of competition assessments: 
 
 
It was seen above that in recent years the Commission has taken the stance that, in cases where 
preventing market foreclosure is not sufficient to remedy concerns over media pluralism, it lacks the 
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Case C-211/91, Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6757, paragraphs 7 et seq.  
151 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v. Commissariaat voor de 
Media, [1991], ECR I-4007, paragraphs 23-29; ECJ, Case C-353/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of the 
Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069, paragraphs 29-31, and ECJ, Case C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. 
Commissariaat voor de Media, [1993] ECR I-487, paragraphs 9-13 
152 Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000). Text of the explanations relating 
to the complete text of the Charter as set out in Charte 4487/00 Convent 50, 14. Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf  
153 As already mentioned in Chapter 1, even if post-Lisbon the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been made legally binding on the 
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competence to examine these concerns further.154 Competence limitations, however, were not the 
only reason put forward in justification of this approach. This is illustrated by Newscorp/BSkyB 
where the Commission stated that the scope and purpose of competition and pluralism assessments 
are very different ,155 clearly implying that a pluralism review would have led to findings different 
from those in its decision.156 
analyses are not irreconcilable. In this part I shall attempt to demonstrate a) that the objectives of and 
legal frameworks for competition and pluralism assessments may, but do not always, produce 
different outcomes, and b) that, if the EU competition rules are properly adapted to the particularities 
of media markets, competition assessments may deliver pluralism-friendly results.    
 
4.1. Why can competition and media pluralism assessments lead to different outcomes? 
 
The goals of and rules underpinning competition and media pluralism reviews may produce 
different, even opposing, outcomes. This is so for at least three reasons. First, concentration as 
prohibited by media regulation, and concentration as a competition concern, do not necessarily 
coincide as normative concepts.157 The accumulation of significant market power is not a breach of 
EU competition law; Article 102 TFEU does not prevent an undertaking from acquiring and holding, 
on its own merits, a dominant position but only the abuse thereof. 158  Yet, from a pluralism 
perspective, centralization of market power, which is the presumed equivalent of opinion forming 
power, would be sufficient to trigger the application of media ownership restrictions.159 Nevertheless, 
there are examples illustrating that in some cases concentration is not understood very differently 
under the two regimes. As already extensively discussed in Chapter 2, certain policymakers have 
recently abolished media-specific ownership rules. For example, in the Netherlands, media mergers 
are now examined under general competition law.160 In cases where ownership rules still apply,161 the 
market share thresholds, above which it is inferred that media firms hold appreciable opinion forming 
power, do not always differ from market share thresholds that could suggest that the firms concerned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 306 
155 Ibid., paragraph 307 
156 Ibid., paragraph 309 
157 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 384 
158 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, paragraph 24; ECJ, Case 
322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 57, and ECJ, Joined Cases 
C 395/96 P and C 396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I 1365, paragraph 37 
159 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 385 
160 Commissariat voor de media (2011). Media Monitor  The Dutch Media in 2010, 6  
161 And this is the case with the vast majority of Member States. However, in most cases, the rules require the media company 
concerned to control at least 25% of the market.  For an overview of the restrictions that apply in each Member State see European 
Commission (2009). Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States  Towards a Risk-based Approach. 
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have the ability and incentive to distort competition. For example, on the one hand, the Greek law on 
media concentration lays down that a media undertaking may not hold more than 35% of the market 
in which it operates.162 In Germany, this threshold is set at 30%.163 On the other hand, in exercising 
merger control, which resembles media ownership control in that the decision to oppose a merger is 
based on the likelihood that the concentration under scrutiny will grant the merging parties the power 
to engage in undesirable practices, the Commission has occasionally found that market shares 
between 25% and 35%, that would be held by the involved undertakings post-merger, were an 
indication that the transaction could significantly impede effective competition.164 These examples 
illustrate that, unless an undertaking becomes dominant as a result of internal growth, which for 
competition purposes would not in itself trigger an intervention against the undertaking concerned 
but which for pluralism purposes would be forbidden, there may be cases where action to address 
concentration under the two frameworks would not necessarily go in different directions.     
 
Second, it has been contended that competition and pluralism assessments are likely to produce 
different outcomes for the reason that competition law protects competition whereas regulation in 
support of media pluralism protects competitors.165 However, what or whom EU competition law 
ice are 
ambiguous on this matter. More particularly, and especially in the past, the Commission seems to 
have used competition policy to safeguard competitors. This policy, which is also referred to as a 
166 supports the idea that individuals should be allowed to participate in 
the market unobstructed from the economic power held by other market participants.167 The influence 
it has exercised on the Commission is exemplified by documents where explicit references to 
individual economic freedom as a goal of EU competition law is made,168 as well as by policy and 
legislative action that was driven by the aim to protect competitors rather than rivalry as a value in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Law No. 3592/2007 of 19/07/2007 on Media Concentration and Licensing Procedures [2007] Official Gazette 161/3371, Article 
3(3). It should be noted that this restriction applies to mono-media concentration  
163 This is expressed in terms of the audience share of all viewers. Interstate Broadcasting Treaty (2009), Article 26(2). Retrieved 
from: http://www.uni-muenster.de/ITMCATR/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Interstate-Treaty-on-Broadcasting.pdf  
164 See, for instance, Commission decision 1999/674/EC Rewe/Meinl, Case IV/M.1221 [1999] OJ L 274/1, paragraphs 98-114; 
Commission decision Nestlé/Ralston Purina, Case COMP/M.2337 [2001] OJ C 239/7, paragraphs 44-47. The Block Exemption 
Regulation on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to certain categories of vertical agreements. is based on a similar presumption. 
More particularly, the Regulation provides that the exemption from the rules on competition applies on condition that the market 
shares held by the parties to the agreement do not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which each party operates. See Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L 102/1, Article 3(1) 
165 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 385 
166 Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2014), supra n. 123, 17 
167 Ibid. 
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itself. For example, the Commission has exempted certain types of agreements from general 
prohibitions on restrictive practices with a view to offering SMEs the opportunity to compete with 
larger firms.169 More recently, the EU institutions appear to advocate the position that a restriction of 
competition is not equivalent to a re
statements made by the Commission,170 this is illustrated by the shift underpinning the refusal to 
supply case law: In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Commission adopted a broad interpretation of 
, whereby companies which held a dominant position and which 
refused to grant to their competitors access to a valuable input were deemed to act in violation of 
Article 102 TFEU.171  In recent times, however, as already seen above, stricter tests have been 
introduced that limited the scope of Article 102 TFEU in cases of refusal to deal.172 Yet, at least in 
the media domain, the issue remains unsettled; the imposition of remedies that seek to ensure access 
to premium content does not protect the process of competition but competing content providers, for 
otherwise the Commission would allow the company that made the highest bid to transmit the 
acquired content on an exclusive basis without requiring it to share the content with its rivals.173   
 
Finally, and arguably more fundamentally, competition and pluralism reviews may lead to 
174 On the one 
hand, for the purposes of competition, the public 
175 The audience member as consumer has traditionally been perceived as 
176 Audiences as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See, for instance, Commission notice of 18 December 1978 concerning its assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in 
relation to Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty [1979] OJ C 1/2, paragraph 1; Commission notice concerning agreements of minor 
importance which do not fall under Article 85 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [1997] OJ C 372/13, 
paragraph 19; Commission (EEC) Regulation No 67/67 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
exclusive dealing agreements [1967] OJ 57/849; Commission (EEC) Regulation No 2349/84 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements [1984] OJ L 219/15, corrected by [1985] OJ L 13/34 
170 See, for instance, European Commission (2013, April). Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address 
competition concerns  questions and answers The Commission does not act to protect competitors as such, but to preserve the 
competitive process for the benefit of consumers. It acts only when there is harm to competition with negative effects on consumers, in 
particular in terms of reduced choice and les http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-383_en.htm  
171 See, for instance, Commission decision Sealink/B&I-Holyhead [1992] 5 Common Market Law Review, 255 
172 See, for instance, CFI, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923; ECJ, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others [1998] ECR I-7791; ECJ, Joined cases T- 
374/1994, T-375/1994, T-384/1994 and T-388/1994, European Night Services and others v. Commission of the European 
Communities [1998] ECR II-3141. For more information on this paradigm shift and the conditions introduced by the more restrictive 
case law see, for instance, van den Bergh, R. and Peter Camesasca (2006). European Competition Law and Economics  A 
Comparative Perspective, 274-276. Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford: Intersentia-Hart Publishing 
173 See, for instance, Commission decision UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ L 291/25, paragraph 171: 
dcasters, including small and medium-sized companies, to obtain 
 
174 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 384 
175 Ibid. 
176 Helberger, N. (2008). From eyeball to creator  toying with audience empowerment in the Audiovisual Media Service Directive, 5. 
University of Amsterdam, Institute for Information Law, Working Paper. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/239, also published in Entertainment Law Review, 6, 128-137  
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consumers are solely concerned with serving their individual needs and preferences,177 and hence 
tend to focus on a limited amount of content that reflects these needs and preferences.178 Along this 
line, the consumer can get the content she wants at a low price through open and competitive 
markets179 and effective competition enforcement. On the other hand, for the purposes of pluralism, 
the public interest is understood as the collective benefit that results from an informed and cohesive 
citizenry.180 The audience member as citizen has an interest in having the media perform functions 
that are vital for a well-functioning democracy (e.g. provide accurate and unbiased information about 
matters of common concern, control the power holders,181 cover issues relating to ethnic minorities, 
etc.).182 This interest is protected through the effective exercise of freedom of expression,183 which is 
enshrined in Article 10 ECHR, the Constitutions of the Member States, Article 11 CFREU, and 
media-specific regulation.184 
 
Yet, the nature of this distinction is not absolute, and not only because we are both consumers 
and citizens.185 The EU competition rules have occasionally been interpreted and applied in order to 
 
above. For example, in CECED, an agreement which bound the parties to refrain from producing 
washing machines that did not meet the energy efficiency standards they had agreed upon,186 the 
Commission decided that the consumer benefit condition set by Article 101(3) TFEU was fulfilled on 
the grounds that: 
seven times greater than the increased purchase costs of more energy-efficient washing 
machines. Such environmental benefits for society would adequately allow consumers a 
fair share of the benefits even if no benefits accrued to individual purchasers of 
machines 187  
The 2006 Leniency Notice, which sets out the framework for rewarding cooperation by undertakings 
and citizens in 
ensuring that secret cartels are detected and punished outweigh the interest in fining those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Hasebrink, U. (2011). Giving the audience a voice: The role of research in making media regulation more responsive to the needs 
of the audience. Journal of Information Policy, 1, 324 
178 Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007). European Broadcasting Law and Policy, 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
179 Lefever, K. (2012), supra n. 43, 78 
180 Ariño, M. (2005), supra n. 12, 384 
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184 Related to this issue see also Karppinen, K. and Halvard Moe (2014). 
Conceptual contestation in contemporary media policy research. Journal of Information Policy, 4, 327-341 
185 Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 178, 8 
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undertakings that enable th .188 
In Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual 
undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union
added].189 By referring to these examples, I do not attempt to argue that the concept of consumer 
interest can be stretched to an extent that encompasses all that is of concern to the audience member 
as citizen. For example, the citizen may benefit from rules preventing journalists from holding a 
political mandate, but this is not a conflict of interest that can be addressed by EU competition law. 
However, in all the above cases, the Commission and the Court understand that competition law is in 
a public interest that embraces but is not confined to consumer satisfaction, that is to say, they 
endorse the idea that competition law may deliver a collective outcome that is not necessarily the 
sum of individual gains. 
 
It is made clear from the above considerations that the purpose of, and legal frameworks for, 
competition and pluralism reviews may be at odds from the outset, but, depending on how EU 
competition law is interpreted, convergent outcomes cannot be excluded.  
 
 4.2. Can EU competition assessments deliver pluralism-friendly results?  
 
The focus of competition assessments and the scope of pluralism reviews are different for the 
reason that an authority entrusted with deciding on the impact of a conduct or transaction on 
pluralism has the power to examine whether the firms or individuals under scrutiny may misrepresent 
facts, marginalize opposing viewpoints, and control the political agenda, in violation of the 
applicable media laws and principles. For example, in assessing the likely effects of the 
Newscorp/BSkyB deal on media pluralism, Ofcom examined, inter alia, whether Newscorp would 
impartiality requirements on TV broadcast news, were sufficient to ensure no undue influence on Sky 
190 The EU competition watchdog is not entitled to carry out these tasks. Does 
this, however, exclude a pluralism-friendly interpretation of the competition rules? The answer is no, 
especially if this interpretation allows the Commission to reach more accurate competition decisions. 
As will be seen in greater detail below, the Commission has ignored the possibilities of a pluralism-
friendly competition analysis that is based on neither controversial and ineffective access remedies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/11, paragraph 3 
189 ECJ, Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, paragraph 22 
190 Ofcom (2010), supra n. 96, pp. 70 et seq. 
  
	   	   123	  
nor disproportionate restrictions of competition for the following two reasons. First, it seems to have 
instances, and more particularly in numerous State aid cases, the Commission appears to have 
unjustifiably narrowed its competence in areas where it clearly had the power to act. Each of the 
above two approaches has negative implications for media pluralism and competition.  
 
 the media 
 
In applying the EU competition rules to media markets, the Commission has disregarded 
altogether parameters of competition that drive demand for content. For example, the Commission 
has maintained that assessments of mergers affecting the media sector focus on checking whether 
the ability of the merged entity to profitably increase prices on defined antitrust 
markets post-merger 191 Yet, competition is not only about prices, as a number of 
policy documents binding on the Commission rightly point out. For example, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the (Horizontal and Non-
mission consists in preventing mergers that would be likely to significantly increase the market 
undertakings to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services or 
diminish innovation  [emphasis added].192 This is repeated verbatim in several other documents in 
which the Commission provides guidance on how it applies EU competition law,193 including the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints194 
applying Article 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.195  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 307  
192 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 8 and Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, paragraph 10 
193 For example, the Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements illustrate how various forms of co-operation agreements 
between actual or potential competitors can positively or adversely affect product quality or variety. Communication from the 
Commission  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1. See, for instance, paragraphs 183, 185 and 190. The Notice on Market Definition provides 
instructions on how quality characteristics can inform the relevant market definition analysis. See Commission notice on the definition 
of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/3, paragraph 22 
194 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1. See, for instance, paragraph 91 
195 The Commission states in its Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
which 
is capable of profitably increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time does not face sufficiently effective 
competitive constraints and can thus generally be regarded as dominant. 
includes the power to maintain prices above the competitive level and is used as short- hand for the various ways in which the 
parameters of competition  such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services  can be influenced to the 
advantage of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of consumers Guidelines on the 
Application of Article 101(3) TFEU 
by the prohibition rule of Article 101(1) when they are likely to have an appreciable adverse impact on the parameters of competition 
on the market, such as price, output, product quality, product variety and innovation  
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The non-price dimensions of competition seem to have played a major role in the 
 on various occasions. For example, the 
Commission has occasionally been based on quality as a feature of product differentiation in order to 
delineate the boundaries of the relevant product market(s). 196  In UPS/TNT, the Commission 
distinguished express services from slower services on the grounds that customers that need to be 
sure that the items they ship will reach their destination within one day are not willing to switch to 
slower services as a result of a price increase.197 Based on this distinction, the Commission found that 
the merging firms were close competitors and decided to block the notified transaction because it 
would have reduced the number of significant players in the market for express services to only 3 or 
2.198 In Unilever/Sara Lee deodorant brands 
Dove and Sanex were substitutable because they shared the same skin-caring attributes. 199  This 
concentration was approved subject to, inter alia, the condition that Unilever would not enter the 
affected markets with the Sanex brand.200 In Universal/EMI, the Commission found that recorded 
music in physical format and recorded music in digital format belong to separate markets because 
they have different sound quality. 201  Having defined the relevant markets in this way, the 
Commission concluded that the transaction would grant the merged entity the ability to extract 
onerous licensing terms from digital retailers202 and adopted a clearance decision after the entity 
undertook to divest a significant part of its digital repertoire.203 The Commission has also used 
quality standards as a parameter against which it assessed supply-side substitutability. For example, 
in Amcor/Alcan, the Commission found that, within the flexible packaging market, pharmaceutical 
flexible packaging should be regarded as a separate market for the reason that it is characterized by 
high hygiene requirements and highly risk-aversive customers.204 The concentration was approved 
subject to the condition that Amcor would divest its main operation for pharmaceutical flexible 
packaging.205  
 
Originality, variety and quality considerations have influenced decisions not only because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  OECD (2013). The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis, 79. Retrieved from: 
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197 European Commission (2013, January). Mergers: Commission blocks proposed acquisition of TNT Express by UPS. Press Release 
IP 13/68. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-68_en.htm  
198 Ibid.  
199 Commission decision Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care, Case COMP/M.5658 [2012] OJ C 23/10, paragraphs 579 et seq.  
200 Ibid., paragraph 1388 
201 Commission decision Universal Music Group/EMI Music, Case No. COMP/M.6458 [2012] OJ C 220/8, paragraph 127 
202 Ibid., paragraph 636 
203 Ibid., paragraphs 826 et seq. and 880 et seq.  
204 Commission decision Amcor/Alcan, Case COMP/M. 5599 [2010] OJ C 35/1, at paragraphs 23 and 137 et seq. These characteristics 
were also indications that the barriers to entry into that market are particularly high (see paragraphs 101-104) 
205 Ibid., paragraphs128 et seq.  
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led to narrower market definitions, but also because they were taken into account in the assessment of 
the effects of a merger transaction or unilateral conduct on competition. For example, in 
Intel/McAfee, one of the main concerns was the possible foreclosure of competing providers of anti-
virus software by Intel degrading interoperability of its hardware with other security solutions than 
the acquired McAfee products. 206  The Commission found that lack of interoperability would 
207 The 
same conclusion was reached in Microsoft concerning the impact of tying Windows Media Player 
and Windows PCs on the delivery of content over the Internet and on multimedia software. 208 
Similarly, in Intel, the Commission concluded that, absent the exclusionary pricing practices in which 
209   
 
However, the non-price dimensions of competition seem to have played little or no role in the 
divided into two categories. First, there have been decisions where the Commission shows a clear 
preference for price competition. For example, in assessing mergers affecting free-to-air TV (i.e. 
advertising-financed television) markets, the Commission has repeatedly taken the stance that, even 
though the aud
210 the exercise of market definition should consist in identifying the 
effective alternative sources of supply for the advertisers on the grounds that the viewers do not pay 
for the content broadcast.211 As a result, merger decisions in the broadcasting sector have been 
limited to discussing the effects of the concentration under scrutiny on advertising prices.212 Similar 
remarks can be made with respect to decisions in the book publishing sector. Parties to fixed book 
pricing agreements, which establish that booksellers shall sell books at the price that is set by the 
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207 Ibid., paragraph 172. Note that in this case the Commission imposed upon Intel a wide range of commitments to ensure that no 
technical tying of Intel hardware and McAfee security solutions would occur (see paragraphs 301 et seq. and 341 et seq.) 
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210 See, for instance, Commission decision RTL/Veronica/Endemol (HMG), Case IV/M.553 [1996] OJ L 124/32, paragraph 20  
211 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/3, 
paragraph 13. See, for instance, Commission decisions NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73 paragraph 24; 
NewsCorp/BSkyB, Case COMP/M. 5932 [2011] OJ C37/2 paragraph 97; SFR/Télé 2, Case COMP/M.4504, [2007] OJ L 316/57, 
paragraph 45; Newscorp/Premiere, Case COMP/M.5121, [2008] OJ C 219/4, paragraph 19; Telenor/Canal+/Canal Digital, Case 
COMP/C.2/38.287, [2003] OJ C 149/10 paragraph 28; Commission Decision BSkyB/Kirch Pay-TV, Case COMP/JV.37, [2000] OJ C 
110/45, paragraph 24; Commission Decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993, [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 18, and 
Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/Telepiù, Case IV/M.584, [1995] OJ C 129/6, paragraph 15 
212 Note that lack of willingness to accept arguments that a transaction may produce negative non-price effects is also evidenced in 
cases in the online search sector. See Commission decision Microsoft/Yahoo!, Case COMP/M.5727 [2010] D/2118, paragraphs 214-
226: while the Commission discussed in more detail non-price effects, and in particular whether the merged entity could lower the 
quality of organic search by degrading the relevance of search results or reduce the variety of search results post-merger, it cleared the 
transaction on the basis that these concerns were not likely to materialize 
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publisher that produced them, occasionally put forward the argument that the agreement under 
consideration qualified for an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU inter alia because it enabled 
publishers to cross-subsidize less popular titles through the profits they made on fast-selling books.213 
As a result, the parties claimed, the agreement led to a wider range of books made available on the 
market, thereby allowing consumers to receive a fair share of the benefits resulting from the 
agreement.214 The Commission rejected this argument on the basis that, even if a variety of titles is to 
be regarded as benefiting the consumers, the price of the product is the key element in their decision 
to purchase a book.215   
 
Second, there have been decisions where the Commission has made incidental references to 
quality, variety or originality as features of product differentiation, but these features have not 
influenced the outcome of the decisions concerned. For example, in merger decisions in the 
newspaper sector, the Commission has repeatedly noted that the market for national daily newspapers 
might be divided into smaller markets according to the editorial line of newspapers or the quality of 
the publications (e.g. quality press as opposed to tabloids). 216  Nevertheless, in these cases, the 
Commission meticulously avoided delineating the boundaries of the markets affected by the 
transaction,217 whereas, to my knowledge, in none of these decisions was quality degradation or 
-merger taken into account. Likewise, non-price dimensions 
of competition in news provision relating to consumption habits that have emerged over the past few 
years, including the use of digital devices or news applications, have occasionally been mentioned 
but they had no impact whatsoever on the final decision.218  
 
Placing an excessive focus on prices or, even worse, ignoring the non-price dimensions of 
219  In a case in the media sector, these particular facts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Commission decision 82/123/EEC of 25 November 1981 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428-
VBBB/VBVB) [1982] OJ L 52/36, paragraph 50 
214 Ibid., paragraph 54 
215 Ibid., paragraph 55 
216 Commission decision Gruner + Jahr/Financial Times/JV, Case No. IV/ M. 1455, paragraph 17 [1999] OJ C 80/5. The text of the 
decision is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1455_en.pdf; Commission decision 
Wegener/PCM/JV, Case No. COMP/M. 3817 [2005] C 191/3, paragraph 10; Commission decision Newspaper Publishing, Case No. 
IV/M. 423, paragraph 18 [1994] OJ C 85/5, and Commission decision Recoletos/Unedisa, Case No. IV/M. 1401 [1999] OJ C 73/6, 
paragraph 18 
217 Commission decision Recoletos/Unedisa, Case No. IV/M. 1401 [1999] OJ C 73/6, paragraph 28; Commission decision Newspaper 
Publishing, Case No. IV/M. 423, paragraph 18 [1994] OJ C 85/5, paragraphs 13-16; Commission decision Wegener/PCM/JV, Case 
No. COMP/M. 3817 [2005] C 191/3, paragraph 20, and Commission decision Gruner + Jahr/Financial Times/JV, Case No. IV/ M. 
1455, paragraph 17 [1999] OJ C 80/5, paragraph 20 
218 See, for instance, Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraphs 207-216 
219 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 5 
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information economy such as free-to-air broadcasters, online search engines and news aggregators 
which offer content for 
they have neither the same single interest nor the same array of interests and identical preferences 
through that array. 220  Even in cases where the provider charges for the content it distributes, 
consumer interests are more relevant than price. For example, if a pay-per-view subscriber wants to 
be entertained but does not like football, it is highly unlikely that she will purchase access to a 
football match because the match is cheaper than a movie. Finally, there are media markets, most 
notably in the publishing sector, where demand is highly price inelastic.221 As the Commission has 
price is 
not the first factor, and only one out of several important factors influencing purchasing decisions 
and determining customer loyalty. The perceived political stance of a newspaper, family heritage, 
social-economic factors and the type of content are more important factors 222 
The above characteristics provide sufficient proof that, from a viewer/end-user/reader perspective, 
price is not the main demand-driver. As a result, a competition analysis that is mainly or solely 
concerned with prices disregards key elements that determine substitutability, ultimately jeopardizing 
the accuracy of the decision.  
 
A similar conclusion can be reached with respect to the other drawback I identified above, that 
 insistence on adopting decisions that are based on inconclusive market 
definitions or remain stuck to consumption patterns that do not reflect the current state of play in 
media supply and usage. A good example is Newscorp/BSkyB, already discussed above in various 
contexts. In this case, the Commission noted that one of the broad markets affected by the transaction 
was newspaper publishing223 (where Newscorp was particularly active) without, however, discussing 
whether consumers regard news delivered by print publications as substitutable with news delivered 
by other content providers. Instead, the Commission preferred to refer to the conclusions of market 
definitions that had determined merger decisions it adopted throughout the 1990s. 224  News 
consumption, however, has undergone significant change since then. For example, newspapers and 
broadcasters, including Sky, have moved online, competing for the same audiences and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 OECD (2003). Policy Roundtable on Media Mergers, 43 
221 See, for instance, Joint Research Center (2012). Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and Content 
Industries: The Newspaper Publishing Industry, 24. Retrieved from: http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69881.pdf 
222 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 231 
223 Ibid., paragraph 28 
224 Ibid., paragraph 214 
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advertisers.225 Moreover, the question of whether, and if so to what extent, the provision of news 
content online exerted competitive constraints on print newspapers was left open on the grounds that 
the transaction would not raise any competitive concerns under any of the alternative product market 
definitions considered.226 This, however, is highly questionable for at least two reasons. First, the 
data on which the Commission based this conclusion could support the opposite. More particularly, 
which would 
include print newspapers and online news websites, the entity would hold between 35% and 55% of 
the UK market post-merger.227 
shares could be an indication that the concentration may impede effective competition.228 Second, 
measurements of the impact of the merger on the UK news market, which took account of the 
audience share and reach of the involved undertakings within individual platforms (e.g. papers, TV, 
radio, online) and cross-platform usage, 229 led Ofcom to conclude that the merged entity would hold 
a strong position with respect to the consumption of news content across all media.230 Attached to 
arguably outdated market definitions and having abstained from delving into current news 
substitutability-related issues, the Commission ignored altogether any horizontal effects the merger 
was likely to create.  
 
Narrow-minded or incomplete assessments of the parameters that determine demand and 
supply in media markets have a negative impact on both competition and pluralism. As regards 
supply-side considerations, from a competition perspective, it can be clearly inferred from the above 
analysis that the approach the Commission has followed thus far inherently entails the risk that the 
adopted decisions are based on erroneous findings that range from flawed market definitions to 
underestimating the market power of the undertakings under scrutiny. This has been exemplified by 
the factors that should play a role in the definition of the news markets affected by Newscorp/BSkyB 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 For a comprehensive overview of the changes that the market for news provision has undergone over the past years see, for 
instance, Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World  Report prepared for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 
226 Ibid., paragraph 216. The alternative product market definitions considered were the following: The market for news content as a 
broad market, which could be further divided into a market for print newspapers and a market for online news services; a market for 
print newspapers v. a market for paid-for online news services; a market for news delivery through new digital devices v. print v. 
online newspapers 
227 Ibid., see Tables 2 and 4 
228 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 17. Note that, with respect to the other markets possibly affected by the 
transaction, no clear data were provided. For example, the Commission does not distinguish between paid-for online news services and 
free news services. See Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, Table 5 
229 Ofcom (2010), supra n. 96, paragraph 5.17 
230 r, it 
was heavily based on methodologies employed in competition law (e.g. degree of substitutability between different platforms, media, 
and providers). Moreover, the metrics on which Ofcom based its analysis, including audience share and reach, are measures that can 
(and arguably should) be used in competition cases involving free content markets, e.g. free-to-air television. These issues will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 3  
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against those factors on which the Commission based its decision. The same decision offers another 
similar example that illustrates the implications for pluralism. In this case, the Commission divided 
the upstream broadcasting market for the acquisition of content into the market for sports events, the 
market for premium films, and the market for other TV content, without, however, specifying what it 
.231 This term may include different types of content such as news, 
serve different purposes and 
could therefore imply the existence of narrower market segments. 232  If the Commission had 
conducted the market definition exercise properly, and if the analysis had concluded that the market 
for the acquisition of news content was a separate market, it would have been able to examine 
concerns over distortions of competition in the affected news markets. It is not excluded that under a 
more meticulous approach the Commission could have found that the merger could afford the parties 
a greater ability to bid for and win wholesale news deals.233 The acquisition of significant market 
power to consistently outbid competitors in upstream markets is a valid competition concern and has 
influenced the outcome of merger decisions in several instances.234 The finding that the merging 
firms could foreclose upstream news markets could lead to the imposition of remedies, such as the 
divestment of news assets,235 to ensure that competition for news content is not eliminated. This 
would clearly have positive spillover effects on media pluralism, for the sale of these assets to a 
forming power.   
 
practice arguably falls short of serving the audience member as consumer for the reason that it 
equates consumer welfare with consumer surplus. Consumer welfare, defined as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 30 
232 This is a possibility the Commission considered but did not discuss in detail in other cases. See, for instance, Commission decision 
TPS, Case No COMP/JV.57, [2002] OJ C 137/23, paragraph 16 where it considered whether the market for pay-TV channels should 
be further segmented by thematic content (such as premium, sports, movies, news, youth channels, etc.). For a U.S. perspective of how 
markets have been (or should be) defined on the basis of genre/type see, for instance, Nesvold, P. (1996). Communication Breakdown: 
Developing an Antitrust Model for Multimedia Mergers and Acquisitions. Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment 
Law Journal 6(2), 781-869 
233 This was an issue that Ofcom considered in the assessment of the same transaction. See Ofcom (2010), supra n. 96, 14 
234 For examples in the media sector see Chapter 3, Part 3.a. 
235  
Newscorp/BSkyB deal. Structural remedies are fairly common in EU merger practice. For recent merger decisions where structural 
remedies were imposed see, for instance, European Commission (2014, July). Mergers: Commission clears acquisition of E-Plus by 
Telefónica Deutschland, subject to conditions. Press Release IP 14/771. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
771_en.htm, and European Commission (2014, May). Mergers: Commission clears acquisition of Telefónica Ireland by Hutchison 3G, 
subject to conditions. Press Release IP 14/607. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-607_en.htm On the issue of 
structural remedies in EU merger control see, for instance, Wand, W. (2011). Structural Remedies in EU Antitrust and Merger 
Control. World Competition 34(4), 571-596, and Papandropoulos, P. and Alessandro Tajana (2006). The Merger Remedies Study In 
Divestiture We Trust? European Competition Law Review 27(8), 443-454  
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236 is a normative concept broader than 
maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a product) and the market price.237 Irrespective of 
whether consumer welfare is the ultimate objective that EU competition enforcement pursues or one 
of the results it is intended to deliver,238 it was demonstrated above that consumer surplus is one, and 
perhaps not the most relevant benchmark against which to measure consumer satisfaction. Moreover, 
as already mentioned above, in cases of markets offering content for free (online search, free-to-air 
-competitive effects that may arise in the 
advertising markets concerned on the grounds that the viewers/users do not pay for the content they 
receive. This inevitably leads to an assessment that ignores the impact on the non-price dimensions of 
competition. If one accepts that demand-side considerations relating to content quality and variety are 
features of product differentiation that determine competition in the media, then non-price effects 
should also be measured for the purposes of a competition analysis. This is far from unordinary; the 
above overview of Commission decisions involving a wide range of products, from deodorants to 
software to postal services, clearly shows that the EU competition rules are sufficiently flexible to 
allow for an interpretation that seeks to protect non-price competition. It is submitted that, were the 
Commission willing to take these factors into account as it did in cases in other sectors, and to be 
guided by a definition of consumer welfare that takes account of the specificities of demand in media 
markets, the outcome of competition decisions would not only be more accurate, but also more 
friendly to pluralism. This is because the analysis would manage to grasp certain quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions of diversity, as defined in Chapter 2. The potential of EU competition law for 
a pluralism-friendly interpretation that is based on sound economic principles is illustrated by an old 
decision,239 United International Pictures (UIP), which concerned the creation of a joint venture, 
UIP, by three Hollywood studios. The object of UIP would be the distribution and licensing on an 
exclusive basis of feature motion pictures produced by the involved studios.240 Based on the finding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 OECD (1993). Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. 
Shapiro, commissioned by the OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177  
237 Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2014), supra n. 123, 4-5 
238 See, for instance, CFI, Joined Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft 
AG v. Commission [2006] ECR II-1601, paragraph 115; CFI, Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission 
[2006] ECR II-2969, paragraph 118, and compare against ECJ, Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, paragraphs 59-60; CFI, Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa 
International Service v. Commission, paragraph 126 ECR II-1729, and ECJ, Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige 
AB [2011] ECR I-527, paragraph 22. The last three cases suggest that the ultimate objective of EU competition law is the protection of 
competition, not consumer welfare 
239 A more recent example is Commission decision Lagardère/Natexis/VUP, Case No COMP/M.2978 [2004] OJ L125/54 where the 
Commission discussed the effects of vertical integration on the diversity of books produced and distributed by the merged entity. For 
an overview of this case see Psychogiopoulou, E. (2008), supra n. 136, 277-279 
240 Commission decision, United International Pictures (UIP) [1989] OJ L 226/25, paragraph 7 
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-box office receipts from 
feature films and because the parties were among the largest film distributors within the EU,241 the 
Commission feared that the agreement could foreclose the market to competing content. The 
Commission exempted the agreement subject to conditions that aimed at preventing the above from 
happening. For example, UIP and the parent companies agreed to make themselves available to 
produce, finance, acquire distribution rights to, and distribute feature films of third parties in the 
EU.242 To allow the Commission to check compliance with related obligations, the parties committed 
to maintain records that showed the titles of local products of third parties produced, financed or 
distributed by UIP, and the identity of local product for which a formal written offer was made by 
third parties to UIP for production, financing or distribution.243 Remedies intended to ensure that 
competition for content is not eliminated may rest upon an entirely economic foundation. It was 
discussed in detail that vertically integrated media undertakings like UIP may decrease diversity 
either by granting to their own products preferential treatment (in order to eliminate competition) or 
by distributing popular content in as many markets and across as many platforms as possible (in 
order to maximize profit). These remedies, however, also embrace pluralism, for they allow content 
produced by suppliers independent from the parties to the agreement to find its way to the audiences. 
Given the positive implications for non-price competition and pluralism, it is unfortunate that this 




As previously noted, the second approach to the application of EU competition law in media 
markets which has led to outcomes that are undesirable from a competition and a pluralism 
competence to address non-price concerns. For 
the avoidance of confusion, Newscorp/BSkyB and Google/Doubleclick do not epitomize the approach 
discussed here. This is because, as I concluded in the part discussing how the Commission may 
address conflicts between competition considerations and non-economic considerations, the latter 
may not supersede the former. In other words, the Commission would not be entitled to ban the 
aforementioned mergers on public interest grounds. Examples 
narrow perception of competence are State aid decisions in the media, and in particular the 
broadcasting sector, because in these cases pluralism considerations can justify restrictions of 
competition without depending on the efficiencies that the aid measure is likely to generate. More 
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particularly, State aid is generally prohibited by EU law,244 but aid measures in support of public 
broadcasting services, which have traditionally been regarded as Services of General Economic 
Interest,245 that is, services that deliver outcomes for the overall public good,246 may qualify for an 
exemption from the rules on competition because the Treaty has made express provision. 247 In our 
case, this means that the Member States which entrust media organizations with providing quality 
and varied programming in order to safeguard media pluralism248 and which, for the performance of 
this mission, grants aid to these organizations, are entitled to request for a derogation from the 
general State aid prohibition. State aid is not assessed against the effects on competition only, but 
also against a social welfare standard,249 which, in addition to economic considerations, takes into 
account the equity objectives which the measure pursues.250 In the case of public service media, those 
equity objectives consist in, e.g., offering the society, including disadvantaged groups such as low-
income citizens that may not afford to pay TV subscriptions, access to information, providing content 
that addresses the needs of cultural and linguistic minorities, etc.251 The Member States are free to 
define and organize the public service remit in a way that best reflects the needs of the society which 
the measure is meant to serve252 
measure does not allow the beneficiary of the aid to misuse the public funds in order to distort 
competition.253    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244  
provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
 
245 The State aid practice the Commission has developed in the broadcasting sector will be examined in detail in Chapter 7 
246 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final,  3. 
Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/docs/comm_quality_framework_en.pdf    
247 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/1, Article 106(2) TFEU and Protocol No. 29 (the Amsterdam 
Protocol  
the competence of Member States to provide for the funding of public service broadcasting and in so far as such funding is granted to 
broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, 
and in so far as such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent which would be contrary to 
 
248  For an overview of public service obligations PSBs are required to discharge see, for instance, Katsirea, I. (2008). Public 
Broadcasting and European Law: A Comparative Examination of Public Service Obligations in Six Member States. Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International  
249 
also how welfare is distributed across countries and citizens. Social welfare thus integrates efficiency elements (i.e. by looking at how 
much wealth is created 
wealth is divided between Member States and citizens). A social welfare standard takes into account all the effects that may be 
generated by the a Common Principles for an Economic Assessment of the Compatibility of 
State Aid Under Article 87(3). Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/economic_assessment_en.pdf  
250  Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (2006). Services of General Economic Interest. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei.pdf  
251 These objectives are determined by each Member State individually. For more information regarding how a selected set of Member 
States defined the equity objectives public broadcasters are required to attain see supra n. 248 
252 See Protocol No. 29 (the Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting), supra n. 247 
253 For an overview of how the Commission believes State aid rules apply to public service media see Communication on the 
application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1 
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As a result of the above, in assessing whether aids in support of public service broadcasting are 
compatible with the common market, the Commission may neither determine the nature of the 
services at which the aids are directed nor base its decisions on purely economic considerations. Yet, 
even within these strict competence limits, the Commission has not used all the means it has at its 
disposal to ensure that the public broadcaster will indeed meet the diversity or quality standards that 
justify the exemption from the general State aid prohibition. For example, it is established case law 
that, while the Commission may not evaluate whether the public broadcaster respects any code for 
the treatment of controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality254 or decide whether the 
service provided by the broadc ,255 it may control whether there exists a 
body independent from the public provider that checks compliance with the public service 
mandate.256 Nevertheless, on several occasions, despite obvious conflicts of interest, the Commission 
hesitated to declare incompatible with the common market measures that allow the managing bodies 
of the public broadcaster to examine delivery of the public service mission and/or to deal with the 
complaints of commercial competitors that these obligations have not been met.257  
 
In cases where the Commission fails to address the loopholes left open by an aid measure, 
concerns over both competition and pluralism are raised. From a competition perspective, if the 
management is not structurally independent from the supervisory body, the public broadcaster has 
both the ability and incentive to engage in anti-competitive practices, which may range from 
undercutting prices in the advertising markets to emptying the market for the acquisition of premium 
content258 to cross-subsidizing commercial activities that do not fulfill a public service mission, to the 
detriment of private competitors. Similarly, in cases where the bodies deciding on the complaints 
filed by competitors are not independent from the public broadcaster, there are no adequate 
guarantees that the redress system will lead to the imposition of appropriate remedies in cases of 
failure to comply, thereby running the risk of being unfair vis-à-vis commercial undertakings.259 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 ECJ, Case T-442/03, SIC v. Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, paragraph 213 
255 See CFI, Joined Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08, Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1), [2010] ECR II-
3397, paragraph 141. See also CFI, Case T-275/11 Télévision française 1 (TF1) v. European Commission (not yet reported), 
paragraphs 130, 133-4 and 138 
256 This stems from ibid., paragraph 233. See also paragraphs 225 et seq. See also Communication on the application of State aid rules 
to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraph 54 
257 See, for instance, Commission decision N631/2001, BBC License Fee, N631/2001 [2003] OJ C23/3, paragraphs 2 and 4 and BBC 
Charter (1997), Article 8(3), and Commission decision E3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany [2007] C185/1, 
paragraphs 255-6, 24 and 372. For more information see Chapter 7, Part 4 
258 This has been a major issue in several Member States. See, for example, Commission decision E 8/2006, Public financing of public 
service broadcaster VRT, [2008] OJ C 143/3, paragraph 57, and Commission decision E2/2008, Financing of the Austrian public 
service broadcaster ORF [2009] OJ C309/1, paragraph 3 
259 This remains an issue in, among others, the UK and Germany, see supra n. 257 
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there is a strong likelihood that pluralism-related public service obligations will not be respected. For 
example, the period 2005-2006, the Austrian and Irish public broadcasters failed to comply with 
content diversity quotas.260 In that period those controlling compliance with the diversity quotas were 
internal bodies of the broadcasters.261  
 
The main conclusion to draw from the above analysis is that EU competition law has the 
potential to protect the readers/viewers/users in a way which goes beyond existing predispositions 
and which respects the boundaries of EU competence.  
 
  5. Conclusions  
 
 This Chapter sought to assess whether EU competition law, as interpreted and applied by the 
Commission, has contributed to the protection of media pluralism. It was seen that the Commission 
has adopted two different approaches to this issue. Under the first, media pluralism has been regarded 
as an almost spontaneous result delivered by unhindered market access. Under the second, pluralism 
has been treated as a value the protection of which would require restrictions of competition that, due 
to competence limitations, the Commission believes is not entitled to allow. The Chapter extensively 
discussed the practice the Commission has developed under both approaches and, having identified 
several shortcomings that involve the implementation of ineffective access policies and an 
inconsistent (and, to some extent, unjustifiably restrictive) interpretation of the Treaties, concluded 
 
 
predisposition towards the relationship between competition and pluralism; a third approach whereby 
pluralism-related considerations form an integral part of a competition assessment was also 
media markets has certain lacunae that may first and foremost imperil the accuracy of competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 See Biggam, R. (2009). Public Broadcasting and State Aid in the New Media Environment  Is There A Need to Update the 
European -Running Competition Issues?, 172. 
In Pauwels, C., Harri Kalimo, Karen Donders and Ben Van Rompuy (eds.). Rethinking European Media and Communications Policy. 
Brussels: VUB Press, and Commission Staff Working Document (2008). Accompanying document to the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions - Eighth Communication on t
amended by Directive 97/36/EC, for the period 2005- 2006, see pp. 127 and 86, SEC(2008) 2310, available at: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/42776/1/SEC_(2008)_2310.pdf  
261 These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, Part 4 
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decisions. I maintained that, were the Commission willing to fill these lacunae by developing a 
framework which grasps the particularities of media markets and which makes full use of the toolbox 
it has at its disposal, the decisions would also deliver a more pluralism-friendly outcome. The 
practice in the media and to exploring the potential of this third approach to the role of competition 
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Chapter 4  EU merger control in the broadcasting sector 
 
1. Introduction  
 
One of the first steps in answering the question of how EU competition law can be applied so 
as to take account of media pluralism was to demonstrate that digital technologies have not remedied 
concerns relating to concentration of ownership across the European Union. This, I said, is largely 
due to the central position that horizontally and/or vertically integrated traditional media 
organizations occupy within the European media market. More particularly, traditional media still 
play a major role in content consumption. For example, television is the most popular medium in the 
EU and radio the second most popular.1 In addition, consumers are attached to traditional providers. 
Empirical research on demand-side concentration in the news market has shown that citizens are still 
inclined to consume content distributed  whilst refraining from looking for 
alternative online content to complement their traditional media experience.2 Finally, the fact that the 
same content can be easily distributed in the new media ecosystem makes it fairly easy for traditional 
media firms to expand into and dominate emerging markets.  
 
Having argued in the previous Chapter that EU competition law is flexible enough to prevent 
concentration-related risks for pluralism, this Chapter will examine the role that EU merger control 
can play in ensuring that significant power does not end up in the hands of a few 
and, by extension, of an asset that shapes market structures such as premium content and distribution 
platforms.  
 
The Chapter focuses on mergers in the broadcasting industry because, as I have already 
explained in Chapter 1, the decisional practice the Commission has developed under each of the four 
pillars of competition law will be examined by reference to a specific sector in order to reflect a 
business strategy, practice, pricing model, or revenue mechanism that has been a major (competition 
and media) policy matter in the sector concerned. In broadcasting, mergers and acquisitions have had 
a broad appeal due to the significant economies of scale and scope that broadcasters can achieve by 
integrating with other firms that operate at the same or at different levels of the supply chain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  European Commission (2012). Media use in the European Union 2011, 5. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_media_en.pdf  
2 See, for instance, Hindman, M. (2008) The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press  
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Integration has undoubtedly been more attractive to TV providers than it has been to providers of 
other traditional media. A vivid illustration of this latter point is that, at the time of writing, 115 
transactions in the broadcasting sector have sought EU regulatory approval 3  whereas in the 
newspapers/journals/periodicals sector only fourteen transactions have been notified to the 
Commission.4 For our purposes, it further bears noting that, by virtue of the fact that mergers and 
acquisitions have been very popular in broadcasting markets and because TV remains the foremost 
source of information in Europe,5 the likelihood that ownership concentration may lead to a distorted 
public discourse, where certain opinions are silenced or improperly represented, seems to be greater 
in mergers of a Union dimension affecting TV markets than in mergers affecting other traditional 
media.  
 
This Chapter shall attempt to assess merger decisions and the applicable legal framework 
against the main claims that were put forward in Chapter 3, namely that by ignoring the particular 
characteristics of media markets the practice the Commission has developed in media markets may 
have fallen short of protecting both competition and media pluralism, and that EU competition law 
can be applied in a way which may lead to competition decisions that are more accurate and 
pluralism-friendly without stretching the Treaty boundaries.  
 
The Chapter is structured as follows: I will begin by examining how the Commission has 
defined the relevant product markets in cases involving free-to-air broadcasters, arguing that failing 
ls short of grasping the demand-side substitution dynamics 
of markets where content is provided for free (Part 2). I then make a critical analysis of how the 
Commission has occasionally assessed the effects of the merger on the broadcasting markets 
concerned. I argue that, as opposed to its current, more permissive, stance towards integration, the 
restrictive approach it had adopted in earlier cases was far more appropriate to protect both 
competition and pluralism. I demonstrate this by examining the impact of prohibition decisions on 
the development of broadcasting markets and compare it against that of the remedies subject to which 
more recent mergers were cleared (Part 3). Part 4 inquires into how pluralism-specific considerations 
can be injected into each step of a merger analysis by means of examples.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
4 Ibid., see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
5 According to the European Commission, most European households have a television set and the average European watches up to 4 
hours a day. See, for instance, http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm Radio and the Internet follow, see supra, n. 1 
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2. Relevant product market for free-to-air television: Is advertising the only content 
broadcast? 
 
In decisions dealing with mergers affecting the retail distribution of broadcasting services, the 
Commission finds that the key parameter to define the relevant markets is the revenue model used by 
program suppliers.6 Thus, according to the Commission, in the case of free-to-air (FTA) TV (i.e., 
advertising-
consist in identifying the effective alternative sources of supply for the advertisers, not the viewers.7  
 
Focusing on advertising markets is justified, the Commission says, on the grounds that there is 
no trade relationship between the broadcaster and the viewer. 8  
perception of trade is mistaken because there are transactions that have an economic value without 
necessarily entailing the exchange of products or services for money.9 In FTA TV, there appears to 
be a transaction whereby, on the one hand, the broadcaster offers content to the consumer (which the 
consumer values because, by accessing the content, she gets informed, educated or entertained), and 
on the other hand the consumer provides access to herself, i.e. her attention, to the broadcaster (which 
the broadcaster values because eyeballs are necessary to generate advertising revenues).10 Hence, if 
services that someone else offers to cover a  what seems to be rather common and increasingly 
popular  ion economy,11 an exchange of content for attention 
12 Accordingly, there is a market for audiences to define. In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  See, for instance, Commission decisions NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 24; 
NewsCorp/BSkyB, Case COMP/M. 5932 [2011] OJ C37/2, paragraph 97; SFR/Télé 2, Case COMP/M.4504, [2007] OJ L 316/57, 
paragraph 45; Newscorp/Premiere, Case COMP/M.5121, [2008] OJ C 219/4, paragraph 19; Telenor/Canal+/Canal Digital, Case 
COMP/C.2/38.287, [2003] OJ C 149/10, paragraph 28; BSkyB/Kirch Pay-TV, Case COMP/JV.37, [2000] OJ C 110/45, paragraph 24; 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993, [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 18 and Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/Telepiù, Case 
IV/M.584, [1995] OJ C 129/6, paragraph 15  
7 See, for instance, Commission decision RTL/Veronica/Endemol (HMG), Case IV/M.553 [1996] OJ L 124/32, paragraph 20  
8 See supra n. 6 
9 Polverino, F. (2012). Hunting the Wild Geese: Competition Analysis in a World of 'Free', 547. In Ghidini, G., Piergaetano Marchetti, 
Marcello Clarich and Fabiana di Porto (eds.). Concorrenza e Mercato. Roma: Giuffrè Editore. For a comprehensive overview of how 
The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: 
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement. NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
14-44. Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2529425#%23  
10 Europe Economics (2002). Market Definition in the Media Sector: Economic Issues. Report for the European Commission, DG 
Competition, 42. See also Stucke, M. and Allen Grunes (2001). Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas. Antitrust Law Journal 69 (1), 
297 
11 An abundance of services from email accounts to music videos to flight price comparison are provided in exchange for attention 
12 Europe Economics (2002), supra n. 10, 44. The importance of attention as a rivalrous good may have increased now with the advent 
of digital media but the emergence of an attention economy was pointed out as early as 1971 by Herbert A. Simon who noted that in a 
content- he 
attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently 
Simon, H. A. (1971). Designing Organizations for an 
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market, basic economic principles apply: a) audiences incur some cost in watching TV, that is, the 
opportunity cost of the time spent in front of the TV set or the opportunity cost of the time spent 
watching the programs of a particular broadcaster and b) attention is a scarce resource because the 
interpretative capacity of the individual is not infinite.13 It follows logically from the above that 
broadcasters compete for eyeballs by seeking to offer attractive content.14  
 
mainly two reasons. First, the relevant advertising 
market affected by the merger. Broadcast programming and advertising space are different products 
by accessing content that fulfills their need to be informed about current affairs, desire to be 
entertained, etc. Advertisers, on the other hand, will seek to use their marketing budget efficiently by 
purchasing the attention of the largest possible audience. In other words, advertisers will show little 
to no interest in minority-taste programming.15 Audience size is not the only parameter responsible 
for the divergence between advertiser and viewer preferences. In addition to mass audiences, 
advertisers will seek t
.16 Baker convincingly demonstrates that advertisers opt for 
on a controversial 
17 As is clear from the above, programs that are regarded 
as substitutes by the advertisers are not ne  
 
Second, the market for free-to-air TV is a two-sided market.18 It was explained in Chapter 2 
that a two-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Information-rich World, 38-52. In Greenberger, M. (ed.). Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press. (Cited after reprint in: H.A. Simon (1982). Models of bounded rationality. Volume 2: Behavioural Economics and 
Business Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). For more on the attention economy see, for instance, Hargittai, E. (2004). The 
Changing Online Landscape: From Free-for-All to Commercial Gatekeeping, 66-76. In Day, P. and Doug Schuler (eds.). Community 
Practice in the Network Society: Local Actions/Global Interaction. New York: Routledge, and Falkinger, J. (2005). Attention 
Economies, CESifo Working Paper, No. 1079, available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_1079.html     
13  Goldhaber, M. H. (1997). The Attention Economy and the Net. 7 March 1997, In First Monday 2(4). Retrieved from: 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/519/440, and Davenport, T. H. and John C. Beck (2001). The Attention Economy: Understanding 
the New Currency of Business, 11. Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
14 Europe Economics (2002), supra n. 10, 44 
15 Owen, B.M. and Steven Wildman (1992). Video Economics, 91-92. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
16 Goodman, E. (2004). Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets. 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 19, 1425  
17 Baker, E. C. (1992). Advertising and a Democratic Press. U. PA. L. REV. 140, 2153, 2156. For more on the commodification of the 
audiences see, for instance, Streeter, T. (1996). Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the United 
States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press  
18 See, for instance, Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2003). Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets. Journal of the of the European 
Economic Association, 1, 990-1029; Argentesi, E. and Lapo Filistrucchi (2007). Estimating market power in a two-sided market: The 
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or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of 
19 Two-sided platforms arise in cases in which there are externalities and in which transaction 
costs do not allow the two sets of agents to address the externality directly.20 The platform is the 
intermediary that solves the externality by minimizing the costs that a transaction between entities 
belonging to these groups of agents would entail.21 The type of two-sided markets in which FTA 
broadcasters are active is advertising-based media. As mentioned above, advertising-based media use 
the content they provide to attract audiences and then sell access to these audiences to advertisers.22 
Where a viewer ended up buying the advertised product, the broadcaster facilitated the completion of 
a transaction that would not have taken place otherwise. 
 
The profit-maximizing logic of a two-sided intermediary is different from that of one-sided 
businesses23 because, in addition to the costs that it must bear to operate the platform and the demand 
for the two different types of products it offers, the intermediary must also take into account the 
interdependence between the two different types of consumers it targets.24 In our case, advertising 
prices depend on whether there are other broadcasters attracting viewers with the same demographic 
profile and on how viewers react to advertising. But, while identifying which broadcasters appeal to 
the audiences that advertisers aim to reach is a rather straightforward exercise, the way in which 
advertisers and viewers interact with each other is not self-evident. On the one hand, it is quite clear 
that the more viewers watch the content broadcast, the more attractive the platform becomes for 
advertisers because a large user base increases the possibilities for value-creating exchanges. On the 
other hand, it is not clear whether audiences appreciate ads. If they wish to purchase a given product, 
the more ads they watch, the more likely it is that they will find the product that fits their 
preferences.25 If, however, they are not interested in buying anything, transmitting too many ads may 
cause their dissatisfaction and force them to switch to another broadcaster or even discourage them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
case of newspapers. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1247-1266; Kaiser, U. and Julian Wright (2006). Price Structure in two-
sided markets: Evidence from the magazine industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 1-28 
19 Rysman, M. (2009). The Economics of Two-sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3), 125 
20 Evans, D.S. and Richard Schmalensee (2007). Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms. Competition Policy 
International, 3, 154 
21  OECD (2009). Policy Roundtable Report on Two-Sided Markets, 11-12. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf  
22 Evans, D.S. and Richard Schmalensee (2007), supra n. 20, 155 
23 For the problems that arise from the application of a traditional one-sided logic to two-sided markets see Wright, J. (2003). One-
Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets. Review of Network Economics, 3(1), 44-64 
24 Evans, D.S. (2009). Two-Sided Market Definition, 7. In ABA Section of Antitrust Law. Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory and 
Case Studies 
25 See Evans, D. S. (2008). Competition and Regulatory Policy for Multi-sided Platforms with Applications to the Web Economy. 
Concurrences, 2, 57-62 
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from watching TV. Alternatively, they may simply choose to ignore ads.26 In this case, putting up 
programming. 
 
The above remarks indicate the existence of indirect network effects between the advertisers 
and the viewers. Determining whether these effects are positive or negative is necessary 27  to 
understand whether or not the broadcaster faces effective constraints. For instance, based on the 
hard to tell whether on the 
the competition assessment in the case of a merger involving FTA broadcasters? If the users dislike 
ads and the merged entity decides to increase the advertising/content ratio, the viewers may switch to 
an alternative broadcaster. This other broadcaster should be regarded as a competitor that is capable 
28 Network effects between the two sides should also be 
measured. In the above example, network effects may be large enough to create a downward spiral 
iew of the above, a competition analysis that focuses on the level 
of advertising rates fails to take account of the demand-side substitution dynamics of FTA TV 
markets; as opposed to what the Commission implies, demand in FTA markets is not driven solely by 
low advertising prices, for advertisers also care about reaching sizeable audiences that are likely to 
buy their products. Similarly, from a viewer perspective, attention
willing to pay, depends on both the content provided by the broadcaster and the amount of time 
devoted to the transmission of ads. 
 
This approach, whereby the relevant product market for free access TV is defined by reference 
to the contractual arrangements between the broadcaster and the advertisers, essentially aims to 
protect price competition without regard for content competition. From a pluralism perspective, this 
has an impact on both the variety and quality of the programs broadcast. More particularly, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In other words, in this case, the broadcaster internalizes the cost of viewing ads by providing free content. See Evans, D. S. and 
Richard Schmalensee (2008). The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 670-1. In Collins, W.D.  (ed.). Issues 
in Competition Law and Policy. Chicago: American Bar Association 
27 Filistrucchi, L., Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme, E. and Pauline Affeldt (2012). Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory 
and Practice, 9. TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-009. Available through SSRN at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2240850 Filistrucchi et al. explain that 
when the value obtained by one group of customers increases with the number of customers (or, more generally, the demand) of the 
 
 
28 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/03, 
paragraph 2 
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previously seen, in a merger between FTA broadcasters, the SSNIP test will be based on a price 
charged to an advertiser that prefers content capable of both reaching a large audience and boosting 
its buying mood. As a result, the demand-side substitutability analysis leads to an assessment that 
ignores the effects of the merger on niche programming or programming that generates disputes, is 
29 Moreover, post-merger, the firms may decide to increase the 
advertising/content ratio.30 The resulting increase in ad space may lead to price reductions (simple 
economics of supply and demand where prices fall when the supply curve shifts outward). Under the 
-competitive concerns; 
to the contrary, it would be found to promote price competition. Similarly, no competition problems 
would be identified if the merging parties started to use the same programming across different 
channels as a means to reduce production costs.31 Hence, this type of analysis fully neglects content 
quality and variety reductions (this issue will be discussed in more detail in Parts 3 and 4).  
 
3. Competitive assessment 
 
3.1. Shift from platform competition at any cost to regulated consolidation of the   
market 
 
Since the Merger Regulation entered into force, the Commission has refused to clear five 
concentrations in the broadcasting sector.32 What these five cases have in common is that the notified 
operations involved broadcasters, content and infrastructure providers, thus raising vertical 
integration concerns.33 In these decisions, the Commission found that the undertakings concerned 
were already holding or would hold as a result of the transaction significant market power, which in 
turn would result in the merged entity sealing off the affected markets. For instance, the first 
prohibited concentration, MSG Media Service, concerned the creation of a joint venture by 
Bertelsmann, a German media group with holdings in commercial television, Kirch, the leading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Sunstein, C. (2000). Television and the Public Interest. California Law Review 88(2), 515 referring to Baker, E. C. (1992), supra n. 
17, 2153-4 
30 Note that the advertising limits under the version of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive [2010] OJ L 332/27 are fairly 
relaxed: broadcasters are entitled to interrupt their programming every 30 minutes provided that the proportion of the spots within a 
given clock hour does not exceed 20%. This means that broadcasters may devote up to 12 mins/hour to advertising (see Articles 20(2) 
and 23(1)) 
31 OECD (2003). Policy Roundtable Report on Media Mergers, 25 
32  Reference is made to Commission decisions Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1; Deutsche 
Telekom/Beta Research, Case IV/M.1027 [1998] OJ C 37/4; MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1; Nordic Satellite 
Distribution, Case IV/M.490 [1995] OJ L 053/20; RTL/Veronica/Endemol (HMG), Case IV/M.553 [1996] OJ L 124/32 
33 For an overview of these and other mergers that fell under Commission scrutiny see, for instance, Nikolinakos, N. (2006). EU 
Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT sectors, 138-161. Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, and Nitsche, I. (2001). Broadcasting in the European Union. The Role of Public Interest in Competition 
Analysis, 111-124. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
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German supplier of feature films and television programming, also active in commercial television, 
and Deutsche Telekom, the German telecommunications incumbent.34 The object of the joint venture 
would be the technical and administrative handling of mainly pay-TV services and the provision of 
the necessary technical infrastructure for the supply of such services. 35  The relevant markets 
identified by the Commission were the market for technical and administrative services for pay-TV 
suppliers, the market for pay-TV and the market for cable television networks.36 In its competitive 
-mover advantage, which was 
likely to create a long-term monopoly in the market for technical and administrative services for pay-
TV in Germany and further strengthen the position of Bertelsmann and Kirch in the market for the 
retail distribution of pay-TV services. 37  With respect to the above, the Commission noted that 
suppliers wishing to enter the pay-TV market following digitalization would be forced to take the 
relevant technical and administrative services from a company controlled by competitors that were 
already in a leading position.38 Additionally, it feared that the concentration would have adverse 
effects on the market for cable networks. The Commission found that the administrative practice 
regarding the granting of authorizations to establish the required reception equipment largely 
protected Telekom from competition.39 In its view, even if this practice were abandoned, cable 
network operators would find it difficult to compete with Telekom.40 There was, in particular, the 
risk that private operators could not access the program licensed by Bertelsmann and Kirch, which 
the Commission considered necessary for the creation of attractive program packages, or could 
purchase it only on unfavorable conditions.41 Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the 
concentration would probably wall off all three markets and decided to ban the transaction.42  
 
An approach similar to the one followed in MSG Media Service was adopted in the assessment 
underpinned by its willingness to ensure inter-platform competition at any cost.43 In spite of not 
being entirely certain about how the markets concerned were likely to evolve, the Commission took a 
strict stance against vertical integration and did not hesitate to sacrifice the provision of new services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraphs 1 and 5-7 
35 Ibid., paragraph 8 
36 Ibid., paragraph 19 
37 Ibid., paragraph 55 et seq. 
38 Ibid., paragraph 82  
39 Ibid., paragraph 93 
40 Ibid., paragraph 92 
41 Ibid., paragraph 93 
42 Ibid., paragraph 102 
43 Ariño, M. (2005). Regulation and Competition in European Broadcasting. A study of pluralism through access, 111. PhD thesis. 
Florence: European University Institute 
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in the short run so as to guarantee that a variety of suppliers could operate in these markets in the 
long run.44  Indeed, vertical integration in the media markets may have several anti-competitive 
effects, ble to obtain 
enough valuable content in the appropriate language to offer a satisfactory selection of channels and 
programs. If the carrier is dominant, a competing provider might be unable to find satisfactory 
45  determination to prevent market foreclosure resulting 
from vertical integration is also demonstrated by the fact that in all the above cases the parties to the 
es of 
46 47 48 49 to address the competition problems 
that arose.  
 
This set of negative decisions represents more than 20% of all transactions the Commission has 
blocked thus far.50 Yet, this does not mean that the Commission has treated concentration in the 
broadcasting sector more restrictively than in other industries. These transactions were notified to the 
Commission when the Commissioner responsible for competition policy within the European Union 
was Karel Van Miert. Instilled in these decisions is V
51 Bu
ensure inter-platform competition at any cost has since undergone significant change. Since May 
1998,52 the Commission has given the green light to all notified transactions in the broadcasting 
sector, several of which subject to (structural and/or behavioral) conditions.53  
 
consolidation is Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram in which the Commission was asked to assess the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007). European Broadcasting Law and Policy, 164. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
45 Temple Lang, J. (1997). Media, multimedia and European Community antitrust law. Fordham International Law Journal, 21(4), 
1359. Retrieved from: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1569&context=ilj  
46 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraph 99  
47 Commission decision Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research, Case IV/M.1027 [1998] OJ C 37/4, paragraph 65   
48  See Commission decisions Nordic Satellite Distribution, Case IV/M.490 [1995] OJ L 053/20 paragraph 154 and 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (HMG), Case IV/M.553 [1996] OJ L 124/32, paragraph 112 
49 Commission Decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 155 
50 According to the Merger Statistics Table published by the Commission, from 21 September 1990 to 31 October 2014, a total of 24 
operations have been rejected. The table is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf  
51 Harcourt, A. (2005). The European Union and the Regulation of the Media Markets, 51. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
52 Last in the series of prohibited operations previously discussed were Commission decisions Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research, Case 
IV/M.1027 [1998] OJ C 37/4 and Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1 (both of them adopted on 
27/051998) 
53 According to a search by NACE code, since May 1998, the Commission has adopted in the information and communication sectors 
29 decisions subject to commitments, 20 under Article 6(1)(b) and 9 under Article 8(2). However, these numbers must be seen with 
caution as Commission Decision BSkyB/Kirch Pay-TV adopted in 2000 which the concentration compatible with the common market 
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acquisition of Seagram (active in different segments of the entertainment business and owner of 
Universal, one of the six Hollywood studios), by Vivendi (active in, inter alia, cinema and television 
through equity interests in Canal+ and BSkyB, two leading pay-TV operators, and a majority stake in 
CDCA, which holds film catalogues and licenses broadcasting rights to French channels).54 In its 
largest film library, the second largest library of TV programming in the EEA and the first acquirer 
of output deals signed with US studios.55 The Commission also noted that, as a result of structural 
and other56 links between Vivendi or Universal and other Hollywood majors, Canal+ was likely to 
have preferential access to movie rights.57 In spite of the above, the Commission approved the 
operation. An amalgamation of behavioral and structural commitments proposed by the parties was 
found to eliminate the anti-competitive concerns that the concentration raised. For instance, Vivendi 
undertook to divest its entire stake in BSkyB and not to grant to Canal+ the first-window rights 
production, thereby leaving the remaining 50% to other 
operators.58  
 
Another example is the high-profile (horizontal) merger NewsCorp/Telepiù dealing with a 
concentration by which media conglomerate News Corporation, operating at all tiers in the broadcast 
supply chain (e.g. production and distribution of motion pictures and TV programming, production 
and distribution of advertising products and services, the development of digital broadcasting, the 
development of conditional access and subscriber management systems, the creation and distribution 
of on-line programming, etc.) would acquire control, via a special purpose vehicle company, of the 
Italian pay-TVs Telepiù and Stream.59 Under the proposed transaction, Telepiù and Stream would 
merge their activities in a combined Direct-to-Home (DTH) satellite platform in which Telecom 
Italia, the Italian telecom incumbent, would hold a minority stake. 60 While the Commission found 
that the merged entity would have a monopoly as regards the DTH means of transmission and would 
also have all the possibilities and economic incentives to foreclose actual and potential competitors 
wishing to enter the market through the same or other means of transmission,61 it declared the 
concentration compatible with the common market subject to a number of behavioral and structural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Commission Decision Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, Case COMP/M. 2050 [2000] C 311/03, paragraphs 1 and 4-8 
55 Ibid., paragraph 15 
56 Ibid., paragraph 49. For example, Universal constituted a significant partner in the then growing segment of films co-financed by 
several studios, including MGM and Paramount 
57 Ibid., paragraph 49 
58 Ibid., at pp. 20 and 22 
59 Commission Decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraphs 1 and 7-9 
60 Ibid., paragraph 1 
61 Ibid., paragraph 140 
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remedies. For instance, News Corporation committed to waive exclusive rights for pay-per-view, 
video on demand and near video on demand on all platforms and not to conclude contracts exceeding 
the duration of two years with football clubs and of three years with film studios. The decision also 
-exclusive 
basis, the right to distribute on platforms other than DTH any premium contents if and for as long as 
the combined platform would offer such premium contents to its retail customers. Telepiù undertook 
to divest its digital and analogue terrestrial broadcasting assets and not to enter into any further 
digital terrestrial television activities, neither as network nor as retail operator.62  
 
Similarly, the Commission decided to clear the acquisition by BSkyB of a stake in Kirch 
despite its concerns that the concentration would result in Kirch acquiring significant power in the 
German pay-TV market resulting from the influx of financial resources from BSkyB. 63  The 
transaction was approved upon the condition that the parties would respect a bundle of (behavioral) 
commitments proposed to the Commission. More particularly, Kirch committed to offer to all 
interested third parties, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, access to its technical 
platform. 64  BSkyB and Kirch also undertook that, in the event they acquired rights for the 
exploitation of a major live international sports event on a multi-national basis, they would not give 
to one another the status of preferred bidder for such rights by granting, for instance, a right of first 
negotiation, first refusal or first offer.65 This condition was imposed so as to address the possible 
adverse effects on the market for the acquisition of TV rights to pan-European sports events.66 
 
A package of behavioral commitments was also accepted in the more recent SFR/Télé 2 
decision dealing with the plans of SFR, jointly controlled by Vivendi and Vodafone, to acquire sole 
control of the Internet access and fixed telephone business of Télé 2.67 The Commission feared that, 
as a result of the proposed project, Vivendi would have the ability and incentive to grant to its 
SFR/Télé2 subsidiary preferential access to the television content it had in its possession.68 Such 
conduct could lead to a severe weakening of other DSL operators, both in the downstream 
distribution market and in the upstream market, for the acquisition of television content.69 In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid., paragraph 225, (c), (d), (i), (g) and (k) 
63 Commission Decision BSkyB/Kirch Pay-TV Case COMP/JV.37 [2000] OJ C 110/45. See in particular paragraphs 1, 5-7, 9, 51 and 
80 
64 Ibid., at p. 20 
65 Ibid., at p. 25 
66 Ibid., see, in particular, paragraphs 90 et seq.  
67 Commission decision SFR/Télé 2 France, Case No COMP M.4504 [2007] OJ L 316/57, paragraphs 1, 6 and 7 
68 Ibid., see paras 92 et seq. 
69 Ibid., paragraph 101 
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eliminate these concerns, Vivendi committed to offer its channels to all DSL operators on normal 
market terms, which could not be less favorable than those provided to SFR. With a view to ensuring 
an adequate monitoring of this undertaking, Vivendi was asked to keep separate accounts for each 
channel distributed wholesale in this way.70 
 
This move from inter-platform to regulated consolidation suggests that the Commission has 
gradually succumbed to the natural tendency of the industry towards concentration. The Commission, 
71 and has therefore decided to adopt an approach that heralds 
72 This logic is ill-
advised. While there is little doubt that the Commission must adapt its assessments to the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case, this does not mean that the latter, including and especially a 
natural tendency towards integration, should render EU merger control devoid of substance. The 
with remedies that 
fell short of capturing media market dynamics have harmed consumer welfare and that, in retrospect, 
despite its lacunae, the reasoning it applied to the prohibited operations discussed above was far 
more adequate to protect competition and pluralism.  
 
3.2. Ensuring market access = Pluralistic and/or competitive broadcasting markets?  
 
While the shift from inter-platform competition to regulated consolidation marks a significant 
policy change, the objective under both approaches is the same: Market access should not be 
prevented as a result of the notified transaction. In the first case, the Commission pursues this 
objective by prohibiting concentrations that would confer an unparalleled first-mover advantage on 
the merged entity. In the second case, the Commission seeks to guarantee that the merger does not 
deter access to key elements, namely premium content and infrastructure, which allow broadcasters 
to effectively compete.73 In both cases, the underlying assumption is that broadcasters that do not fall 
within the sphere of influence of one of the merging firms will be able to undertake activities in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid., paragraph 117 
71 Mendes-Perreira, M. (2003). Vertical and horizontal integration in the media sector and EU competition law, 10. Paper presented at 
the Workshop The ICT and Media Sectors within the EU Policy Framework, Brussels, 7 April 2003. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_009_en.pdf  
72  Alexiadis, P. and Miranda Cole (2004). Revisiting Competition Law and Regulatory Analyses of Consolidations in the 
Communications Sector, 14. Financier Worldwide, Industry Sector Review: Technology, Media & Telecommunications 2004. 
Retrieved from: http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Alexiadis_Comm_Sector_Comp_Law.pdf See also Nikolinakos, 
N. (2006), supra n. 33, 170 
73  mergers in the media sector. See, for instance, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/overview_en.html See also Mendes-Perreira (2003), supra n. 71, 12  
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affected markets. For example, the Commission refused to clear Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, which 
concerned the plans of CLT-UFA and Kirch to merge their digital television activities in Germany 
into the Premiere venture,74 on the grounds -TV and multimedia 
75 Similarly, in the approved 
NewsCorp/Telepiù, it explained that, if the merged undertakings restricted access to premium 
content, -TV 
76  The Commission seems to imply that market access, guaranteed either through a 
negative decision or through a conditional clearance, caters to supply diversity.77  
 
Under both approaches, the effects of a concentration on content diversity have largely been 
marginalized. For instance, in NSD, the Commission was limited to noting that the operation would 
78 In Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, it 
mentioned that a horizontally integrated undertaking active in both the pay- and free-to-air TV 
markets could negatively influence the attractiveness and range of programs in each of the two 
segments.79 However, these and other similar remarks are incidental rather than parts of a full-
fledged analysis of whether the transaction would adversely affect minority-taste, assorted and/or 
high value programming. The reasoning behind these decisions seems to be based on the premise that 
such programming is a natural outcome of supply diversity. For instance, in NewsCorp/Telepiù, in its 
assessment of the impact of the merger on the market for the acquisition of TV channels, the 
the merged entity dec
 consumers would enjoy a greatly 
reduced variety of products and freedom of choice 80  
 
rger practice in the broadcasting sector as 
described above. The first is related to the assumption that content diversity derives from supply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Commission decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 1 
75 Ibid., paragraph 122 
76 Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 184  
77 The Commission has supported this position in several policy documents. See, for instance, European Commission (2005). Issues 
Paper for the Liverpool Audiovisual Conference Media Pluralism -  2, and Staff Working 
Document on Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, SEC (2007) 32, 7 
78 Commission decision Nordic Satellite Distribution, Case IV/M.490 [1995] OJ L 053/20, paragraph 151 
79 Commission decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993, [1999] OJ L 053/1. See in particular paragraphs 87-
more varied and attractive the programs offered by the free broadcasters, the less incentive there is for viewers to subscribe to pay-TV 
en a television operator has a 
leading position in pay-TV and free-TV, and also holds the main program rights for free-TV and pay-TV he is in a position to control 
the interaction between free- and pay-  
80 Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 173 
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diversity and the second regards the imposition of remedies imposed in the post-van Miert era that 
did not manage to ensure market access. 
 
The assumption that supply diversity will guarantee content diversity is weak. The main 
reasons explaining why in media markets the former does not necessarily lead to the latter have 
already been discussed in Chapter 2.81 With respect to the broadcasting sector, the following features 
are particularly counterproductive to a varied programming even in markets where several channel 
distributors are active: first, as I explained above, the use of advertising results in programming 
which seeks to attract mass audiences and promote materialism.  
 
Second, TV content produced in-house has, as a rule, high first-copy costs. For example, 
Game of Thrones costs an average of $6 million per episode.82 Acquired content is also very 
expensive. For instance, for a high-cost drama series, the BBC pays the independent producer an 
average of GB £700k - £900k per hour.83 In Germany, Sky currently pays the Bundesliga a licence 
.7 million per season84 whereas in the UK, Premier League rights cost BSkyB GB £760m 
per year.85 Transaction costs related to rights clearance are high too. A major broadcaster negotiates 
approximately 70,000 contracts per year with rights holders.86 
 
Third, as opposed to production or purchase of attractive content, distribution of TV 
programming is fairly cheap, and even more so with technology convergence. It was explained in 
Chapter 2 that previously different communication infrastructures now use the same transport 
protocols. This means that television broadcasts can currently be delivered on multiple platforms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, this is also an assumption that seems to have underpinned regulation in support of media 
pluralism. For an overview see, for instance, Napoli, P.M. (2011). Exposure diversity reconsidered. Journal of Information Policy, 1, 
246-259, and Valcke, P. (2011). Looking For the User in Media Pluralism Regulation: Unraveling the Traditional Diversity Chain 
and Recent Trends of User Empowerment in European Media Regulation. Journal of Information Policy, 1, 294-5. Note that content 
diversity may be further undermined by factors that were examined in detail in Chapter 2, Parts 3.4.1. and 3.4.2.  
82 Garofalo, A.  With High Cost Per Episode. 14 
August 2014, International Business Times. Retrieved from: http://www.ibtimes.com/game-thrones-big-budgets-bring-huge-success-
how-hbo-series-makes-money-high-cost-episode-1658966  
83  BBC Tariff Prices for Independents. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/commissioning/tv/how-we-work/business-
requirements/tariff-ranges.shtml  
84 These fees cover the period from 2013 until 2016. See Briel, R. Sky Deutschland wins all live Bundesliga rights. 18 April 2012, 
Broadband TV News. Retrieved from: http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2012/04/18/sky-deutschland-wins-live-bundesliga-rights/  
85 As with the Bundesliga-Sky arrangements, these fees cover the period from 2013 until 2016. See Pearce, J. Premier League rights 
sold to BT and BSkyB for 3bn. 13 June 2012, the BBC. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18430036  
86 See http://www3.ebu.ch/advocacy/initiatives/copyright Note that, compared against other costs incurred in the daily operations of a 
channel, inc
See, for instance, BBC (2003). Facts and Figures, 2. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/psb/responses/mceihil_annex.pdf See also Herbert, U. Commercialising sport: 
Understanding the TV Rights debate. Speech delivered in Barcelona, 2 October 2003. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_024_en.pdf 
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with significantly less cost.87 Besides terrestrial, direct-to-home satellite and cable networks, TV 
programming is also available on Internet Protocol television, offered by telecommunication 
providers over managed networks with high quality of service, and Over-The-Top (OTT) television, 
provided by the content owners themselves (e.g. the BBC iPlayer, Hulu, YouTube,88 etc.) without the 
ISP or network operator controlling viewer access.89 As a result, the same content can be delivered 
on multiple devices (e.g. traditional TV set, tablets and smartphones) and in several formats (e.g. 
linear transmission, catch-up and on-demand).  
 
Finally, content is a product with highly uncertain consumer demand. There is little doubt that 
the success of a film, series or anchorman depends on viewer preferences that are not easy to predict. 
This is not just common sense, but an empirically verified hypothesis. For example, De Vany and 
Walls tested the assumption that the variance of the probability distribution of movie outcomes is 
infinite by developing a model that makes distribution conditional on a list of choice variables that 
.90 After applying their model to a sample 
of 2,015 movies, De Vany and Walls concluded that it is impossible to determine the parameters that 
make a movie successful. Factors such as release strategies, budget and aggressive marketing made 
no difference, since no pattern could be identified. This finding illustrates why content production (or 
acquisition) is a very risky undertaking.91  
 
H
favor of programming that mimics existing programming successes and/or that holds out the promise 
se, the programming produced may systematically 
92 In view of the above, market access should not be regarded as a 
vehicle for content diversity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Pavlik, J. (2005). Understanding Convergence and Digital Broadcasting Technologies for the Twenty-First Century, 142. NHK 
Broadcasting Studies. Retrieved from: https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/pdf/05_no4_08.pdf  
88 YouTube, which started as a peer video upload website, now provides access to programming posted by mainstream broadcasters. 
See OECD (2013). Competition Issues in Television and Broadcasting, 2  
89 Ibid., 9-10. For more information on technology convergence and how it affects broadcasting see, for instance, EBU (2013). Reply 
to the European Commission Green Paper  Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation and Values. 
Retrieved from: http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Knowledge/Initiatives%20-
%20Policy/Topical%20Issues/Hybrid/EBU_reply_to_Green_Paper_convergence_final.pdf  
90 De Vany, A. and W. David Walls (1999). Uncertainty in the Movie Industry: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office? 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, New York, January 1999. Retrieved from: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wgreene/entertainmentandmedia/Devany&Walls.pdf  
91 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 16, 1435 
92 Ibid. 
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 As regards access remedies imposed in the post-van Miert era, these were poorly conceived 
and hence inadequate to keep the markets affected by the transaction open to competition. Take as an 
example the commitments that were made legally binding in order to ensure access to premium 
content. As already seen, the merging parties occasionally undertook to reduce the duration of 
exclusivity contracts with rights holders. The rationale behind this solution is that the acquiring 
entity will not be able to force its rivals to exit the market permanently whilst being granted a certain 
amount of time to recoup the investment. However, a loosely defined obligation whereby auctions for 
the content rights must be organized every x years is not sufficient to guarantee that the rights will be 
purchased by a different provider. Premium content is very expensive and antitrust intervention to 
limit the contract length does not necessarily mean that a smaller competitor will have the financial 
resources to successfully bid for the rights after the contract expires. For example, as already seen in 
Chapter 3, the Commission decision dealing with the TV rights to the English Football Association 
Premier League (FAPL) provides that related agreements shall be concluded for a period not 
exceeding three seasons.93 This, however, did not prevent Sky from successfully bidding for the 
rights in every single auction that was organized after the decision was adopted.94 Interestingly, the 
prohibition decisions discussed above were partly based on the concern that, even after termination of 
their output deals for pay-TV rights with film studios, the merging parties, given their financial 
strength, were most likely to acquire those rights for another term.95  
 
Another remedy imposed on the merging parties with a view to guaranteeing access to 
premium content is the duty to sublicense rights acquired on an exclusive basis. However, these 
sublicensing schemes have been far from a success story. The difficulties that competitors have 
encountered in their attempt to acquire premium content will be illustrated through an analysis of the 
wholesale must-offer mechanism, subject to which the Newscorp/Telepiù merger was cleared. 
 
How is premium content sublicensed? In Newscorp/Telepiù, the merged entity undertook to 
offer to third parties the right to distribute premium content on the basis of the retail minus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Commission decision Joint Selling of the Media Rights of the FA Premier League (FAPL), Case COMP/C.2/38.173 [2006] OJ L 
176/104, paragraph 16 
94 In fact, Sky Sports has been broadcasting the Premier League to UK TV viewing audiences since the launch of the league in 1992. 
See Harris, C. BSkyB Retains Majority of TV Rights to Premier League On UK TV For 2013-16. 13 June 2012, World Soccer Talk. 
Retrieved from: http://worldsoccertalk.com/2012/06/13/bskyb-retains-majority-of-tv-rights-to-premier-league-on-uk-tv-for-2013-16/ 
For recent developments see Williams, C. Virgin Media urges Ofcom crackdown on Premier League TV prices. 30 September 2014, 
The Telegraph. Retrieved from: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/11131139/Virgin-Media-urges-Ofcom-
crackdown-on-Premier-League-TV-prices.html  
95 See, for instance, Commission decisions Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraphs 49-50, and 
Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research, Case IV/M.1027 [1998] OJ C 37/4, paragraphs 31-32 
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principle.96 This is a principle whereby the wholesale price is calculated as the retail price charged by 
the sub-licensor minus the cost of an efficient undertaking.97 For retail minus pricing to protect 
competition, it is necessary that the sub-licensor face competitive pressure. If not, a retail minus 
mechanism does not prevent it from charging excessive retail prices (which automatically translate 
into excessive wholesale prices).98 In Newscorp/Telepiù, the competitive analysis had concluded that 
the merged entity would acquire a near-monopoly position in the pay-TV market, thus having both 
99 It is therefore 
odd that the Commission found that, in the case of Sky, a sublicensing scheme based on the retail 
minus pricing principle would allow other pay-
would otherwise be too costly for them to purcha .100 If the Commission carefully weighed 
the position Sky would hold in the market post-merger against the condition under which retail minus 
pricing can be an effective means to safeguard competition, it could have predicted what happened 
one year after the decision was adopted: following complaints by competitors, the Italian media 
regulator, AGCom, intervened to change 
wholesale offers were unsustainable.101 
  
What is sublicensed? Problems arise 
scope of the wholesale must-offer regime, thereby allowing the incumbent to empty content markets, 
including emerging content markets. In the case of Newscorp/Telepiù, the Commission left out the 
Desperate Housewives and Lost).102 Following the decision, Sky went on to sign a series of exclusive 
agreements with these basic package channels. 103 As a result, this content, which, according to 
former IPTV provider Fastweb, was the main reason for becoming a pay-TV subscriber for 70% of 
the viewers, 104  was not available to other pay-TV operators. This may go part way towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, see Section 10 of the Commitments, pp. 8-11 
97 For more details on the method applied in Newscorp/Telepiù see Section 10 of the Commitments, paragraphs 10.5. and 10.6. 
98  ERG (2009). Report on price consistency in upstream broadband markets, 15. Retrieved from: 
http://www.irg.eu/streaming/ERG_(09)_21_ERG_Report_on_price_consistency_in_upstream_bb_markets.pdf?contentId=546067&fie
ld=ATTACHED_FILE See also Geradin, D. (2005). Access to content by new media platforms: A review of the competition law 
problems. European Law Review 30 (1), 84. On the inadequacy of retail minus mechanisms to protect competition see also Geradin, 
D. and Michel Kerf (2003). Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs Sector-specific Regulation. Oxford: OUP 
99 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 140 
100 Ibid., paragraph 246 
101 See Agcom (2004). Delibera N. 360/04/CONS. Retrieved from: http://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/538769/Delibera+360-04-
CONS/7b5b88af-14bc-4915-b264-dd1ca75e2ff9?version=1.0&targetExtension=pdf In this case, e.Biscom argued that the price 
charged by Sky Italia was too high and asked a 50% discount on the retail price. AGCom agreed with e.Biscom and imposed on Sky 
the obligation to modify its wholesale offer as follows: The minus value of the six packages subject to the must-offer regime must be 
between 51.6% (the most expensive package) and 62.6% (the cheapest packages) of the retail price of the premium package. See 
 
102 Ofcom (2009). Wholesale must-offer remedies: International examples, 9 
103 Ibid., 14 
104 Ibid. 
  
	   	   154	  
explaining why the Italian IPTV market105 collapsed a few years later. In the second half of 2012, 
Wind and Fastweb, finding themselves unable to create a sustainable customer base, closed their 
IPTV services.106 Moreover, Sky Italia is reportedly not incentivized to expand into IPTV, which 
further reduces the likelihood of viewers switching from DTH to IPTV.107  This shows that, in 
addition to distortions of competition, an ill-designed sublicensing mechanism may also have a 
chilling effect on innovation (IPTV delivers better picture and sound quality and has richer 
functionality108 than DTH).  
 
When is premium content sublicensed? In Newscorp/Telepiù, the Commission does not set a 
deadline by which Sky must grant access to the rights. The decision lays down that the wholesale 
ble terms and conditions (including, without limitation, reasonable 
109 
not enough to prevent the incumbent from engaging in anti-competitive practices. Furthermore, 
introducing a binding arbitration system does not fully address the concerns that may arise from 
failure to comply with the obligation to sublicense content 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism is undoubtedly faster than regular court proceedings, 
however, recourse to arbitration does not mean that the dispute will be resolved overnight. For 
example, it took the International Court of Arbitration two years to decide whether the FIFA World 
Cup was must-offer content110 and AGCom another two to conclude whether Sky implemented its 
cost-allocation strategies on a discriminatory basis.111  
 
But, what best illustrates the limitations of this mechanism is that, long before the commitments 
expired, IPTV operators and Sky Italia abandoned the wholesale must-offer and signed unregulated 
commercial agreements whereby IPTV players would act as Sky distributors and be remunerated on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 In 2008, the aggregate market share of all telecoms operators providing pay-TV services was 3,7% whereas Sky Italia controlled 
88,8% of the market. See Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù, Case No COMP/M.2876 C(2010) 4976 final, paragraph 31. In 
supra n. 102, 7 
106 Retrieved from: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=18  
107 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 102,15 
108 Ibid. For example, IPTV has the ability to provide on-demand content channel and interactive content applications 
109 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, Section 10.4. of the Commitments 
110 In Newscorp/Telepiù, the combined platform undertook not to make any exclusivity arrangements for means of transmission other 
than DTH in future agreements concerning worldwide sports rights (see Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, 
Section 8.1. of the Commitments). In November 2008, Sky purchased from RAI the transmission rights for pay-TV on all platforms, 
including DTT, of the FIFA World Cup. In February 2010, RTI, the broadcast media subsidiary of the Mediaset group, brought a 
complaint before the International Court of Arbitration (ICC) arguing that Sky had violated the above obligation. The ICC held that 
the FIFA media rights were not covered by the commitments on the grounds that the event did not have the capacity to generate a 
Agcom (2013). A429 - 
RTI/SKY-Mondiali di Calcio, Provvedimento n. 24325, paragraphs 17 and 19 
111 See Agcom (2010). A407- Conto TV/Sky Italia, Provvedimento n. 21316, paragraph 6. This decision will be discussed in more 
detail in Part 4 
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the basis of a revenue-sharing model. 112  Sky Italia would bill the viewer directly and own the 
customer relationship. 113  Apparently, these arrangements also fell short of boosting competition 
because, as already seen, two of the three IPTV providers (Fastweb, Wind and Telecom Italia) were 
forced to exit the market in 2012.  
 
With respect to pluralism, I explained in Chapter 3 that the contribution of a competition policy 
facilitating access to premium content to the protection of media pluralism should not be 
overestimated. Newscorp/Telepiù is a vivid illustration of this point in that the competitor that seems 
to have been favored by the remedies the most is Mediaset. This is because the merged entity, Sky 
Italia, committed not to develop activities on DTT,114 which Mediaset penetrated after the decision 
was adopted115 and has controlled ever since.116 Being the leading commercial FTA broadcaster, 
Mediaset has the deep pockets to acquire premium content and provide an offer alternative to that of 
Sky. Mediaset is, however, owned by Silvio Berlusconi, know
policies in order to advance his own political and commercial interests.117  
 
In view of the above, the merger practice the Commission has developed in the broadcasting 
sector seems to have fallen short of protecting both media pluralism and competition.   
 
3.3. Public policy considerations in th How decisive are 
they? 
 
The Commission may have regard to public policy considerations when it is called upon to 
assess whether a concentration between media undertakings is compatible or not with the common 
market. Insofar as the media sector is concerned, the legal basis for integrating such considerations 
to take 
cultural aspects into account when action is taken in the framework of other Union policies, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 This was based on the number of subscribers and the value of the acquired package. See Ofcom (2009), supra n. 102, 15 
113 Ibid. 
114 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, Section 10.4. of the Commitments. Note that, 
apply for an 
authorization with the competent Italian authorities for the award of one DTT mux. See Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù, Case 
No COMP/M.2876 C(2010) 4976 final 
115 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 102, 7 
116 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù, Case No COMP/M.2876 C(2010) 4976 final, paragraphs 31-32 
117  See, for instance, EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (2004). Synthesis Report: Conclusions and 
Recommendations on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2003, 40; (2005). Synthesis 
Report: Conclusions and Recommendations on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its Member States in 
2004, 62, and (2006). Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2005, 109. The 
first two reports are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/document/index_en.htm whereas the third is available 
at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/EU-funrights-report05.pdf  
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as Article 11(2) CFREU, which establishes the obligation to respect freedom and pluralism of the 
media. In addition to these provisions of constitutional character, Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation lays down that the Commission must consider the development of technical progress and 
the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers when scrutinizing a merger. The question 
which therefore arises and seeks an answer in this section is whether, and if so how and to what 
extent, the Commission has made use of the above provisions so as to protect, in its assessment of 
mergers affecting the broadcasting sector, Union values other than (price) competition. The cases 
discussed below mainly concern transactions affecting the broadcasting markets. However, where 
appropriate, reference is also made to decisions dealing with concentrations in other sectors of the 
media industry to complement the analysis.  
 
3.3.1. Public policy considerations under Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation:  
Development of technical progress and consumer interests 
 
In Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, the parties to the merger argued that the proposed project, the 
creation of a digital pay-TV program and marketing platform using the d-box technology,118 required 
a significant investment. According to the parties, it was only by joining forces that the infrastructure 
necessary for the breakthrough of digital television in Germany could be established. 119  If the 
operation were approved, the parties said, 
view, however, it was extremely doubtful whether the merger would indeed have a positive impact 
on technical progress because the transaction was likely to seal off the (then nascent) pay-TV 
market.120  The Commission further noted that, even if the project could contribute to technical 
progress, this was irrelevant under Article 2(1)(b) because the criterion of technical progress 
121 Based 
had reached the same 
conclusion in MSG Media Service, the earlier unsuccessful attempt of Bertelsmann and Kirch to 
solidify their presence in the German pay-TV market.122  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Commission decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 8 
119 Ibid., paragraph 119 
120 Ibid., paragraph 122 
121 Ibid. 
Commission Decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, 
spread of digital television presupposes a digital infrastructure and hence that an enterprise with the business object of MSG can 
 is subject 
MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 
364/1, paragraph 100  
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The first problem with the above reasoning is that it renders Article 2(1)(b) devoid of 
presence of economic and technical progress would be unnecessary to authorize a transaction in the 
123  This interpretation has justifiably been criticized by 
commentators and practitioners alike because it deprives the parties to a concentration of the ability 
to put forward any dynamic efficiency claims. 124  The second problem arising from the above 
decisions is that no reliable economic data were relied upon to assess whether or not the notified 
operation could enhance technical progress. For example, in MSG Media Service, the Commission 
based its conclusion on a series of opinions of competing enterprises surveyed; unsurprisingly, 
competitors y would have to review and possibly 
abandon existing plans or thoughts on future pay- 125 Instead 
the Commission should have attempted to establish the causality link between the impact of the new 
entity on the ability and incentive of other companies to penetrate the affected market and how this 
impact could obstruct the rapid acceptance of digital television.126 
 
It is not excluded that a rational interpretation of Article 2(1)(b) or a detailed economic analysis 
could have led to the same conclusion, that is, that the merger would likely harm both technical 
progress and competition. It bears noting that the decision to ban these mergers was not wrong, if for 
other reasons. We have already seen that the prohibitions were largely based on the assumption that 
vertical integration combined with an unparalleled first-mover advantage would grant the merged 
entity the ability and incentive to foreclose the market for pay-TV. It was on the basis of these 
 it was only by pooling 
their resources that the infrastructure necessary for the breakthrough of digital pay-TV television in 
Germany could be established.127 The way the market developed proved the Commission right. 
Bertelsmann (now part of the RTL Group)128 is still alive and kicking in both free-to-air and pay-
TV.129 Deutsche Telekom has been very successful in the IPTV segment where it faces competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Lascowska, M. (2013). Dynamic Efficiencies and Technological Progress in EC Merger Control. The University of Oxford, Centre 
for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP (L) 29, 5. The paper is available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336956  
124 Butorac Malnar, V. (2008). The Role of Efficiencies in Merger Control: Comparative EU-USA Perspective. Zb. Prav.fak. Sveuc. 
Rij, 29(2), 864-5 
125 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraph 101 
126 Lascowska, M. (2013), supra n. 123, 6. Lascowska convincingly argues that the assessment of whether the merging parties in 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere can contribute to technical progress also lacks a sound economic reasoning, see in particular pp. 9-11  
127 See Commission decision Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 [1999] OJ L 053/1, paragraph 119 
128  Note that in 2000 Bertelsmann CLT-UFA merged with Pearson TV and became the RTL group. See 
http://www.rtlgroup.com/www/htm/AboutUs_History.aspx 
129 http://mavise.obs.coe.int/company?id=2093  
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from Vodafone.130  In 2010, an SES Astra subsidiary launched the HD+ program package which is 
becoming increasingly popular,131 thus possibly having the capacity to exercise constraints on Sky 
Deutscheland (former Kirch)132 and RTL. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in the period following 
the prohibition decisions, the average prices for pay-TV in Germany were significantly lower than in 
several other European countries.133  
 
Compared against MSG Media Service and Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, the Commission 
follows an apparently more permissive approach in NewsCorp/Telepiù. This latter case did not 
concern the development of technical progress, but the interests of end consumers. As already 
mentioned, the Commission found that the concentration would lead to the creation of a near-
monopoly in the pay-TV market in Italy134 and that the conditions for the transaction to qualify as 
ficulties faced by Stream were not fulfilled.135 Nevertheless, 
the Commission concluded that the authorization of the merger, subject to conditions, would be more 
beneficial to consumers than a disruption caused by a potential closure of Stream. 136  A factor 
in
profitable. It was therefore likely that one of them would exit the market anyway, resulting in the 
market being controlled by an unregulated monopolist. Put simply, the Commission felt that 
-TV subscribers. 137 
However, it reached this conclusion without making any reference to Article 2(1)(b) and, most 
importantly, without substantiating in which way the consumers would be worse off if Stream went 
bankrupt. While the wording of the decision indicates that the Commission took into account the 
interests of end-users as an exception to competition, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
consumer protection factored into its decision to clear the merger.  
 
Considering how the market evolved post-merger, the outcome of the decision appears to have 
harmed rather than improved consumer welfare. As already seen, Sky, which still controls the pay-
TV market, has engaged in practices which seem to have deprived consumers of innovative services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=2  
131 Ibid. This package was available free of charge in its first year and now offers 24 encrypted commercial channels and 29 
unencrypted HD channels. According to SES, within three years after its launch, HD+ had been activated in 1.1 million households. 
132 Note that in 2008 Premiere AG (former Kirch) was acquired by News Corporation 
133 Padilla, J., Matthew Bennett and Wim Koevoets. Pay-TV prices in Europe - An Econometric Analysis, 6. London, 18/06/2007. 
Retrieved from: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/market_invest_paytv/annexes/annex1.pdf 
134 Commission decision Newscorp/Telepiù Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, paragraph 114 
135 Ibid., paragraph 205 et seq. 
136 Ibid., paragraph 221 
137 Nikolinakos, N. (2006), supra n. 33, 168 
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(e.g. IPTV packages). Moreover, in the period following the decision, pay-TV prices in Italy were the 
second highest in Europe.138  
 
3.3.2. Media pluralism and cultural diversity considerations  
 
In MSG Media Service, the Commission seems to have taken account of the concerns related to 
the concentration of significant (opinion-forming) power in the hands of one media owner. In 
assessing the competitive constraints that potential competitors could exert on the merged entity, the 
Commission noted that  
ivate 
television broadcaster PRO 7 (50.1 %) and News Corporation Ltd (49.9 %), which 
47.7 % of the shares in 
PRO 7 are held by Mr Thomas Kirch, the son of the owner of the Kirch group
PRO 7 therefore should probably be included at least in the sphere of influence of the 
Kirch group. Against this background it is hardly to be expected that Selco will enter into 
 [emphasis added].139  
National regulatory instruments in support of media pluralism adopt the same approach. For example, 
Article 5(3) of Greek Law 3592/2007 on media concentration provides that the rules established 
.140 But, 
achieving the same objective as a regulatory tool aiming to protect media pluralism does not imply 
MSG cannot be grounded on economic principles. In other 
words, this approach should not necessarily be regarded as an exception to competition. For example, 
it is a commonly accepted principle that a vertically integrated company enjoying significant market 
power will have the ability and incentive to favor its own upstream or downstream services.141 The 
same logic may apply by analogy to the situation in which two undertakings are controlled by two 
persons that are connected by blood or marriage. Moreover, including Pro7 in the sphere of influence 
of the Kirch group is supported by the Merger Regulation, which defines t
by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and having 
regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Padilla, J., Matthew Bennett and Wim Koevoets (2007), supra n. 133 
139 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraph 65 
140 Law No. 3592/2007 of 19/07/2007 on Media Concentration and Licensing Procedures, Official Gazette, No. 161, at p. 3371. See in 
particular Article 5(3)(a) and (b): 
 
 
141 See Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, paragraphs 31 et seq. 
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influence on an undertaking  [emphasis added].142 Even if the son of Kirch was not a majority 
stakeholder in Pro7, the 47.7% of shares he held in the company was, based on existing case law, 
enough to consider that he (and, by analogy, his father) was in control of Pro7.143 The Commission 
would have reached the same conclusion by examining the coordinated effects to which the 
concentration could give rise. Pursuant to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, coordination may take 
various forms, including market division, for instance by customer characteristics.144 In this case, 
market division arrangements seem to have taken place. As opposed to the merging firms, Pro7 
would only market foreign-language programs in Germany and, according to the information 
available to the Commission at the time of the decision, it was not planning to engage in the 
a 145 The above analysis clearly illustrates that, if the Commission is willing 
to apply competition law in a pluralism-friendly manner, it can do so without necessarily deviating 
from an economics-based analysis.  
 
In recent years, the Commission has disassociated merger control from pluralism and cultural 
diversity considerations. Two examples of this arguably rigid application of competition law are 
NewsCorp/BSkyB and NBC/Comcast. 146  The former has already been extensively discussed in 
Chapter 3. 147  For our purposes here, it bears repeating that, in addition to the possible anti-
competitive effects it was likely to create,148 the proposed concentration also raised major pluralism 
concerns. More particularly, it was feared that, if the transaction were approved, it would give media 
entrepreneur, Rupert Murdoch, a dangerous level of control of the UK media.149 The Commission 
was limited to noting that relevant issues are for the UK authorities to address under Article 21(4)150 
of the Merger Regulation151 and decided to approve the concentration on the grounds that it did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 In an equally flexible and broad manner,  (a) are 
holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned; or (b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to 
rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom  
143 In cases concerning the application of the EU Merger Regulation to minority shareholdings of between 25.96% and 36.9% can 
confer de facto sole control o
voting and other rights in Pro7 
144 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 40 
145 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraph 65 
146 Commission decision Comcast/ NBC Universal, Case No COMP/M.5779 [2010] OJ C228/2 
147 See Part 3 
148 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 28 
149 See, Ofcom (2010). Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News 
Corporation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78516/OfcomPITReport_NewsCorp-
BSkyB_31DEC2010.pdf  
150 See Chapter 1, fn. 89 
151 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 309 
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raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. 152  In NBC/Comcast, the 
Commission was called upon to decide whether the creation of a joint venture by Comcast (a cable 
network operator which is also involved in the licensing of TV programming and TV channels to 
pay-TV operators and in the production of motion pictures and TV programs) and NBCU (a global 
media and entertainment company, active in the development, production, marketing and distribution 
of entertainment, news and information) is compatible with the common market.153 After a brief 
analysis of the structure of the affected markets, the Commission concluded that the notified 
operation would not have any significant impact as regards the availability of TV content and was 
therefore unlikely to harm cultural diversity. 154  The reasoning that led to this conclusion is 
problematic for three reasons: f
transaction should be approved because, as a result of the significant growth in the number of new 
TV channels across Europe, there has been an increase in the demand for new content. However, as 
was already seen above and in Chapter 2, an increase in the number of TV channels is neither an 
indication that the market is competitive (e.g. the channels may be owned by the same group) nor an 
that European TV program producers are strong competitors inter alia because, under the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive, broadcasters are required to reserve the majority of their 
broadcasting time for European works. The assumption that European TV program producers exert 
competitive constraints on their US counterparts due to the European works quota rule is unfounded. 
As explained in Chapter 1, from a cultural diversity perspective, this rule is ill-designed because it 
imposes no quality requirements.155 Third, the Commission refrains from considering the effects of 
the concentration on cultural diversity. The conclusion that the latter is not threatened as a result of 
the creation of the joint venture is derived from the finding that the transaction will not significantly 
impede effective competition.156 The Commission followed this approach in several other cases, 
including HBO/Ziggo,157 Bertelsmann/Planeta/Circulo158 and Bertelsmann/KKR.159 There have also 
been cases such as SFR/Télé 2160 and Unitymedia/LGE161 where no mention of cultural diversity is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Ibid., paragraph 310 
153 Ibid., paragraphs 2-6 
154 Ibid., paragraph 44 
155 ing 
 
156 Ibid., paragraphs 36 et seq.  
157 Commission decision HBO/ Ziggo/ HBO Nederland, Case No COMP/M.6369 [2012] OJ C 72/2, paragraph 53 
158 Commission decision Bertelsmann/Planeta/Circulo, Case COMP/M.5838 [2010] OJ C 228/3, see in particular, paragraphs 39, 49, 
57 and 59 
159 Commission decision Bertelsmann/KKR, Case COMP/M.5533 [2009] OJ C 240/01. See in particular paragraph 79 
160 Commission decision SFR/Télé 2, Case COMP M. 4504 [2007] OJ L 316/57 
161 Commission decision Liberty Global Europe/Unitymedia, Case COMP/M. 5734 [2010] OJ C36/1 
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made. Mere or no references to this value in the assessment of a merger affecting cultural industries 
renders Article 167(4) TFEU devoid of any mandatory effect.162 
 
The above analysis sufficiently proves that public policy considerations have, at best, played 
limited to no role in determining the outcome of a merger decision. The approach followed in 
NBC/Comcast, suggests that the Commission perceives cultural diversity as a spontaneous result 
delivered by the undistorted functioning of the markets, objectives whose realization depends on the 
outcome of market forces. In Newscorp/Telepiù, the interests of the consumers seem to have been 
taken into account as an exception to competition policy but the Commission abstained from 
conducting a detailed assessment to substantiate this finding and therefore the extent to which such 
interests determined the outcome of the decision is not quantifiable. Lately, the Commission seems 
eager to distance itself from the protection of objectives that it does not consider relevant to EU 
merger control, including media pluralism, the Newcorp/BSkyB decision being the most prominent 
example of this approach.  
 
4. 
merger control in a pluralism-friendly manner 
 
Moving from theory to practice, this section will examine how pluralism-specific 
considerations can be integrated into each step of the assessment of a merger affecting the 
broadcasting sector. I will use the example of a concentration involving two free-to-air broadcasters. 
However, as I will explain in more detail below, the suggestions made throughout this section are 
also appropriate for the assessment of mergers involving other players that provide content for free as 
well as for the assessment of mergers affecting markets that entail the exchange of content for 
money.  
 
4.1. Market definition in the assessment of mergers affecting FTA TV markets: What is 
 
 
As discussed above, in the case of a merger affecting free-to-air TV markets, the Commission 
is willing to identify the advertising markets affected by the transaction but not the relevant audience 
markets. The argument it puts forward to explain this approach is that, in the absence of a trade 
relationship between the broadcaster and the viewers, there is no market to define. This argument, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 The problems that arise from this approach have been examined in Chapter 3, Part 3 
  
	   	   163	  
say, is unconvincing on the grounds that 
allocated between broadcasters through competition. Hence, there is a market for audiences, which 
must be defined for the purposes of competition law for at least two reasons. First, content that 
advertisers regard as substitutable is not a proxy for content that viewers regard as substitutable. 
Second, FTA TV is a two-sided platform exhibiting indirect network effects that need to be defined 
and measured because the interdependence between the two demands exercises competitive 
constraints on the broadcaster that affect the outcome of the decision. In view of the above, the 
exercise of market definition should consist in identifying the effective alternative sources of supply 
for both the advertisers and the viewers.  
 
The fact that in the case of FTA TV there is no exchange of money, i.e. no benchmark price 
against which to apply the hypothetical price increase to run a traditional SSNIP test, is not a valid 
reason for refusing to 
instruments used to exercise merger control must be flexible enough to be able to grasp dimensions 
of competition that are relevant to the market under scrutiny. In its notice on the definition of the 
relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, the Commission itself notes that 
depending very much on the characteristics and specificity of the industry and 
products or services that are being examined. The same type of evidence may be of no importance 
163 As the example that follows will illustrate, if adjusted to the 
particulari
switching rates and how they affect competition. 
  
In the case of a traditional application of the SSNIP test, the first step would consist in 
examining how consumers would react to price increases. In our case, however, content is provided 
for free. We may overcome this barrier by asking what viewers would do if there was a change in 
quality rather than price.164 A widely accepted quality indicator in FTA TV that could be used to 
conduct the substitutability assessment is the amount of time devoted to the transmission of 
advertisements. The assumption that viewers dislike advertising has been verified by empirical 
studies.165 On this basis, it is possible to run a hypothetical monopolist test by considering the likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/3, 
paragraph 25   
164 Europe Economics (2002), supra n. 10, 88  
165 See, for instance, Wilbur, K. C. (2008). A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television Advertising and Viewing Markets. Marketing 
Science, 27 (3), 356-378, and Jeziorski, P. (2011). Merger enforcement in two-sided markets. Working Paper, John Hopkins 
University  
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effects of a small but significant increase in the number of advertising minutes per hour, keeping 
166 If this change leads viewers to watch more of the other 
available channels, this would imply that the broadcaster competes in a wider viewer market which 
includes these other channels. If this change, however, leads viewers to spend less time watching 
television, this would indicate that the hypothetical monopolist holds significant power in attracting 
viewers to its content.167  
 
method, and more particularly conjoint analysis, may lead to a more nearly complete assessment of 
the viewer-
respondents with hypothetical choices among different products, which are carefully made different 
on different aspects wh 168 It is in essence a SSNIP test that takes 
account of more than one dimension of competition. For example, in the case of ad markets, a 
conjoint analysis may ask advertisers which broadcaster they would prefer if they had to choose 
between two broadcasters that charge the same price but appeal to viewers with different 
demographic profiles and vice versa.169 
of time devoted to the transmission of advertisements, variables that may be used to conduct a 
conjoint analysis include content variety, the availability of programming, i.e. whether the 
broadcaster makes its programming available when the consumer wants to see it (e.g. through catch-
up TV or archive),170 and even the introduction of a subscription fee.171 
 
This market definition analysis would largely depend on data collected with consumer surveys. 
The Commission itself acknowledges that surveys on usage patterns and attitudes are an appropriate 
instrument to establish whether an economically significant proportion of consumers considers two 
products as substitutable172 and has relied on their results in merger investigations, but unfortunately, 
only on a few occasions.173  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Europe Economics (2002), supra n. 10, 89 
167 Ibid. 
168 Filistrucchi, L., Damien Geradin and Eric van Damme (2012). Identifying two-sided markets, 15. Discussion Paper, TILEC DP 
2012-008 
169 Ibid. 
170 Csorgo, L. and Ian Munro (2011). Market Definition Issues for Audio and Audio-Visual Distribution Products and Services in a 
Digital Environment, A Report Prepared for the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. Retrieved from: 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/rp110215.htm#_ftn7 Comparable parameters were used in Universal/EMI where the 
Commission based the assessment of whether recorded music in physical format is a substitute for recorded music in digital format on 
characteristics such as sound quality, usage restrictions and the art work (covers, booklets and lyrics). See Commission decision 
Universal Music Group/EMI Music, Case No. COMP/M.6458, [2012] OJ C 220/8, paragraph 127 
171 YouTube is introducing subscription fees for content without ads: http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/YouTube-will-start-
charging-to-see-music-videos-5706889.php 
172 See, for instance, Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
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The proposed method has several advantages. First, as opposed to qualitative techniques,174 a 
conjoint analysis would not simply define the nature of the indirect network effects between the 
viewers and the advertisers, but would further allow the Commission to measure their size, thus 
leading to a more accurate assessment of the competitive constraints exerted on the merging 
parties. 175  Moreover, consumer surveys may play a major role in informing the substitutability 
assessment in cases where econometric data such as diversion ratio estimates are not available.176 
Even in cases where econometric analyses were available,177 consumer surveys have proved useful 
for complementing or testing the validity of their results.178  
 
These consumer surveys can be conducted by the parties to the transaction or by the 
Commission itself. If the survey is conducted by the parties, the report should include detailed 
information about how the research was carried out.179 This would allow the Commission to check 
whether the parties committed errors or made choices that may have produced biased results. For 
example, in the case concerning the joint venture between BBC, Channel Four and ITV relating to 
the video on demand sector (Project Kangaroo), the results of the survey conducted by the parties 
were (correctly) not relied upon by the Competition Commission because, contrary to the small price 
increases logic underpinning the SSNIP test, consumers were asked what they would do if content 
prices increased by as much as 200%.180 If the Commission takes the initiative to commission its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
OJ C 372/3, paragraph, 41; Commission (EU) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, paragraph 29; DG Competition (2010). Best Practices for the 
Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases Concerning the Application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU and in 
Merger Cases. Staff Working Paper. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/best_practices_submission_en.pdf  
173 See, for instance, Commission decisions Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M. 4439 [2007] OJ C 10/6; KLM/Martinair, Case 
COMP/M. 5141 [2009] C 51/4; Pernod Ricard/V&S, Case COMP/M. 5114 OJ [2008] C 219/5; Lufthansa/SN Airholding, Case 
COMP/M. 5335 OJ [2009] C 295/8; Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M. 4439 [2007] OJ C 10/6 (the full text of the decision is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4439_20070627_20610_en.pdf) and 
Statoilhydro/Conocophilips, Case COMP/M. 4919 OJ [2009] C 201/06 (the full text of the decision is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4919_20081021_20600_en.pdf)  
174 Take the example of deductive reasoning which is premised on a logical assumption. In the case of advertising-financed TV, we 
would take for granted that viewers dislike advertising. This would be correct but we would be unable to draw any conclusions on the 
size of the network effects. For an overview of the qualitative methods that may be employed when defining two-sided markets see 
Filistrucchi, L. et al. (2012), supra n. 168, 12-15 
175 Ibid., 13-15 
176 See OECD (2011). Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis, The diversion ratio from product A to product B measures the 
advertising minutes per 
hour or any other negative change in quality 
177 This was, for instance, the case in Commission decisions Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M. 4439 [2007] OJ C 10/6. While the 
Commission found the econometric analysis useful, it also found it incomplete because 
competition between the merging parties, nor competition on factors other than price, such as frequencies, advertising or ancillary 
supra n. 176, 258 
178 DG Competition (2010), supra n. 172, paragraph 30 
179 Ibid., paragraph 39 
180 Competition Commission (2009). A report on the anticipated joint venture between BBC Worldwide Limited, Channel Four 
Television Corporation and ITV plc relating to the video on demand sector, The survey carried out by the parties was 
intended to inform our understanding of the substitutability of UK and non-UK content. However, in our view the results might 
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consumer survey, it would need to grasp the most relevant demand parameters prior to conducting 
the interviews. To this end, interested third parties, i.e. the consumers, should have a say in the 
questionnaire design and instruments of data collection.181 In the case of the viewers market, an 
interested third party which could help the Commission choose relevant variables or more generally 
provide useful information on consumption habits in the media markets affected by the merger is 
EURALVA, an alliance of national associations representing the interest of listeners and viewers of 
broadcasting.182 
 
This approach has certain drawbacks, most notably the possibility for a divergence between 
stated and real preferences;183 if what consumers say they prefer is different from what they actually 
prefer, the surveys, no matter how well designed, will produce inaccurate findings. This obstacle, 
erences 
184 
it would be necessary to collect data on advertising rates, the quantity of advertising slots and the 
demographic profile of the viewers to which a broadcaster appeals.185 
measure the volume of consumption (minutes of watching TV), reach (the percentage of people who 
are exposed to a broadcaster in a given period of time), the amount of time the broadcaster in 
question devotes to advertising, and multi-sourcing (the average number of broadcasters that viewers 
used in a given period of time).186 In each Member State there is at least one company (e.g. Nielsen, 
GfK, TNS, etc.) providing audience measurement services and, in most cases, broadcasters have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
r likely responses to relatively large increases in the price of 
UK TV archive content relative to other options. They were asked how they would respond if UK TV archive content, instead of being 
free, cost £0.50, and how they would respond if prices increased from £0.50 to £1.50, while the price of other options (such as non-UK 
TV content) was variously free or cost £0.50. This makes it difficult to interpret the results of the survey within the context of the 
SSNIP test, which is based on proportionately 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141250/http://competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-inquiry/rep_pub/reports/2009/fulltext/543 See also OFT (2008). 
Completed acquisition by Global Radio UK Limited of GCap Media plc, paragraph 201 
181 The Commission itself notes in its Staff Working Document (SWD) on Best Practices for the submission of economic evidence in 
competition cases that, if it decides to run a survey, it is appropriate to consult interested third parties. See DG Competition (2010), 
supra n st 
practices on the conduct of merger control proceedings explicitly refers to consumer associations as third persons whose views the 
Commission welcomes throughout a merger investigation. See DG Competition (2004). Best practices on the conduct of merger 
control proceedings, paragraph 34, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/proceedings.pdf The legal basis is 
Article 16(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 the implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings OJ [2004] L 133/1. 
182 http://www.euralva.org/wordpress/  
183 Camesasca, P.D., Maarten Meulenbelt, Thomas Chellingsworth, Ief Daems and Julie Vandenbuccche (2009). The Dutch Yellow 
Pages Merger Case 2-1 Will Go! European Competition Law Review 30(1), 7 referring to Louviere, J.J., D.A. Hensher and J.D. 
Swait (2000). Stated choice methods: Analysis and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
184 Filistrucchi, L. et al. (2012), supra n. 168, 17 
185 Ibid.  
186 Ofcom (2012). Measuring media plurality, 19-20 
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access to (their own and -related data. Under Article 11(1) of 
the Merger Regulation, the Commission may, by simple request or decision, obtain the above data 
fit.187  
 
While one may argue that the Commission has only ninety working days to decide whether or 
not to approve a merger,188 the methodology applied to the prohibition decision concerning the 
proposed acquisition of sole control by Ryanair of Aer Lingus clearly shows that the proposed 
analysis is not only defensible in theory but also workable in practice. To assess demand-side 
substitutability, the Commission conducted consumer surveys at Dublin airport. Where data 
regarding distances and travelling times derived from the responses to the questionnaire were 
incomplete or manifestly questionable, the Commission obtained the information it needed from 
websites providing mapping and route planning services.189 The Commission also took into account 
course of the investigation, after comparing them against the results of reports such authorities made 
independently of the proposed transaction.190 The Commission complemented its analysis with other 
data, including the estimated proportion of leisure passengers on a route, the impact of the regulatory 
correlation analysis it conducted during the investigation.191 
 
One might ask whether the proposed method can really make a difference. The answer is yes, a 
big one. The approach the Commission followed in Newscorp/BSkyB illustrates why its lack of 
incomplete market definitions that may ultimately affect the outcome of the decision. For example, in 
this case, the Commission avoided defining the market for audiences, implicitly assuming that 
viewers are indifferent to advertising. 192   mean 
accepting that a broadcaster may raise ad prices and/or increase the advertising/content ratio without 
worrying about viewers switching to another provider. However, as previously mentioned, empirical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See also DG Competition (2004), supra n. 181, paragraphs 26-28  
188 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation) OJ L 24/1OJ L 24/1, Article 10(3)  
189 Commission decision Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M. 4439 [2007] OJ C 10/6, paragraph 99(1) 
190 Ibid., at (3) 
191 Ibid., at (4)-(8) 
192 Filistrucchi, L. et al. (2012), supra n. 168 fn. 54 
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studies have found that demand for advertising affects demand for content because audiences dislike 
advertising.193  
 
In Newscorp/BSkyB, the Commission also found that the market for the provision of 
broadcasting services to end-users in the UK and Ireland encompasses all technical means of 
distribution, including satellite, DTT and IPTV.194 It based this finding on the replies given by 
content distributors, not viewers.195 However, in its report on the same transaction, Ofcom found that 
IPTV was not (and is unlikely to become in the near future), a traditional 
conclusion was based on TV content viewing habits.196   
 
Failure to take account of what type of content audiences regard as interchangeable may also 
lead to the definition of the relevant product market in a broad manner, thus making it less likely to 
find that the merger will adversely affect competition. For example, in Newscorp/BSkyB, the 
Commission made a distinction between the market for sports events, the market for premium films 
and the market for other TV content without, how
197 It simply referred to documentaries and TV series as examples of the types of content 
covered by that category.198 Unsurprisingly, the Commission found that neither News Corporation 
nor BSkyB were holding significant market power in the markets for sale and acquisition of other TV 
content respectively.199 However, in its report on Project Kangaroo, the Competition Commission, 
largely based on consumer survey results, concluded that the market for TV content was further sub-
divided into different markets on the basis of form, availability, origin and genre as follows:  
(a) Short form vs long form. Short-form video includes clips from longer videos or short video 
clips uploaded by users (user-generated content). Long-form content refers to full-length 
material. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Wilbur, K. C. (2008), supra n. 165 
194 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, see paragraphs 100 et seq. 
195 Ibid., paragraph 104 
196  Ofcom (2010). Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News 
Corporation, paragraph A2.267. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78516/OfcomPITReport_NewsCorp-
BSkyB_31DEC2010.pdf Another report reaching the same conclusion is Ofcom (2012). Securing long term benefits from scarce low 
frequency spectrum, 6. Retrieved from: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/uhf-
strategy/statement/UHF_statement.pdf  
197 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 30 
198 Ibid. 
199 For a detailed discussion of the approach to market definition the Commission followed in this case and its implications for 
competition and media pluralism see Chapter 3, Part 4,  
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(b) Catch-up vs archive. Catch-up content is made available soon after it is first broadcast on 
linear TV (generally within hours and for up to 30 days). Archive content is content that is no 
longer available within the catch-up window. 
(c) Content of UK origin vs content of non-UK, primarily US, origin  
(d) Genre (including drama, entertainment, comedy, sport, news, etc.) .200 
It bears noting that, while in several decisions the Commission has considered sub-dividing the 
market201 in a way similar to the above, it has meticulously left open the question of whether the 
market for TV content should be further segmented.202  
 
The above analysis convincingly demonstrates that the Commission can and must define the 
imperative because, with the advent of digital media, public broadcasters are increasingly getting 
involved in projects aiming to deliver free content on new distribution platforms. For example, in the 
UK, BBC Worldwide partnered with inter alia ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 and created a digital 
terrestrial TV/on-demand platform called YouView. 203  The platform is free-to-air and offers 
broadcasting content (channels and VOD) separately either on the main YouView guide, which does 
not carry advertising, 204  or through personal portal sites. 205  A similar platform involving public 
broadcasters ARD and ZDF was also envisaged by German operators. 206 As hybrid distribution 
platforms constantly emerge, the Commission may soon be called upon to clear a transaction in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Competition Commission (2009), supra n. 180, paragraph 2.6. For more details see paragraphs 4.15 et seq. Similar remarks can be 
made about the different approaches followed by the European Commission and the Conseil de la Concurrence concerning the French 
broadcasting market. See Commission decision of 3 March 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, Case 
No IV/36.237 [1999] OJ L 90/6, paragraphs 34-36 (the Commission refrained from delineating the boundaries of the market for the 
acquisition of sports and film rights) and compare against Décision n° 98-D-70 du 24 novembre 1998 relative à la saisine des sociétés 
Multivision et Télévision Par Satellite (TPS) dans le secteur des droits de diffusion audiovisuelle (see p. 17) where the Conseil de la 
Concurrence, based on a study submitted by the ) on film consumption that concluded that the 
offer of American films does not fulfill the needs of French audience, divided the market into two segments, namely the market for 
French films and the market for American films  
201 See, for instance, News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 63 where it considers dividing the market 
for films in a market for US-produced films and a market for European films, and Commission decision TPS, Case No COMP/JV.57 
[2002] OJ C 137/23, paragraph 16 where it considered whether the market for pay-TV channels should be further segmented by 
thematic content (such as premium, sports, movies, news, youth channels, etc.) 
202  See Commission News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 66; Commission decision News 
Corp/Premiere, Case No COMP/M.5121 [2008] OJ C 219/4, paragraph 35, and Commission decision TPS, Case No COMP/JV.57, 
[2002] OJ C 137/23, paragraph 16 
203 http://www.youview.com/  
204  McCabe, M. YouView will encourage competition, says chief. 16 September 2010, MediaWeek. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mediaweek.co.uk/article/1028931/youview-will-encourage-competition-says-chief  
205 Bania, K. and Richard Burnley (2014). Co-operation between broadcasters in the new media age: Rethinking national competition 
policy. European Competition Law Review 35(5), 220 
206 However, the transaction failed to get regulatory approval by the German competition authority, Bundeskartellamt. For more 
information on this project see, for instance, Krieger, J. ARD and ZDF establish VOD portal. 25 April 2012, RapidTVNews. Retrieved 
from: http://www.rapidtvnews.com/index.php/2012042521488/ard-and-zdf-establish-german-vod-portal.html; Briel, R. (2012), supra 
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which broadcasters, entirely or partly financed through license fees, participate. In this case, an 
examination of whether the new platform will have the ability and incentive to raise advertising 
prices post-merger can hardly produce accurate conclusions on whether the platform will indeed have 
the power to distort competition. But the suggestions made above are by no means limited to the 
b -based. Hence, 
if properly adapted to the particularities of each case,207 the proposed approach to market definition 
may be used in competition cases involving undertakings that provide free content in exchange for 
attention, including online search engines such as Google and Bing, news aggregators such as Feedly 
and Google News, social networking sites like Facebook and LinkedIn, etc.  
 
The proposed methods may (and, arguably, should) also be used in cases of two-sided markets 
where audiences are required to pay to access the platform. For example, in mergers affecting the 
pay-TV markets, the Commission has referred to the level of subscriptions that viewers are willing to 
pay as a key parameter to define the markets affected by the merger. 208  However, pay-TV 
programming is sold in bundles of several channels and, as a result, audiences are not able to indicate 
their preferences for a particular channel or for a specific program provided by that channel.209 This 
criterion leads to a substitutability analysis that has the main drawback of market definition in FTA 
TV markets, that is, a focus on ad prices casts 
interests into account as suggested above would address this problem.210 
 
4.2. Competitive assessment: How can the effects on content diversity and quality be 
measured?  
 
In Part 3, I mentioned that the Commission refrained from discussing the likely adverse effects 
of a concentration on content diversity and quality. I also demonstrated why its assumption that 
supply diversity will deliver varied and high-value content is ill-founded. In this section, I attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 For example, in the case of search engines, variables to conduct a conjoint analysis could be the amount of ads displayed alongside 
the search results, the relevance of the search results and the introduction of a subscription fee to use the search engine. In the case of 
free newspapers, it may be that readers are indifferent to advertising because they can easily avoid it. In this case, we may ignore the 
two-
increase advertising prices. See Filistrucchi, L. et al. (2012), supra n. 168, 13 
208 See supra n. 6 
209 Goodman, E. (2004), supra n. 16, 1426 
210 -
TV markets. However, it largely refrained from conducting a detailed analysis of the factors that shape the provision of pay-TV 
Newscorp/BSkyB and SFR/Tele2, it based the assessment on replies given by 
distributors (the platforms carrying the content) and TV channel suppliers, not the subscribers themselves. See Commission decision 
Newscorp/BSkyB, Case COMP/5932 [2011] OJ C 37/02, paragraph 46, fn. 35 and Commission decision SFR/Télé 2 France, Case 
COMP/M.4504 [2007] OJ L 316/57, paragraphs 98-104 respectively  
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show how theory and practice can guide the Commission in incorporating related considerations into 
its merger decisions in the broadcasting industry.  
 
The argument that the impact of a concentration on content diversity should not be 
marginalized is not democracy rhetoric. In Chapter 3 it was extensively discussed that competition in 
media markets has several non-price dimensions, including variety and quality. 211  Naturally, 
assessing whether a merger will have adverse effects on non-price competition is a question of fact 
that cannot be determined in the abstract. However, developing a framework within which this 
assessment can be conducted is far from an impossible task. For example, the question of whether a 
merger is likely to reduce content diversity can be answered by reference to the importance of fixed 
costs. The higher these costs are, the more the new entity will be incentivized to provide the same 
content over all its constituent parts.212 For instance, provided that both of them continue to exist 
post-merger, two broadcasters attracting viewers with the same demographic profiles can be expected 
to depend on the same content (e.g. a successful TV series) or the same content provider (e.g. a news 
agency) to generate audiences. This assumption is based on sector-specific economics; we have 
already seen that in media markets in general and in broadcasting markets in particular content 
creation (or acquisition) is very expensive but distribution fairly cheap. In their attempt to rationalize 
resources, the broadcasters are highly likely to seize the opportunity to exploit large economies of 
scale. Content diversity reductions may also be linked to the incentive to preempt entry into the 
market.213 This incentive is particularly strong in the case of new media markets because they involve 
significant network effects, thus being vulnerable to tipping in favor of the first-mover.214  Pre-
emption becomes easier in cases where the merging parties control access to a valuable input such as 
premium content. As seen above, the Commission partly based its early prohibition decisions dealing 
with mergers affecting the then nascent pay-TV market on this concern,215 and rightly so. Market 
data needed to conduct an analysis, as suggested above, are not difficult to collect from the merging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See Chapter 3, Part 4 
212 OECD (2003), supra n. 31, 44 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., 40 
215 experience in other countries shows that pay-TV suppliers or cable 
network operators are the most likely suppliers of technical and administrative services for pay- -
TV so far, Bertelsmann/Kirch already have, through Premiere, a subscriber base which they can also use in future digital pay-TV. The 
parties object in this respect that Premiere's subscriber base would not be sufficient to ensure a pay-back on the investment in MSG. 
This may be true. However, the risk of investment in a digital infrastructure is significantly reduced if the service provider can build on 
a subscriber base of analog pay-TV customers. Each competitor of MSG would have to build on a subscriber base which the pay-TV 
suppliers handled by them would have to first acquire. Competitors of Bertelsmann/Kirch on the market for pay-TV would, in contrast 
to the parent companies of Premiere, have to start from scratch. The same applies to potential competitors of MSG in the area of 
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parties, their competitors, other interested third parties (e.g. companies operating upstream such as 
news wholesalers), and publicly available sources.   
 
As regards quality, one may argue that this depends on the idiosyncrasy of each viewer and 
that, as a result, no meaningful analysis of the quality of the content offered or the provider itself can 
take place in a merger decision. Indeed, quality is a subjective variable. However, subjective does not 
mean immeasurable. The approach followed in the prohibition decision concerning the proposed 
acquisition of sole control by Ryanair of Aer Lingus is a good example illustrating how related 
considerations can inform a competition analysis. Based on the results of the consumer survey 
conducted at Dublin airport, the Commission decided to ban the transaction inter alia because the 
216 Similar to Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the Commission 
can integrate degradation of quality into the theory of harm with reference to parameters to which 
viewers, not the merging parties or their competitors, attach particular importance.  
 
Another example exemplifying an economics-based approach that seeks to understand the 
impact of a concentration on non-price competition is Universal/EMI, where the Commission found 
that the notified transaction would adversely affect the development of emerging online platforms 
and their ability to geographically expand into various digital markets, ultimately depriving EU 
consumers of innovative services.217 This was likely to materialize, the Commission said, because the 
concentration would grant the merged entity the ability and incentive to extract more onerous 
licensing terms from these platforms. The link between an entity that may leverage its combined size 
in relation to its customers/platforms that bring new ways to consume music and the potential harm 
to innovation is rather straightforward. What deserves a closer look is the approach the Commission 
followed to determine whether the entity would, as a result of the merger, acquire the power to 
engage in exploitative practices that could produce this negative effect. In the event, the Commission 
conducted an econometric analysis which used the retail revenue share as the measure of each 
.218 To control for repertoire quality, the 
Commission took account of variables such as the chart position of each track, age (months since first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Commission decision Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M. 4439 [2007] OJ C 10/6, paragraph 497. For the role that quality aspects 
played et seq. 
217 Commission decision Universal Music Group/EMI Music, Case No. COMP/M.6458 [2012] OJ C 220/8, paragraph 636 
218 Ibid., Summary of the Economic Analysis, paragraph 20 
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scale) and the proportion of hits (top fifty 219 Using the above 
method, the Commission found that the proposed transaction would increase by 10-
share and that, due to the resulting increase in its product line, the entity would likely be able to 
impose disadvantageous commercial conditions to its digital customers.220  
 
The Commission may conduct an analysis similar to the one in Universal/EMI in order to 
check whether a merger between two broadcasters would grant the merged entity the ability and 
incentive to extract better terms and conditions from independent TV content producers. Qualitative 
suggested by the Copé Commission, a committee of experts appointed by the French government to 
examine the role that public television should play in the digital era. These criteria comprise 
long-time period, and measurement of the usage rate (percentage of persons having accessed at least 
once a program offered by the broadcaster on a given period).221 Depending on the resulting increase 
result of the merger, the entity may exert significant bargaining power vis-à-vis production 
companies to which it is not structurally linked, thus potentially depriving viewers of original 
content.  
 
The above analysis inevitably gives rise to the following question: if the Commission found 
that the merger could have a negative impact on diversity or quality, would that be a good enough 
reason to prohibit (or attach conditions to) the merger concerned? The answer to this question 
depends on several parameters. But, if the need to conduct a balancing exercise indeed arises, there is 
no a priori reason why price reductions should prevail over diversity reductions. Consider again a 
merger between two FTA broadcasters. Post-merger, the broadcasters will be less restrained than 
before in increasing the advertising/content ratio (bad for quality). An increase in that ratio would 
lead to an increased supply of advertising space and a possible ad price reduction (good for price 
competition). 222  The likely positive effects on price competition should be carefully considered 
against the overall market structure (i.e., concentration levels) and the popularity of the merged 
entity. Moreover, the possible ad price reduction is subject to the condition that both broadcasters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Ibid., paragraph 46, at p. 328 
220 Ibid., paragraph 614 
221 Commission pour la nouvelle télévision publique (2008). Rapport Présenté au Président de la République par Jean-François Copé 
le 25 juin 2008, 15. Retrieved from: http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/dossiers/Rapport_Cope/rapport_commission.pdf  
222 OECD (2003), supra n. 31, 25 
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will continue to operate post-merger. For example, if the acquiring entity plans to shut down the 
acquired outlet to eliminate competition or if the parties intend to merge their broadcasting operations 
(as was, for instance, the case with Stream and Telepiù in Newscorp/Telepiù) no ad space increase 
and hence no ad price reduction can be expected. If both broadcasters remain active post-merger, and 
assuming that ad prices may decrease, the final effect would depend on whether the merger could 
result in an increase in the prices of advertised products.223 
 
4.3. Structural and behavioral commitments: Designing remedies that protect supply 
and content diversity 
 
As already seen in Part 3, one of the most common remedies imposed on undertakings involved 
in transactions affecting the broadcasting sector has been the obligation to sublicense premium 
content. Following the analysis of how these mechanisms were designed and implemented, I reached 
the conclusion that they did not manage to ensure that competition (and pluralism) would not be 
adversely affected post-merger. I shall now demonstrate that this conclusion is equally valid for other 
commitments the Commission has occasionally accepted and make some proposals to address their 
lacunae.  
 
Structural remedies alone may not address foreclosure or ownership concentration concerns in 
the case of a merger involving a vertically integrated undertaking. 224  
other competi 225 Even if it does, 
an ill-designed obligation to behave in a certain way in that other market is unlikely to resolve the 
issue. For example, as already seen, in Newscorp/Telepiù, Telepiù undertook to divest its digital 
terrestrial broadcasting assets and not to enter into any further digital terrestrial television activities, 
neither as network nor as retail operator.226 However, the merged entity was not prevented from 
controlling the market for the acquisition of premium content in all distribution platforms, including 
DTT, as a wholesaler.227 As we have already seen, the wholesale offer mechanism has created several 
hurdles.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Ibid. 
224 Note that the vast majority of concentrations notified to the Commission that affect the broadcasting markets involve companies 
that are active on several levels of the supply chain 
225 European Commission (2005). Merger Remedies Study, 23. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf  
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Related to the above, a duty to divest assets in a market where there is no overlap between the 
merging parties is only partly appropriate to eliminate concerns over market foreclosure. In 
Newscorp/Telepiù, both Stream and Telepiù operated as pay-TV broadcasters via DTH, but only 
Telepiù broadcast on DTT.228 There may have been a good reason why Telepiù was asked to sell its 
control on a lasting basis, but there was no structural remedy concerning the satellite platform, which 
the merged entity would clearly control post-merger. Instead of divestiture, the Commission accepted 
-oriented non-discriminatory 
formula based on directly attributable costs of the services, a share of relevant technical costs (fixed 
229 This loosely defined 
obligation led to Sky Italia imposing onerous access conditions. More particularly, absent any 
specifications on be
parties would accrue from using the platform.230 centage of the 
revenue generated from the sale of subscriptions or, in the case of pay-per-view, events.231 This 
method raised two concerns: first, it established a causal link between the wholesale price charged by 
Sky and the retail price charged by competitors. In other words, it made the wholesale price 
dependent on the type of content transmitted, not on the effective use of the platform.232 Second, it 
required third parties to provide Sky with sales volumes data, i.e. commercially sensitive 
information.233 
that the wholesale price would reflect the cost Sky would bear in the daily management of the 
platform.  
 
Furthermore, even when certain aspects of an access mechanism are sufficiently precise or 
unambiguous, this does not mean that the merged entity will not breach the commitments it made to 
the Commission with a view to granting preferential treatment to its own subsidiaries. In the above 
example, in clear violation of the obligation established in the decision, 234  Sky refrained from 
implementing and maintaining accounting separation between its broadcasting, retail distribution and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Ibid., paragraphs 8 and 9 
229 Ibid., paragraph 225(h) 
230 AGCom (2010). A407- CONTO TV/SKY ITALIA, Provvedimento n. 21316, paragraph 8. See also Delibera n. 233/09/CONS, 
paragraphs 24 et seq. 
231 AGCom (2010), A407- CONTO TV/SKY ITALIA, Provvedimento n. 21316, paragraph 8 
232 Ibid., paragraph 21 
233 Ibid., paragraph 22 
234 Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, Commitments Section, paragraph 10.6 
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platform operations,235 ength 
principle. AGCom had to intervene again to ensure that Sky complied with accounting separation-
transparency obligations.236  
 
concludes that remedies aiming to grant access to IPRs or know-how have deterred rather than 
.237 In its report concerning the wholesale 
premium content packages supplied by Sky in the UK, Ofcom made similar remarks.238  
 
In light of the above, we may draw the following conclusions: with respect to behavioral 
commitments, theory says and experience shows that they do not reduce the incentive to act anti-
competitively. This means that access remedies must be described in as much detail as possible to 
-merger. For example, in the case of 
wholesale must-offer regimes, the pricing method applied by the incumbent should be clearly defined 
and assessed prior to merger clearance.239 As for the scope of the sublicensing mechanism, this 
should be determined by reference to the type of content (e.g. major sports competitions, Hollywood 
first-run movies, etc.) rather than channels. We have already seen that in Newscorp/Telepiù the 
concluding a series of exclusive agreements with these channels,240 thus making them unavailable to 
other pay-TV operators, including operators active on platforms into which Sky was not planning to 
expand. In France and Spain, inclusion of channels in the sublicensing scheme led to the merged 
entity reducing the investment in those channels, thereby making them less attractive to 
competitors.241 Finally, it bears noting that the EU merger control toolbox provides the Commission 
with two apparatuses that could be used to improve the effectiveness of access remedies. First, if the 
parties fail to act in accordance with the commitments they made to get the merger cleared, the 
Commission may impose fines.242 -going 
for a number of years and for which not all contingencies can be predicted at the time of the adoption 
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236 Ibid. 
237 European Commission (2005), supra n. 225, 118  
238  Ofcom (2010). Competition issues in premium pay-TV movies, p. 61, paragraph 6.26. Retrieved from: 
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have failed to achieve their objective.243 These two possibilities have largely been ignored to date.   
 
As already seen, access to premium content remedies do not guarantee that content diversity 
will not be adversely affected post-merger. Hence, if, following the approach proposed above, the 
Commission finds that a concentration is likely to have a negative impact on non-price competition, 
other undertakings should be preferred in order to alleviate concerns arising from diversity 
reductions. Establishing behavioral obligations with a view to preserving competition in the content 
market is not as inconceivable as one might think. For example, in Canal+/TPS, in order to ensure 
that the quality of certain channels carried by the merging parties would not be reduced post-merger, 
the Conseil de la Concurrence imposed on the merging firms the obligation to broadcast 50% of these 
tal transmission time films that were not available on another channel.244 In the case of 
vertical mergers or mergers involving firms that are already vertically integrated, the entity should be 
required to acquire content from producers that have no structural links to the merging parties. The 
flipside of the remedy proposed in Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram could be an option here. As mentioned 
above, to get the merger approved, Vivendi undertook not to grant Canal+ the first-window rights 
covering more than 50% of the production of Universal Studios,245 implying that Universal would 
need to conclude acquisition agreements with other content providers for the remaining 50% of first-
window rights. I have already demonstrated that this type of remedy may be ineffective because the 
obligation to sell does not guarantee acquisition by other firms. In fact, the parties to the transaction 
for all or part of the balance of Univ 246 A duty to acquire content from 
independent producers would address the concerns identified above; it would limit the ability to close 
competitors in the downstream market and result in the distribution of content that would not 
necessarily carry the editorial stamp of the merging parties.    
 
With respect to the design of structural remedies, the most important issue consists in what 
should be divested. Structural remedies must first and foremost concern assets that the parties own in 
the market where there is substantial overlap.247  Moreover, the divested activities must consist of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 802/2004, paragraph 74 
244 Ofcom (2009), supra n. 102, 21 
245 Commission Decision Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, Case COMP/M. 2050 [2000] C 311/03, at p. 20  
246 Ibid.  
247 
European Commission (2005), p. 38, paragraph 34 noting that overlap divestiture remedies 
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viable businesses
operated by a suitable purchaser, can compete effectively with the merged entity on a lasting basis. 
This should be borne in mind if the merger is likely to affect the market for news provision. Even if 
-making 
entities owned by broader, profitable media companies, so there is no guarantee that the loss-making 
248 If substantial overlap is found 
in the market for news provision and the entity is not likely to find a credible purchaser, the proposal 
that was made in the assessment of the Newscorp/BSkyB merger investigation by the UK authorities 
can be considered here. In brief, the proposal was that Sky News would start to operate as an 
independent public limited company. Its shares would be distributed amongst the existing 
shareholders of Sky in line with their existing shareholdings. As a result, post-merger, Sky N
structure would remain as if the concentration had not happened.249 While this remedy would not 
result in the acquisition of the outlet by a provider that is not linked to the merged entity, it would at 
least not lead to a more concentrated market for news provision post-merger.  
 
 5. Conclusions  
 
The objective of this Chapter was to examine the role that EU merger control has played/may 
play in ensuring that significant (market and opinion-forming) power is not concentrated in only a 
handful of traditional media owners. For that purpose, I examined the reasoning the Commission 
developed in merger decisions in the broadcasting sector. Some decisions were adopted several years 
ago and this has allowed me to assess the impact of a number of decisions on the affected markets. 
After identifying the drawbacks of the relevant decisional practice, I inquired whether the applicable 
legal framework may be interpreted and applied in a way that leads to a more complete assessment of 
the effects of a concentration on competition post-merger and explored to what extent my proposed 
approach might also benefit pluralism. In light of the results of the study of these cases and, based on 
the theoretical framework I developed throughout this Chapter and Chapters 2 and 3, the following 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248   (2012), 12. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/responses/bbc.pdf  
249 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2011). Notice on consultation on the proposed acquisition by News Corporation of up to 
60.9% of British Broadcasting Group Plc-Undertakings given by News Corporation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (Protection of Legitimate Interests) Order 2003, 2 
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viewers and advertisers interact with each other will allow the Commission to accurately measure the 
competitive constraints exerted on the merged entity. However, the proposed approach to market 
definition, which is largely based on consumer surveys, will also allow viewers to explain what their 
preferences are. From a pluralism perspective, this is a step forward because content appealing to 
advertisers, i.e. content that can attract large audiences and promote materialism, is not representative 
the amount and type of content audiences access and/or would like to engage with, is taken into 
account. Moreover, because there is a direct link between market definition and the theory of harm 
that is formulated in assessing possible anti-competitive behavior post-merger, defining the markets 
by reference to the content viewers regard as substitutable leaves room for considering the impact of 
the merger on more niche programming, thereby potentially leading to a more content diversity-
friendly outcome. Content diversity may also be enhanced if the Commission abandons the 
assumption that supply diversity will guarantee a broad range of programming to choose from and 
accepts that the parameters of non-price competition in media markets are equally, if not more, 
important than price competition. Finally, with respect to remedies, the problems that have arisen in 
the implementation of must-offer mechanisms, such as loosely constructed pricing methods or 
inadequate definitions of the term premium content , may provide guidance in the design of similar 
schemes in the future with a view to avoiding opportunistic interpretations on the part of the merged 
entity that will attempt to game the commitments to its advantage. However, I have expressed strong 
doubts about the effectiveness of behavioral remedies that seek to ensure access to infrastructure or 
attractive content. If properly designed, structural remedies are far more appropriate to address both 
competition and pluralism concerns. From a competition perspective, compared against access 
Study, which analyzed forty decisions adopted in the five year period 1996-2000,250 found that, in the 
cases where structural remedies were imposed on the 
businesses were still operating and therefore exercising some degree of competitive constraint on the 
251 Structural commitments are also more appropriate to protect pluralism because the 
sale of the divested business to a provider that is not structurally linked to the merged entity reduces 
the -forming power, thereby safeguarding supply diversity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 European Commission (2005), supra n. 225, 11 
251 Ibid., 128 
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Chapter 5  Antitrust control in print and digital publishing 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The previous Chapter dealt with mergers and acquisitions in the broadcasting sector. It was 
seen that, due to the significant economies of scale and scope broadcasters can achieve by integrating 
with other firms that operate at the same or at different levels of the supply chain, mergers and 
acquisitions have been a rather common business strategy in television. Consolidation has not had the 
same appeal to newspaper and book publishers; in the publishing industry, two popular business 
strategies have been Resale Price Maintenance (hereinafter RPM) governing trade in print titles and, 
more recently, RPM-based agency governing trade in digital publications. The connecting thread 
remains the application of EU competition law to media undertakings that are in control of an asset or 
parameter that may somehow affect competition in the markets concerned. But, while in television 
this is control of the acquired entity, in the case of books and newspapers it is control over price.    
 
RPM in publishing refers to an arrangement whereby the publisher sets the retail prices of the 
titles it produces and the retailer is not permitted to offer discounts or any other forms of promotion 
unless the publisher explicitly grants its authorization. RPM is a very controversial issue from both a 
competition and a media pluralism perspective. Conflicting views on the pros and cons of this pricing 
model pull in many different directions. For example, as regards competition, opponents maintain 
that the ban on price competition eliminates the incentive for dynamic efficiencies whereas 
proponents argue that the protected profit margin encourages market entry. With respect to media 
pluralism, opponents say that the ban on price competition deprives readers of the ability to buy 
publications at lower prices and proponents claim that the protected profit margin protects and 
promotes supply and content diversity. Empirical research dealing with the impact of RPM on either 
competition or media pluralism is scarce, which is why we are still in limbo over the effects fixed 
prices may generate.  
 
The picture is equally complex when we discuss the legal aspects of RPM as a business model 
employed to sell content. In some Member States, laws establishing an exemption from the general 
competition rules apply on the grounds that fixed prices help advance pluralism in print publishing.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for instance, the Spanish Ley 10/2007, de 22 de junio, de la lectura, del libro y de las bibliotecas Publicado en BOE núm. 150 
de La regulación sobre la comercialización del libro y publicaciones afines parte de la convicción de 
que se ofrece un producto que es más que una mera mercancía: se trata de un soporte físico que contiene la plasmación del 
pensamiento humano, la ciencia y la creación literaria, posibilitando ese acto trascendental y único para la especie humana, que es la 
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At EU level and in Member States where no RPM laws apply, agreements establishing fixed prices 
are presumed to be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU (or the national equivalent), but it is generally 
accepted that the parties may put forward efficiencies under Article 101(3) TFEU (or the national 
equivalent). Naturally, this has created a legal patchwork. For example, in Germany, news publishers 
fixing the retail prices of their titles benefit from a derogation from the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition 2  whereas in the Netherlands they enjoy no such privilege. 3  National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) and the EU institutions have approached this issue in different ways. For 
example, the Dutch 4  and Irish 5  NCAs have dismantled the respective national RPM systems 
governing trade in newspapers whereas in the UK the scheme has been treated favorably.6 At the EU 
level, the Commission has been permissive towards RPM for newspapers7 whereas it appears to have 
taken a strict stance on RPM for books.8 The Court has been sympathetic to RPM arrangements by 
reason of both the contribution newspaper publishing can make to media pluralism9 and the role of 
books in protecting cultural unity between linguistically homogeneous areas.10 This legal patchwork 
is not a problem because it leads to opposing outcomes across the EU. It is a problem because, as 
already mentioned, there is not enough evidence (including and especially studies dealing with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lectura. La difusión de esas creaciones, su valor cultural y su pluralidad requieren una cierta garantía tanto en el control de calidad 
del texto como en su comercialización para que puedan ser accesibles al mayor número de potenciales lectores
For the Member States where RPM laws for books still apply see Joint Research Center (2012a). Technical Report on 
Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and Content Industries: The Book Publishing Industry, fn. 198. 
Retrieved from: http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC76642.pdf Note, however, that in Greece this law was recently abolished. On the 
generalized adoption of fixed prices for newspapers see, for instance, Kjolby, H. (2008). Denmark, 145-178. In Yamey, B. S. (ed.) 
Resale Price Maintenance. A Comparative American-European Perspective (3rd Edition), 157. New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 
and OECD (1997). Policy Roundtable on Resale Price Maintenance 
2 Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version published on 15 July 2005 (Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) I, page 
2114; 2009 I page 3850), as last amended by Article 3 of the Act of 26 July 2011 (Federal Law Gazette I, page 1554), paragraph 30. 
Retrieved from: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html  
3 Netherlands Competition Authority (1999). NMa and DTe Annual Report, 59  
4 Ibid. 
5  Irish Competition Authority (2003, December). Newspapers to amend business practices considered anti-competitive by The 
Competition Authority. Retrieved from: http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2003-12-
13%20News%20Release%20(Newspapers).pdf The decisions relating to this case are available at: http://www.tca.ie/EN/News--
Publications/News-Releases/Newspapers-to-amend-business-practices-considered-anticompetitive-by-The-Competition-
Authority.aspx  
6 Office of Fair Trading (2008a). Newspaper and magazine distribution-Opinion of the Office of Fair Trading - guidance to facilitate 
self-assessment under the Competition Act 1998 
7 Commission Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Regulation No 17 concerning Agence et Messageries de la Presse, Case IV/31.609 
[1987] OJ C 164/02 
8 See Commission decision 82/123/EEC of 25 November 1981 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428-
VBBB/VBVB) [1982] OJ L 52/36, and Commission decision of 12 December 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty (IV/27.393 and IV/27.394, Publishers Association - Net Book Agreements) [1989] OJ L22/12 
9 ECJ, Case 243/83, SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la presse [1985] ECR 2015 
10 ECJ, Case C-360/92, The Publishers Association v. Commission [1995] ECR I-23, paragraph 44. In this latter judgment, the Court 
condemned the Commission for not having carefully considered whether the agreement concerned was essential to promote cultural 
unity between the UK and Ireland, in which case it could be eligible for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. Sadly, we cannot 
assess the impact of this judgment on the reasoning that the Commission would have adopted in the examination of the RPM 
agreements the second time around: one month before the ruling, publishing house Hodder Headline withdrew from the agreement, a 
move that heralded the collapse of the RPM mechanism. After most of the major publishers pulled out of the NBA, the system was 
dismantled and the Commission did not bother to adopt a new decision. For more information see McDonald, M. Collapse of Net Book 
Agreement within months. 26 December 1994, The Independent. Retrieved from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/collapse-of-
net-book-agreement-within-months-collapse-1388530.html, and The Booksellers Association (2011). Reports Library RPM-Book 
Sales in the UK 
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particularities of each national market) suggesting whether RPM leads to higher prices and, if this is 
indeed the case, whether it stimulates non-price competition, thereby outweighing the harm that 
results from higher prices.   
 
As regards RPM-based agency, this model was first introduced by Apple and major book 
publishers in 2010. It has since become an attractive strategy for the sale of digital content services 
that range from e-books to apps, including news apps, to newspaper subscriptions. It bears noting 
that, while often finding themselves in a weaker bargaining position, this model has been embraced 
by book and newspaper publishers alike. Insofar as the legal status of RPM-based agencies is 
concerned, the issues that arise go far beyond the controversies of fixed prices. Under certain 
conditions, an agency contract falls outside Article 101(1) TFEU.11 In such cases, agencies with an 
forcement. 
However, the case law is far from clear as to the conditions under which an agency relationship may 
indeed benefit from antitrust immunity. The particularities of digital markets and the inclusion in 
agency contracts of provisions that may be at odds with an agency structure that would otherwise 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/01, paragraph 18 
12  Venizelos, T. Greece to liberalize fixed system of book pricing. 18 March 2014, Press TV News. Retrieved from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cTeRM3Kj-x0  
13 Loi n° 2011-590 du 26 mai 2011 relative au prix du livre numérique, Version consolidée au 09 avril 2015. Retrieved from: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000024082056  
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14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
15 See, for instance, Joint Research Center (2012a), supra n. 1, 81 for action taken by the Swedish competition authority. See also 
Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (2006, March). Publishers right to fix book prices considerably reduced. Retrieved 
from: http://en.kfst.dk/Indhold-KFST/English/Decisions/20062903-Publishers-right-to-fix-book-prices-considerably-
reduced?tc=97B735EA5AB44503BC0991771AF3120D and supra ns. 3-6 for action taken by other competition authorities. See also 
infra n. 216 for recent cases involving online retailers  
16 Commission decision of 12/12/2012 addressed to: Hachette Livre SA, HarperCollins Publishers Limited, HarperCollins Publishers, 
L.L.C., Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH & Co. KG, Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH, Simon & Schuster Inc., Simon & 
Schuster (UK) Ltd, Simon & Schuster Digital Sales, Inc., Apple, Inc. relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/AT.39847 E-books, C(2012) 9288 
(consolidated version) 
17 See, for instance, Foros, Ø., Hans Jarle Kind Greg Shaffer (2013). Turning the Page on Business Formats for Digital Platforms: 
Does Appl  1-2. CESIFO Working Paper No. 4362. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2317715 
18 See infra Part 3.b. 
  












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World  Report prepared for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 6-7 
20 Commission Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning an application for negative clearance or 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, Cases COMP/34.657, Sammelrevers and COMP/35.245 to 35.251, Einzelreverse 
[2000] OJ C 162/8 
  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Ernst and Young (2014). Creating Growth. Measuring cultural and creative markets in the EU, 31. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Measuring_cultural_and_creative_markets_in_the_EU/$FILE/Creating-Growth.pdf  
22  Ibid., 32; For more information see Joint Research Center (2012a) supra n. 1, 16. Retrieved from: 
http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC76642.pdf  
23 Joint Research Center (2012a), supra n. 1, 14  
24 Ibid., 75 
25 Ibid., 71; For the importance the publishing trade attaches to this data see Rimm, A. M. (2014). Conditions and Survival: Views on 
the Concentration of Ownership and Vertical Integration in German and Swedish Publishing. Publishing Research Quarterly, 30(1), 
77-92 
26 European Commission (2013). Media Use in the European Union, 8. Note that the importance citizens attach to newspapers is akin 
to radio and the Internet. See Ofcom (2012). Measuring Media Plurality, 14. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/statement/statement.pdf 
27 Ibid., 12 
  













The discussion over the effects of RPM on competition is far from settled. Proponents mainly 
contend that, while it eliminates intra-brand price competition, RPM promotes intra-brand service 
competition, eliminates the risk of free-
of service, protects the image of luxury goods, which, if subject to aggressive price competition 
would lose value, and addresses the problem of double marginalization.34 Opponents argue, inter 
alia, that RPM facilitates horizontal collusion both upstream and downstream and, because it 
prevents any form of price competition (discounts, promotional offers, etc.), it does not allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Joint Research Center (2012b). Technical Report on Statistical, Ecosystems and  Competitiveness 
Analysis of the Media and Content Industries: The Newspaper Publishing Industry, 6. Retrieved from: 
http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69881.pdf  
29 Ibid. 
30 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/01, paragraph 48 
31 See, for instance, Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L 102/1, Article 4(a) of 
the BER; ECJ, Case 243/83, SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la presse [1985] ECR 2015; ECJ, Case 161/84 Pronuptia 
de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 00353; Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 
101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 23   
32 Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 47  
33 Ibid., paragraph 60; CFI, Case T-168/2001, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR II-2969, paragraphs 247-252 
34  Petit, N. and David Henry (2010). Vertical Restraints under EU Competition Law: Conceptual Foundations and Practical 
Framework, 9-10 SSRN Working Paper. Retrieved from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1724891  
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distributors to engage in price discrimination which may result in output increases and cost savings 
that may be passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. 35  But, empirical research 
discussing the positive or negative effects of RPM on competition is scarce. Relevant studies cover a 
fairly limited number of issues relating to RPM and focus on only a few sectors, which does not 
allow us to draw a general and definitive conclusion.  
 
The discourse surrounding the impact of RPM on media pluralism is equally unsettled. 
Advocates claim that fixed prices mitigate the risks associated with newspaper and book publishing 
and, in doing so, they allow publishers to make available on the market a broad range of print 
products, including slow-moving esoteric books and new newspaper titles, thereby contributing to 
content diversity. It is also argued that the protected profit margin resulting from RPM encourages 
small publishers and independent non-integrated retailers to penetrate the market, thus increasing 
supply diversity. Opponents mainly argue that RPM does not benefit media pluralism because it 
deprives customers of the ability to buy content at lower prices. However, again, robust empirical 
research testing the above claims is scarce and, where it exists, incomplete. For example, in the late 
1990s, the UK book market switched from fixed to free pricing. Empirical findings demonstrate that 
following the dismantlement of the RPM system the number of books published increased.36 Yet, no 
systematic content analysis was carried out that addressed the question of whether the number of 
titles represented more diversity (e.g. did the number of titles by genre increase or did the publishers 
focus on sentimental novels?). Cross-country comparative studies, that is, studies comparing markets 
with RPM against markets with free prices, have also failed to reach definitive conclusions.37 The 
consumer of print products is another big mystery. For example, to date, there are no studies on the 
price elasticity of demand for books, but only some studies on the price elasticity of the total demand 
for books.38 These latter provide some insight into whether books are interchangeable with other 
media products39 but say nothing about substitutability within the book market. Moreover, the lack of 
rigorous empirical research results in fragmentary knowledge about consumption habits such as 
brand loyalty, genre preferences, etc. Bookstores, especially large book chains, engage in gathering 
data about their customers, but this information is, naturally, not publicly available. As a result, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 8-9 
36 Bennett, M., Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass (2010). Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the 
controversy, and small steps towards a more nuanced policy. Fordham International Law Journal 33, 1295  
37 Appelman, M. and Marcel Canoy (2002). Horses for Courses: Why Europe should not harmonize its book policies. De Economist 
150(5), 592  
38 Canoy, M., Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg (2005). The Economics of Books. CESifo Working Paper No. 1414, 12. 
Retrieved from: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_1414.html 
39 Ibid. 
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is still significant uncertainty about substitutability on the demand side and hence about whether 
RPM enhances or harms exposure diversity.    
 
In this section, I shall examine whether, and if so under what conditions an RPM agreement 
governing trade in books or newspapers may indeed deliver non-price efficiencies which can lead to 
an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU and which can be beneficial for media pluralism. This 
analysis shall be conducted in the light of VBBB/VBVB.40 This case concerned an RPM agreement 
which provided that Dutch and Belgian publishers would fix the retail price of the titles they 
produced and that booksellers would not offer any discounts except in cases where this was explicitly 
allowed by the publishers.41 The focus of my analysis is on VBBB/VBVB because this is the only 
decision in the print publishing sector where the Commission conducted a fully-fledged assessment 
of whether all four conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU were met. Sammelrevers,42 which 
dealt with an RPM agreement governing trade in books and magazines between Germany and 
Austria (this decision raised other issues which will be discussed in more detail in Part 4 of this 
Chapter), and Agence et Messageries de la Presse,43 which concerned an RPM system for the sale of 
Belgian and foreign newspapers in Belgium, are clearance notices, lacking a detailed analysis of the 
factors that led to granting the exemption. In Net Book Agreement, 44  a decision on the RPM 
mechanism governing trade in books between the UK and Ireland, the Commission assessed only 
whether the agreements concerned were indispensable to alleviate administrative burdens on 
publishers (e.g. whether, absent fixed prices, it would not be practicable for publishers to give notice 
ole of RPM as a conduit for non-price competition.  
 
From the outset it bears noting that, in VBBB/VBVB, the parties did not provide sufficient 
evidence to substantiate that the first condition under Article 101(3) TFEU, namely that the 
agreement improves production and/or distribution, was met. Therefore, the Commission correctly 
found that the arrangements could not benefit from the exemption. Despite the fact that it was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Commission decision 82/123/EEC of 25 November 1981 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428-
VBBB/VBVB) [1982] OJ L 52/36 
41 Ibid., paragraph 9 
42 Commission Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning an application for negative clearance or 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, Cases COMP/34.657, Sammelrevers and COMP/35.245 to 35.251, Einzelreverse 
[2000] OJ C 162/8 
43 Commission Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Regulation No 17 concerning Case IV/31.609, Agence et Messageries de la Presse 
[1987] OJ C 164/02 
44 Commission decision 82/123/EEC of 25 November 1981 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428-
VBBB/VBVB) [1982] OJ L 52/36 and Commission decision of 12 December 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/27.393 and IV/27.394, Publishers Association - Net Book Agreements) [1989] OJ L22/12 
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required to examine whether the other three conditions set by Article 101(3) TFEU were fulfilled (the 
four conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU must be met cumulatively), the Commission went 
on to conduct a complete certain aspects of 
collective resale price maintenance in general 45 Hence, the positions the Commission takes in 
VBBB/VBVB are not limited to the facts of that particular case. 
 
2.1. Can RPM contribute to improvements in the production and distribution of print 
products?  
 
As already mentioned, the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU requires that the agreement 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU, the aim of the analysis is to determine what are the objective 
efficiencies46 created by the agreement and their economic importance.47 The Guidelines explicitly 
state that, in addition to cost efficiencies, parties may put forward efficiencies of a qualitative 
nature.48 It bears noting that the wording of the Guidelines does not suggest a preference for cost 
efficiency enhancing potential of the agreement is not cost reduction; it is quality improvements and 
other efficiencies of a qualitative nature. Depending on the individual case such efficiencies may 
49 This fits nicely media markets 
because, as already explained in Chapter 3, price is not the main parameter driving demand for 
content. In our case, as already indicated, the publishing trade has traditionally contended that RPM 
arrangements protect and promote non-price competition in the form of a broad range of titles and a 
variety of publishers and retailers serving the consumer. It is noted that, for the purposes of this 
thesis, a broad range of titles would be a reflection of content diversity whereas a variety of 
publishers and retailers a reflection of supply diversity and that the term non-price competition that is 
used throughout this Chapter refers to both these pluralism-friendly outcomes.  
 
The following analysis will examine whether RPM may indeed stimulate non-price competition 
in print publishing and how open the Commission has been to related arguments.  
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46 Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 49. According to established 
case law efficiencies are not assessed from the subjective point of 
 
47 Ibid., paragraph 50 
48 Ibid., paragraph 59 
49 Ibid., paragraph 69 
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2.4. Does RPM eliminate competition?   
 
The final condition of Article 101(3) TFEU requires that the agreement does not afford the 
undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of 
the products concerned. In VBBB/VBVB, in assessing whether this condition is met, the Commission 
first noted that dimensions of competition such as stocking, specialization, service offered and 
ordering facilities should be regarded as secondary to price competition and that, since the agreement 
between the two associations prevented retailers from offering discounts to their customers, 
competition was eliminated in the affected market.134 
argument that publishers participating in the RPM system compete with one another within 
individual categories of books, the Commission took the stance that competition of this type is 
restricted to a small number of titles or series.135 More particularly, it noted that:  
books are completely original works, written by an author following his 
inspiration at the time of writing. They cannot be compared with one another. In a 
principal feature, but rather the objective information which the book is intended to 
convey. Books covering the same ground can therefore to some extent be regarded as 
substitutes, and may thus constitute a single market. But these works account for only 
a limited share of the total number of books in the market 136 
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The above analysis shows that Article 101(3) TFEU is flexible enough to allow for the non-
price dimensions of competition to be taken into account in cases concerning RPM agreements for 
the sale of print products. Moreover, and relevant for the purposes of this thesis, economic theory 
supports the argument that, depending on the specific conditions of the market examined (e.g. the 
perishable nature of newspapers, language size, population density, etc.), RPM may be both 
appropriate and essential to deliver qualitative efficiencies in the form of a wide variety of titles or an 
extensive network of retailers, thereby remedying certain challenges facing media pluralism in the 
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The previous Chapter studied, inter alia, the role of a category of digital intermediaries, namely 
digital stores, in shaping media markets. It did so by examining the effects of the RPM-based agency 
model, initially introduced by Apple and major book publishers and later on adopted by other key 
players, on the economics of news provision. As already seen in Chapter 2, molding the future of 
news provision is one of the main areas that illustrate the role that digital intermediaries may play in 
harming or promoting media pluralism.  
 
Moving away from Article 101 TFEU but remaining within the confines of antitrust, this 
Chapter will discuss issues that relate to the application of Article 102 TFEU to digital 
intermediaries. In addition to practices affecting news economics, this Chapter will examine other 
types of conduct potentially beneficial or damaging to media pluralism that were mentioned in 
Chapter 2,1 namely the editorial-like judgments digital intermediaries perform in selecting, ranking 
and displaying information and practices in which they engage in their role as distribution 
bottlenecks
in general online search,2 which is ongoing at the time of 
writing. The Google antitrust case has been chosen mainly for two reasons. First, this is the first (and 
so far the only) case where the Commission has dealt with anti-competitive unilateral conduct in 
markets where digital intermediaries operate. As a result, it sheds light on the intricacies of the 
markets in question and illustrates the challenges with which the Commission has to cope in reaching 
a decision. Second, the allegations against Google are numerous, ranging from the anti-competitive 
use of third-party content to algorithm manipulation to restrictions on data portability. The issues that 
arise from these practices cover the full spectrum of the aforementioned types of conduct. For 
example, insofar as the impact on news economics is concerned, one of the complaints concerns the 
A complaint that exemplifies the role of an intermediary as a distribution bottleneck concerns 
that object to the use of their stories on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Part 3.b. 
2 European Commission (2010, November). Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google. Press Release 
IP/10/1624. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en   
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results. Finally, with respect to editorial-like judgments, allegations have been made that Google has 
been deliberately demoting competing websites whilst granting preferential treatment to its own 
content.  
 
Similar to Chapters 4 and 5, this Chapter discusses the application of EU competition law to 
undertakings that control an asset or parameter that affects competition. In Chapter 4 it was control of 
the acquired entity, whereas in Chapter 5 it was control over the retail price of newspaper and book 
engine, which Google allegedly uses to expand into and dominate adjacent markets such as news 
aggregation and vertical search markets.  
 
broadcasting and publishing markets, this Chapter seeks to establish whether the Commission has 
made proper use of the EU competition law toolbox to address the issues it has identified throughout 
its investigation and if not, to explore whether, if properly applied, Article 102 may address concerns 
over media pluralism in the affected markets. The Chapter is structured as follows: Part 2 makes an 
over
economics of news provision. Part 4 explores allegations relate
bottleneck, namely retaliatory practices that affect the news markets, restrictions of data portability, 
and the exploitative gathering and processing of user data. Part 5 focuses on the editorial-like 





On November 30, 2010, the European Commission announced that it decided to initiate an 
investigation into allegations that Google has abused its dominant position in the online search 
market, in violation of Article 102 TFEU.3 The decision to open a formal investigation was based on 
complaints launched by Foundem, a UK price comparison website, Ciao, a German price comparison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid.  
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website and Microsoft subsidiary, and eJustice, a French legal portal.4 All three complainants are 
vertical search engines. These are distinct from general search engines in that, instead of indexing 
large portions of the Internet through a web crawler,5 they index content by reference to a specific 
topic, location, and/or industry.6 Google is a general search engine, but, over the past few years it has 
expanded into neighboring vertical search markets such as product and flight price comparison. 
Complainants argue that Google has abused its dominant position in general online search with the 
aim to push competing services out of vertical search markets.7 Before discussing in more detail what 
this complaint is about, it is essential  
 
Google Search is an advertising-based medium which means that it supplies search results for 
free and that its revenues come from advertising. Google delivers two types of results, namely unpaid 
results and paid results/sponsored links. The unpaid results, which 
, are the results that are returned based on 
the Web site .8 The paid results or sponsored links are third party advertisements displayed at the top 
9 Google sells this ad space through its 
auction-based advertising platform, AdWords. 10  After creating a Google account, the advertiser 
chooses keywords that are words or phrases relevant to its business. 11 The position that an advertiser 
is allocated in the list of paid search results depends on the bid the advertiser makes for a given 
12 The Quality Score is an approximate calculation of how relevant 
13 It is determined by several 
click-through rate (i.e., how often that keyword led to clicks on the 
ad), the quality of the landing page (i.e., how relevant, transparent, and easy-to-navigate the 
geographic performance (i.e., 
been in the regions it is targeting).14 The price an advertiser must pay Google is the bid that it made 
for a keyword multiplied by its Quality Score.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  European Commission. Case AT.39740, Google Search. All relevant documentation is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
5 Commission decision Microsoft/Yahoo!, Case No COMP/M.5727 C(2010) 1077, paragraph 31 
6 Definition retrieved from: http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=vertical+search+engine&i=57892,00.asp  
7 European Commission (2010, November), supra n. 2 
8 Definition retrieved from: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/N/natural_search.html  
9 European Commission (2010, November), supra n. 2 
10 See http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704410  
11 For more information see on the process see: 
https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?service=adwords&hl=en_US&ltmpl=jfk&continue=https://adwords.google.com/um/gaiaau
th?apt%3DNone%26ltmpl%3Djfk&passive=86400&sacu=1&sarp=1&sourceid=awo&subid=ww-en-et-awhp_nelsontest_con  
12 Information retrieved from: http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2454010 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.   
15 Varian, H. (2010, March). Search Advertising With Google: Quality Score Explanation by Google Chief Economist. Retrieved from: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwuUe5kq_O8  
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Going back to the antitrust investigation, complainants allege that Google has been lowering 
the ranking of their websites in the list of organic results, whilst ensuring prominent display for its 
own services.16 Moreover, they accuse Google of manipulating paid search results by downgrading 
the Quality Score of their services.17  
 
In addition to the above, the Commission is concerned about the exclusivity obligations that 
Google imposes on its advertising partners. As regards advertising with AdWords, Google appears to 
restrict advertisers to exporting ad campaign data into competing platforms, including general search 
engines.18 The other concern relates to how Google does business as an intermediary in the online 
advertising market. In Google/Doubleclick, th
advertising space made available for sale by publishers [i.e. website owners] and advertisers wishing 
to buy advertising space and facilitate the matching between the supply of ad space and the demand 
for ad 19 Google provides intermediation services through its AdSense platform: 
website owners make ad spaces available by pasting ad codes on their sites, and advertisers bid for 
their ads to be displayed in these spaces.20 According to the information that is currently publicly 
available, Google imposes upon the website owners the obligation to acquire most, if not all, of their 
advertisements from Google advertisers.21  
 
-party content. More particularly, Google 
copies material offered by other websites and uses it in its own offerings without seeking permission 
from the websites concerned.22 For example, Google copies parts of news articles which it displays in 
its news aggregation platform, Google News.  
 
following practices:23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 European Commission (2010, November), supra n. 2 
17 Ibid. 
18 European Commission (2012, May). Speech/12/372. Statement of VP Almunia on the Google antitrust investigation. Retrieved 
from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-372_en.htm  
19 Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraph 18 
20Information retrieved from: http://www.google.com/adsense/start/  
21 European Commission (2010, November), supra n. 2 
22 European Commission (2014a, February). Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialized search 
rivals - Frequently asked questions. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-87_en.htm?locale=en 
23 Note that since 2010 other companies filed complaints similar to those initially raised by Foundem. See, for instance, Microsoft 
(March, 2011). Adding our Voice to Concerns about Search in Europe. Retrieved from: http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2011/03/30/adding-our-voice-to-concerns-about-search-in-europe/ However, to my knowledge, the Commission has not 
released information about the number or the identity of the complainants 
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o Manipulation of general search results, which may produce exclusionary effects in 
markets adjacent to general online search; 
o Exclusivity restrictions imposed on advertisers and web publishers, possibly 
foreclosing advertising markets, and 
o Scraping third-  
 
The Commission initially stated that it would follow a commitments procedure on the grounds 
that 24 
restore competitive conditions on a [fast- .25 However, at the time of writing, no 
decision has been adopted on this matter. Google has already proposed commitments three times:26 
the first two proposals were expressly rejected. In February 2014, the Commission announced that 
the third set of undertakings submitted by Google rns.27 But, in 
April 2015, that is, more than one year later, in a controversial move, the Commission stated that it 
decided to send Google a Statement of Objections which relates to the allegations on preferential 
treatment only and that this 
28  While there is considerable 
uncertainty as to how the case will evolve, the above statement implies that, as regards the allegations 
on scraping and exclusivity, the Commission may still be considering the adoption of a commitments 
decision on the basis of the final set of undertakings proposed by Google.  
 
Having explained the conduct that is being investigated and how the Commission may proceed 
in the future, two remarks should be made regarding the scope of my analysis. First, the Chapter will 
not examine the concerns that arise from the restrictions imposed on web publishers. Currently, there 
is not sufficient factual information that would allow me to engage in an assessment of the 
agreements concerned. Suffice it to say that, from the statements the Commission has made on 
certain occasions, the scope of these restrictions appears to be wide ranging (publishers are bound to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 European Commission (2014b, February). Statement on the Google investigation. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm  
25  European Commission (2013, April). MEMO: Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address 
competition concerns  questions and answers. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-383_en.htm   
26  See Google (2013, April). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf; Google (2013, October). Commitments in Case 
COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others. Retrieved from: http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/googlesettlment102113.pdf, 
and Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others. Retrieved from: 
http://docs.dpaq.de/6448-google_commitments_full.pdf  
27 European Commission (2014a, February), supra n. 22 
28 European Commission (2015, April). Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping 
service. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm  
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29). It may be inferred from 
these statements 
breach Article 102 TFEU if they have the effect of preventing the entry or expansion of competing 
undertakings .30 Second, given that the Commission left the door open for a commitments decision to 
be adopted with respect to scraping and data portability, restrictions on the basis of the most recent 
proposals submitted by Google, I shall examine whether the suggested undertakings are indeed 
appropriate to alleviate the concerns to which they give rise. Since the commitments related to 
preferential treatment were rejected, they will not be included in the analysis.  
 
3. Scraping third-party content: Feed aggregators and Article 102 TFEU 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, digital intermediaries may impact media pluralism by, inter 
alia, affecting the ability of news providers to generate (advertising and subscription) revenues. 
Chapter 5 examined the effects that the agency model has had on newspaper publishing and 
concluded that in light of current business realities, these effects appear to be positive; evidence 
suggests that the agency model has been the first viable income-generating strategy for online news 
provision.31 Moreover, even if publishers usually find themselves in a weaker bargaining position, 
vis-à-vis the digital retailers that provide access to the audiences that are locked in to the hardware 
devices they manufacture, publishers maintain control over price and ownership of the content that is 
made available to the readership whilst getting 70% of the retail proceeds.32 This section will discuss 
to generate the financial resources that are necessary to gather and report news. I will focus on the 
party content, which, as already mentioned, the Commission is currently investigating in the context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
30 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 34. On the parameters the Commission would take into account to conduct an 
assessment of exclusive purchasing deals see paragraphs 33 et seq. of the Guidance. It is worth mentioning that, in addition to 
preventing web publishers from doing business with competing search engines, Google appears to have concluded a series of 
exclusivity agreements with a number of key players in markets adjacent to online search that may have had far-reaching effects on 
competition. For example, Google has signed exclusivity agreements with a number of popular web-browsers such as Safari, Firefox, 
and Opera in order to become the default search engine. While competitors brought this issue to the attention of the Commission, the 
llegations see 
ICOMP (2013, January). Complaint of ICOMP against Google, Inc. under Article 101 TFEU, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
9EC) No 1/2003. Retrieved from: http://www.i-comp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/AnnexesICOMPMarketTestSubmission310513.pdf  
31 Joint Research Center (2012). Technical Report on Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness 
Analysis of the Media and Content Industries: The Newspaper Publishing Industry, 65. Retrieved from: 
http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69881.pdf 
32 See Chapter 5, Part 3.b. 
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of the Google antitrust case.33 
remunerating the news outlet that has written the story.   
 
formation from multiple sources and 
34 News aggregators resemble traditional news providers more than other 
digital intermediaries; they choose the information that reaches the readership35 and some of them 
run their own news production operations.36 While they may take various forms,37 
such as Google News and Yahoo! News are the most common type. A feed aggregator contains 
material from a number of websites organized into various feeds , typically arranged by source, 
topic, or story .38 
e, with a link to where the rest of the story appears on the original 
39 The business models of feed aggregators vary. For example, Google News40 is ad-free 
whereas Yahoo! News41 is ad-based. In terms of use, while the majority of users still go directly to 
branded sites to read news,42 in several Member States news aggregators are the second most popular 
means of finding news online.43 
 
The emergence and increasing use of news aggregators has sparked a hot debate over how 
to content providers in that they divert traffic to the original websites, thereby allowing them to reach 
new audiences and increase ad revenues.44 It is also said that even in cases where news aggregators 
le 
45 Opponents, including and especially news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
34 Isbell, K. (2010). The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications and Best Practices, 2. The Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society at Harvard University Research Publication No. 2010-10 
35 On how news aggregation works in practice see, for instance, Anderson, C. W. (2010). What Aggregators Do: Rhetoric, Practice, 
and Cultures of Digital and Analog Evidence in Web-Era Journalism. Paper Submitted to the 12th International Symposium for 
Online Journalism Austin, Texas, April 2-3. Retrieved from: https://online.journalism.utexas.edu/2011/papers/Anderson2011.pdf  
36 Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World  Report prepared for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 25 
37 Other categories are specialty aggregators, blog aggregators, and user-curated aggregators. For their definitions and the ways in 
which they operate see Isbell, K. (2010,) supra n. 34, 2-5 
38 Ibid., 2 
39 Ibid. 
40 http://news.google.com/  
41 http://news.yahoo.com/  
42 On the phenomenon of demand-side concentration see Chapter 2, 3.b. 
43  Ofcom (2013). International Communications Market Report, Figure 1.57. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/icmr/ICMR_2013_final.pdf  
44 Lee, A. M. and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2015). The Rise of Online News Aggregators: Consumption and Competition. International Journal 
on Media Management, 17(1), 4 
45 McDonnell, J. C. (2012). The Continuing Viability of the Hot News Misappropriation Doctrine in the Age of Internet News 
Aggregation. Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 10(3), 256 
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providers, claim that news aggregators do nothing but steal from media organizations that spend 
significant amounts of money to gather facts and report them. As Rupert Murdoch famously put it, 
to our salaries. To aggregate stories is not fair use.46 47 
Since the audiences get all the information they need by reading the first few lines of the story, so the 
argument goes, they have no interest whatsoever in accessing the full text.48 However, the results of 
empirical research on the impact of aggregation on news providers are mixed. Some found that a 
significant proportion of online news consumers scan the headlines without clicking through to the 
original websites,49 whereas others found that news aggregators and traditional news media outlets 
are in a symbiotic, non-competitive relationship.50 Hence, the issue of whether news aggregation 
substitutes or complements news outlets is, at the time of writing this thesis, far from settled.  
 
Prior to delving into the intricacies of competition law, I must underline that, while determining 
whether news aggregators are substitutes for or complements to news outlets is key to understanding 
how they may influence the future of news provision, the ways in which they may affect the demand 
side of the market, namely the readership, and media pluralism is a far more complex issue. On the 
one hand, those aggregators that license content from news agencies and produce their own news 
reports contribute to supply and content diversity. Moreover, to the extent that they facilitate and (one 
may say encourage) active multi-sourcing,51 they enhance exposure diversity. On the other hand, one 
may question whether news aggregators indeed engage the readership in a meaningful media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Fair use is a term used in copyright law; if usage of third party content fulfills the conditions of fair use, the usage does not amount 
to a copyright infringement 
47 Bunz, M. . 1 December 2009, The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/dec/01/rupert-murdoch-no-free-news  
48  See, for instance, European Press Publishers (2014). Press Publishers Response to Google's Third Commitments Proposal. 
European Commission's Competition Investigation of Google - AT.39.740, 10 
49 See, for instance, Wauters, R. 44% Of Google News Visitors Scan Headlines, . 19 January 2010, Techcrunch. 
Retrieved from: http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsell-google-news/ Two studies examined the effects of incorporating local news 
links to Google News on visits to local news outlets. The first study, conducted by Athey and Mobius, concluded that, while visits to 
local news outlets initially increase, they are reduced over time and ultimately users rely on Google News exclusively to consume 
local news. The second, conducted by George, finds that total visits increase by less than 1% and that, as a result, adding local news 
us Mobius 
(2012). The Impact of News Aggregators on Internet News Consumption: The Case of Localization. Working Paper. Retrieved from: 
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Athey_Impact_News_Aggregators_on_Internet_News_Consumption.pdf and George, 
L. (2013). Local News Online: Aggregators, Geo-Targeting and the Market for Local News, 27. Time Warner Cable Research 
Program on Digital Communications. Report Series Winter 2013. Retrieved from: 
http://www.twcresearchprogram.com/pdf/TWC_George_Report.pdf 
50 See, for instance, Lee, A. M. and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2015), supra n. 44; Yang, M. J., and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2011). Competing with 
. Journal of Media Business 
Studies, 8(4), 59 74; Huang, J. S., Yang, M. J., and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2013). Friend or foe? Examining the relationship between news 
portals and newspaper sites in Taiwan. Chinese Journal of Communication, 6(1), 103 119. For a different perspective of how the 
existence of a news aggregator may affect competition among newspapers see Esfahani, N. N. and Don-Shin Jeon (2013). News 
Aggregators and Competition Among Newspapers in the Internet. IDEI Working Paper, n. 770 
51 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 36, 25 
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experience. To put it bluntly, what makes the reader more knowledgeable? Scanning the ledes of the 
stories of ten different news outlets or reading the full story distributed by one single provider? And 
the world? Attention scarcity and content personalization, and, more particularly, their possible 
effects on news consumption and media pluralism have been explored in Chapter 1 52  and are 
undoubtedly worthy of further empirical research.  
 
3.1. News aggregation and EU competition law 
 
From the very outset, it bears noting that the practice of scraping raises both competition and 
copyright issues. Given the focus of this thesis on EU competition law, this section will explore the 
former (but without altogether ignoring the latter). Two remarks must be made here. First, at EU 
level, there are no statutory provisions for the copyright protection of headlines and small excerpts of 
news stories. The EU Copyright Directive imposes on the Member States the obligation to harmonize 
their national laws for three types of works, namely computer programs, databases and 
photographs.53 As a result, the question of whether headlines and small excerpts are copyrightable is 
answered by the national legislator or judge, depending on the criteria that each Member State has set 
 and thus deserving of protection. Second, copyright law 
does not preempt EU competition law. The Union has exclusive competence in this latter area and, 
unlike the harmonizing copyright rules that are established by means of a Directive, 54  EU 
competition rules are directly applicable and in a higher position in the hierarchy of EU norms. It 
55  
 
This section will build around the above two issues from two different perspectives. First, 
irrespective of whether news outlets benefit from copyright protection in the Member State(s) where 
they operate (irrespective because action taken to cease a copyright infringement does not preclude 
action under EU competition law), and bearing in mind that the ability of news outlets to generate 
revenues is key to the production of high quality investigative journalism, does EU competition law 
equip them with any tools to prevent aggregators from using their content? Second, bearing in mind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Part 4.a. 
53 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10, Articles 1.3, 3.1. and 6 
54 Our approach would not be different even if one accepted that the Infopaq judgment has so far-reaching effects that it extends the 
copyright protection afforded under the EU Copyright Directive to newspaper articles. See ECJ, Case C-5/08, Infopaq International 
A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-6569 
55 See, for instance, ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann e Independent Televisión Publications Ltd. 
v. Comission, [1995] ECR I-743 and CJEU, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and 
Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083  
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that news aggregators may bring added value to the readership and assuming that headlines and small 
excerpts are protected by copyright, does EU competition law equip aggregators with any tools56 to 
force publishers to grant access to their content? 
 
3.1.1. Can EU competition law help publishers prevent news aggregators from scraping 
their content?  
 
The question that seeks an answer here is whether a news aggregator which uses the headlines 
and the first few lines of a news story without remunerating the undertaking that produced the story 
in question violates EU competition law. To my knowledge, no case with comparable facts has fallen 
under the EU antitrust microscope thus far. In certain States in the US, cases brought by news 
publishers that allege that a firm has engaged in anti-competitive behavior by copying their content 
without their permission have been dealt with under the Hot News Misappropriation doctrine. The 
Hot News Misappropriation doctrine emerged as early as 1918 in International News Service v. 
Associated Press, a judgment rendered by the US Supreme Court.57 International News Service (INS) 
and the Associated Press, two organizations consisting of newspapers published throughout the 
.58 INS bribed employees of AP members to furnish news prior to publication and copy news 
from early editions of AP newspapers which it would subsequently sell, either bodily or after re-
writing it. 59  
unfair competition 60 This latter question, the Court said, should be answered with due 
regard to the nature and conditions of the business concerned.61 The Court held that AP gathered 
62 and that, unless it benefited from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Note that, from a copyright law perspective, Article 5 of the Copyright Directive allows Member States to provide for exceptions or 
limitations to the rights enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 the Directive. The derogation laid down in Article 5(3)(c) seems at first sight 
 reproduction by the press, communication to the 
public or making available of published articles on current economic, political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other 
subject-matter of the same character, in cases where such use is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including the 
author's name, is indicated, or use of works or other subject-matter in connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent 
justified by the informatory purpose and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
s 
reproduction under the provisions implementing Article 5(3)(c
media organizations. For more on this issue see Xalabarder, R. (2011). Google News and Copyright. In Lopez-Tarruella, A. (ed.). 
Google and the Law: Empirical Approaches to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-Economy Business Models, 145 
57 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) 
58 Ibid., 229 
59 Ibid., 234-236 
60 Ibid., 236 
61 Ibid., 248 
62 Ibid. 
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- 63 it would 
64 Based on the 
above, the precisely at the point where the 
profit [was] to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have 
earned it to those who have not 65 The Hot News Misappropriation has been endorsed by five States 
thus far, where it forms part of unfair competition law.66 Courts in these States have expanded the 
doctrine and further elaborated upon the conditions for its application.67 In the leading judgment 
National Basketball Association v. Motorola,68 which concerned a complaint brought by the National 
-
NBA scores,69 the Second Circuit laid down the following five conditions under which the doctrine 
may apply:   
generates or gathers information at a cost;  
(ii) the information is time-sensitive;  
(iii) a defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding  
(iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; 
and  
(v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so 
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be 
 [emphasis added].70 
In the US, the rise and increasing popularity of news aggregators have prompted a feverish debate 
over whether the Hot News Misappropriation tort, as exemplified by NBA, should also cover their 
activities.71 At the time of writing, views are polarized and, while proposals have been put forward to 
federalize the tort,72 Congress has not taken any relevant initiative so far.  
 
Given the lack of any relevant case law in the EU, could the elements set out in NBA be 
founded on EU competition law principles, thereby providing news outlets active in the EU with a 
means to impede aggregators from scraping their content? For the avoidance of confusion, I am not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., 234 
64 Ibid., 235 
65 Ibid., 240 
66 Reference is made to New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, California, and Illinois. See McDonnell, J. C. (2012), supra n. 45, 256 and 
262. On the hot news misappropriation doctrine and the relevant U.S. case law see also Rosenfeld, S. (2014). How Far Will News 
. Berkeley Journal of Entertainment and Sports 
Law, 3(1), 86-92; Tan, W. A. (2013). Montgomery, S. W. (2012). Extra!! Extra!!: The Viability of the Hot News Misappropriation 
Claim Is in Jeopardy. Loyola L.A. Entertainment Law Review 32, 365-398; Schmidt, E. P. (2011). Hot News Misappropriation in the 
Internet Age. Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9, 313-343; Beaton, G. D. (2012). The Cold Reality of the 
Ineffective Hot News Remedy, and the Case for Contract. Columbia Law Review 112, 2068-2109 
67 McDonnell, J. C. (2012), supra n. 45, 260 
68 National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1585 (2d Cir. 1997) 
69 Ibid., paragraphs 2 and 5 
70 Ibid., paragraph 16 
71 On developments in recent case law and relevant literature see supra n. 66 
72 See, for instance, McDonnell, J. C. (2012), supra n. 45, 273 referring to Deutsch, A. L. (2010). Protecting News in the Digital Era: 
The Case for a Federalized Hot News Misappropriation Tort. In Advanced Seminar on Copyright Law, (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 1003, 2010), 511 
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suggesting importing the NBA test into EU competition law as such. Because the facts between NBA 
and the Google case are very similar, the criteria the Second Circuit established in this judgment may 
serve as useful indicators; the test would still need to be adapted to the standards set by EU 
competition law.  
 
We should start our analysis by noting that in the US a news provider may invoke violations 
73  In EU 
competition law, however, the only provision that may apply to a case with comparable facts is 
Article 102 TFEU. Hence, in addition to any evidence supporting their complaint that an abuse has 
taken place, news providers would need to demonstrate that a news aggregator such as Google News 
is in a dominant position in the affected market. At EU level, decisional practice does not shed light 
on this or closely related issues because, as already discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission has more 
often than not refrained from completing the market definition exercise in decisions concerning news 
provision.74 National courts have not been particularly helpful either. For example, in Copiepresse, 
which dealt with, inter alia, the legitimacy of the use by Google News of snippets of articles 
produced by French and German-speaking Belgian publishers, the Brussels Appeal Court refused to 
75 As explained 
in detail in Chapter 2, this approach may jeopardize the accuracy of the decision, adversely affecting 
both competition and media pluralism. In the case at hand, from a statement the Commission made 
on, inter alia, the scraping allegations, it may be inferred that it is inclined to think that Google News 
and online news websites are competitors. 76  However, as will be seen below, this is not so 
straightforward. Hence, were a commitments decision to be adopted (i.e., a decision where the 
Commission would not need to conduct a full-fledged market definition analysis), remedies may 
penalize Google News even if it is not active in the same market as news publishers, possibly to the 
detriment of innovation and consumer choice. It further bears noting that in this particular area, an 
additional problem arises, that of establishing that a copyright infringement has taken place. For 
example, in Copiepresse, the Court held that reading the headlines and the first few lines of a news 
to the original websites,77 without, however, basing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 000) 
74 Chapter 3, Part 4.b. 
75 Court of appeal of Brussels, Google Inc. v. Copiepresse, R. No. 2011/2999, No. 817, paragraph 62 
76 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25: Google uses on its own specialized search services original material taken from 
 
77 Ibid., paragraph 28 
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this finding on any evidence.78 Having assumed that Google News was a substitute for rather than a 
complement to the websites of news providers, the Court concluded that the use by Google News of 
reby 
falling foul of copyright law.79 
practices may have led to an erroneous finding.80 The Court was, arguably correctly, criticized on this 
point.81  
 
The most recent Commission decision where 
markets were considered (but not discussed in detail) is Newscorp/BSkyB.82 While not dealing with 
news aggregation, the brief analysis the Commission conducted raises some issues that are relevant 
here. For example, Newscorp submitted that the relevant product market is the market for the supply 
of print newspapers and online news services.83 More particularly, Newscorp argued that print titles 
face significant competitive constraints from branded websites, including websites of established 
broadcasters such as the BBC, Internet portals such as Yahoo!, search engines and blogs. 84  In 
Newscorp/BSkyB, it was further mentioned that whether or not the provider charges for news might 
play a pivotal role in assessing demand-side substitutability. If so, print newspapers may be 
interchangeable with online paid-for services,85 but not with online news content offered for free. The 
issue of whether online news provision is an alternative to print titles is still unresolved. While 
regulatory authorities tend to treat off- and on-line news as complements rather than substitutes,86 
empirical research has produced mixed outcomes.87 As regards the distinction between paid-for and 
free news content, in the past, the Commission found that national dailies and free newspapers belong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Docquir, P. F. and Bart Van Besien (2014). Changing Conditions of Competition for Public Service and Commercial Media in 
Belgium: Implications for Media Independence, 154. In Psychogiopoulou, E. Media Policies Revisited. The Challenge for Media 
Freedom and Independence. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan  
79 Court of appeal of Brussels, Google Inc. v. Copiepresse, R. No. 2011/2999, No. 817, paragraphs 27-29 and 44 
80 This example illustrates another function that EU competition law may perform; tools used to assess demand-side substitutability 
may also inform an analysis under IP law 
81 Xalabarder, R. (2011), supra n. 56, 160  
82 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2 
83 Ibid., paragraph 207 
84 Ibid., paragraph 209 
85 Commission decision News Corp/BSkyB, Case No COMP/M.5932 [2011] C 37/2, paragraph 211 
86 See, for instance, Ofcom (2012). Measuring Media Plurality TV, Radio, Newspapers, Online should not be seen as 
 Waldman, S. and 
the Working Group on Information Needs of Communities (2011). The Information Needs of Communities. The changing media 
landscape in a broadband age -throated endorsement to new media platforms as a substitute for 
http://www.fcc.gov/info-needs-communities  
87 See, for instance, Gentzkow, M. (2007). Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online Newspapers. The American 
Economic Review, 97(3), 713-744; De Waal, E., Klaus Schönbach and Edmund Lauf (2005). Online newspapers: A substitute or 
complement for print newspapers and other information channels? Communications: The European Journal of Communication 
Research, 30, 55-72; Filistrucchi, L. (2005). The Impact of Internet on the Market for Daily Newspapers in Italy. EUI Working Paper 
ECO No. 2005/12. Retrieved from: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/3353/ECO2005-12.pdf; Kaiser, U. and Hans Christian 
Kongsted (2005). nnibalize the Demand for the Print Version? Centre for Applied 
Microeconometrics - Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen Working Paper 2005-07. Retrieved from: 
http://academics.holycross.edu/files/econ_accounting/Knuff.pdf  
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to separate markets.88 This distinction may be relevant in the online world. As already seen in 
Chapter 5, given the amount of information that is currently available online for free, users are not 
amenable to pay for content.89 Of course, reaching conclusions on the above issues depends on a 
number of factors (e.g. Internet penetration and use, demographics, news consumption habits in the 
relevant market, etc.). Any decision would therefore require a fact-intensive analysis that takes 
account of the particularities of the market(s) under scrutiny. However, if we indeed define the 
market as broadly as suggested in Newscorp/BSkyB (market for the supply of news or market for 
paid-for v. market for free news content), Google News is unlikely to be found dominant.  
 
is, a market for the supply of content (headlines and small excerpts) that attracts users to one or 
another website.90 This should not be excluded. In Chapter 4, I extensively discussed why in cases 
where the consumer is not required to pay in order to access a content platform, a market for 
audiences may need to be defined for antitrust purposes. The main argument put forward in Chapter 3 
is that limiting the market definition exercise to advertising markets is not a proxy for the market for 
audiences, for programs that are regarded as substitutes by the advertisers are not necessarily 
s. One could argue that this risk does not exist in the case of news 
aggregators because behavioral targeting is more effective than advertising with generalist TV 
channels, that is to say, in the online sphere, advertisers do not necessarily invest in the webpage that 
attracts the masses but may target each user individually depending on preferences that are revealed 
by her online history. This may apply to some extent to news aggregators that sell advertising space 
such as Yahoo! News. But, Google News is ad-free. Would that mean that services such as Google 
News are not relevant for a competition analysis? The answer is no. An undertaking may produce 
anti-competitive effects irrespective of the business model it uses to offer its products. Google 
detail below, may have implications for competition assessments in a way that is similar to the 
transaction described in Chapter 4, namely the exchange of content for attention. This is where the 
third condition set in NBA, namely that the firm misappropriating the content is in direct competition 
with news outlets, comes in. If we indeed follow the approach proposed here, then Google News and 
news providers could be competing in a market for (on
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See, for instance, Commission decision Newspaper Publishing Case No IV/M.423 [1994] OJ C 85/5, paragraph 17 and Case 
IV/M.1401, Commission decision Recoletos/Unedisa, Case No. IV/M. 1401 [1999] OJ C 73/6, paragraph 29 
89 Joint Research Center (2012), supra n. 31, 6  
90 Note that this has been logic has been applied to cases concerning copyright infringements. See, for instance, Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 65 (1985) 
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News could be found to possess the market power required to trigger the application of Article 102 
TFEU.  
 
The first and second conditions imposed in NBA (information is gathered at a cost and news is 
time-sensitive) are both fairly easy to fulfill and reflect factors that have long been taken into account 
application of Article 102 TFEU lays down that the existence of high barriers to entry is a parameter 
for assessing the closure effects that the conduct of the dominant firm may generate.91 As discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2, the production of news content, which involves exceptionally high 
newsgathering costs, labor costs, etc.,92 is a rather expensive undertaking. With respect to the second 
condition, the Guidance Paper also lays down that, in examining foreclosure effects, the Commission 
will take into account the conditions of the market affected by the conduct. Applied to the newspaper 
INS could be raised here; news 
has a short life cycle and a dominant news aggregator may harm competition to the extent that it 
93 In Chapter 5, where I discussed the highly perishable nature of newspapers, I referred to 
cases indicating that the Commission and the Court were largely sympathetic to this particularity of 
news markets.94 
 
Fulfillment of the final two criteria, namely free-
reduction or elimination of the incentive to compete as a result of the unlawful conduct, could, under 
certain conditions, support the claim that Google News has abused its position. In the EU, free-riding 
as behavior that raises anti-competitive concerns has mostly been dealt with in the literature 
regarding vertical restraints. For example, as already discussed in detail in Chapter 5, advocates of 
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contend that the obligation to sell at a retail price set by the 
manufacturer eliminates the risk of free- quality of 
service.95 As also seen in Chapter 5, proponents of Most-Favored-Nation clauses (MFNs) maintain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraphs 16-17 and 20 
92 On this see Norton, S. W. and Will Norton Jr. (1986). Economies of Scale and the New Technology of Daily Newspapers: A 
Survivor Analysis. University of Nebraska  Lincoln College of Journalism & Mass Communications, Working Paper 6 
93 International News Service v. Associated Press, 240 U.S. 215 (1918) 
94 See Commission Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Regulation No 17 concerning Case IV/31.609, Agence et Messageries de la 
Presse [1987] OJ C 164/02 and ECJ, Case 243/83, SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la presse [1985] ECR 2015  
95 See, for instance, Petit, N. and David Henry (2010). Vertical Restraints under EU Competition Law: Conceptual Foundations and 
Practical Framework, 9-10 SSRN Working Paper. Retrieved from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1724891; 
Peepercorn, L. (2008). Resale price maintenance and its alleged efficiencies. European Competition Journal 4(1), 201-212; Elzinga, K. 
G. and David E. Mills (2010). Leegin and Procompetitive Resale Price Maintenance; Gippini-Fournier, E. (2010). Resale Price 
Maintenance in the EU: in statu quo ante bellum? SSRN Working Paper, 15. Retrieved from: 
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that MFNs encourage a distributor to make the contract-specific investment required to penetrate a 
risky (downstream) market because it provides it with some certainty that the manufacturer will not 
free-ride on its efforts, offering subsequent entrants better deals in order to expand its distribution 
network.96 
under Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission Guidelines give an example of an exclusive distribution 
agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor that undertakes, inter alia, to advertise the 
product, survey consumers and ensure quick delivery.97 The Commission notes that a ban on active 
sales preventing other firms from selling into the territory of the distributor could be regarded as 
indispensable on the grounds that the latter would lack the motivation to sell the product if other 
firms could free-ride on its investments.98 As regards the relationship between unilateral conduct and 
free-riding, Article 102 TFEU has occasionally been applied in a way that favored the competitors of 
the dominant firm rather than competition as a value in itself. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that in the late 
nificant market power and which refused to grant access 
to an input they controlled were axiomatically deemed to act in violation of Article 102 TFEU.99 This 
approach, which mainly aimed to liberalize former State monopolies,100 was subsequently modified 
and stricter tests have been introduced that limited the scope of Article 102 TFEU.101 Yet, while the 
approach to complaints alleging abuses of dominance has undoubtedly gradually become more 
stringent, Petit and Neyrinck make a convincing case that, even in more recent case law such as 
Microsoft, Article 102 TFEU was instrumentalized in order to put competitors on a par with a 
dominant firm that possessed a valuable input, allowing competitors to free-ride to some extent on 
. 102  Indeed, as already seen in Chapter 3, the Court has interpreted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1476443 Also available in Hawk, B. (ed.). Annual Proceedings of the 36th Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy-Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 515-549. Huntington, NY: Juris Publishing 
96 See Vanderborre, I. and Michael J. Frese (2014). Most Favored Nation Clauses Revisited. European Competition Law Review, 12, 
589, and Baker, J. B. and Judith A. Chevalier (2013). The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions. Antitrust 
Magazine, 27(2), 20-21 
97 Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 82 
98 Ibid. 
99 See, for instance, Commission decision Sealink/B&I-Holyhead [1992] 5 Common Market Law Review, 255 
100 For more information on this issue see, for instance, van den Bergh, R. and Peter Camesasca (2006). European Competition Law 
and Economics  A Comparative Perspective, 274-6. Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford: Intersentia-Hart Publishing. 
101 See, for instance, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. 
KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others [1998] ECR I-7791; Joined cases T- 374/1994, T-
375/1994, T-384/1994 and T-388/1994, European Night Services and others v. Commission of the European Communities [1998] 
ECR II-3141 For more details on the case law and how it has been applied to the media sector see Chapter 2, Parts 2.a. and 4.a. 
102 Petit, N. and Norman Neyrinck (2011). Droit de la Concurrence et Instrumentalisation Parasitaire, 10-16. Working Paper. Institut 
d'Etudes Juridiques Européennes, Université de Liège. Retrieved from: http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/98911  
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 in order to ensure that competitors would be granted 
access to the input to which they sought access, namely interoperability information.103  
 
Adapting the above to the case at hand, we should first say that the thread joining the theories 
in favor of introducing restraints that seek to address this type of conduct is the concern that, absent 
the restraint, the incentive to penetrate a market, invest in risky projects, etc. would be either 
significantly reduced or altogether eliminated.104 Similar remarks can be made with respect to the 
logic underpinning the decisional practice in cases of abuse of dominance. For example, as will be 
seen in greater detail below (Part 5), in Microsoft, the Commission has sought to ensure that the 
source code but interoperability information, which is a less invasive alternative). 105  To ensure 
consistency with economic theory and the relevant case law -riding could be regarded 
as abusive if it reduced or eliminated the incentive of newspapers to gather and report news. Here, 
one would need to check whether readers indeed replace news outlets with Google News, thereby 
potentially depriving the former of the ability to generate revenues. It bears noting that in the FTC 
proceedings, this issue created considerable tension between the Commissioners because, from the 
evidence submitted, it could be inferred that scraping favored rather than harmed websites competing 
with Google. For example, in his (dissenting) statement, Commissioner Rosch noted that the 
investigation revealed that the alleged victims   not injured: overall traffic 
to the alleged victims increased substantially while the alleged scraping was occurring and traffic to 
these websites from Google grew at an even faster rate .106 Google ultimately committed to refrain 
from scraping third-party content, 107  
argument that no harm was done to competitors, it is questioned whether the FTC followed the right 
approach to this issue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 CFI, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-03601, paragraphs 630 et seq. See 
2008). 
EU Competition Law - Texts, Cases and Materials (3rd Edition), 571-574. Oxford: OUP 
104  See, for instance, Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 82; 
Vanderborre, I. and Michael J. Frese (2014), supra n. 96, 589; Baker, J. B. and Judith A. Chevalier (2013), supra n. 96, 20, and 
Orbach, B. Y. (2008). Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices. Arizona Law Review 50, 276 
105 See infra, Part 4. On this issue see also Massadeh, A. A. (2011). The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under Scrutiny: EU and US 
Perspective. UEA Working Paper Series 2011-AM-1 (see in particular pp. 20 et seq.) 
106  See Federal Trade Commission (2013b, January). Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch 
Regar FTC File No. 111-0163. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-and-dissenting-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-
rosch-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103googlesearchstmt.pdf and Federal Trade Commission (2013c, January). Statement of 
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen In the Matter of Google Inc. FTC File No. 111-0163. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commissioner-maureen-
ohlhausen/130103googlesearchohlhausenstmt.pdf  
107  See Federal Trade Commission (2013a, January). 
Practices In the Matter of Google Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163, fn. 2. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
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The above analysis shows that, provided that Google News holds a dominant position in the 
affected market, news providers could bring a complaint under Article 102 TFEU. However, a 
decision dealing with whether scraping amounts to an abuse should be based on proof demonstrating 
on to the aggregating platform. In the absence of relevant evidence, the Commission would commit 
the error to punish a firm which a) has not harmed the complainants, and b) possibly brings added 
value to the readership.  
 
3.1.2. Can publishers be forced to grant access to their content under EU competition 
law?  
 
Assuming that news aggregators bring added value to the readership and that the headlines and 
small excerpts of a news story enjoy copyright protection, I shall also attempt to answer the flipside 
to the question posed above, that is, whether EU competition law equips news aggregators with any 
tools to force news outlets to license their content. As already indicated above, the issue of whether 
snippets of news articles are indeed copyrightable is still unsettled across the EU. Court rulings and 
recent legislative action in a handful of Member States suggest a tendency toward granting news 
publishers benefits of copyright protection.108 Whether news scraping should qualify as a copyright 
infringement falls outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that granting news outlets 
exclusivity over snippets of articles which they produced and which are publicly available on the 
Internet has generated much controversy. Many have argued that snippets are not worthy of copyright 
protection and that -founded attempt to 
109 that stretched the boundaries of IP law in an excessive manner.110 
Hence, the below analysis is based on a premise that represents a recent trend that has emerged in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See, for instance, Court of appeal of Brussels, Google Inc. v. Copiepresse, R. No. 2011/2999, No. 817, 52-55 and infra ns. 121 and 
126 
109 See, for instance, Ibáñez Colomo, P. The Spanish Google tax, or (twice) the perfect cartel
Retrieved from: http://chillingcompetition.com/2014/03/19/the-spanish-google-tax-or-twice-the-perfect-cartel/   
110 See, for instance, Rosati, E. Fordham Focus 9: News Aggregators and Fair Use. 5 April 2013, The IPKat. Retrieved from: 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.it/2013/04/fordham-focus-9-news-aggregators-and.html Another case with a similar factual background is 
NMPP v. Conseil de la Concurrence, which concerned the refusal of NMPP, the largest press distributor in France, to grant access to 
its software system and database. The Cour de Cassation annulled a judgment of the Paris Court of Appeals that had upheld the 
decision of the Conseil de la Conc
competitor had successfully argued before the Conseil de la Concurrence that, although it had at its disposal the necessary resources to 
design software with 
la Concurrence Decision n. 03-MC-04 of December 22, 2003, Messageries Lyonnaises de Presse and Cour de Cassation, Judgment of 
February 12, 2004, NMPP v. Conseil de la Concurrence, BOCCRF n. 5 of May 4, 2004. For a brief analysis of this case see Georges, 
A. and Matteo F. Bay (2005). Essential Facilities: A Doctrine Clearly in Need of Limiting Principles? Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Jour, 17(12), 1-4 
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copyright law across the EU, but this should not be understood to mean that the headline and the first 
few lines of the lede of a news story (should) enjoy copyright protection.  
 
For our purposes, we assume that all or the vast majority of news outlets that produce the 
content to which content is sought jointly decide to refuse to supply Google News. In other words, 
we assume that news outlets enjoy a collective dominant position which is, inter alia, determined 
concerned.111 Albeit outside the boundaries of the EU, this has happened. In Brazil, newspapers 
collectively decided to opt out of Google News.112 
 
Delineating the boundaries of the relevant market is, once again, key to answering the question 
at hand. Pursuant to the refusal to supply line of case law, if news outlets and news aggregators 
operate in the same market, news outlets may not be forced to license their content. In Chapter 2, it 
was seen that in Volvo,113 which concerned the refusal by the proprietor of a design right covering car 
body panels to license third parties to sell products incorporating the protected design, the Court 
ruled that in the primary market for which a dominant undertaking has a monopoly owning to its own 
IP, the exclusive right to produce or sell should be fully respected.114 As already discussed above, the 
issue of whether news aggregators compete with news outlets is still unsettled and dependent on the 
approach to market definition the Commission would adopt in such cases. If news aggregators and 
news outlets were found to operate in separate markets, the latter could, under certain conditions, be 
required to license their content. These conditions were dealt with in Magill, which concerned the 
refusal of three Irish broadcasters to license their program listings to a weekly TV guide.115 In Magill, 
the Court held that, unless there is an objective justification for the refusal (note that the mere 
possession of an IPR is not an objective justification for exclusionary behavior116), the dominant 
company must provide access to its input if the refusal prevents the creation of a new product and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  See ECJ, Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and others v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-01477. For a 
comprehensive overview of the case law on collective dominance see Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2008), supra n. 103, 918-935 
112 Fraga, I. Brazilian newspapers leave Google News en masse. 22 October 2012, Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. 
Retrieved from: https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-11841-newspapers-say-their-boycott-turned-google-news- -brazil-
reiterate-request-p I adopt this approach because saying that a single news outlet should be obliged to license snippets on the grounds 
that it be a 
stretch 
113 ECJ, Case 238/87 Volvo v. Veng (UK) [1988] ECR 6211 
114 Ibid., paragraph 8 
115 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Commission [1995] ECR I-743 
116 Examples of acceptable justifications include poor creditworthiness, safety, etc. See Anderman, S. and Hedvig Schmidt (2011). EU 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights  The Regulation of Innovation (Second Edition), 104. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
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results in excluding potential competition in the secondary market.117 A broad interpretation of the 
above criteria could lead to the conclusion that news aggregators requesting access to content 
produced by news outlets may pass the Magill test. A news aggregator such as Google News may 
full text of the articles it aggregates118 and does not display the content of one source only. Moreover, 
news aggregators and news outlets may fulfill different needs of the readership. For example, a recent 
words, they do 
not want to read opinionated news when they access a news aggregation platform119 (note that this 
parameter could also inform market definition). This is in sharp contrast to consumption of traditional 
titles which, as already seen, is often driven by political preferences.120 And finally, assuming that 
news aggregators operate in a separate market, a refusal to supply would exclude downstream 
competition since the alternative (creating an x amount of news outlets to aggregate their content) 
would not only seem unfeasible but also invalidate the raison d' être of the service, that is, the 
aggregation of content provided by numerous news sources covering a wide variety of topics.  
 
From a practical perspective, however, one may question whether establishing the duty to 
license will produce positive results. There is worrying evidence to suggest that this duty may create 
more problems than it solves. One way of testing this is to check what happened in cases where a 
licensing mechanism was established by means of regulation. For example, the Spanish legislator has 
recently introduced a law requiring news aggregators to pay (through AEDE, the Asociación de 
Editores de Diarios Españoles) news outlets a fee for the use of content produced by the latter.121 An 
important aspect of this law is that news outlets may not opt out of the regime, that is, they are not 
allowed to offer their content for free.122 Google exited the market shortly after the law was adopted 
portedly subsequently reduced by 10-15%.123 AEDE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Comission, [1995] ECR I-743, paragraphs 54-56 
118 For differences among news aggregators see Huang, J. S., Yang, M. J., and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2013), supra n. 50, 4 
119 Lee, A. M. and Hsiang Iris Chyi (2015), supra n. 44, 18 
120 See, for instance, Chapter 3, Part 4.b. 
121 Ley 21/2014, de 4 de noviembre, por la que se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, aprobado por Real 
Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de abril, y la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil. [2014] BOE Núm. 268 Sec. I. Pág. 
90404. Retrieved from: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2014/11/05/pdfs/BOE-A-2014-11404.pdf  
122 La puesta a disposición del público por parte de prestadores de servicios electrónicos 
de agregación de contenidos de fragmentos no significativos de contenidos, divulgados en publicaciones periódicas o en sitios Web de 
actualización periódica y que tengan una finalidad informativa, de creación de opinión pública o de entretenimiento, no requerirá 
autorización, sin perjuicio del derecho del editor o, en su caso, de otros titulares de derechos a percibir una compensación equitativa. 
Este derecho será irrenunciable 
[emphasis added] On this see also García, R. R. Google News solo volverá a España si la tasa por contenidos es voluntaria. 12 
December 2014, La Voz de Galicia. Retrieved from: http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/vidadigital/2014/12/12/google-news-solo-
volvera-espana-tasa-contenidos-voluntaria/0003_201412G12P61991.htm  
123 Google News Spagna Chiude? Traffico in Calo del 15%
http://www.tomshw.it/news/google-news-spagna-chiude-traffico-in-calo-del-15-63176  
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called upon the public authorities to take action124 and, following a petition launched by opposition 
party PSOE, the law is currently under review by the Constitutional Court.125 In Germany a similar 
law was introduced in 2013 which apparently also has been far from a success story; publishers 
reportedly voluntarily relinquished their right to payment from Google only.126 In this scenario, the 
obligation to license burdens in effect smaller aggregators, thus impeding the development of a 
competitive news market.  
 
A different path was followed in Belgium and France where the cases concerning scraping by 
Google News were settled before regulatory plans materialized. For example, in Belgium, a 
partnership was established whereby Google committed to, inter alia
efforts to generate revenues via its various advertising services (AdWords, AdSense, AdExchange), 
promote reader 
.127 In France, Google made 
a hefty contribution to a special fund in order to assist French media with increasing their presence on 
the Internet.128 While it is probably too soon to say with certainty whether these initiatives will 
positively affect the future of news provision, at this stage, given the developments discussed above, 
they may be more appropriate than an obligation to license irrespective of whether the latter is 
imposed as a result of competition law proceedings or by means of regulation.  
 
scraping: Going too far?  
 
We are now turning to the assessment of the remedies proposed by Google in the pending 
antitrust case. In the document outlining the remedies concerned, Google undertook to provide 
publishers with a technical solution to a) prevent the display of snippets for their articles on Google 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Kassam, A. . 16 December 2014, The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/16/google-news-spain-publishing-fees-internet On this issue see also El cierre de Google 
News no impedirá al ciudadano el acceso a las noticias. 13 December 2014, El Periódico. Retrieved from: 
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/cierre-google-news-espana-acceso-noticias-internet-3769029, and Perpetuo, J. El 
cierre de Google News y la libertad de información en España. 11 December 2014, El Mundo. Retrieved from: 
http://www.elmundo.es/blogs/elmundo/jaqueperpetuo/2014/12/11/el-cierre-de-google-news-y-la-libertad.html  
125 See Koch, T. La Ley de Propiedad Intelectual será juzgada por el Constitucional. 5 March 2015, El País. Retrieved from: 
http://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2015/03/05/actualidad/1425572373_653722.html 
126 Malcolm, J. Google News Shuttered in Sp . 10 December 2014, Electronic Frontiers 
Foundation. Retrieved from: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/google-news-shuts-shop-spain-thanks-ancillary-copyright-law and 
Reda, J. An EU-wide Google Tax in the Making? 28 December 2014, Julia Reda. Retrieved from: https://juliareda.eu/2014/10/an-eu-
wide-google-tax-in-the-making/ 
127  Google (2012b, December). Partnering with Belgian news publishers. Retrieved from: 
http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.it/2012/12/partnering-with-belgian-news-publishers.html  
128  Kelly, A. Google to pay 60 million euros into French media fund. 8 January 2013, Reuters. Retrieved from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-france-google-idUSBRE91011Z20130201   
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News, but without preventing the display of result links to the articles on Google News, and b) 
specify on a webpage-by-webpage basis a particular date when certain articles should no longer by 
displayed on Google News.129  
 
As regards the first proposal,130 one cannot help but wonder whether the remedy is going too 
far. From a competition perspective, in view of the remarks that were made above regarding the 
uncertainty surrounding the impact of news aggregation on the original websites, preventing the 
display of snippets may harm both Google News and the publishers. The doubts that were raised by 
FTC Commissioner Rosch are illustrative in this regard. From a media pluralism perspective, if the 
small excerpts indeed encourage the user to click through, then 
drive consumers to consult the few branded websites they have always consulted. In other words, 
display of links only may ultimately result in discouraging users from discovering alternative sources 
of information.   
 
The second commitment has to do with 
.131 In our case, this means in practice that the 
user may access a story even after the publisher removed it from its site.132 It should be noted that the 
EU Copyright Directive133 and the e-Commerce Directive134 provide that caching is not a copyright 
infringement or an illegitimate restriction on the free movement of information society services 
135 However, courts in France136 and Belgium137 rejected 
transposing) the above Directives.138 This may explain why Google offered the commitment as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 20 (c) 
130 t a 
copyright infringement. See, for instance, BGH, Paperboy, Judgment of 17.07.2003, I ZR 259/00. Available (in German) at: 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2003&Sort=3&Seite=5&client=3&anz=1706&pos=171&nr=27035 
and CJEU, Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB [2014] (not yet reported) 
131 Definition retrieved from: http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/issues-paper/caching-indexing-and-other-internet-functions#_ftn55  
132 Xalabarder, R. (2011), supra n. 56, 115 
133 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10, Article 5(1) 
134 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
rticle 13 
135 Article 13 of the e-Commerce Directive poses some additional conditions that need to be fulfilled for cache storing to be legitimate 
136 , S.A.R.L., and Google Inc. 
Judgment of 26.01.2011, 08/13423, 8. Retrieved from: http://juriscom.net/wp-content/documents/caparis20110126.pdf  
137 Court of appeal of Brussels, Google Inc. v. Copiepresse, R. No. 2011/2999, No. 817, 52-55; Court of First Instance of Brussels, 
Copiepresse v. Google, No. 06/10.928/C, pp. 18 et seq. 
138 On the copyright issues that arose in these cases see Xalabarder, R. (2011), supra n. 56, 115 et seq. 
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as why the Commission was willing to accept it.139 This approach may be understandable in that it 
that may apply to Google. However, again, this commitment may be going too far. It would be 
difficult to understand what would be the anti-competitive effects on the publisher if the user were 
allowed to access an article as it appeared on the original website.  
 
The main conclusion to draw from the above is that, under certain conditions, Article 102 
TFEU may be invoked by news publishers and news aggregators alike, even if for diametrically 
opposed purposes. However, the analysis demonstrated that the Commission should intervene with 
caution. By accepting axiomatically that a news aggregator harms competition in news markets, the 
Commission runs the risk of penalizing a platform, the conduct of which is not capable of producing 
exclusionary effects and, by imposing on the aggregator concerned far-reaching obligations, it may 
deprive the readership of a service that offers convenient access to a variety of news content.140 In the 
more extreme case of news aggregators seeking access to the content produced by news outlets, the 
Spanish and German experiences show that establishing a licensing duty may produce a less-than-
desirable outcome.  
 
4. Search engines as distribution bottlenecks: Retaliation, Exclusivity and Data 
Exploitation 
 
the most important gateway used to find 
content 141 including content that seeks to ensure an informed citizenry; in several Member States, 
search engines are the most popular means of discovering news online.142 While not all information 
is nosed out and indexed by search engines, the latter have undeniably broadened our knowledge of 
the world. To grasp the role they play in our lives, we may ask ourselves what we would do without 
them. Could we imagine an online universe where we would need to find links to websites that could 
possibly contain interesting content without a search engine assisting us with this daily activity? In 
view of what the alternative would be, it is easy to understand that, in their role as gatekeepers, 
search engines have made a significant contribution to creating an environment where information, 
including information on matters of common concern, is instantly and effortlessly available.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 European Commission (2014a, February), supra n. 22 
140 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 36, 25 
141 van Eijk, N. (2009). Search Engines, the New Bottleneck for Content Access, 141. In Preissel, B., Justus Haucap and Peter Curwen 
(eds.), Telecommunication Markets: Drivers and Impediments. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 
142  See, for instance, Ofcom (2013). International Communications Market Report, Figure 1.58. Retrieved from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-reports/cmr13/international/icmr-1.58  
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that [search engines] are now an indispensable part of our lives also means that they have the 
potential to exert significant influence over public access to different types of content, including 
. 143  In other words, search engines are not only capable of facilitating the discovery of 
information we were previously not aware of, but also capable of behaving as bottlenecks, restricting 
the scope of content that is indeed available. In this latter case, the risk that the user may be prevented 
from consulting other sources of information is greater if the market is highly concentrated. In the 
144 and the following two practices that are currently being investigated 
by the Commission illustrate how a dominant search engine may act as a bottleneck. First, Google 
; it artificially reduces the information that is 
available on the web in cases where those providing the information concerned refuse to serve 
l interests in neighboring markets. The second area which illustrates how a 
search engine may act as an information bottleneck has to do with the gathering and processing of 
gle seems to 
restrict advertisers to transferring ad campaign data to other advertising platforms, thereby potentially 
preventing them from reaching audiences that use competing services. Moreover, Google collects 
and processes a vast amount of user data in order to provide search results that are largely based on 
145 While this is supposed to deliver results that best match the 
user or 
rather to direct her to information that primarily serves its own commercial interests.  
 
Prior to discussing the above two practices in more detail, it should be noted that retaliation 
affects media pluralism in an obvious manner. The other practices, namely those related to the use of 
data, affect more generally access to information. Hence, the discussion, albeit undoubtedly relevant 
for our purposes, has a broader focus.  
 
4.1. Retaliation affecting news markets 
 
As already mentioned above, one of the main complaints put forward by news publishers 
consists in that those publishers that have objected to the display of their content in Google News 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 36, 26 
144 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
145 Note that this issue is not being investigated by the Commission 
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have been told by Google that the only way for their content not to appear on the News website 
would b 146 
iminary assessment was 
indeed driven by the three requirements which, pursuant to its Guidance Paper on the application of 
) the firm is in a 
dominant position in the tying market147 
148); b) the tying and tied products are two distinct 
products149 150); and c) the tying practice is likely to lead to 
anti-competitive foreclosure 151  
152). If broadly interpreted, the case law, as codified in the Guidance Paper, would support 
the argument th
customers that purchase one product (the tying product) are required also to purchase another 
153 News publishers are 
the case of Google News they are suppliers of a valuable input. In view of the above, this is not a 
typical tying case. However, Google does make display in Search entirely conditional upon display in 
News and, where a news publisher does not allow the use of its content by the aggregating platform, 
compete in the general search market, but a finding of abuse does not depend on whether the anti-
competitive effects are manifested in the tied or the tying market154). Ultimately, even if one were 
Google is using its market power in general online search to strengthen its position in an ancillary 
market, however that latter market is defined (see above on possible market definitions).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
147 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 50 
148 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
149 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 50 
150 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
151 Guidance on the Commissio
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 50 
152 European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25 
153 s in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, 
consumers as well as undertakings competing with the dominant firm in upstream or downstream markets 
154 ). 
Leveraging Market Power Through Tying: Does Google Behave Anticompetitively?, 15-17. Harvard Business School - Working Paper 
14-112. Retrieved from: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7464.html 
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To address the concerns associated with the retaliation practice, Google undertook to ensure 
e Search. As will be seen in greater 
mechanism.  
 
Opt out of what? In all three submissions, Google explicitly stated that, were a news outlet to 
opt out o Generic Search 
Results 155 
are news results that are 
inter alia, results directing to DG 
formation on the proceedings, analyses of whether Google should be 
charged with antitrust violations, and a block of two or three results which originate from the 
websites of news outlets and which include updates on the investigation. This block of results is 
Google News service they contain the headline, sometimes the first few lines of the story, and a link 
to the story concerned.  
 
The way in which the commitment is drafted would arguably give Google considerable room 
for maneuver in disputes that could possibly arise after the closing of the investigation. More 
not 
restricted by design to one or a limited set of pre-defined content categories, such as news, product, 
local businesses, images, travel and video, and 
Google General Search Input Feature 156 This definition would seem to free 
Google of the obligation to include in News Universals stories produced by news outlets that opt out 
of Google News.157 Moreover, were news publishers to bring complaints after this remedy is made 
legally binding, Google could argue that this is how its Universal Search model is designed (note that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Google (2013, April). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 19. Note that the second time 
 
Google (2013, October). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 21 and Google (2014, January). 
Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 22 
156 Ibid., 8 
157 European Press Publishers (2014, September). Press Publishers' Response to Google's Third Commitments Proposal. European 
Commission's Competition Investigation of Google - AT.39.740, 11-12 
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algorithm would search all of its content sources, for instance YouTube, Google News, Google 
158). If a 
cannot be included in the News Universals block. The ways News Universals affect news 
consumption is admittedly far from clear. However, one cannot help but have mixed feelings about 
this remedy. If the prominent display of News Universals encourages users to click through the 
websites of (only or predominantly) those publishers that appear on Google News, then the 
commitment may introduce a different, albeit softer, form of retaliation, thereby falling short of 
addressing the main concern that arose in the context of the investigation, that is, th
Google News to Google Search. Unsurprisingly, news publishers criticized this proposal, maintaining 
those results to protect its content 159 
 
How to opt out? Google provided news outlets with two options. First, news outlets may fill in 
a web-based Notice Form where they state that they wish to opt out of the News service.160 This 
proposal is both superfluous and highly likely to be ineffective: superfluous because apparently the 
Notice Form mechanism was in place long before the investigation.161 And likely to be ineffective 
because Google would cease displaying content on News 
162 As already explained, news is time sensitive and hence highly 
perishable. Thus, using the Notice Form is arguably not a viable solution for a news publisher that 
exercises the right maintain a specific robots 
exclusion protocol .163 
For the sake of clarity, it bears noting that, a robots exclusion protocol, as a technical solution, has 
been available to websites for quite some time. In fact, the mere ability to use robots exclusion 
protocols has been one of the oft-repeated arguments put forward by Google in cases concerning 
copyright infringements, where it has contended that the fact that a website does not implement a 
164 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158Google (2007, May). Google Begins Move to Universal Search. Retrieved from: http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-
begins-move-to-universal-search_16.html 
to break down the silos of information that exist on the web and provide the very best answer every time a user enters a quer  
159 European Press Publishers (2014, September), supra n. 157, 11-12 
160 Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 11 
161 Edelman, B. (2014), supra n. 154, 14 
162 Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 12 
163 Ibid., paragraph 20 
164 On this issue and relevant case law see Xalabarder, R. (2011), supra n. 56, 155 
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 complaint consisted in that Google would use a system 
whereby whichever website implemented the robots exclusion protocol to prevent display in News 
would automatically lose visibility in Google Search. 165  This may still be a problem since the 
commitments have not been made legally binding and, to my knowledge, Google has not taken any 
action on its own initiative to ensure that a website using an exclusion protocol for News will not be 
ostracized from generic search results.  
 
What to opt out? In cases where they indeed use a robots exclusion protocol, publishers are 
entitled to opt out on a webpage-by-webpage basis. That is to say, in cases where a webpage contains 
several stories, the news outlet may not choose which stories it wants to see displayed in Google 
News. Google provided no explanations as to why the opt out should have such a wide scope.166 
However, the technical means supporting inclusion on an item-by-item basis seems to exist. For 
example, in the case dealing with the retaliation complaint brought by Italian publishers, AgCom, the 
Italian media regulator imposed upon Google the obligation to ensure that publishers are in the 
167   
 
Retaliation, as manifested in the Google case, is a worrisome practice, possibly more 
worrisome than scraping in that, as opposed to the latter, the effects of the former are per se 
exclusionary. It is therefore inexplicable why the Commission appeared willing to accept the 
commitments proposed by Google which, as the above analysis showed, would be incapable of 
addressing the concerns to which they give rise.   
 
4.2. Retention and Use of Data affecting advertisers and online users 
 
The other area that illustrates the ways in which digital intermediaries may shape the 
architecture of information markets in their role as bottlenecks is the gathering and processing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Sullivan, D. . 27 August 2009, Search Engine  Land. 
Retrieved from: http://searchengineland.com/deunking-the-italian-newspapers-antitrust-allegations-against-google-24698  
166 Note that in the case of the Notice Form, the opt out would have an even wider scope, allowing website owners to opt out either for 
their entire domain or for one or some of their sub-domains. See Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - 
Foundem and others, paragraph 11 
167 AGCom. A420 - AS787. . 
Gli editori possono decidere di 
escludere selettivamente specifici articoli o immagini
http://www.agcm.it/stampa/news/5194-a420-as787-antitrust-accetta-impegni-di-google-e-chiede-al-parlamento-di-adeguare-le-norme-
sul-diritto-dautore.html That this technical measure is possible can also be inferred from how Google proposes to display content of 
competing (e.g. travel and product) sites. Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, 
paragraph 18  
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the collection and use of data arise in two contexts that will be examined in this section. First, Google 
has engaged in practices that restrict advertisers to exporting ad campaign data into competing 
advertising platforms. This in turn can be seen from two different perspectives. First, content 
providers, including news outlets, advertise with Google. If the restrictions introduced by Google 
lead to content providers advertising exclusively with Google, then Google may have prevented them 
from reaching the user base of other search engines. Second, data portability restrictions may 
significantly reduce the ability of other search engines to attract advertisers.   
 
Data portability restrictions relate to a broader problem that arises in markets where digital 
intermediaries operate, namely the existence of high switching costs that may amount to customer 
lock-in. The degree of customer lock-in resulting from data portability restrictions will, inter alia, 
depend on the scope of the restrictions and the type of the intermediary. For example, in the case of 
digital retailers which manufacture the hardware devices to which their digital content stores are tied 
and which do not allow the user to transfer the acquired content to a competing device, customer 
lock-in appears to be high. In the case of social networks that provide users with the tools to export 
some (but not all) of their data into a competing network, customer lock-in is lower.          
 
The second issue that relates to the use of data by powerful digital intermediaries is the 
(sensitive) information supplied by the online user to the intermediary. Digital intermediaries rely 
heavily on collecting and processing user data that reveals valuable information about consumer 
preferences and is used to serve a number of purposes, including targeted advertising. However, 
online users are not always aware of how intermediaries they use in their daily lives implement their 
privacy policies, that is, they are in limbo over the vast amount of data they (involuntarily or light-
heartedly) unveil. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the intermediary 
processes data to bring an added value to the user (e.g. 
her to information that primarily serves its purpose to maximize profit. Consumer exploitation in this 
context may give grounds for antitrust intervention that seeks to increase transparency about the ways 
in which the collection and processing of data may affect the information to which online users are 
exposed. 
 
4.2.1. Restrictions on Data Portability 
 
electronic processing system to and into another, without being prevented from doing so by the 
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168 
Interface (API),169 an instrument that facilitates the management of an AdWords campaign,170 are 
prevented from using tools offered by software developers that allow them to transfer ad campaign 
data, such as keywords, price and targeting information,171 to rival advertising platforms such as 
172  
 
Data portability restrictions raise barriers to substituting a service provider for another.173 In 
antitrust parlance, they create switching costs,174 
.175 Switching costs may become a 
competition issue if they are high enough to lock in the customer to a given provider.176 In the case at 
hand, advertiser lock-in may push out of the market competing ad-based search engines or raise (the 
already high177) barriers to entry,178 thereby producing exclusionary effects. Moreover, were the 
restrictions concerned so stringent as to impede the creation of instruments that allow a more efficient 
use of ad campaign data, it could also be argued that Google harms innovation. Under this lens, 
179  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final, 9. The 
proposal refers to natural persons, but, for our purposes, we adopt a broader 
undertakings  
169 
other control program such as a database management sy
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/37856/api  
170 See https://developers.google.com/adwords/api/  
171  Federal Trade Commission (2013, January). Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition 
Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search. Press Release. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc  
172  European Commission (2014a, February), supra n. 22; European Commission (2013, April), supra n. 25, and European 
Commission (2010, November), supra n. 2 
173 Geradin, D. and Monika Kuschewsky (2013). Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue, 10-
11. SSRN Working Paper. Retrieved from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216088  
174 On switching costs in new economy markets see, for instance, Edlin, A. S. and Robert G. Harris (2013). The Role of Switching 
Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of Microsoft and Google. Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 15(2), 171-213 
175 Harris, R. G. The Role of Switching Costs in the Markets for PC Operating Systems, Online Search, Internet Access and Mobile 
Service: Implications for Australian Competition and Consumer Protection Policy
https://www.ipria.org/events/conf/Competition_Conference/Switching_Costs.pdf Note that switching costs may take various forms; 
they can, inter alia, be inherent (present in all markets) or strategic (created or raised by a competitor to reduce or eliminate the 
incentive to switch) 
176 Geradin, D. Data Portability and EU Competition Law, 3. Presented at the BITS conference, Brussels, 24 April 2014 
177 For an analysis see Chapter 1, Part 3.b. 
178 le 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 17 
179 Geradin, D. and Monika Kuschewsky (2013), supra n. 173, 11; Graef, I., Jeroen Verschakelen and Peggy Valcke (2014). Putting 
the right to data portability into a competition law perspective, 7. SSRN Working Paper. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416537  
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In view of the above, data portability may be an issue of concern to competition authorities. It 
restrictions were caught on the EU antitrust radar, distortions of competition that may arise from high 
switching costs are hardly new to competition law. The IBM commitments decision concerning 
processing unit and operation system and software developed by competing undertakings, thus 
locking in the customer to IBM products), which dates back to 1984, is illustrative in this regard.180 
Naturally, markets evolve and new factors come into play. Data has undoubtedly become a valuable 
the development of new services. This 
has not passed unnoticed by the Commission. For example, former Competition Commissioner 
consumers can easily and cheaply transfer the data they uploaded in a service onto another service 
181 Similarly, in its Impact 
Assessment Report on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, the Commission notes that 
182  
 
Consequently, a remedy imposing the obligation to lift data portability restrictions is nothing 
 digital 
markets. But, while the imposition of the remedy as such is not controversial, a decision finding that 
a refusal to allow data portability amounts to an abuse can be, because the relevant assessment will 
undoubtedly involve examining and weighing complex technical parameters that will ultimately 
determine whether customers are indeed locked in to the products of the firm under scrutiny. At the 
time of writing this thesis, factual information about the restrictions imposed on advertisers is not 
publicly available. But, the wording of the remedy proposed by Google is very similar to that of the 
remedy made legally binding on the search giant in the US.183 In order to provide the basis of a 
framework within which the switching costs incurred by advertisers using the AdWords platform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 European Commission (1984). Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy, 77-79. Retrieved from: http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-
bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=CB4184822  
181 Almunia, J. Competition and personal data protection
m: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-860_en.htm  
182 European Commission (2012). Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment accompanying the General Data Protection 
Regulation and the Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and 
the free movement of such data SEC (2012) 72 final, p. 28 
183  Compare Google (2012a, December). Commitments Letter From Google Inc. to Chairman Leibowitz, II (retrieved from: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/google-inc./130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf) and Google (2014, 
January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraphs 33 et seq. 
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may be assessed, I shall use the information about the contracts that were scrutinized by the FTC, 
speculatively inferring that the restrictions set on advertisers in the EU are analogous to those set on 
advertisers in the US.  
 
As already indicated, in order to determine whether the customer is locked in to a service, one 
184 
Where the customer has entered into a contract with the provider concerned, one aspect that is key to 
calculating switching costs is the scope of restrictions introduced by the contract in question.185 In the 
US, apparently, AdWords advertisers were allowed to use other advertising platforms, including 
APIs linked to those other platforms.186 In other words, they were not bound by exclusive purchasing 
deals, which, as already seen, may make antitrust bells ring (especially if they involve a dominant 
firm). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, advertisers were prevented from using third party 
tools only, that is, they were not prevented from developing their own data portability tools.187 
Finally, advertisers were allowed to transfer AdWords campaign data to a competing platform.188 
Referring to the above, FTC Commissioner Rosch maintained that the restrictions were limited in 
scope and that, as a result, Google should not be forced to eliminate them.189 However, in order to 
determine the magnitude of switching costs, the analysis should go beyond the assessment of the 
contract entered into between Google and advertisers, for the lock-in may not necessarily be 
contractual. That is to say, the same restrictions may lead to de facto exclusivity. Therefore, even if 
not expressly restricted by contract, one would need to check whether it is feasible for an advertiser 
to develop its own data portability tool190 or recreate another campaign (e.g. by inserting the data 
191 ). If associated costs are high, 
advertisers, including and especially small firms, may be discouraged from advertising with another 
which advertisers developing their own portability tools must comply. Depending on how strict they 
are, these requirements could reduce or eliminate the incentive to multi-home campaigns.192 The 
same effect may be produced by harsh contractual termination provisions combined with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Shy, O. (2001). The Economics of Network Industries, 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
185 Ibid. 
186 Federal Trade Commission (2013b, January), supra n. 106, 4 
187 Ibid., 4-5 
188 Ibid., 5 
189 Ibid., 4-6 
190 the AdWords API is a good option for advertisers who have a developer or programmer who 
 with small advertisers the AdWords Editor tool. Information retrieved from: 
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/15235?hl=en 
191 Federal Trade Commission (2013b, January), supra n. 106, 5 
192 ICOMP (2013, May). Response to the Remedies Proposed by Google Inc. in Case COMP/C-3/39.740, paragraph 203 
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ambivalence as to the conditions under which advertisers may exercise their contractual right to 
If you violate any part of this AdWords API Agreement [] your access to the AdWords API may 
be suspended or terminated without notice and you have no right to use the AdWords API 193 
deliberately do not clarify certain technical aspects (e.g. whether it is allowed to display aggregated 
campaign data).194 
subject to opportunistic interpretation. 
  
However, deciding whether a remedy to lift data portability restrictions should be imposed on 
Google does not solely depend on the degree of switching costs, but also on what is the relevant 
market affected by the refusal to eliminate the restriction. In our case, it is not clear whether the 
relevant market is the broader (online) advertising market195 or whether there is a distinct market for 
(online advertising platforms) APIs or even a separate sub-market for the AdWords API. This is an 
all information and 
documentation Google provides -
-protected asset196 and, 
as already discussed, according to the relevant case law, in the primary market for which a dominant 
undertaking has a monopoly owning to its own IP, the exclusive right to produce or sell should be 
fully respected.197 Hence, pursuant to the relevant case law,198 Google should be forced to allow data 
portability enabled through third party tools if the market for the AdWords APIs or the market for 
(online advertising platforms) APIs (assuming these are two plausible market definitions) is the 
primary market and the advertising market is the ancillary market. It bears repeating that the 
inputs protected by IPRs,199 including decisions and judgments dealing with a closely related issue, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Ibid., 205 
194 Ibid., 204-205  
195 For possible market definitions in the online advertising sector see Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 
4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraphs 44 et seq. On the broader issue of how competition authorities should define the relevant product 
markets in the online search sector see Zingales, N. (2013). Product Market Definition in Online Search and Advertising. Competition 
Law Review, 9(1), 29-47 
196 See https://developers.google.com/adwords/api/docs/terms  
197 ECJ, Case 238/87, Volvo v. Veng (UK) [1988] ECR 6211, paragraph 8 
198  Ibid. See also ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd. v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743 
199 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-5039 and 
infra ns. 200 and 201 
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namely interoperability, such as Microsoft200 and IBM,201 were based on the same premise, that is, 
that the dominant firm under scrutiny was using its position in one market to strengthen its position 
(and possibly distort competition) in an ancillary market. Were we to interfere with the exercise of 
IPRs in primary markets, the incentive to innovate would arguably be significantly reduced. A good 
example that serves our purposes is Google Print Ads, a tool that was introduced to enable advertisers 
to buy traditional newspaper ads through the AdWords interface. Advertisers, including local firms, 
could use Print Ads202 to identify newspapers that fit their needs and organize their campaigns 
accordingly. If a firm knows in advance that competitors that have not made the investments required 
(in the Print Ads example these would include e.g. establishing contacts with newspapers interested 
in participating in the platform, design and implementation of supporting software, etc.) to undertake 
such initiatives may free-ride on its efforts, then why should it bother to innovate in the first place?  
 
Furthermore, if the relevant market is the (broader) advertising market, Google may still be 
found dominant, but establishing the duty to lift the restriction may not be necessary to address any 
foreclosure concerns that may arise. For example, in the US, search engine marketing firms and 
advertisers that were surveyed during the investigation stated that the API restriction did not play a 
role in their decision to choose advertising platform. 203  In other words, this was not a factor 
determining demand-side substitutability.  
 
The above remarks on the scope of data portability restrictions and possible market definitions 
lead to the following conclusion: if the costs of switching to another platform are low or if the market 
affected by the restrictions is the same market where Google exercises its API-related IPRs, then the 
duty to lift the restrictions is not proportionate to the allegedly unlawful conduct, namely that Google 
distorts the market for the AdWords APIs or the market for (online advertising platforms) APIs. If 
the affected market is the market for advertising and substitutability does not depend on the API 
restrictions, then the remedy is not necessary. Pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 See CFI, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-03601, and Commission 
decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) C (2004) 900 
final 
201 European Commission (1984), supra n. 180, 77-79 
202 While this does not alter the conclusion of the paragraph using the Print Ads example, note that Google discontinued the service 
two years after its launch 
203 Federal Trade Commission (2013b, January), supra n. 106, fn. 11 
  
	   	   268	  
and impose remedies204 and the above examples regarding data portability restrictions go partway 
toward explaining why in complex cases commitments decisions may fail to find the target.       
 
Notwithstanding the possibility that the remedy likely to be imposed upon Google will be 
disproportionate and/or unnecessary, it should be noted that where customer lock-in concerns indeed 
arise, establishing the duty to lift data portability restrictions is a powerful tool in the hands of the 
Commission. This is illustrated by the scope of the remedy envisaged in the Google case, which 
provided that Google would delete clauses of the API terms that prevented software developers from 
offering functionalities that allowed advertisers to a) copy
AdWords and non-Google advertising services and b) transmit -Google 
advertising services. 205  The wording of the commitment resembles greatly the wording of the 
proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, which will soon replace the EU Data Protection 
Directive.206 
controller a copy of the provid transferred directly from 
207 The 
right to data portability applies in cases of copying and transfer of personal data, 
information to an identified or identifiable natural person.208 As the Google case clearly illustrates, a 
remedy imposed on a firm that violated the competition provisions is more far-reaching since it may 
also cover data that are not strictly .209 Hence, to the extent that the commitment protects 
the competitive process, EU competition law may address a regulatory gap, to the benefit of the user 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
205 Google (2014, January). Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others, paragraph 33 
206 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive) [1995] OJ L 281/31 
207 
exercise of the right to transfer data to cases where this would be technically and feasible and available. See Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11, final and compare with European Parliament 
legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011  C7-0025/2012  2012/0011(COD)), Article 15(2)(a). Also note that the right to data 
portability may have far-reaching and -some say- mostly adverse consequences for the consumer. For a comprehensive overview of 
the potential negative implications arising from establishing a right to data portability as envisaged by the EU legislator see Swire, P. 
and Yianni Lagos (2013). Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique. 
Maryland Law Review, 72(2), 335-380 
208 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive) [1995] OJ L 281/31, Article 2(a) 
209 Graef, I., Jeroen Verschakelen and Peggy Valcke (2014), supra n. 179, 8. It goes without saying that remedies intended to lift data 
portability restrictions may not only concern advertisers and software developers, but also the online users. Google seems to have 
taken some steps to facilitate management of data extracted from email accounts and social networking tool Google+, but Facebook 
has been severely criticized over the data portability restrictions imposed on users. On the competition concerns that arise from 
s see Graef, I., Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas and Peggy Valcke. Data 
Interoperability in Online Social Networks. Paper presented at the International Workshop on Competition Policy and Regulation in 
Media and Telecommunications: Bridging Law and Economics, 23 and 24 May 2013, Tilburg  
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that will have, as a result, more choice. Moreover, fear of falling under the EU antitrust microscope 
for refusing to lift data portability restrictions may produce substantial deterrent effects that (at least 
for a dominant firm) are larger than those produced by the envisaged regulatory framework: under 
EU competition law, an undertaking which has abused its dominant position may be required to pay a 
fine up to 10% of its total turnover, 210  whereas under the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation,211 an undertaking that falls short of respecting obligations to respect data portability may 
be required to pay a fine up to 5% of its turnover.212  
 
To sum up, data portability restrictions may (artificially) raise the switching costs consumers 
need to incur to change from one intermediary to another. Imposing on a powerful firm the duty to 
lift these restrictions is not only a manifestation of the flexibility of EU competition law to adapt to 
the specific circumstances of new economy markets, but also a useful tool in the hands of the 
Commission to ensure that consumer choice is not reduced. However, the switching costs must be 
carefully measured, for otherwise they may chill innovation, including the emergence of products 
that could contribute to the development of content markets.  
 
4.2.2. Exploitative Gathering and Processing of User Data 
 
As already mentioned, the second issue that relates to the use of data by powerful digital 
intermediaries is the collection and processing of information disclosed by the online user. User data 
213 including and especially advertising-based providers; user 
data enables a company like Google to strengthen its relationship with its advertising partners 
combining information regarding geographical location, time of day, areas of interest, previous 
214 and so much more. Moreover, and besides delivering the promise for more 
ts. This 
relevance does not relate solely to the query, but also (and perhaps primarily) to the interests of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, Article 23(2)(a) 
211 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011  C7-0025/2012  2012/0011(COD)), Article 79(2a)(c) 
212 Graef, I., Jeroen Verschakelen and Peggy Valcke (2014), supra n. 179, 8 
213 The Economist which, after making an overview of the 
business: 
Data, data everywhere. 25 February 2010. Retrieved 
from: http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 Less than three years later after this article was published, former Competition 
Commissioner, Joaquin Almun
supra n. 181 
214 Commission decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraph 45 
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particular user. Customized results that are based on previous searches or information that matches 
consumer tastes, such as a catalogue on Amazo you , undoubtedly bring 
some value to the user. Yet, there exist significant information asymmetries: intermediaries have 
more often than not covered with a veil of secrecy the practices concerning data collection and 
processing, confusing consumers over how these practices may affect their content choices. These 
choices are (to some extent) determined by the inclinations of the users, but it is unclear whether they 
are predominantly driven by the intermediary itself, thereby resulting in serving the commercial 
interests of the former rather than the information needs of the latter. This latter issue is particular 
relevant for our purposes because shady tactics surrounding the mechanisms that lead to the 
provision of content, inclu
history may prevent users from discovering alternative sources of information. In such cases, the user 
must be adequately informed of the parameters that determine the content that reaches her and be 
given the necessary instruments that would allow access to the information that is available in a non-
personalized universe.215 In this section I will demonstrate that Article 102 TFEU equips users with 
tools to tackle this problem.216 While the collection and processing of data was not included in the 
intermediaries can go to gather personal information as well as how far EU competition law can go to 
address information asymmetries associated with exploitative data-related practices. I will start the 
analysis by shedding some light on the ways in which Google harvests user data and will then turn to 
exploring action users may take under Article 102 TFEU.  
 
4.2.2.1. How does Google harvest user data?  
 
Google employs a variety of methods to gather and combine user data. First, insofar as general 
online search is concerned, typing queries in the Google Search Box feeds Google with data on, inter 
alia, our location, language, the URLs we visited, and date and time of the searches. 217 Google also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 More broadly, on how personalized consumption habits may affect democracy see Chapter 1, Part 4.a. 
216 On the issue of anticompetitive gathering of data from a different perspective, that of competitors, see Geradin, D. and Monika 
Kuschewsky (2013), supra n. 173, 7-9. Note that, while this section focuses on the negative implications of data gathering for access 
to information, collection of data may also result in price discrimination. On this issue see Newman, N. (2014). The Costs of Lost 
Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google. William Mitchell Law Review 40(2), 865-73. 
Retrieved from: http://open.wmitchell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1568&context=wmlr For a different view see Manne, G. A. and 
Ben Sperry. The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an Antitrust Framework. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, May 
2015(2), 6-8  
217  The user implicitly grants her consent by agreeing to the terms of use of the search engine. Information retrieved from 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ and http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ For a comprehensive overview of the user 
data that Google collects see Dover, D. . 24 June 2008, 
Moz Blog. Retrieved from: http://www.seomoz.org/blog/the-evil-side-of-google-exploring-googles-user-data-collection 
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ell). By using the general search 
engine, Google is also able to identify our hardware model, operating system version, and mobile 
network information, including our phone number.218 Second, Google also assembles a vast amount 
of information in cases where the consumer uses other services provided by Google for free such as 
Google Product Search, YouTube and Google Maps. Accordingly, Google has a clear idea about our 
online users if the latter decide to use certain services they can access only if they hold a Google 
Account (e.g. Gmail). Registering with Google requires the user to provide data such as her name, 
email address, date of birth and gender.219 Moreover, i
-in users, that is users with a Google Account, would get, in 
response to their queries, results based on their web history.220 In 2009, Google announced that it 
extended the personalized search model to signed-out users worldwide. Google does this through the 
insertion of a cookie in the browser that allows it to personalize search results based on 180 days of 
search activity.221 Google users may now access information that is not related to their previous 
queries only if they disable customizations based on search activity. 222 Finally, in March 2012, 
Google announced that it would modify its Privacy Policy, merging 60+ product-specific privacy 
policies and generalizing combination of data across services.223 This is why the terms of privacy of, 
for instance, Gmail, YouTube and Google Product Search redirect to the terms of privacy of Google 
Search.224  This means in practice that Google may use the data it acquires from all additional 
functionalities to further personalize the search results it delivers through its general search engine 
and vice versa.  
 
4.2.2.2. Can users rely on Article 102 TFEU to tackle collection and processing of a  
vast amount of user data? 
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed here is that of locus standi. Pursuant to Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003,225  a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
219 See https://accounts.google.com/SignUp?continue=https%3A%2F%2Faccounts.google.com%2FManageAccount  
220 Google (2005, June). Search gets personal. Retrieved from: http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/06/search-gets-personal.html  
221  Google (2009, December). Personalized search for Everyone. Retrieved from: 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html  
222 There is a small tool icon on the Google Search page. One needs to go to Web History and disable customizations based on search 
activity 
223 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2012). Letter Addressed to Google, 1. Retrieved from: http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-
and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-incomplete-information-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-data-across-ser/ 
224 Information retrieved from: http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
225 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
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226 
227 
ts are directly and adversely affected 
insofar as they are buyers of goods or services that are the object of an infringement can be in a 
228  Consumer associations are also entitled to lodge 
complaints.229  
 
In terms of procedure, an additional remark should be made as regards the burden of proof. 
230 To this end, complainant
allegations and further information as to where additional documentation can be obtained by the 
Commission.231 However, in its Notice on the Handling of Complaints under Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, the Commission explicitly states that where it deems appropriate it may waive this 
obligation.232 
complaints by consumer associations where they, in the context of an otherwise substantiated 
complaint, do not have access to specific pieces of information from the sphere of the undertakings 
233 The information submitted by a consumer association may lead to a full-blown 
investigation by the Commission.234 In view of the above, it is not only possible but also less fact-
102 TFEU.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 See, for instance, CFI, Case T-37/92, Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European 
Communities [1994] ECR II-285, paragraph 36; CFI, Joined cases T-213 and 214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG and Bank für 
Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v Commission of the European Communities [2001] II-03963. See in particular 
considers that a final customer who shows that his economic interests have been harmed or are likely to be harmed as a result of the 
restriction of competition in question has a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation No 17 in making an 
application or a complaint in order to seek a declaration from the Commission that Articles 81 EC and 82 EC have been infring
See also Commission decision of 9 December 1998 in Case IV/D-2/34.466, Greek Ferries [1999] OJ L 109/24, paragraph 1 
227 Van Bael, I. (2011). Due Process in EU Competition Proceedings, 117. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International  
228 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/05, paragraph 37 
229 Ibid. 
230 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, Recital (5) 
231 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/05, paragraph 31 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., paragraph 31 
234 Ibid., paragraph 4 
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Yet, the question remains: could the collection and use of a vast amount of user data by a 
dominant firm be regarded as an abuse under Article 102 TFEU?235 Given that the practice concerned 
impacts consumers directly, that is to say, its effects are not manifested indirectly through foreclosure 
that may lead to consumer harm in the form of higher prices, lower quality, or less choice, the 
236 While the focus of the Commi
notwiths 237  As extensively 
discussed elsewhere, the Commission has been mainly concerned with prices. Hence, unsurprisingly, 
the example of exploitative behavior given in the Guidance Paper is that of a dominant firm 
.238 However, it was explained in detail in Chapter 3 that in media markets 
there are many instances where a transaction does not involve the exchange of a service for money. 
In the case at hand, the transaction that is relevant for antitrust purposes involves the exchange of 
user Accordingly, an undertaking that requires the user to 
for exploitative abuse under Article 102 TFEU.239  
 
But what c 240 In relevant cases, the Court defined excessive 
241 
The Court further established a two-
assessment of a) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 From a different perspective, that is, whether Google should be forced to grant access to user data, see Graef, I., Sih Yuliana 
Wahyuningtyas and Peggy Valcke (2013), supra n. 209, 12-16 
236 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 7 
237 Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
IV/36.888  1998 Football World Cup) [2000] OJ L 5/55, paragraph 100; ECJ, Case C-6/72, Continental Can [1973] ECR 215, 
paragraph 26 
238 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 7 
239 Note that the a report produced by the EDPS suggests the same approach without, however, providing a framework within which 
 See 
European Data Protection Supervisor (2014). Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between data 
protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy, 29. Retrieved from: 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2014/14-03-
26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf  
240 Note that the only decision where concerns from access to user data (as a source of market power) were discussed is Commission 
decision Google/Doubleclick, Case COMP/M. 4731 [2008] OJ C 184/6, paragraphs 255 et seq. References to user data were also made 
in Commission decision Facebook/Whatsapp, Case COMP/M. 7217 [2014] OJ C 417/2, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
241 ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities 
[1978] ECR 207, paragraph 250 
  
	   	   274	  
242 and b) 
(if the profit margin is indeed excess
243 This test, albeit seemingly irrelevant, could be 
applied here: even if no monetary exchange takes place to access user data or the platform, 
economists are increasingly developing methodologies for calculating the value of personal 
information. For example, one method consists in conducting surveys and economic experiments 
with a view to determining the price that individuals would charge the platform in order to reveal the 
information concerned.244 Some of the results of empirical studies that have been conducted thus far 
are particularly relevant here.245 
information is highly dependent on context, including and especially the nature of information to 
which access is sought.246 For instance, a series of experiments conducted by Frog showed that users 
are particularly sensitive about their digital history such as their web browsing history and location-
related information.247 Frog found that users would charge US $50 per entry for disclosing this 
information.248 Other pieces of information such as the online advertising click history are less 
expensive (users would charge US $3-6 per entry). 249  An additional parameter that apparently 
determines the price the user would charge is the data controller. For example, participants in the 
experiments conducted by Frog replied that social networks are less trustworthy than banks.250 
Methodologies have a
profit per data record
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Ibid., paragraph 251 
243 Ibid., paragraph 252. For an example of how the Commission carried out this test see Commission decision, Scandlines Sverige AB 
v Port of Helsingborg, Case COMP/A.36.568/D3 [2006] CMLR 1298, paragraphs 145 et seq. On other judgments concerning 
excessive pricing see, for instance, ECJ, Case 26/75, General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities 
[1975] ECR 01367; Case 226/84, British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission [1986] ECR 3263; Case 78/70, Deutsche 
Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG [1971] ECR 487. For an overview of this case law see 
Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2008), supra n. 103, 585-594 
244 OECD (2013). Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, 29. Note 
that this would reflect the selling price users, i.e. not the dominant undertaking, would charge. But, the purchase price the dominant 
cessive  
245 See, for instance, Spiekerman, S., Jens Grossklags, and Bettina Berendt (2002). E-privacy in 2nd generation E-Commerce. ACM 
Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), Hrsg. ACM New York, 38-47. Tampa, Florida: ACM Press; Chellapa, R. and Raymond 
G. Sin (2005). . Information 
Technology and Management, 6(2-3), 181-202; Wathieu, L. and Allan Friedman (2005). An Empirical Approach to Understanding 
Privacy Valuation
Kumpost, Vashek Matyas, and George Danezis (2006). A Study On The Value Of Location Privacy. Proceedings of Workshop on 
-118; Hui, K. L., Hock Hai and Sang-Yong Tom Lee (2007). The Value of Privacy 
Assurance: An Exploratory Field Experiment. MIS Quarterly, 31(1), 19-33, and Acquisti, A., Leslie John, and George Loewenstein 
(2009). What is Privacy Worth? Working Paper Carnegie Melon University. Retrieved from: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos/wise/papers/wise2009-6a1_paper.pdf 
246 OECD (2013), supra n. 244, 31 
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251 (note that a record could be a specific piece of information such as the data 
252 including name, address, age, employment, etc.). For 
example, the OECD estimates that in 2012 the value of an individual record for Facebook was US 
$300.253 Of course, whether the profit margin is indeed excessive for the first condition of the test set 
by the Court to be fulfilled is a question of fact. Numerous factors would come into play in relevant 
 is measured, 
such as the costs incurred by the firm in creating and maintaining the platform and the revenues it 
generates, the above examples illustrate that parameters such as the nature of information disclosed, 
d the type of data controller are also relevant. As a result, 
profit margin valuations should include such variables.  
 
254 the Commission finds 
that reasonableness should be assessed against the specific circumstances of the case, including non-
cost factors that relate to demand.255 Since exploitative abuses in the form of collection and use of 
personal data have not fallen under the EU antitrust microscope thus far, Data Protection Law may 
provide some guidance here: Article 6(1)(b) of the Data Protection Directive lays down that personal 
Party states that incompatibility should be examined on the basis of, inter alia the reasonable 
expectations of the data subjects at the time of collection 256 Again, surveys can shed light on the 
has economic foundations. The empirical studies referred to above found that the price users would 
charge is closely related to how they believe the data will be used by the controller.257  
 
Clearly, the above analysis does not attempt to suggest a clear-cut standard against which we 
may assess whether an entity like Google, which gathers and uses a vast amount of personal 
information, engages in exploitative abuse for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU. It did, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Ibid., 19 
252 Ibid., 18 
253 Ibid., 22 
254 ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities 
[1978] ECR 207, paragraph 250 
255 Commission decision Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg, Case COMP/A.36.568/D3 [2006] CMLR 1298, paragraph 232 
256 Article 29 Working Party (2013). Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 13. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf  
257 OECD (2013), supra n. 244, 32 
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demonstrate that economic tools that may be used to measure the value of user data and profits 
earned by firms heavily relying on the extraction of such data are available, thereby making it 
possible to carry out the two-step test designed by the Court. It further bears noting that by no means 
does the case law suggest that this test is the only means to determine excessiveness. As the Court put 
it in United Brands
ways may be devised  and economic theorists have not failed to think up several  of selecting the 
258 
 
Having established that it is possible to create a framework within which one may examine 
whether the collection and use of personal information may be excessive, thereby violating Article 
102 TFEU, I will now turn to a specific circumstance under which the Commission may intervene in 
order to address concerns related to data exploitation. More particularly, the case law appears to have 
established the condition that antitrust intervention is subject to the condition that the domestic 
sector-specific regulator has not taken action to remedy such concerns.259 This is also implied in the 
Guidance Paper where the Commission states that, in cases of e where 
260 There are valid reasons 
for this approach; a regulator has expert knowledge and, broadly speaking, a clearly defined and 
specific mandate for dealing with the issues concerned. For our purposes, it bears noting that, over 
the past three years, data protection authorities across the EU have taken considerable steps towards 
ted a new privacy 
-specific privacy policies and [generalized] combination of data 
261 This move prompted a pan-European investigation by national Data Protection 
Authorities, coordinated within the framework of the Article 29 Working Party, which concluded that 
Google did not provide sufficient information to online users regarding the purposes and types of 
data it processed and clear tools that would enable users to control the combination of data.262 A 
number of recommendations were addressed to Google, which undertook to take measures to 
increase the transparency of its data gathering and processing operations.263  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities 
[1978] ECR 207, paragraph 253 
259 Jones, A. and Brenda Sufrin (2008), supra n. 103, fn. 500; Röller, L. H. (2007). Exploitative Abuses, 525-532. In Ehlermann, C. D. 
and Mel Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Retrieved from: http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Roeller.pdf  
260 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraph 7  
261 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2012), supra n. 223, 1 
262 Ibid., 1-2 
263 Data Protection Act 1998  Google Inc. Undertaking. ICO Ref: 
ENF0492064. Retrieved from: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-
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Had the regulator failed to intervene, there would be room for action under EU competition 
law. If Google were found to engage in exploitative abuse, certain commitments to remedy the abuse 
could come near to those made in the context of the data protection proceedings. For example, in the 
UK, Google undertook, inter alia, to explain in clear terms user rights, including their right to object 
to the combination of data (opt-
content un 264 Transparency obligations are far from new in the realm of EU competition 
policy. In antitrust, a good example is the recent VISA Europe,265 which concerned multilaterally 
agreed interchange fees, that is, fees which are charged by a 
payment card.266 In this case, Visa Europe undertook to introduce certain transparency measures to 
protect the merchant (i.e., customer), including the establishment of a rule whereby the acquiring 
267 As regards continuing evaluation, in an abundance of decisions the merged 
entity or the antitrust offender undertook to appoint independent Monitoring Trustees to check 
compliance with the obligations imposed in the context of the proceedings.268 Naturally, some of the 
commitments imposed on Google (e.g. Google
products obtain the required consent) are data protection-specific and could only be imposed by a 
regulator.269  However, the above examples illustrate that competition law may easily adapt to the 
particularities of a case involving a dominant firm relying excessively on the collection and use of 
personal data.  
 
5. Editorial-  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
policy-after-ico-investigation/ For action taken by the Italian Data Protection Authority see: 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/2348801 
264 , supra n. 263, 6. On more details on the opt-out mechanism suggested by EU Data 
Protection Authorities see Article 29 Working Party (not dated). Appendix  Google Privacy Policy: Main Findings and 
Recommendations. Retrieved from: http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/GOOGLE_PRIVACY_POLICY-
_RECOMMENDATIONS-FINAL-EN.pdf  
265 Commission decision of 26.2.2014 addressed to: Visa Europe Limited relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, Case AT.39398, VISA MIF, C (2014) 1199 final, 
paragraph 33 
266 Definition retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/enforcement_en.html  
267 Commission decision VISA MIF, Case AT.39398 C (2014) 1199 final, paragraph 16 
268 Ibid., paragraph 34; See also Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, and Commission 
decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) C (2004) 900 
final 
269 supra n. 263, 8 
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As already mentioned, other practices which digital intermediaries engage in and which may 
impact media pluralism and, more broadly, the fair and free flow of information, concern the 
editorial-like judgments they perform in selecting, ranking, and in making available the content to 
which online users are exposed. For example, search engines employ hundreds, if not thousands, of 
signals,270 which are criteria that range from how often a website updates its content to how much 
271 These 
signals (to which the algorithm assigns different weights) determine the ranking of search results.272 
Apple subjects the apps that are sold through its iTunes Store to an approval process that is based on 
guidelines to which software developers must adhere.273 Amazon displays 
274 
users.275 While in some cases (e.g. guidelines on app approval) the factors that the intermediaries take 
into account to perform these editorial-like judgments are published by the intermediaries 
themselves, usually there is considerable vagueness and haziness over the parameters underpinning 
their decision whether, and if so how, they will display content.  
 
A rather common factor motivating controversial editorial-like judgments is the promotion of 
 commercial interests.276 More particularly, integrated digital intermediaries have 
often been accused of granting to their own affiliates preferential treatment to ensure that their 
services are more visible (or the only one available), thereby increasing the likelihood that consumers 
will purchase (either with money or with attention) the content they provide. Depending on the type 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Foundem (2012). Remedy Proposals - -Competitive Manipulations of its Search 
Results and Ad Listings, 10 
271 For examples of ranking http://backlinko.com/google-ranking-factors  
272 Foundem (2012), supra n. 270, 10 
273 See https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/  
274 See http://www.amazon.com/Editors-Picks-Kindle-eBooks/b?ie=UTF8&node=353898011  
275 See https://www.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/  
276 Note that the motivations underpinning editorial-like judgments vary. For example, in 2010, in a controversial move, Apple 
removed an app which provided instant access to the Wikileaks website. Apple said that it discontinued the service on the grounds that 
the app failed to comply with its guidelines which, provide, inter alia -spirited, or 
likely to pl
comments that could shed some light on this decision. There are other examples of app rejection by Apple and other intermediaries 
that may be perceived as a form of quasi-censorship. These examples are, however, isolated (for now). For more information on the 
above see, for instance, Tsotsis, A. Apple Removes WikiLeaks App From App Store. 20 December 2010, Techcrunch. Retrieved from: 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/20/apple-removes-wikileaks-app-from-app-store/; Helft, M. Why Apple Removed a WikiLeaks App. 21 
December 2010, The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/why-apple-removed-wikileaks-app-
from-its-store/?_r=0; The BBC. Apple removes iPhone Wikileaks app from iTunes. 22 December 2010. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12059577; Kiss, J. Apple pulls Wikileaks app, but Android apps remain. 21 December 2010, 
The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/dec/21/apple-wikileaks-app; Kiss, J. Apple pulls 
Wikileaks app, but Android apps remain. 21 December 2010, The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/dec/21/apple-wikileaks-app, and Gokey, M. Just say no - Apple and Google reject 
Flappy Bird Clones. 17 February 2015, Techtimes. Retrieved from: http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3526/20140217/just-say-no-
apple-and-google-reject-flappy-bird-clones.htm 
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of intermediary, this preferential treatment may be manifested in different ways. For example, 
Google makes sure that certain services it provides in markets neighboring general online search (e.g. 
price comparison services) are prominently displayed in the search results page, whilst refusing to 
apply to its own services penalties that determine ranking.277 Apple operates as both retailer selling 
content through its App Store and manufacturer of the hardware devise to which the store is tied. 
While technology and apps in particular make it possible for example an iPad owner to purchase 
content using another store, Apple has been keen to take measures to prevent this from happening. 
For example, it has reportedly rejected the Sony Reader iPhone app, which would have allowed users 
to purchase and access e-books from the Sony Reader Store.278  
 
There is little doubt that preferential treatment in general and prominent display in particular 
may affect consumer choice. This is as true in the online world as it is in traditional content markets. 
An example from the offline universe is the so-
trade which refers to an arrangement whereby the publisher pays the retailer279 to for example display 
the book in special areas such as tables near the entrance.280 Readers are generally inclined to buy 
281 In online search, the overwhelming 
majority of users  past the first page of search results 282 and evidence suggests that the 
283 of all traffic.284 Similarly, content that is in 
a prominen increases the likelihood of visibility.285 
 
The degree to which editorial-like judgments performed by digital intermediaries may impact 
media pluralism will, of course, depend on various factors, including how successful these practices 
are in marginalizing competing content and the type of content that is downgraded or altogether 
locked out of potentially more diverse content made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 These issues will be the focus of the analysis that follows 
278  Helft, M. Apple Moves to Tighten Control of App Store. 1 February 2011, The New York Times. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/technology/01apple.html?_r=0  
279 Canoy, M., Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg (2005). The Economics of Books. CESifo Working Paper No. 1414, 16. 
Retrieved from: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_1414.html 
280 Commission decision Lagardère/Natexis/VUP, Case No COMP/M.2978 [2004] OJ L125/54, paragraph 672 
281 Cowen, T. (2000). What Price Fame?, 37. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
282 See, for instance, Siu, E. 24 Eye-Popping SEO Statistics. 19 April 2012, Search Engine Journal. Retrieved from: 
http://www.searchenginejournal.com/24-eye-popping-seo-statistics/42665/  
283 See, for instance, Goodwin, D. Top Google Result Gets 36.4% of Clicks. 21 April 2011, Search Engine Watch. Retrieved from: 
http://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/2049695/top-google-result-gets-364-clicks-study  
284  See also Sharp, E. The first page of Google, by the Numbers. 30 April 2014, Protofuse. Retrieved from: 
http://www.protofuse.com/blog/first-page-of-google-by-the-numbers/  
285 For examples see Foster, R. (2012), supra n. 36, 36 
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available on the competing platform. 286 In extreme cases, an intermediary that engages in 
discriminatory practices to promote a certain political agenda may impact the democratic process. As 
already mentioned in Chapter 1, an experiment that was conducted by Epstein and Robertson showed 
287  While arguing that the 
editorial-like judgments digital intermediaries currently perform are capable of producing such 
drastic effects on opinion forming is probably a stretch, related issues will gain prominence, 
especially as intermediaries are increasingly expanding in (news) content markets (see, e.g. the 
acquisition by Amazon of The Washington Post288).  
 
This section will deal with  what appears to be  the most common factor that motivates 
controversial editorial-
services. More particularly, I shall attempt to answer the question whether, and if so under what 
conditions, an integrated firm that uses its dominant position in one market to favor the services it 
provides in an adjacent market is an antitrust offense. The analysis that follows focuses on the 
allegations against Google, however, the above examples clearly illustrate that the issue of 
preferential treatment has a much broader relevance for this thesis.    
 
integrated firm that has the effect of raising the costs of rivals competing against an affiliated division 
289 may be caught by Article 102(c) TFEU. This provision lays down that 
o equivalent 
discussing whether, and if so under what conditions, 
in EU law in general and EU competition law in particular. For example, in Chapter 3 we examined 
an abundanc
result of the concentration, the acquired or acquiring firm would be granted preferential access to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 In a case similar to the removal of the Wikileaks app (see supra n. 276), users would be deprived of an additional tool that would 
allow access to content on matters of common concern and, perhaps more importantly, they would be prevented from financing a non-
profit organization that acts as a watchdog over governments (US $1 from every US $1.99 sale of the app was directed to Wikileaks 
Additional in that users would still be able to access directly the Wikileaks website 
287  Epstein, R. and Ronald E. Robertson (2013, May). Democracy at Risk: Manipulating Search Rankings Can Shift Voting 
Preferences Substantially Without Voter Awareness. American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology Working Paper 
Series/Summary of a paper presented at the 25th annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, Washington, D.C. 
Retrieved from: http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/politics/epstein_robertson_2013.pdf  
288 Farhi, P. Washington Post to be sold to Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon. 5 August 2013, The Washington Post. Retrieved from: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/washington-post-to-be-sold-to-jeff-bezos/2013/08/05/ca537c9e-fe0c-11e2-9711-
3708310f6f4d_story.html  
289 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2014). Exclusionary Discrimination under Article 102 TFEU. Common Market Law Review, 51, 146 
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valuable input owned (e.g. infrastructure) or licensed (e.g. premium content) by the merged entity. 
Where this concern arose, the Commission either blocked the merger in question or imposed upon 
the entity the obligation not to favor its affiliated divisions.290 In Newscorp/Telepiù, for instance, Sky 
Italia undertook to offer competitors access to its satellite platform on the basis of transparent, fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.291 Similar solutions were adopted in antitrust cases such as 
Microsoft.292 In the field of State aid, on several occasions, public service broadcasters were required 
(e.g. transparency obligations guaranteeing that the public broadcaster has acted in line with the 
market economy investor principle293). In the regulatory realm, several instruments tackle preferential 
treatment. For example, the Regulation on Computerized Reservation Systems for air transport 
products provides that a vertically integrated system vendor, that is, an entity which distributes 
294 and which is owned or controlled by an air 
carrier, must treat other air carriers on a non-discriminatory basis.295 The Access Directive imposes 
the same obligation on vertically integrated operators of communications networks in order to ensure 
accessibility for competing radio and broadcasting services.296  
 
Turning to abusive discrimination, we should first make some remarks as regards the scope of 
Article 102(c) TFEU. As already indicated, th
demotion of competing services would not seem to fall under the scope of Article 102(c) TFEU. 
Strictly speaking, there is no transaction between Google and competing specialized services. For 
example, Google pays neither its own vertical search engines nor its competitors to appear in its 
organic results. Moreover, while some competitors pay Google to be displayed prominently, most do 
not. But, it has been made clear throughout this thesis that the term transaction should not be defined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 See Chapter 3, Parts 3 and 4.c. 
291 Commission decision NewsCorp/Telepiù, Case COMP/M.2876 [2004] OJ L 110/73, Undertakings, paragraph 11.1 
292  Commission decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft) C (2004) 900 final, paragraphs 1005-1009 
293  This principle is now codified in Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the 
Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraph 93. Related issues will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6  
294 The European Parliament defines Computerized Reservation Systems as 
carriers' schedules, availability, fares and related services with or without facilities through which reservations can be made or tickets 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/tran/105/chap3_en.htm  
295 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2299/89 of 24 July 1989 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems [1989] OJ L 
220/1, Articles 2(d) and (e) and 7 
296 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/7, Article 5(1)(b). There is also 
regulation in favor of preferential treatment where this is believed to be in the public interest. For example, the Access Directive 
allows Member States to take measures that aim to ensure that broadcasters carrying public service content are prominently displayed 
in the Electronic Program Guide. See Recital (10) 
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by reference to monetary exchanges only, for such a straightjacketed interpretation would not reflect 
how certain markets work in practice. Since Google uses its competitors to provide users with 
information relevant to their queries, and competing websites use Google to reach its large user base, 
he purposes of Article 102(c) 
TFEU. It further bears noting that the list outlining potential types of abuse that is included in Article 
102 TFEU is not exhaustive and the Commission has not been reluctant to interpret the provision 
flexibly in order to punish forms of discrimination that did not carry all the elements set out in Article 
102(c) TFEU. For example, in Deutsche Post, the Commission found that Article 102 TFEU applies 
to discrimination that affects the consumer directly, irrespective of whether or not there are 
297 
Furthermore, while the relevant decisional practice and case law have been solely concerned with 
price discrimination, 298  such as discounts, 299  geographical price discrimination 300  and delivered 
pricing301 nothing in the wording of Article 102(c) TFEU implies that it would not apply to non-price 
discrimination. A teleological interpretation would be in line with this approach in that a dominant 
ng in non-price practices. For 
example, in the telecommunications sector, vertically integrated firms have occasionally placed firms 
competing in retail markets at a competitive disadvantage by degrading the quality of 
interconnection, thereby making them less attractive to consumers. 302  Finally, in some cases 
discrimination caught by Article 102(c) TFEU may be rather straightforward (e.g. a dominant firm 
charges its customers different prices for the same amount of units of the same product and 
competitors/customers are asked to pay significantly more than non-competitors/customers). In other 
cases, discriminatory conduct may be overt. For example, in Portuguese Airports, the airport operator 
would charge air carriers significantly higher (landing and take off) fees for international flights than 
it did for domestic flights.303 The Court ruled that this was discriminatory on the grounds that the 
services provided by the airport were the same irrespective of the point of origin or destination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Commission decision Deutsche Post AG - Interception of cross-border mail, COMP/C-1/36.915 [2002] OJ L 331/40, paragraph 
133 
298 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia Sri v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783; CFI, 
Case T-229/94, Deutsche Bahn AG v. Commission [1997] ECR II-1689, and CFI, Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission 
[2000] ECR II-3929 
299 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-163/99, Portugal v. Commission. Landing Fees at Portuguese Airports [2001] ECR I-2613 
300 See, for instance, ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities [1978] ECR 207 
301 See, for instance, Commission decision of 18 July 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Case No 
IV/30.178 Napier Brown - British Sugar) [1988] OJ L 284/41 
302 For more on this issue see, for instance, Economides, N. (1998). The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 272 
303 ECJ, Case C-163/99, Portugal v. Commission. Landing Fees at Portuguese Airports [2001] ECR I-2613, paragraphs 61 et seq. 
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flights and that the reduced prices clearly conferred an advantage on the Portuguese airlines, TAP 
and Portugalia, which operated more domestic than international routes.304  
 
In the case at hand, the complaint regarding discrimination is two-fold. First, competitors say 
- 305 For example, Google prominently displays its 
its web search. Second, Google refuses to apply to its own services rules it applies to competing 
websites. For example, Google generally demotes websites that copy content from other sites or that 
306 These rules appear to apply to all (but 
Google) websites irrespective of their purpose, including vertical search engines which are essentially 
based on aggregating content offered by other sites and which, broadly speaking, do not create their 
own content.307  
 
Having clarified the scope of Article 102(c) TFEU and the allegations made against Google, I 
shall now attempt to identify the factors that should drive an analysis of whether discrimination 
amounts to an abuse. There appear to be two approaches to conducting relevant assessments. First, 
we could claim that an integrated firm that enjoys a dominant position is under a general obligation 
to treat affiliates and competitors on non-discriminatory terms.308 A literal interpretation of Article 
102(c) TFEU would certainly favor this approach.309 The provision simp
competitors are placed be ascribed to the discriminatory conduct concerned.310 This approach could 
also be supported by decisional practice and case law in the field of exclusionary conduct that set 
very low thresholds for establishing that an abuse has taken place. For example, several decisions and 
judgments were predominantly based on the presumed intent of the firm to push its competitors out 
of the market.311 In AKZO
regarded as abusive if they are determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor
added].312 Similarly, in Tetra Pak, the Commission deliberately
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Ibid., paragraph 66 
305 Foundem (2012), supra n. 270, 2 et seq. 
306  Foundem (2013). Assessing the Legitimacy of a Google Penalty, 3 et seq. Retrieved from: 
http://www.foundem.co.uk/Enabling_an_Anti-Demotion_Remedy.pdf  
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2014), supra n. 289, 150 
309 Ibid., 151 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid., 151-152 referring to Commission decision of 29 July 1987 (IV/32.279 - BBI v. Boosey & Hawkes) [1987] OJ L 286/36, 
paragraph 19; Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 Case No IV/30.178 - Napier Brown v. British Sugar) [1988] OJ L 285/41, 
paragraph 62  
312 ECJ, Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 72 
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loss313 with the aim 314 Even if it can be backed by precedent, one must 
still ask whether establishing ex ante that integrated dominant firms are bound not to engage in 
discriminatory behavior, vis-à-vis their competitors, would be desirable. This approach has been 
criticized on the grounds that intent is not an accurate indicator of the actual impact of the conduct on 
the market.315 In other words, so its opponents say, presumptions of intent run the risk of leading to 
erroneous outcomes, potentially punishing conduct that is not harmful. While persuasive, this 
argument is not ultimately conclusive. EU competition law is largely founded on presumptions and 
this, in retrospect, is not necessarily a bad thing
context of which the Commission must assess whether, as a result of the concentration, the merged 
entity will not only have the ability but also the incentive to distort competition.316 In Chapter 3, it 
was shown that a strict approach based on hypotheticals that the merging firms would be incentivized 
to act anti-competitively post-merger protected rather than harmed competition. 317  It was also 
nothing to protect the competitive process. In fact, the adoption of less stringent criteria has not only 
led to the obvious, that is, higher concentration ratios, but in certain cases it harmed innovation and 
led to higher prices.318 My analysis concerned broadcasting markets only, but if this is any indication 
of the (positive) role that presumptions of intent may play in avoiding distortions of competition in 
markets presenting similar characteristics (e.g. a natural tendency to concentration attributed to two-
sidedness and the resulting network effects and downward spirals), then the scale would seem to tip 
in favor of a more cautious approach to how firms may 
which analyzed forty decisions adopted in the five-year period 1996-2000319 and from which we may 
clearly infer that behavioral remedies (that is to say, remedies that sought to temper the incentive to 
behave anti-competitively) have been far from a success story lend further support to the claim that if 
an integrated firm which enjoys market power were bound by a general obligation not to 
discriminate, this could be to the benefit of competition. The dominant firm could still defend itself 
by putting forward objective justifications 320  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Commission decision of 24 July 1991 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31043 - Tetra Pak II) 
[1992] OJ L72/1, paragraph 150 
314 Ibid., paragraph 104. For other examples and a comprehensive overview of the role of intent in Article 102 cases see Akman, P. 
(2014). The role of intent in the EU case law on abuse of dominance. European Law Review 39(3), 316-337 
315 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2014), supra n. 289, 153 and 155 
316 See Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, paragraph 15 and Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3. See, for instance, paragraph 28 
317 Chapter 4, Parts 3.b. and 4.c. 
318 Ibid. 
319  European Commission (2005). Merger Remedies Study. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf  
320 y 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraphs 28-31. On a comprehe
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introduced by an agreement,321 efficiencies in support of the discriminatory behavior in question.322 
Ultimately, whether presumed intent is better than other (higher) thresholds for establishing abuse 
may only be determined if one compared how markets evolved under the former standard as opposed 
to how markets developed under more relaxed standards. The above remarks should not be 
understood to mean that a finding of abuse based on presumptions of intent is devoid of drawbacks. 
Because finding abuse would (solely) rely on establishing that the conduct concerned contains 
elements of discrimination and on evidence suggesting that the firm embarked on the conduct in 
order to eliminate competition, competitors would probably find it easy to free-ride on the dominant 
 
 
The second possible way to check 
amounts to abusive discrimination would consist in a case-by-case assessment that measures the 
effects that the conduct under scrutiny produces or is likely to produce on competition.323 This would 
be in line with the more economics-based approach to competition analyses the Commission has 
been advocating for over the past few years and, compared against the above proposed method, 
complaints and decisions would need to be founded on more robust evidence. However, if we were 
indeed to go down this path, we would still need to identify a threshold above which it may be 
accepted that discrimination may produce exclusionary effects. Ibáñez Colomo convincingly argues 
that in such cases it would have to be shown that ceasing and desisting from engaging in 
. 324  Adopting the 
strategies, such as refusal to supply, that essentially seek to achieve the same objective, namely 
leveraging,325 and it would also accord with the principle that only in exceptional circumstances a 
firm should be forced to deal with its rivals.326 be adapted to the 
specific circumstances of the case, not least because the relevant decisional practice and case law are 
rather inconsistent. For example, in Magill, which concerned refusal to license IPRs, the decisive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
has been interpreted by the Court see Albors-Llorens, A. (2007). The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application 
of Article 82 EC. Common Market Law Review, 44, 1727 1761 and Loewenthal, P. J. (2005). 
in the application of Article 82 EC. World Competition, 28, 455-477 
321 See Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/08, paragraph 60; CFI, Case T-168/2001, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-2969, paragraphs 247-252 
322 exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, paragraphs 28-31 
323 Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2014), supra n. 289, 155-156 
324 Ibid., 157 
325 Ibid., 156 
326 Ibid., 158 
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factor for establishing abuse was that the conduct prevented the appearance of a new product.327 As 
already mentioned, to reach this conclusion the Court took account of the fact that there was no 
substitute for the product for which there was potential consumer demand and that the raw material to 
which access was sought was indispensable for its creation.328 To put it simply, indispensability was 
integrated in the examination of whether competitors were seeking to offer a new product. This was 
not the direction the Court followed in Tiercé Ladbroke,329 which concerned the request by a Belgian 
owner of betting shops to be granted access to televised transmissions of French horse races. In this 
latter case, the Court ruled that the refusal to supply would be abusive 
service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in question, in that there was no real 
or potential substitute, or was a new product 
added].330 In Oscar Bronner, which concerned access to a newspaper delivery scheme, the Court 
altogether refrained from referring to the new product requirement. 331  And in Microsoft the 
Commission found that the refusal to share the indispensable input, namely interoperability 
inform
-
improving their own products. 332  In view of the above, there is considerable uncertainty over 
whether, and if so how big of, 
determining that trading on a non-discriminatory basis is indispensable.      
 
There are differences between the facts of the cases cit
practices. As regards the latter, it is not access to the facility, but equitable access that is sought. 
However, some of the parameters that influenced the outcome of the above decisions and judgments, 
including and especially the benchmarks against which indispensability was assessed, appear relevant 
here. For example, the fact that what competitors seek is not access to the algorithm (which would 
allow them to design their sites in a way that ensures prominent display), but non-discriminatory 
treatment (which would allow their services to somehow communicate with the algorithm in the 
same way that Google content does, thereby potentially appearing in a more prominent position) 
establishes a strong resemblance with cases concerning interoperability such as Microsoft. As already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, paragraphs 54-56 
328 Ibid. 
329 CFI, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923 
330 Ibid., paragraph 131 
331 ECJ, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others 
[1998] ECR I-7791, paragraph 41 
332  Commission decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft) C (2004) 900 final, paragraphs 630 et seq.  
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rver 
inter alia, the reliability of the 
system and security, two characteristics to which consumers attached particular importance.333 If the 
Commission followed the same approach in this case, it would need to establish that, in light of 
consumer preferences, the quality of competing websites (e.g. functionalities they offer, how easy 
Microsoft and which is linked to the Google case is the scope of measures (i.e., levels of 
, thus greasing the 
Microsoft said that what the competitor asked was a disclosure of source code written by Microsoft 
and the right to copy or modify that source code in order to integrate it in its own products (this was 
334 Based on expert statements, the Commission drew 
specification describes what an implementation must achieve, not how 335  The 
336 If equal treatment does not require disclosure of 
the algorithm (competitors insistently argued that it woul 337), then antitrust intervention in the 
Google case would not seem to be as intrusive as in cases involving access to IPRs (or any other 
property rights). Yet another element that appears relevant here is a parameter that influenced the 
Court in Tiercé Ladbroke: the Court held that the televised transmission of French horse races to 
which the not indispensable, since it [took] place after bets 
[were] placed, with the result that its absence [did] not in itself affect the choices made by bettors 
and, accordingly, [could not] prevent bookmakers from pursuing their business  [emphasis 
added].338 As already seen, prominent display that results from discrimination may in itself affect the 
choices made by online users and 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European 
Communities [2007] ECR II-03601, paragraph 652 
334  Commission decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft) C (2004) 900 final, paragraph 568 
335 Ibid., paragraph 570 
336 Ibid., paragraph 572 
337 See, for instance, Foundem (2012), supra n. 270, 5 
338 CFI, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923, paragraph132 
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interpretations, there is a common thread in all the above cases, namely the (additional) condition that 
the conduct concerned must further lead to the exclusion of competition in the affected market.339 
That is to say, it would have to be shown that discrimination diverts significant traffic from 
competing sites to G  
 
As already mentioned, the Commission has not adopted a decision yet. Interestingly, however, 
from the statement of objections the Commission recently sent to Google, it may be inferred that its 
preliminary assessment that the search giant is abusing its dominant position was (at least, if not 
predominantly) grounded on a) the three parameters that were discussed above that would lend 
) 
evidence suggesting exclusionary effects. In the relevant press release the Commission states, inter 
alia, that:  
Google systematically positions and prominently displays its comparison shopping service in 
its general search results pages, irrespective of its merits 
comparison shopping service, did not benefit from any favorable treatment, and performed 
poorly. 
The Statement of Objections takes the preliminary view that in order to remedy the conduct, 
Google should treat its own comparison shopping service and those of rivals in the same way. 
This would not interfere with either the algorithms Google applies or how it designs its 
search results pages  
ing services 
 
As a result of Google's systematic favouring of its subsequent comparison shopping services 
"Google Product Search" and "Google Shopping", both experienced higher rates of growth, to 
the detriment of rival comparison shopping services. [This] has a negative impact on 
consumers and innovation. It means that users do not necessarily see the most relevant 
comparison shopping results in response to their queries, and that incentives to innovate from 
rivals are lowered as they know that however good their product, they will not benefit from the 
 [emphasis added to the second phrase of the second 
paragraph]. 
Were the Commission in the position to prove the above, it would appear that, even under a strict 
effects-based approach, whereby discrimination must be regarded as abusive only if refraining from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 See, for instance, CFI, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comission, [1997] ECR II-923, paragraph 133; Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. and others [1998] ECR I-7791, paragraph 41; 
ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Comission, [1995] ECR I-743, paragraphs 54-56; Commission decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) C (2004) 900 final, paragraphs 585-589; ECJ, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto 
Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] ECR 223, paragraph 25, and ECJ, Case 311/84, Centre belge 
d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité 
Benelux (IPB) [1985] ECR 3261, paragraphs 26-27 
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law may serve as a tool to address concerns relating to how a dominant digital intermediary exercises 




This Chapter discussed a number of issues that relate to the application of Article 102 TFEU to 
h not only because at the time of writing 
this thesis Google Search is the only case where the Commission has been called upon to assess 
unilateral conduct in markets where digital intermediaries operate, but also because the complaints 
against Google give rise to a plethora of issues that illustrate the ways in which an intermediary with 
interests in several markets may impact competition and media pluralism; the allegations concern, 
inter alia  data portability restrictions 
general search that may affect vertical search markets.  
 
Similar to Chapters 4 and 5, the Chapter examined competition intervention in order to 
establish whether the Commission has made appropriate use of the tools it has at its disposal to 
address the competition issues it has identified during the Google investigation, and if not, to explore 
whether a proper application of Article 102 may remedy concerns over media pluralism in the 
approach to the complaints against Google. First, as regards the question of how the case has been 
approached, the assessment of the proposed undertakings that are likely to be accepted by the 
Commission shows that, where a number of complex issues arise, a commitments decision may fail 
to find the target. As extensively discussed throughout the Chapter, certain undertakings were far-
reaching and with potentially adverse effects on the markets concerned (scraping), some were poorly 
designed and hence highly likely to be ineffective (retaliation), and others simply unnecessary (data 
portability restrictions). This problem arises because in a commitments decision the Commission 
does not need to define relevant markets or measure the effects of the conduct under scrutiny. The 
implications of this approach for competition and media pluralism were discussed in detail in Chapter 
3, where the Newscorp/BSkyB decision was used as an example that vividly illustrated how avoiding 
dealing with complicated matters might jeopardize the accuracy of a competition decision and 
possibly media pluralism. The same conclusions can be drawn with respect to Google. For example, 
the Commission is inclined to prevent Google from displaying snippets of newspaper articles on 
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Google News without 
websites. If these effects are positive, there is no harm to competition. From a media pluralism 
perspective, if the small excerpts indeed encourage the users to click through, then preventing the 
display of snippets may eventually drive consumers to consult the few branded websites they have 
always consulted, ultimately dis-incentivizing them from discovering alternative sources of 
information.   
 
Another issue concerns the management of the case in procedural terms. The Commission 
justified its decision to pursue the commitments route on the grounds that in fast moving markets, 
340 Yet, nearly five years after the Commission opened its probe, we are still waiting for the 
decision. Moving at such a slow pace renders the commitments procedure devoid of any benefit.341 A 
veil of haziness hangs over the most recent development, namely the decision to send Google a 
Statement of Objections regarding the practice of preferential treatment. The Commission provided 
no explanations as to the reasons that prompted it to proceed in this way. In respect of this move, it 
bears noting that the Statement of Objections does not impose any legal deadlines on the Commission 
to complete the investigation concerned (and the Commission was eager to make that remark in the 
relevant press release342). Hence, it is not excluded that the case will be dragged on for several 
months, maybe years. In view of the above, it would be no exaggeration to say that this case was 
procedurally mishandled with adverse effects on both competition and media pluralism. As already 
discussed in Chapter 2, the affected markets have a natural tendency to concentration and, once it 
acquires a dominant position, the antitrust offender may be difficult to challenge. That is to say, the 
longer Google is allowed to act anti-competitively, the less likely it is that other firms will be able to 
exercise effective competitive constraints upon it. With respect to media pluralism, the fact that no 
 
 
That Article 102 has still not managed to address the issues which Google
should be attributed to the Commission only. The Chapter showed that the provision offers multiple 
avenues for remedying concerns associated with the practices of a dominant digital intermediary. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 European Commission (2014a, February), supra n. 22 
341  It would no be an exaggeration to say that this violates the right of the firm that has allegedly breached the EU competition rules to 
have its affairs handled within a reasonable time, a right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] C 364/1, Article 41(1) 
342 European Commission (2015, April), supra n. 28  
  
	   	   291	  
example, entities which compete with the intermediary in a neighboring market and provide better 
quality content services can rely on Article 102 to prevent the intermediary from granting preferential 
treatment to its own services. Users can also rely on Article 102 to address exploitative practices that 
largely affect their content choices. Adding to the above, in a recent Resolution the European 
Parliament notes the significant role that search engines play in ensuring access to information, draws 
attention to the adverse effects of concentration on the content to which consumers are exposed, and 
.343 This was clearly referring to the market power Google enjoys in the EU and 
to the practices that are currently being investigated by the Commission. 344  Albeit an extreme 
solution and subject to the condition that no behavioral remedy would be equally effective or less 
burdensome, breaking up a dominant company is possible under EU competition law.345 This is 
another manifestation of the tools that EU competition law offers to deal with ownership 
concentration. 
 
With that said, a strict application of Article 102 may not manage to mitigate all the risks 
associated with how intermediaries behave to advance their own interests. Given how multi-layered 
and complex the structures of these companies are, it is difficult to conceive all the ways in which 
they may grant preferential treatment to their own content. As the Commission put it with insight in 
MSG Media Service, one of the oldest decisions in the broadcasting sector, there are innumerous 
that a dominant firm controlling access to a popular information gateway behaves neutrally vis-à-vis 
providers that compete with it in downstream markets.346 But maybe some of the harm caused by 
digital intermediaries that disrupt the fair and free flow of information may be overridden by the 
existence of strong and independent public service media organizations. This will be discussed in 
detail in the next and final Chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 European Parliament resolution of 27 November 2014 on supporting consumer rights in the digital single market (2013/2973 
(RSP)). Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2014-
0071+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
344 See, for instance, Kanter, J. E.U. Parliament Passes Measure to Break Up Google in Symbolic Vote. 27 November 2014, The New 
York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/international/google-european-union.html?_r=0  
345 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, Article 7(1)  
346 Commission decision MSG Media Service, Case IV/M.469 [1994] OJ L 364/1, paragraph 98 
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Chapter 7  State aids in support of public service media  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The previous Chapters examined how the Commission exercises/may exercise merger and 
antitrust control in media markets. This Chapter will deal with the remaining pillar of EU 
competition law, that is, State aid control. In the same way as Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this Chapter 
discusses the application of EU competition law to undertakings that control assets that may affect 
competition in the markets where they operate. In the case at hand, the key issue is to determine how 
the Commission applies the State aid provisions of the Treaty to media undertakings that control 
public funds. To this end, I will thoroughly examine State aid decisions concerning advantages 
granted to public service broadcasters (hereinafter also referred to as PSBs or public broadcasters). I 
focus on this area mainly for three reasons. First, compared against other media undertakings that 
receive public funding, public service broadcasters are the most generously funded.1 Second, State 
aid control in public service broadcasting is a major policy issue insofar as the application of State 
aid rules to media markets is concerned: the Commission has adopted thirty-eight decisions in the 
broadcasting sector2 and only five in the newspaper publishing sector.3 Third, the granting of aids in 
support of PSBs has become an issue of great concern to undertakings other than commercial 
broadcasters; over the past few years, PSBs have expanded into new media markets, providing a 
variety of services from mobile news apps to catch-up TV to online advertising space. Therefore, 
they now directly compete with a wide range of content producers and distributors, including 
newspapers and IPTV providers. In view of the above, the likelihood that unlawful aids in support of 
certain media organizations will harm competition seems to be greater in cases of aid measures 
supporting public broadcasters than in cases of schemes supporting other media.   
 
Pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, aid granted by a Member State which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, shall be declared incompatible 
with EU law. However, Article 106(2) TFEU gives a derogation from this rule in cases where the aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Compare the amount of money dispersed in support PSBs against, e.g., those in support of newspapers. The State aid measures 
containing the relevant figures are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/decisions_psb.pdf (PSBs) and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result (newspapers) 
2  A list with all State aid decisions concerning PSB schemes is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/decisions_psb.pdf To this list we must add the recently adopted decision that concerns 
the financing regime of Belgian broadcaster RTBF that has not been published yet. On this latter decision see European Commission 
(2014, May). State aid: Commission approves amended financing regime of Belgian broadcaster RTBF. Press Release. Retrieved 
from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-523_en.htm  
3  A list with all State aid decisions concerning aid schemes in support of newspapers is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
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measure supports the provision of a Service of General Economic Interest (hereinafter also referred 
to as SGEI), that is, a service that delivers outcomes in the overall public good.4 One of the main 
rationales for applying this derogation to PSBs is their presumed contribution to the protection and 
promotion of media pluralism.5 Under certain conditions, this contribution can be big. For example, 
if safeguards are in place to ensure the independence of the PSB from political and commercial 
forces, a PSB increases supply diversity. Moreover, all PSBs are obliged to provide a balanced and 
varied programming,6 
private, mostly advertising-based, providers. Provided that PSBs comply with this obligation, the 
public broadcasting system promotes content diversity. Finally, empirical research has demonstrated 
that viewing public rather than (or at least in addition to) commercial broadcasting is associated with 
higher levels of public affairs knowledge.7 Hence, public broadcasting may also increase exposure 
diversity.  
 
However, an aid scheme supporting the provision of public broadcasting services does not 
automatically guarantee media pluralism. For example, in the absence of a mechanism ensuring that 
it delivers a wide range of programming, the PSB is no different from its commercial counterparts 
which, as seen in detail in Chapter 4, show little to no interest in minority-taste programming. In the 
absence of safeguards ensuring that it is independent from political actors, the PSB may become a 
pawn of the government that finances it. Finally, in the absence of a supervisory body that is 
entrusted with controlling whether its behavior is market-conform, the PSB may engage in 
exclusionary practices. For example, the PSB may unlawfully use the public money to undercut 
advertising prices or cross-subsidize commercial activities that deliver no public value. This may 
push other providers out of the market, thus harming supply diversity. Therefore, a properly 
implemented legal framework is needed to ensure that the PSB does not deviate from its mission to 
protect media pluralism. Otherwise, the harm to competition resulting from the advantage PSBs gain 
over their competitors does not qualify for an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU, rendering the 
aid scheme incompatible with EU law.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final, 3. 
Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/docs/comm_quality_framework_en.pdf    
5 See, for instance, the European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2010 on public service broadcasting in the digital era: the 
future of the dual system, [2010/2028 (INI)], and Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on public service broadcasting [1999] OJ C 30/1  
6  For an overview of public service obligations PSBs are required to discharge see, for instance, Katsirea, I. (2008). Public 
Broadcasting and European Law: A Comparative Examination of Public Service Obligations in Six Member States. Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International  
7 See, for instance, Soroka, S., Blake Andrew, Toril Aalberg, Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, Sharon Coen, Kaori Hayashi, Paul Jones, 
Gianpetro Mazzoleni, June Woong Rhee, David Rowe and Rod Tiffen (2012). Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current 
Affairs Knowledge. British Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1-21 
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The Commission, through the enforcement of the State aid rules, has played a crucial role in the 
creation of a framework aimed to minimize abuses that may take place in the provision of public 
broadcasting services: any new aid measure the Member States plan to adopt in order to support their 
PSBs must be notified to the Commission before it is implemented. The Commission is also the 
competent body to investigate private sector complaints concerning an existing aid scheme. As a 
result, the Commission has often injected into the relevant national schemes its own views about 
 
 
In line with the approach followed throughout the thesis, this Chapter will seek to establish 
whether the Commission has enforced State aid law in a way that benefits competition and if not, to 
what extent a proper application of the relevant State aid provisions would achieve that objective 
without the Commission acting ultra vires. It bears noting, however, that, compared against the 
action it may take under the other pillars of EU competition law, the Commission has a limited 
margin of discretion when assessing PSB schemes. This is because, pursuant to the principle of 
subsidiarity, the Member States are free to organize the public broadcasting system in accordance 
with the social, democratic and cultural needs of the society they serve. This does not prevent the 
Commission from applying to relevant schemes an evidence-based approach that is grounded on 
sound economic principles, but the Treaty undoubtedly sets tighter limits on the assessment of 
whether a PSB measure may harm competition. These limits are related to three areas that are key to 
every public broadcasting system, namely the definition of the public service remit, the supervisory 
system that has been established to monitor whether the PSB fulfills the remit in question, and the 
amount of money dispersed to support public service broadcasting.  
 
As regards the first area, the Commission may not interfere with how the Member States have 
defined the public service obligations the PSB is required to discharge. 8  For example, the 
Commission may not decide whether it is appropriate to use State funds to cover major sporting 
competitions. However, the Commission can examine whether the remit is so vague as to make it 
impossible to decide whether the service concerned could indeed be regarded as an SGEI, and check 
for manifest errors.9 A manifest error is deemed to have taken place if commercial activities are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 48 
9 Ibid., paragraph 39  
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that seek to crowd out private competitors. As regards the second area, the Commission may not 
conduct evaluations of whether the provider complies with the qualitative standards set out in the 
public service remit. For example, the Commission may not assess whether the PSB presents facts 
with due accuracy and impartiality. However, the Commission is entitled to control whether there is a 
supervisory system ensuring that these qualitative standards are met.10 Finally, as regards the third 
area, the Commission has no power to carry out efficiency assessments when applying the State aid 
rules to a PSB service,11 i.e. it may not j
scrutiny. The Commission can, however, check whether the amount of money dispersed exceeds the 
net costs of the public service mission, thereby resulting in disproportionate distortions of 
competition that are not necessary for fulfilling the public service remit. It is made clear from the 
above considerations that State aid control in this area is a delicate balancing exercise that seeks to 
create the conditions under which public service media may perform their democracy-enhancing 
tasks without disproportionately distorting competition. This Chapter shall attempt to demonstrate 
that, in spite of the above limits, the Commission has not exhausted the means it has at its disposal to 
strike the right balance between public service and private media. To this end, it will compare the 
outcome of relevant decisions against the approach the Commission could have legitimately followed 
in each one of the above three areas, namely the definition of the public service (including online) 
remit, the supervisory systems of the Member States, and the assessments of whether State funds are 
proportionate to the costs incurred in the performance of the public service tasks.  
 
The Chapter is structured as follows. Part 2 provides a brief overview of the EU legal 
framework that applies to PSBs. Part 3 examines the reasoning the Commission has developed in its 
attempt to ensure that not every service sought to be provided is swept under the rug of democratic, 
social and cultural justifications. Three questions will seek an answer: How broad can the public 
service remit be? How big of a role does universality play in declaring the aid measure compatible 
with the Treaty
to assessing the conditions under which a supervisory system justifies a derogation from the rules on 
three different angles: independence of the body entrusted with monitoring compliance with the 
public service tasks from the management of the PSB, independence of the body handling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 CFI, Case T-442/03, SIC v. Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, paragraph 213 
11 See GCEU, Joined Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08, Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) [2010] ECR II-
3397, paragraph 141, and Case T-275/11 Télévision française 1 (TF1) v. European Commission (not yet reported), paragraphs 130, 
133-4 and 138 
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from political actors. Part 5 examines how diligent the Commission has been in assessing whether 
overcompensation has taken place. I look into how it dealt with financial transparency requirements 
the PSBs must fulfill, the financial monitoring mechanisms the Member States have set up, and the 
amount of money directed to premium content. Part 6 studies how the Commission has dealt with the 
PSBs into new media markets. More particularly, I thoroughly discuss its decision to impose upon 
several Member States the duty to conduct a prior evaluation procedure for new media services and 
subsequently examine whether the procedure has indeed been implemented by the Member States 
concerned.  
 
2. The applicable legal framework: Article 106(2), the Amsterdam Protocol and the 
Broadcasting Communication  
 
2.1. Primary EU law regulating public service broadcasting: The puzzling wording of  
Article 106(2) TFEU and the Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting 
 
The Commission has treated aid granted to PSBs as State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU.12 This, however, does not mean that relevant aid measures are unacceptable under EU 
law. Public broadcasting services have traditionally been perceived as Services of General Economic 
Interest,13 which triggers the application of Article 106(2) TFEU.14 Article 106(2) TFEU provides an 
exemption from the rules on competition insofar as the application of these rules obstructs the 
performance of the tasks of the undertakings entrusted with delivering an SGEI. Yet, deciding 
whether this derogation applies to a public broadcaster is far from a straightforward exercise because 
Article 106 TFEU conveys a mixed message. While acknowledging that Member States may grant 
special rights to certain undertakings as a means to support the provision of services for the overall 
good of society, it also requires that the provision of such services do not affect trade to such an 
extent as would be contrary to Union principles, in particular the principle of undistorted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For the purposes of this study, the application of Article 107 TFEU to the public broadcasting sector will not be examined in detail. 
For an example of how the Commission applies 107(1) TFEU to PSBs see Commission decision State aid E 3/2005, Financing of 
public service broadcasters in Germany [2007] C 185/1, paragraphs 141 et seq. The Commission has never made use of the exception 
provided for by Article 107(3)(d) TFEU which provides for an exception to the general State aid prohibition for measures aimed at 
promoting culture. For a detailed analysis of how Article 107 TFEU has been applied to PSBs see, for instance, Harrison, J. and Lorna 
Woods (2007). European Broadcasting Law and Policy, 290 et seq., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Antoniadis, A. 
(2006). The Financing of Public Service Broadcasting, 591 et seq. In Sanchez Rydelski, M. (ed.). The EC State Aid Regime: Distortive 
Effects of State Aid on Competition and Trade. London: Cameron May  
13 See, for instance, ECJ, Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409, [1974] CMLR 177, paragraph 15; CFI, Joined cases T-528/93, T-
542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93 Metropole Television SA, Reti Televisive Italiane SpA, Gestevision Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de 
Television v. Commission [1996] ECR II-649, [1996] 5 CMLR 386, paragraph 116 
14 With the exception of Commission decision BBC License Fee [2003] OJ C 23/6, all other schemes supporting public broadcasting 
activities were declared compatible with the common market under Article 106(2) TFEU 
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competition. 
 
Similar remarks can be made with respect to the interpretative Protocol on the System of Public 
Broadcasting in the Member States (hereinafter referred to as to the Amsterdam Protocol or the 
Protocol) introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 15  The Protocol endorses the role of public 
broadcasting in fulfilling the democratic, social and cultural needs of a given society as well as the 
need to preserve and promote media pluralism and explicitly provides that it is up to the Member 
States to define and organize the public service remit in a manner of their own choosing. However, it 
also lays down that State financing of broadcasting activities may not bring about distortions of 
competition that are not necessary for fulfilling the public service mission. Therefore, in the same 
way as the derogation under Article 106(2) TFEU, the Protocol does not go so far as to provide a full 
exemption from the Treaty rules.16  
 
Both Article 106(2) TFEU and the Amsterdam Protocol demand in essence a balance between 
national interests and the Union interests but do not explain how this balance may be achieved. 
Pursuant to Article 106(3) TFEU, the Commission is the competent body to strike this balance.  
 
2.2. 
public broadcasting policy 
 
The Commission assesses aid schemes in support of public service broadcasters on a case-by-
case basis because it believes that State aid control must take due account of the heterogeneity 
characterizing the European public broadcasting landscape. 17  Indeed, each public broadcasting 
system has developed in different historical and media policy contexts. This in turn has led to the 
creation of various models of public broadcasting across the Union that differ significantly in terms 
of the legal framework in which they operate, their financial organization, and the public service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  is directly related to the 
democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism, have agreed upon the following 
interpretive provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European 
Community: The provisions of the Treaties shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the funding 
of public service broadcasting and insofar as such funding is granted to broadcasting organizations for the fulfillment of the public 
service remit, as conferred, defined and organized by each Member State, and insofar as such funding does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Union to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the realization of the 
 
16 It appears that the Member States feared expansion of Union competence in the media domain which can explain why they agreed 
on the adoption of a Protocol interpreting Article 106(2) TFEU rather than the introduction of a provision in its main text. See 
Harrison, J. and Lorna Woods (2007), supra n. 12, 295 
17 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 41 
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mission they are expected to fulfill.18 
 
Yet, on the basis of the case-by-case approach to public broadcasting schemes, the Commission 
gradually identified certain basic principles which, if respected, are considered to render the measure 
compatible with EU law. The Commission codified these principles into a soft-law instrument, the 
Broadcasting Communication, to help streamline the State aid review process and to provide legal 
certainty to interested stakeholders as to what is permissible and not permissible under State aid law. 
The first Broadcasting Communication started to apply in 2001.19 It was revised in 2009 to deal with 
issues that have arisen as a result of the expansion of public service broadcasters into new media 
markets.  
 
The Broadcasting Communication refers to the three conditions set by Article 106(2) TFEU as 
interpreted by the Court and further explicates them. In providing guidance on how PSB schemes 
may be brought in line with EU law, it also outlines the limits (already described in the Introduction) 
within which the Commission may conduct an assessment under Article 106(2) TFEU. These three 
conditions are the following:  
a. The public broadcasting service must be a service of general economic interest, clearly 
defined as such by the Member State (definition);  
b. The broadcaster must be explicitly entrusted by the Member State with the provision of that 
service and there must be an effective monitoring mechanism ensuring that the public service 
obligations are complied with (entrustment and supervision); 
c. State financing must not exceed the net costs of the public service mission 
(proportionality).20  
 
A short note on the assessment procedure and the nature of PSB schemes: The three conditions 
set by Article 106(2) TFEU must be met cumulatively. Otherwise, the measure is in violation of EU 
os are 
possible:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a comparative analysis of PSB systems see Katsirea, I. (2008), supra n. 6 
19 Given the specific nature of public service broadcasting, the Commission had long stressed the need for a more consistent approach 
to the assessment of the relevant aid measures. Initiatives at European level can be traced back to 1998. See, for instance, European 
Commission DG IV (1998). Discussion Paper: Application of Articles 90, section 2, 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty in the Broadcasting 
Sector, and European Commission (1998). Report from the High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy: the Digital Age: European 
Audiovisual Policy. The Broadcasting Communication started to apply after two decisions had been adopted and several formal 
investigations in relevant aid schemes had been opened 
20 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 37 
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-
or before the Member State joined the EU, and provided that the Commission finds that the existing 
scheme does not meet one or more of the above three conditions, it proposes appropriate measures to 
the Member State concerned.21 If the Member State accepts the proposed measures, it is bound by its 
acceptance to implement them.22 If, however, the Member State refuses to comply with the proposed 
measures, the Commission may open a formal investigation and, where necessary, impose specific 
commitments to ensure that future aid is compatible with the Treaty.23 It bears noting that, where the 
decision is on existing aid, the Commission is not entitled to order the recovery of aid already given, 
but will prevent the Member State from granting future aid.24  
- ,25 must be 
notified to the Commission in sufficient time by the Member State concerned.26 If the Member State 
complies with the pre-notification requirement and the Commission finds that one or more of the 
above conditions is not met, the measure will be declared incompatible with EU law and the service 
sought to be provided may not be launched.  
-If the aid is new and the Member State implements the unlawful scheme before the 
Commission adopts its decision, the Commission may order that aid to be recovered.27  
 
28 is the most common because relevant aid 
schemes were introduced a long time ago.29 Given that new aid that is incompatible with Article 
106(2) TFEU needs to be repaid, the Member States have always attempted to convince the 
Commission that ad hoc PSB measures fall under the existing aid scheme and the Commission has 
been willing to accept this. As a result, new projects funded out of the license fee, including 
interactive learning materials30 and thematic channels,31 have been regarded as services fulfilling the 
existing public service mandate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty [1999] L 83/1, Article 18(1) 
22 Ibid., Article 19(1)  
23 Ibid., Article 19(2)  
24  For an overview of the procedures followed in State aid cases see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/state_aid_procedures_en.html  
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty [1999] L 83/1, Article 1(c) 
26 Ibid., Article 2(1) 
27 Ibid., Article 14 
28 See, for instance, Commission decision State aid E 3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany [2007] C 185/1, 
paragraphs 200 et seq. 
29 For a detailed explanation of how the Commission applies the concept of existing aid to PSB schemes see Communication on the 
application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 257/1, paragraphs 25 et 
seq. 
30 Commission decision N37/2003, BBC Digital Curriculum [2003] OJ C 271/47, paragraphs 27 et seq.  
31 Commission decision State aid E 3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany [2007] C 185/1, paragraph 211 
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The analysis that follows examines the Commi
of the above three conditions is met and reflects on whether, as a result of the decisions it has adopted 
thus far, the right balance between public service and private media has been struck.  
 
3. Clear and precise definition:  
 3.1. How broad can the public service remit be?  
 
The Commission does not have the power to dictate which programs are to be financed as an 
SGEI nor to question the quality or nature of a specific program.32 As already mentioned, with 
regards to the remit, the Member States must only ensure that the obligations the PSB is required to 
discharge are defined as clearly and precisely as possible. What does this mean in practice? When it 
comes to controlling the mandate, the Commission limits its assessment to two elements: first, it 
examines whether the terms in which the entrustment act are so vague as to make it difficult to decide 
whether the service concerned could indeed be regarded as an SGEI. Second, it checks for manifest 
errors,33 that is, it evaluates whether the Member States have included in the remit commercial 
activities such as teleshopping and merchandising,34 thereby facilitating spillovers of State funds to 
the provision of non-SGEIs. 
misuse State resources to provide e-commerce services. E-commerce may perform information 
functions, but it is widely accepted that it cannot be considered to meet, in the wording of the 
Protocol, the democratic, social and cultural needs  of the society the PSB is meant to serve.35   
 
As laid down in the Broadcasting Communication, an unambiguous and detailed definition of 
the public service remit fulfills the following threefold objective: the Commission can determine 
whether any abuses in the definition of the service as an SGEI have taken place, national bodies 
entrusted with supervising the PSB can control whether the latter complies with the obligation to 
provide a balanced and varied offer, and private undertakings can plan their activities.36 Either as a 
tool enabling the competent authority to examine whether the PSB has acted unlawfully or as a guide 
for commercial operators, an entrustment act that includes a clear description of the mandate serves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 48 
33 Ibid., paragraph 39  
34 Ibid., paragraph 48 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., paragraphs 45 and 46 
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one sole purpose, that is, it establishes certainty; certainty that the scheme under scrutiny qualifies for 
an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU, certainty that the PSB respects and caters to the diverse 
needs of the individuals residing in the Member State concerned, and certainty that a commercial 
competitor can invest in an innovative project without fearing that the resulting competitive 
advantage will be offset by aids granted to the PSB. 37  In any of these three forms, certainty 
contributes to leveling the playing field between public and private media.  
 
a straightforward exercise. To comply with the subsidiarity principle, the Commission is bound to 
accept extensive mandates.38 But, to make room for private initiatives, it must also ensure that the 
mandate is so precise that it leaves no doubt as to whether a service provided by the entrusted 
operator is intended by the Member State to be included in the public service remit or not. 39 
Moreover, due to 
SGEI, a distinction between a service delivering public value and a commercial service is not always 
easy to make. On several occasions, the Commission has had to cope with broad public service 
remits (a legacy of the monopoly era), under the umbrella of which potentially fall all types of 
traditional broadcasting and new media services.  
 
This part discusses the reasoning the Commission has developed in cases touching upon the 
definition of the public service mission. Through an analysis of several decisions the Commission has 
adopted thus far, I will show that, in its effort to ensure that not every service sought to be provided is 
swept under the rug of democratic, social and cultural justifications, it has more often than not been 
inconsistent as to the conditions under which the supply of a certain public broadcasting service does 
not constitute an abuse. These inconsistencies jeopardize the certainty that the requirement to provide 
a clear and precise definition of the remit pursues. The decisions were divided into three categories 
which correspond to the three different themes that I identified as the most appropriate to highlight 
the challenges facing the Commission in the attempt to balance competition and public broadcasting 
remit must be to justify an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU, the extent to which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Spector, D. (2007). The economic policy of State aids: The assessment criteria, 179-180. In Vivier, X. (ed.). Competition Policy in 
the EU-Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome. Oxford: OUP  
38 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 47 
39 Ibid., paragraph 45 
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universality of the service under scrutiny plays a role in the approval of the scheme, and whether the 
Commission has occasionally made value judgments, acting ultra vires. I will discuss this latter issue 
by examining how the Commission dealt with the complaint that PSBs focused excessively on the 
coverage of sports events. For the avoidance of confusion, the question of how the Commission dealt 




   
In BBC News 24, the Commission was called upon to decide whether the State financing of an 
advertising-free news channel was compatible with the common market. 40  The BBC Charter 
provided that, in addition to the main public services, that is, sound and TV programs of information, 
education and entertainment, the corporation could provide, subject to the prior approval of the 
Secretary of State, .41 Based on the fact 
that BBC News 24 had been launched as an ancillary service, the complainant argued that the 
channel did not qualify for an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU.42 The Commission replied that 
it lacks the power to pronounce on concepts used in national legislation,43 underlying that its task is 
limited to ensuring that no abuses44 have taken place in the definition of services which are assessed 
under Article 106(2) TFEU as SGEIs.45 Subsequently, it took account of the mandate of the channel, 
which, as envisaged by the approval decision, would be the provision of a 24-hour news service, and 
concluded that the channel could be regarded as an SGEI on 
and a more in- 46  
 
The approach followed in BBC News 24 is in sharp contrast to the one adopted in BBC Digital 
Curriculum dealing with the public financing of an online service aimed to provide interactive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraphs 1 and 16 
41  BBC Charter (1997). Article 3(a) and (b). The Charter is available at: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/archive/1997.pdf See also Commission 
decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraph 5 
42 Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraph 16(iii) 
43 Ibid., paragraph 46 
44 According to Article 106(3) TFEU the Commission is entrusted with ensuring the application of the provisions laid down therein 
without leaving room for the involvement of other institutions or the Member States in performing that task. However, such an 
aggressive interpretation would not be welcomed by the Member States. Being one of the first decisions in the sector, BBC News 24 
follows a via media t may 
have taken place in the definition of the remit. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Craufurd-Smith, R. (2001). State 
Support for Public Service Broadcasting: The Position Under European Community Law. Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 28, 
14 
45 Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraph 47 
46 Ibid., paragraph 49. See also paragraphs 50-51 
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learning materials to homes and schools.47 The Commission had expressed doubts48 about whether 
the Digital Curriculum, sought to be provided as an ancillary service,49 was indeed covered by the 
only after the UK proposed several undertakings to address the concerns related to the ambiguities 
that could have arisen when interpreting the entrustment act.50 More particularly, the State authorities 
committed to ensure that the BBC would publish a Commissioning Plan fifteen months before the 
launch of the Digital Curriculum that would set out the subjects to be covered during the first five 
years of the service.51 The Plan would also be accompanied by explicit exclusion criteria with a view 
to providing clarity to users and commercial operators regarding the subjects that would not be 
provided by the BBC throughout the duration of the Plan.52 Any divergence from the scope of the 
Plan would be considered a breach of the entrustment act and hence a violation of the State aid 
rules.53  
 
Compared against BBC News 24, the approach followed in BBC Digital Curriculum seems to 
be more adequate to level the playing field between public service and private media. The BBC 
Agreement (the entrustment act that complements the Charter by providing more detail on how the 
BBC must deliver the public service mission) that was applicable at the time made no mention of the 
ancillary services54 that could form part of the public broadcasting offer. The only reference to 
BBC Charter where they were defined 
as public services whether or not broadcasting or program supply services that inform, educate and 
entertain.55 Yet, this is far from a clear and detailed description of the remit, for it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to think of content t
BBC News 24 the Commission lamented that the legal framework regulating public broadcasting left 
room for doubt as to what is defined as an ancillary service and what is not,56 but granted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Commission decision BBC Digital Curriculum, N37/2003 [2003] OJ C 271/47, paragraph 4  
48 Ibid., paragraph 43 
49 Ibid., paragraph 18 
50 Ibid., paragraph 43 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. This decision was also problematic because, in the assessment of whether the aid granted to support the provision of the Digital 
dered to be 
to the extent that it remains closely associated . See paragraph 36 of the 
decision. The requirement to plan activities in close relation to television and radio services is arguably in violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity and against the technology neutrality principle because it implies a dependence on specific platforms and technologies. 
For a discussion of this decision from that point of view see, for instance, Psychogiopoulou, E. (2006). The Integration of Cultural 
Considerations in EU Law and Policies, 321. PhD Thesis. Florence: European University Institute, and Harvey, S. (2010). No Jam 
, 3. Draft Paper for RIPE Conference, University of Westminster, London, 8-11 September 
54 See BBC Agreement (1996). Retrieved from: http://www.bilderberg.org/bbchartr.htm  
55 BBC Charter (1997), Article 3(a) and (b) 
56 Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraphs 69, 64 and 65 
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approval anyway.  
 
description of ancillary services should be are not clear. The launch of both BBC News 24 and BBC 
Digital Curriculum rested on the same legal basis.57 Both measures envisaged that the services would 
be offered free of charge and that they would not be fuelled by increases in the license fee paid by 
UK citizens.58  Finally, both types of services, that is, thematic news channels59 and digital learning 
materials, 60  were already available in the market. Given these similarities, accepting the broad 
definition of ancillary services in BBC News 24, whilst demanding a detailed description of the 
Digital Curriculum offer, falls short of achieving the certainty which compliance with the duty to 




In BBC License Fee, the Commission was asked to decide whether the launch by the BBC of 
nine digital channels was compatible with the common market. 61  The BBC Charter that was 
applicable at the time laid down that the core public services of the BBC consisted in sound and TV 
programs of information, education and entertainment. 62  Article 2(2) of the BBC Agreement 
expressly laid down that the corporation was expected to provide the core public services by means 
of two television and five radio program services available for general reception throughout the UK, 
an additional sound program service for general reception in each of Scotland and Northern Ireland 
respectively, and a number of local radio programs and two additional sound program services for 
general reception in Wales.63 However, this provision left considerable room for manoeuvre as it also 
laid down that the BBC could, subject to the prior agreement of the Secretary of State, vary the 
number of the core public services.64 Article 2(2) was the legal basis on which the launch of the new 
channels rested.65 Similar to BBC News 24 (where it remarked on the excessively broad definition of 
ancillary services), while lamenting that the Agreement and the Charter were not sufficiently clear 
about the conditions under which the BBC could provide the channels under scrutiny, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., paragraph 46 and Commission decision BBC Digital Curriculum, N37/2003 [2003] OJ C 271/47, paragraph 18  
58 See, for instance, Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraph 53 and Commission decision BBC 
Digital Curriculum, N37/2003 [2003] OJ C 271/47, paragraph 40 
59 For example, Sky News was launched in 1989. See http://mavise.obs.coe.int/channel?id=486 
60 Commission decision BBC Digital Curriculum, N37/2003 [2003] OJ C 271/47, paragraphs 7 et seq.  
61 Commission decision BBC License Fee [2003] OJ C 23/6, paragraphs 3 and 4 
62 BBC Charter (1997), Article 3(a)  
63 BBC Agreement (1996), Article 2(2)  
64 Ibid., Article 2(3) 
65 Commission decision BBC License Fee [2003] OJ C 23/6, paragraph 28 
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Commission found that no manifest errors had taken place in the definition of their mandate.66  
 
The BBC Charter and Agreement have been amended several times since these decisions were 
adopted.67 However, the provisions that define the core and ancillary services the BBC is entitled to 
finance out of the license fee remain intact.68 Considered alongside the State aid decisions dealing 
with PSB schemes of other Member States that will be examined below, the Commi
service remit in more precise terms.  
 
In more recent cases, the Commission has more strenuously tackled the uncertainty and abuses 
that may arise from broad public service mandates. An example illustrating this more restrictive 
approach is Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, 69  concerning, inter alia, the 
definition of the remit of six digital channels provided by ARD and ZDF. The Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty laid down that ARD and ZDF were entitled to offer, in addition to the main public service 
channels, additional digital channels subject to the condition that they had their focus on culture, 
information and education.70 
general requirement was sufficiently precise, noting that without a clearer circumscription of what is 
meant by culture, information and education  most program genres offered by public service 
broadcasters could be covered by these concepts .71 The Commission pointed out the need for a 
the additional public 
value 72  The German authorities made the following two proposals which the 
Commission ultimately accepted:73 first, they undertook to introduce in the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty program categories to determine what is meant by information, education and culture.74 
Second, they committed to legally oblige public broadcasters to develop a program concept 
specifying these different program categories.75 The program concept would require a specific act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid., paragraph 36 
67  For the amendments that have taken place see: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/governance/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement.html  
68  BBC Charter (2006), Article 5(1) and (2). Retrieved from: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf 
in the Agreement see also BBC Agreement (2006), Article 11. No definition of ancillary services is included in the Agreement, which 
is available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/agreement.pdf  
69 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, State aid E 3/2005 [2007] C 185/1 
70 Ibid., paragraphs 51 and 88 
71 Ibid., paragraph 227 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., paragraphs 358-361 
74 Ibid., paragraph 335 
75 Ibid., paragraph 336 
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entrustment.76  
 
The amendments the German authorities introduced to comply with the above two legally 
binding commitments were arguably an improvement in the German aid scheme. The following 
example illustrates why the current framework regulating definition of the remit increases certainty: 
before they launched the digital channels, public broadcasters committed to use them as a service 
complementing the content provided by the main channels77 with a view to amplifying the balanced 
and varied programming they were expected to offer under the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty.78 
However, public broadcasters seem to have taken dishonest advantage of the vaguely worded duty to 
focus on information, education and culture, 79  using the digital channels for extensive sports 
transmissions.80 Following the amendments to the Interstate Treaty, sports coverage is explicitly 
81 
procedure, broadcasters are expected to determine in advance the profile of the channel, including the 
sports that wi
channels whose programming was a bone of contention in the State aid case, explicitly provides that 
the channel will focus on the transmission of less popular sports events such as the sailing 
82 It is submitted here that, while program concepts are drafted in broad 
terms, they are more detailed than an all-encompassing mission to focus on information, education 
and culture. This does not entirely eliminate the concern that public broadcasters may use the broad 
definition of the remit to act anti-competitively, but it is a step towards minimizing abuses that may 
take place in the interpretation of the entrustment act.  
 
The Commission adopted the same approach in the assessment of the aid scheme supporting 
Austrian public broadcaster ORF. In 2005, Austria made an amendment to the law regulating ORF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., fn. 10 
78 Pursuant to the general Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting ("Rundfunkstaatsvertrag", RStV), public service 
Pflichtaufgabe
production and distribution of radio and television programmes (§ 11 (1) first sentence RStV). Public service broadcasting has to 
provide in its offers and programmes an overview of the international, European, national and regional events in all areas of life. It 
shall contribute to international understanding, European integration and cohesion on the federal and regional level. Its programme 
shall serve information, education, advise and entertainment purposes. It shall offer in particular cultural programmes. Public service 
broadcasting needs to respect principles of impartiality and objectivity and shall take into account the plurality of opinion and ensure 
a balanced programme offer  
79 Ibid., paragraph 22 
80 Ibid., paragraphs 122 and 227 
81 See Interstate Broadcasting Treaty (2009), Article 2(14): 
political information, economics, reports from abroad, religion, sport, regional information, society news, service and contemporary 
http://www.uni-muenster.de/ITMCATR/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Interstate-Treaty-on-
Broadcasting.pdf  
82 Programmkonzept Digitale Fernsehprogramme der ARD (Program Concepts of Digital Television Channels of ARD), paragraph 4.  
Retrieved from: https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_show_anlage?p_id=9246  
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which laid the way for the launch of a sports channel, Sport Plus.83 However, the remit of the 
channel, as set out in the provision introduced in the ORF Law, simply followed the orientations 
84 which stipulated that the television programming 
should, inter alia, fully [inform] the general public about all important political, social, economic, 
cultural and sporting questions  [emphasis added].85 Similar to the German case discussed above, 
the Commission noted that the abstract wording of the new provision made it impossible to examine 
whether the public broadcaster was indeed entitled to finance a sports channel out of the license fee, 
could not be satisfied as part of the existing program remit.86 In order to address t
concerns, Austria offered to set certain qualitative criteria that Sport Plus would need to meet in order 
to justify public expenditure such as the obligation to encourage appreciation of the audience for less 
known sports and their practice rules, increase the interest of the population in these sports and report 
about health-related sports aspects.87  
 
However, while the decisions relating to the Austrian and German PSB schemes may imply 
that the Commission has become less tolerant, it is still not entirely clear how it will deal with the 
launch of a thematic or generalist channel that is based on a loosely defined public service mission. 
For example, the Commission raised concerns similar to those in the ORF case in State funding for 
Flemish public broadcaster VRT concerning, inter alia, the compatibility of measures supporting 
sports channel Sporza. 88  While it noted that the general mandate of VRT to offer quality 
programming that focuses on information, education, culture and entertainment left room for doubt as 
to whether or not VRT could provide a channel focusing on sports content,89 the Commission did not 
, covering a 
wide range of sports events, including major football and tennis competitions.90  
 
3.2. Is universality of the service sought to be provided as an SGEI important or not?  
 
In  (hereinafter CFII) the Commission was asked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Commission decision Financing of the Austrian public service broadcaster ORF, E2/2008 [2009] OJ C309/1, paragraph 9 
84 Ibid., paragraph 132 
85 Ibid., paragraph 18 
86 Ibid., paragraph 146 
87 Ibid. paragraph 194 
88 Commission decision Public financing of public service broadcaster VRT, E 8/2006 [2008] OJ C 143/1, paragraph 14 
89 La VRT assure une offre de qualité dans les secteurs de l'information, de la culture, de 
l'éducation et du divertissement. La VRT doit proposer en priorité des programmes informatifs et culturels axés sur les spectateurs et 
les auditeurs. Elle assurera en outre des programmes sportifs, des programmes éducatifs contemporains, des productions dramatiques 
propres et des programmes de distraction  
90 See http://www.sporza.be/cm/sporza  
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to assess the compatibility of a measure aiming to support the launch of an international news 
channel that would be broadcast overseas.91 In its assessment of whether an abuse in the definition of 
the remit took place, the Commission followed an approach somewhat different from the one adopted 
bring the French point of view on international news to foreign audiences,92 the Commission decided 
that there was not a strong enough link between the service sought to be provided and the fulfillment 
of the democratic, social and cultural needs of French society.93 The characteristics of CFII, the 
Commission said, were not de facto problematic, but the State aid assessment should be based on 
Article 106 TFEU, not the Protocol or the guidelines laid down in the Broadcasting 
Communication.94 In order to establish whether the service under scrutiny was correctly defined as an 
SGEI, the Commission referred to the French law that regulated public service media entities, which 
stated that their mission would, inter alia, be to promote the French culture and language. 95 
 duty to disseminate 
pluralistic information or to offer a balanced programming, were described in detail in the 
entrustment act. 96  Applying this line of reasoning, the Commission concluded that the French 
authorities had not committed a manifest error in t .97    
 
Broadcasting Communication are meant to interpret how Article 106 TFEU applies to the 
broadcasting sector. The decision to ignore them in this case is therefore somewhat confusing; the 
Protocol and the Communication neither contradict Article 106 TFEU nor introduce a logic different 
from the balancing exercise that is conducted in the examination of other aid schemes in support of 
SGEIs. Second, the Commission based its approval on Article 106(2) TFEU in spite of the fact that 
the service would not be broadcast in the French territory.98 A universal service obligation, that is, the 
service throughout the national territory at affordable prices and on similar quality 
conditions 99 has often been a key parameter to the assessment of whether a service has correctly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Commission decision , N54/2005 [2005] OJ C 256/25, paragraph 8 
92 European Commission State aids: the Commissio  
(CFII). Press Release IP/05/689. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-689_en.htm  
93 Commission decision , N54/2005 [2005] OJ C 256/25, paragraph 40 
94 Ibid. 
95 It bears noting that CFII was not, strictly speaking, a public service organization of audiovisual communication. But, since it shared 
certain characteristics with this type of entities, including and especially the financing of its operations with State funds, the 
Commission considered it appropriate to refer to the provision laying down the mission of the undertaking that was defined in French 
Commission decision 
international, N54/2005 [2005] OJ C 256/25, paragraph 41 
96 Ibid., paragraph 42 
97 Ibid., paragraph 43 
98 Ibid., paragraph 39 
99 Communication on Services of General Interest [2001] OJ C 17/04, paragraph 14 
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been defined as an SGEI. 100  The case law may not be entirely clear as to how big of a role 
universality plays in deciding whether the derogation under Article 106(2) TFEU applies,101 but even 
in cases where the Court ruled that a limited territorial or material application does not necessarily 
call into question the nature of a service as an SGEI,102 the service under scrutiny could at least be 
accessed by anyone living in the territory (or part thereof) of the State concerned.103 As already 
mentioned, in the case at hand, the channel was created with the primary aim to target international 
audiences.104 It may be argued that an international news channel intended to be broadcast abroad 
and now offering content also in English and Arabic105 is more likely to strengthen the brand image 
of an organization rather than fulfill the needs of the taxpayers that fund it.106 In view of the above, 
doubts are raised as to whether the CFII indeed qualified as an SGEI. This should not be understood 
of non-French citizens, contribute to the protection of pluralism in the markets where it is broadcast 
and strengthen cultural diversity across the EU. But, if one of the main public service obligations of 
the channel was to expose foreign audiences to the French language and culture, the Commission 
could have granted an exemption under Article 107(3)(d) TFEU,107 which allows for a derogation 
from the rules on competition if the aid measure under scrutiny aims to promote culture, and avoid 
the SGEI jargon which undermined legal certainty.   
 
Finally, for our purposes, CFII should be compared against two older decisions where lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-320/91, Corbeau [1993] ECR I-
proceedings, it cannot be disputed that the Régie des Postes is entrusted with a service of general economic interest consisting in the 
obligation to collect, carry and distribute mail on behalf of all users throughout the territory of the Member State concerned, at uniform 
tariffs and on similar quality conditions, irrespective of the specific situations or the degree of economic profitability of each 
 also ECJ, Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and others v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-
n of 
services of general interest, it should be borne in mind that it has been given the task, through the grant of a non-exclusive concession 
governed by public law, of ensuring the supply of electricity in part of the national territory. Such an undertaking must ensure that 
throughout the territory in respect of which the concession is granted, all consumers, whether local distributors or end-users, receive 
uninterrupted supplies of electricity in sufficient quantities to meet demand at any given time, at uniform tariff rates and on terms 
 
101 Compare ECJ, Case C-320/91 Corbeau, paragraph 15 and ECJ Case C-393/92 Almelo, paragraphs 47 and 48 against CFI, Case T-
289/03, BUPA and Others v. Commission [2008] ECR II-
must be noted at the outset that, contrary to the theory put forward by the applicants, it does not follow from Community law that, in 
order to be capable of being characterised as an SGEI, the service in question must constitute a universal service in the strict sense, 
 
102 CFI, Case T-289/03, BUPA and Others v. Commission [2008] ECR II-81, paragraph 187 
103 Ibid., paragraph 42 
104 Within the French territory, the channel would be marginally accessible by viewers that possessed special equipment (antenna 
satellite or decoder) permitting the receipt of the signal via satellite through which the channel would be broadcast in Europe. See 
Commission decision , N54/2005 [2005] OJ C 256/25, paragraph 39 
105 See http://www.france24.com/en/?&_suid=1421416480638033961083041504025  
106 Note that CFII was a partnership between commercial broadcaster TF1 and PSB France Télévision, see paragraph 4 of the decision. 
The channel is now wholly owned by the French government after TF1 and France Télévision sold their shares to l'Audiovisuel 
extérieur de la France (a holding company owned by the French government) 
107 For a criticism of how inconsistently the Commission has applied this provision to the media sector see Harrison, J. and Lorna 
Woods (2007), supra n. 12, 305-306 
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universality was treated differently. In BBC License Fee, the scheme provided that the new channels 
would be digital. 108 Hence, they would not be made available for analogue transmission, which was 
at the time the most widely used method of distribution of broadcast programming. The Commission 
mote digital take-up 
109 The temporary nature of technical constraints, a 
result of which the public service was not immediately available to the whole population, was also 
key to declaring BBC News 24 compatible with the common market.110 Post-CFII, we may not 
determine the degree to which universality will influence an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU.  
 
3.3. Sports coverage as part of the public service mandate: How much is too much?  
 
Sports coverage has been a major bone of contention in State aid cases; in most cases dealing 
with general aid schemes in support of PSBs, complainants put forward the argument that PSBs were 
excessively focused on sports and that this was an indication that they deviated from their public 
service mission. The Commission first tackled this issue in a case relating to aid measures in support 
of the Dutch public service broadcasters. The Media Act, one of the two instruments regulating the 
broadcasting sector in the Netherlands,111 laid down that sports coverage, including but not limited to 
competition and cup matches and international events, was part of the public service remit, without, 
however, predetermining the amount of total broadcasting time that should be devoted to sports.112 
Complainants claimed that public broadcasters broadcast too much sports (and too much football in 
particular), thereby falling short of fulfilling the different needs of Dutch society, whilst gaining 
considerable market share at the expense of private competitors.113 The Commission rejected the 
argument, finding [s]ports can be part of the public service mission of broadcasters and a 
proportion of 10% of broadcasting time dedicated to sports is not inconsistent with the remit of 
offering a balanced and varied programming mix  [emphasis added].114  
 
The amount of time that public broadcasters allot to sports programming is undoubtedly an 
issue to consider when discussing whether PSBs indeed protect media pluralism by providing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Commission decision BBC License Fee, N631/2001 [2002] OJ C 98/1, paragraph 4 
109 Ibid., paragraph 30 
110 Commission decision BBC News 24, NN 88/98 [2000] OJ C78/6, paragraph 60 
111 Commission Decision Ad hoc financing of Dutch public service broadcasters C 2/2004 [2006] OJ L49/1, paragraph 19 
112 Ibid., paragraph 23 
113 Ibid., paragraph 120 
114 Ibid., paragraph 121 
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comprehensive range of content that informs and educates the citizens.115 Nevertheless, this is a 
(national) media policy issue rather than a concern the Commission has the power to address under 
the State aid r
nature of the programming that is provided as an SGEI. If the mandate explicitly provides that the 
broadcaster must transmit sports events, the Commission may merely check for manifest errors, that 
is, control whether commercial activities such as the resale of sports rights116 and sponsoring have 
been included in the list of public service obligations. 117  In view of the above, establishing a 
threshold above which the provision of sports programming would render the aid incompatible with 
the Treaty violates the Member States  to design the public service mandate as they deem 
appropriate.118  
 
The approach followed in the Dutch case is in conflict with the one adopted in an older 
decision concerning measures supporting Italian public broadcaster RAI: commercial broadcasters 
119 Without referring to sports in particular, the 
did] not explicitly include 
120  The direction followed in the RAI case is more in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity.  
 
In terms of methodology, the decision concerning the Dutch aid measures raises two problems. 
First, the Commission refrained from elaborating a reasoning which would explain why, in its view, a 
proportion of sports that does not exceed on average 10% of the overall broadcast time is not 
exorbitant. It seems that in the Dutch case (where this rule emerged), this finding was based on the 
established practice of the public broadcaster to devote a 9-11% of total broadcasting time to sports 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 For example, in 2006 the Irish public service provider spent more than 16% of total prime time (the daypart with most viewers and 
therefore where broadcasters generate most of their advertising revenues) on sports events (see Commission decision State financing 
of RTE and TG4, E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/1, paragraph 20, Figure 4). Thus, an excessive focus on this genre could be regarded as an 
indication that public broadcasters are driven by commercial rather than cultural and social considerations when it comes to sports 
coverage. Note that this is not limited to cases where public television is funded partly through advertising; representatives of various 
public broadcasters across Europe have openly stated that they prioritize premium sports programming as a means to legitimize the 
license fee paid by the taxpayers. See Solberg, H.A. (2007). Sports Broadcasting: Is it a Job for Public Service Broadcasters?  A 
Welfare Economic Perspective. Journal of Media Economics, 20(4), 305 
116 This is a commercial activity developed by TV2 Danmark, see Commission decision Financing of TV2/Danmark, C 2/2003 [2011] 
OJ L 340/1, paragraph 35  
117 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 48. Commercial activities unlikely to substantiate the wording of the Amsterdam Protocol include advertising, e-
commerce, teleshopping, the use of premium rate numbers in prize games and merchandising 
118 Van Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2012). Competition Law, Sports, and Public Service Broadcasting: The Legal Complexity 
and Political Sensitivity of Measuring Market Distortion and Public Value. Journal of Media Law, 4(2), 221-222 
119 Commission decision Ad-hoc payments to RAI, C 62/1999 [2004] OJ L 119/1, paragraph 53 
120 Ibid, paragraph 117 
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programs.121 relating to the schemes 
supporting the German and Irish broadcasters.122 It did so without considering significant differences 
among these three markets (e.g. size, structure, position held by public broadcasters in the market for 
sports content, interest of national audiences in following certain sports events, etc.). Second, the 
Commission failed to take account of the fact that public broadcasters have been providing on-
demand services. 123  It is therefore far from clear how private operators that consider filing a 
complaint with the Commission should calculate the total time the public broadcaster dedicated to 
sports when related content is offered in a non-linear fashion.124  
 
The main conclusion to draw from the above is that, while it may be tempting to advocate for 
EU intervention in cases where the provider focuses excessively on sports programming, the 
Commission does not have the power to establish to what extent sports must be included in the public 
service remit. However, this does not mean that the State aid rules do not grant the Commission the 
power to establish a practice that could result in public broadcasters directing the license fee to other 
genres. The Commission may address this issue by exercising effective control over the amount of 
money dispersed to acquire (the very expensive) broadcast rights to these events in the assessment of 
whether the proportionality criterion is met (discussed in more detail below).   
 
The above analysis illustrates that striking a balance between the definitional freedom of the 
Member States and undistorted competition has not been an easy task. In certain cases, such as BBC 
News 24 and State funding for Flemish public broadcaster VRT, the Commission did not exhaust the 
means it had at its disposal to ask for amendments to the definition of broad remits that arguably 
allow PSBs to expand beyond what the market thinks is permissible. In other cases, however, 
including those concerning the Ger
have prompted legislative changes that clarified to a certain degree what activities may or may not be 
performed by the PSBs. In cases concerning sports coverage, the Commission seems to have made 
value judgments of the services that may fulfill a public service mission, thereby moving beyond its 
competence limits. Most importantly, the Commission followed unjustifiably contradictory 
approaches to the conditions under which services provided by PSBs may be regarded as SGEIs, 
even in cases of services that were assessed in the light of the same legal framework (e.g. BBC News 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Commission decision Ad hoc financing of Dutch public service broadcasters, C 2/2004 [2006] OJ L49/1, paragraph 23 
122 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E 3/2005 [2007] OJ C 185/1, paragraph 292 and 
Commission decision State financing of RTE and TG4, E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/1, paragraph 87 
123 See, for instance, http://www.bbc.co.uk/tv/programmes/genres/sport/schedules 
124 Van Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2012), supra n. 118, 222 
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24 and BBC Digital Curriculum). As a result, the main goal that an unambiguous and detailed 
description of the mandate pursues, that is, certainty, has not been achieved yet.  
 
4. Supervision  
  
The Commission is not competent to conduct evaluations of whether the provider complies 
with its public service remit, including the qualitative standards set out in that remit. The 
Commission may solely control whether there is a supervisory system ensuring that the public 
service mission is delivered. 125  In line with the Amsterdam Protocol, the Broadcasting 
Communication lays down that it is up to the Member States to choose the monitoring mechanism to 
ensure effective supervision of the fulfillment of the mandate.126 However, it also states that for 
supervision to be considered effective it should be exercised by a body independent from the public 
broadcaster.127 This condition does not d
to organize the public service as they see fit; since the Commission does not have the power to assess 
whether a public broadcaster offers a varied programming or whether it respects any code for the 
treatment of controversial subjects with accuracy and impartiality, calling upon the Member States to 
have a body that can perform this task in an unbiased manner seeks to establish a minimum guarantee 
of fairness vis-à-vis commercial providers.  
 
Yet, the decisions the Commission has adopted thus far have not always been consistent with 
, thereby creating confusion as to when a supervisory system 
enough to justify a derogation from the rules on competition. For example, in BBC License Fee,128 
the Commission found that the BBC Board of Governors (currently the BBC Trust) satisfied the 
requirement of effective supervision in spite of an evident conflict of interest; the then applicable 
BBC Charter provided that the Governors should, at all times, include the Chairman and Vice-
129 It bears noting that, despite 
the fact that several amendments have been introduced to the Charter after BBC License Fee was 
adopted, the Chairman of the BBC Trust can still be the Chairman of the BBC.130 The Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 CFI, Case T-442/03, SIC v. Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, paragraph 213 
126 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 54 
127 Ibid.  
128 Commission decision BBC License Fee N631/2001 [2003] OJ C23/3, paragraphs 2 and 4. The full text of the decision is available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/136401/136401_438497_21_2.pdf  
129  BBC Charter (1997), Article 8(3). Retrieved from: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/archive/1997.pdf  
130  See BBC Charter (2006), Article 10. Retrieved from: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf  
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took an equally permissive stance in the more recent case concerning the German PSB scheme. 
Initially, it had expressed strong doubts 131  about how effective the control exercised by the 
Broadcasting Councils, internal bodies of the public broadcasters,132 was, but it ended up concluding 
that the supervision requirement was met.133 The Commission appears to have followed a stricter 
approach in State aid financing of Irish public broadcasters RTÉ and TNAG. In this case, it found 
that the general aid scheme was not in line with the State aid provisions of the Treaty because the 
body independent from the RTÉ but rather an integral part of it 134 To address the Commission 
concerns, the Irish authorities committed to create an independent content regulator, the Broadcasting 
Authority of Ireland, which is responsible, inter alia, for safeguarding compliance with the public 
service contracts.135 In view of the above discrepancies, private providers are not sure how the 
Commission will deal with concerns arising from the lack of independence of the body entrusted with 
supervising whether the 
requirements laid down in the entrustment act. 
 
The Broadcasting Communication also states that independence is important to ensure that 
complaints launched by interested stakeholders will be handled on a non-discriminatory basis.136 
However, in practice, the Commission does not seem to have been particularly concerned with 
whether the redress systems that have been set up by the Member States can lead to the imposition of 
appropriate remedies in cases of failure to comply. For example, in Germany, third parties, including 
commercial providers, can file complaints with the Broadcasting Councils and ultimately with the 
Rechtsaufsicht 137 This mechanism is problematic because, in addition to the 
fact that they are granted limited power to exercise legal supervision of the public broadcasters, those 
exercising external control on the Länder level are often also members of the Broadcasting 
Councils.138 In spite of 
context of the State aid investigation, it was not addressed in the decision.139 Similar concerns exist in 
the UK where fair trading complaints, i.e. complaints that the BBC has exploited its position as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraphs 255-6. The full 
text of the decision is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/198395/198395_678609_35_1.pdf  
132 Ibid., paragraph 24 
133 Ibid., paragraph 372 
134 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraph 97. The full text of the 
decision is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/198587/198587_816753_152_2.pdf  
135 Ibid., paragraph 151 
136 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 54 
137 Ibid., paragraph 26 
138 Ibid., paragraphs 124 and 256-258  
139 Ibid., see in particular paragraphs 368-374 
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publicly funded body to secure special advantages in the market, are received and handled by the 
140. Surely, German 
and UK commercial operators are not prevented from ultimately introducing actions before the 
national courts141 or from submitting complaints to the competent competition authority.142 But this 
undermines the purpose of the State aid sector-specific rules that seek to establish a framework 
within which public broadcasters operate lawfully.  
 
The Broadcasting Communication refers only to the independence of the monitoring bodies 
from the management of the public broadcaster.143 However, we should also consider whether, in the 
context of State aid control, the Commission is entitled to call upon the Member States to design their 
systems in a way that the body conducting supervision is also independent from political actors. This 
is an issue that arises in cases where national laws lay down that the members of the monitoring body 
must be members of the Parliament (or appointed by the government) and that the individuals 
managing the PSB must be appointed by the government. The INDIREG Study, which was 
conducted on behalf of the European Commission with the aim to identify the key characteristics of 
an independent regulator in light of the AVMS Directive, defines independence as the condition in 
phere 
(government, parliament, other political forces), but also from the regulated industry 144 The 
Commission could adopt the same definition of independence in the assessment of a body that is 
required to monitor compliance with the PSB remit and this would arguably not violate the principle 
of subsidiarity. The (purely economic) argument may be raised that, in cases where the body 
responsible for controlling whether the PSB has misused public funds consists of members of the 
entity that both appoints the -General and fixes the license fee 
contributions, the PSB has the ability and incentive to ignore its public service mission. This is all the 
more so if the complaints regarding failure to respect the public service contracts are examined by the 
same body or individuals. Irrespective of whether the PSB may ignore the public mission to serve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 BBC (2014). Complaints Framework - Procedure No. 2: Fair trading complaints and appeals procedures, 3. Retrieved from: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/protocols/2014/complaints_fr_work_fair_trading.pdf Any 
appeals may be filed to the BBC Trust. Note, however, that any appeals relating to competition law may be filed to the competent 
competition authority 
141 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 26 
142 See, for instance, http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/governance/complaints_framework/fair_trading.html  
143 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 54 
144 Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research et al. (2011). INDIREG Report on Indicators for independence and efficient functioning 
of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies for the purpose of enforcing the rules in the AVMS Directive, 5. See also European 
Commission (2004). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2004) 374 final, paragraph 
The implementation of [SGEI] principles generally requires the existence of independent regulators with clearly defined powers 
and duties  
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political interests or to engage in anti-competitive practices, Article 106(2) TFEU may no longer 
apply because the PSB has the ability and incentive to refrain from providing the SGEI.  
 
The suggested approach would not only contribute to a more transparent use of the State 
resources that are directed to PSBs, but also benefit media pluralism. History is full of examples of 
governments that have abused their power in cases where they were entitled to appoint the members 
of the supervisory body. In the UK, for example, governments, most notably the Thatcher 
government, would make sure that the BBC Board of Governors was composed of like-minded 
people. 145  
freedom. 146  Similar concerns also exist in Italy where a specific Parliamentary Commission, 
Vigilanza RAI, supervises the fulfillment of the public service mandate 
Executive Board. 147  In Germany, representatives of the political parties that participate in the 
Broadcasting Councils 148  reportedly act as members of the respective parties rather than as 
representatives of the German society as a whole.149  
 
5. Proportionality  
 
The Commission has no power to carry out efficiency assessments when deciding whether a 
PSB scheme may be exempted under Article 106(2) TFEU.150 However, the Commission can check 
whether the amount of money dispersed exceeds the net costs of the public service mission, thereby 
resulting in disproportionate distortions of competition that are not necessary for fulfilling the public 
service remit. However, to allow the Commission to conduct a meaningful proportionality analysis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Klug, F., Keir Starmer and Stuart Weir (1996). The Three Pillars of Liberty: political rights and freedoms in the UK, 182. London: 
Routledge 
146 Ibid. See also Dyson, K., Peter Humphreys, Ralph Negrine and Jean-Paul Simon (1988). Broadcasting and New Media Policies in 
Western Europe. London: Routledge, at p. 263 and Nicholls, T., Ron Southwell, William Houseley and Peter Block (2001). Managing 
in the Media, 44. Oxford: Focal Press  
147 
instance, Cavino, M. and Lucilla Conte (2013). Il diritto pubblico, 120-121. Santarcangelo di Romagna: Maggioli. For a criticism see, 
for instance, Giurato B., Carlo Freccero: Bisogna separare la Rai dalla politica. 7 June 2013, Lettera 43. Retrieved from: 
http://www.lettera43.it/cultura/carlo-freccero-bisogna-separare-la-rai-dalla-politica_4367598161.htm; Nicoli, S. Vigilanza Rai: tra 
conflitti di interesse dei commissari e il solito peso di Berlusconi. 7 June 2013, Il Fatto Quotidiano. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/06/08/vigilanza-rai-tra-conflitti-di-interesse-dei-commissari-e-solito-peso-di-b/619818/ and 
Zitelli, A. Rai: ma quale servizio pubblico? 18 June 2014, Valigia Blu. Retrieved from: http://www.valigiablu.it/rai-ma-quale-servizio-
pubblico/ 
148 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, fn. 12 
149 See ELIAMEP (2011). MEDIADEM Does media policy promote media freedom and independence? The case of 
, 22. Retrieved from: http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Germany.pdf Note that the 
Broadcasting Councils also elect the Directors of ARD and ZDF. See Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters 
in Germany E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 24 
150 See GCEU, Joined Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08, Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) [2010] ECR II-
3397, paragraph 141, and Case T-275/11 Télévision française 1 (TF1) v. European Commission (not yet reported), paragraphs 130, 
133-4 and 138 
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the Member States must ensure that PSBs comply with the duty to keep separate accounts between 
public service and commercial activities, and  what appears to have been established in recent 
decisions  that a body independent from the PSB is responsible for checki
behavior conforms to the market. Otherwise, it is questionable whether the balance sheets and 
accounting reports on which the Commission bases its proportionality analysis contain accurate data. 
As a result, prior to examining how the Commission dealt with allegations of overcompensation, I 
will discuss how it approached the above two issues.    
 
5.1. Transparency in the use of State resources: Separation of accounts between public 
service and commercial activities 
 
The Broadcasting Communication lays down that a clear and appropriate separation between 
public service and commercial operations, including and especially a separation of accounts, is a 
useful tool for defending justified compensation payments for democracy-enhancing general 
economic interest tasks.151 Separation of accounts is not simply a Commission recommendation 
addressed to those Member States with public broadcasters that develop commercial activities, but an 
obligation under the Directive on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and 
public undertakings (hereinafter Transparency Directive or Directive).152 Pursuant to Article 4 of the 
Transparency Directive, all public service and commercial costs and revenues must be correctly 
allocated on the basis of consistently applied and objectively justifiable cost-accounting principles 
that must be established beforehand.  
 
While the role that separation of accounts can play in the examination of whether cross-
subsidization of commercial activities has taken place is pretty straightforward, it took a long time 
before compliance with this obligation became an integral part of State aid assessments in the 
broadcasting sector. While the Transparency Directive was adopted in 1980,153 it was only after 2000 
that its provisions started to apply to public broadcasters.154 Hence, it is questionable whether the 
proportionality criterion was actually met in several cases that concerned aid schemes assessed before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 61  
152 Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as 
well as on financial transparency within special undertakings [2006], OJ L318/17, Recital 16 
153 Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings, [1980] OJ L 195/35. See in particular Article 4(b)  
154 Commission Directive 2000/52/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings 
[2000] OJ L 193/75. See also European Commission (2000). Commission approves rules on separation of accounts for public service 
providers. Press Release IP/00/763. Retrieved from: 
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the 2000 version of the Directive entered into force. More questionable is the basis on which the 
Commission conducted its analyses; absent any accurate data about cost and revenue allocation, how 
accurate can the finding that the proportionality principle is respected be? Indeed, there were 
decisions in which the Commission lamented that the figures it used to calculate whether public 
distinction between the costs incurred in the operation of the public service and those incurred in the 
development of commercial activities.155 
 
Yet, even long after the amended version of the Directive entered into force, proportionality 
assessments remained difficult, if not impossible, to conduct. For example, until 2007, when the 
Commission adopted the decision dealing with the general aid scheme supporting the German public 
broadcasters, the State authorities still had not transposed the necessary legal provisions as regards 
separation of accounts. 156  Notably, the Directive had been transposed into national law, 157  but 
Germany refrained from applying its provisions to public broadcasters. During the State aid 
investigation, Germany went so far as to argue that public broadcasters did not fall under the scope of 
the Directive158 despite the fact that the statements made by the Commission in the context of the 
amendments made in 2000 left no doubt as to whether public broadcasters would need to maintain 
separate accounts.159 In the case dealing with the scheme supporting Irish RTÉ, the Commission was 
not able to verify whether RTÉ was engaging in cross-subsidization because, while the then 
applicable Broadcasting Act envisaged its duty to distinguish in its accounts between public service 
and commercial costs and revenues, it did not lay down any rules as regards cost allocation.160  
 
Germany and Ireland undertook to introduce legislation to ensure that public broadcasters 
comply with the requirements set by the Directive.161 Both Member States seem to have respected the 
commitments they made to the Commission. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See, for instance, Commission decision Financing of Spanish national public broadcaster RTVE, E8/2005 [2006] OJ C 239/17, fn. 
Esta cifra sólo es aproximada puesto que los costes de RTVE (que no se han tenido en cuenta para determinar los costes del 
servicio público) contienen costes de servicios (empleados, etc.) que también benefician a TVE. La falta de datos detallados en las 
cuentas y el hecho de que no se aplique una contabilidad analítica según lo exigido por la Directiva sobre transparencia y la 
Comunicación dificultan la determinación y la imputación exacta de estos costes
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/198590/198590_604955_69_2.pdf  
156 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 314 
157  See Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2000/52/EG der Kommission vom 26, Juli 2000 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 
80/723/EWG über die Transparenz der finanziellen Beziehungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und den öffentlichen Unternehmen 
(Transparenzrichtlinie-Gesetz - TranspRLG), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/transprlg/gesamt.pdf  
158 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 73 
159 See European Commission (2000), supra n. 154 
160 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4) E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraphs 106-107 
161 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraphs 343 and 375 and 
Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4) E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraphs 154, 179 and 180 
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obligation to include in its annual accounting report a statement of the cost accounting principles and 
methods by which costs and revenues are assigned to public service and commercial activities.162 The 
German Interstate Broadcasting Treaty of 2009 explicitly laid down that if ARD and ZDF developed 
commercial activities separate accounting would be provided for.163 These examples illustrate the 
role of State aid control in promoting greater transparency in the broadcasting sector, which in turn 
protects the interests of commercial operators and increases the likelihood that State funds will be 
directed to services that deliver public value. However, given that the deadline for the transposition 
of the Directive was 31/07/2001,164 it is clear that the reform that was achieved as a result of State aid 
intervention was remarkably slow.165    
 
5.2. Who should be in charge of financial supervision? 
 
In the past, the Commission followed a rather relaxed approach in relation to the supervisory 
systems the Member States had set up to prevent overcompensation. For example, in Portugal 
verification of compliance with the public service obligations was based on annual reports produced 
by an internal body of auditors.166 Moreover, while Portuguese law also provided that an external 
audit had to be carried out each year, an audit statement did not systematically accompany the 
internal audit reports.167 In spite of the above, the Commission found that an effective mechanism 
was in place to monitor whether Portuguese public broadcaster RTP received more funds than was 
necessary to fulfill the public service mission.168 The decision was later overturned by the Court inter 
alia d from an objective weakness of 
169  
 
In recent cases, the Commission has been more eager to ensure that the Member States ensure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Broadcasting Act 2009, Section 109. The text is available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2009/en/act/pub/0018/sec0109.html  
163 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Interstate Broadcasting Treaty) in the version of the 12th Amendment to the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty dating from 18 December 2008 in force since 1 June 2009, Article 16a(1). The Treaty is available at: 
http://www.uni-muenster.de/ITMCATR/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Interstate-Treaty-on-Broadcasting.pdf  
164 See Commission Directive 2000/52/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings 
[2000] OJ L 193/75, Article 2 
165  Note that infringement proceedings may settle the issue in much less time than State aid investigations. For example, the 
Commission filed an action under Article 258 TFEU against Luxembourg for failure to transpose the Transparency Directive. This 
action was filed in July 2003 and the judgment was rendered in March 2004. See ECJ, Case C-314/03, Commission v. Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-2257. Initiation of infringement proceedings may also have a deterrent effect. See, for instance, European 
Commission (2008). State aid: Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia and Slovak Republic implement Financial Transparency Directive in full; 
Commission closes infringement procedures. Press Release IP/08/1040. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1040_en.htm?locale=en 
166 Commission decision Ad-hoc Payments to RTP, ex NN 133/B/01, NN 85/B/2001 and NN 94/B/99 [2002] OJ 85/5, paragraph 178 
167 Ibid., paragraph 180 
168 Ibid., paragraph 181 
169 See CFI, Case T-442/03, SIC v. Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, paragraph 233. See also paragraphs 225 et seq. 
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that the proportionality criterion is met. For example, in the Austrian case, the Commission noted that 
the financial control system was not adequate inter alia because the audit committee which prepared 
control the finances of ORF on a regular basis.170 The Austrian authorities endeavored to envisage a 
system whereby monitoring would be exercised by an independent regulator that would guarantee 
that the public broadcaster does not sell advertising below the market value or purchase premium 
sports rights above the market price.171 Similarly, in the Irish case, the Commission found that there 
was no mechanism ensuring that RTÉ respected market principles, including compliance with the 
duty not to undercut prices on the advertising market, and the duty 
principle in all financial transactions between the public service broadcaster and commercial 
subsidiaries. 172  
173 The Irish authorities committed to set up a mechanism whereby an independent 
regulator would control on an annual and a five-year basis the fulfillment of the above obligations 
and, where overcompensation has taken place, adjust the level of public funding.174  
 
5.3. Determining whether overcompensation has taken place: How did the Commission 
deal with allegations that the PSB was emptying the market for sports content? 
 
As already mentioned, in the context of a proportionality assessment, the Commission needs to 
examine whether public broadcasters engage in activities which would result in disproportionate 
distortions of competition that are not necessary for fulfilling the public service mission. Such 
distortions occur, for instance, in cases where the PSB uses State funds to empty the market for the 
acquisition of premium program rights.175 The issue relating to the amount of money directed to the 
acquisition of premium content, and in particular sports rights, has been a major cause of conflict 
between PSBs and private operators. This is no big surprise given how expensive and important (to 
attract audiences and hence advertisers) premium content is.176 Examining how the Commission dealt 
with relevant complaints is therefore a good example to illustrate how diligent it has been in 
assessing whether the proportionality criterion is met.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Commission decision Financing of the Austrian public service broadcaster ORF, E2/2008 [2009] OJ C 309/1, paragraphs 173 and 
53 
171 Ibid., paragraphs 222 and 225 
172 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C 121/5, paragraphs 117, 115, 127 
173 Ibid., paragraph 128 
174 Ibid., paragraph 183 
175 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraphs 92-97. Another example is failure to undertake commercial investments in line with the market economy investor 
principle (e.g. the undercutting of advertising prices) 
176  
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In many cases, including those concerning the German, Flemish and Irish aid schemes, 
complainants argued that prices paid by public broadcasters for certain sports rights could not have 
been refinanced under normal market conditions, thereby indicating that they had spent more than 
was necessary to fulfill their mandate.177 However, the Commission refrained from investigating 
these allegations. It is worth quotin
Commission would like to point out that the scope of the present procedure as outlined in the Article 
17 letter covers the question of the public service remit as regards sports broadcasts [and not the] 
possible disproportionate effects on competition related to the scope of sports rights acquired by RTÉ 
178 But why in the assessment of the legitimacy of the general scheme did the Commission 
refuse to examine whether the State funds allocated to the acquisition of sports rights exceeded the 
net costs of the public service mission? This question has yet to be answered; despite the fact that it 
explicitly mentioned that the possible distortions of competition caused by the purchase of sports 
rights would be examined separately,179 no other decision dealing with aid measures in support of 
public broadcasting in Ireland has been adopted since then.  
 
As previously explained, according to the Amsterdam Protocol, the Member States are free to 
define the remit, including sports events coverage, on the basis of national cultural traditions, not the 
180 However, this does not mean that spending exorbitant amounts of public 
monies with a view to crowding out commercial operators can be swept under the Amsterdam 
Protocol mantra. It is worth noting that, during the relevant Commission investigations, German 
public broadcasters had purchased the rights to, inter alia, the German Cup (DFB Pokal), the games 
of the national football team, the UEFA Cup, the EURO, the Olympic Games, the World Cup and the 
Tour de France.181 In Austria, the ORF generalist channels had acquired the broadcast rights to the 
Federal League, the World Cup, the Formula 1 and major skiing and tennis competitions.182 In the 
included the rights to 
American football, the biathlon world cup, and several ice hockey, golf, motor sport and sailing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E 3/2005 [2007] OJ C 185/1, paragraph 130 and 
Commission decision Public financing of public service broadcaster VRT, E 8/2006 [2008] OJ C 143/, paragraph 57 
178 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, at fn. 6 
179 Ibid.  
180 In fact, the Commission has repeatedly stated that sports may perform social, cultural and educational functions which need to be 
taken into account under the competition provisions of the Treaty. See, for instance, Declaration (No 29) on Sport, annexed to the final 
act of the Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C 340/136, and Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in 
Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies, Presidency conclusions, Nice European Council, 
Meeting, 7, 8, 9 December 2000 
181 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E 3/2005 [2007] OJ C 185/1, paragraph 111 
182 Commission decision Financing of the Austrian public service broadcaster ORF, E2/2008 [2009] OJ C309/1, paragraph 65 
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competitions.183 By referring to these examples, I do not suggest that the purchase of rights to several 
sports events is sufficient to establish that overcompensation has taken place. In other words, sports 
rights acquisition does not necessarily imply that competition has been distorted. For example, public 
broadcasters have occasionally been awarded the broadcast rights to the Olympic Games in spite of 
the fact that they had not made the highest bid.184 However, the concentration of a large amount of 
athletics events in the hands of public broadcasters or their consistently overbidding for premium 
sports rights could be an indication that the proportionality principle has been violated. Hence, the 
Commission needs to be more diligent when it comes to determining whether public funds used to 
buy sports rights constitute incompatible State aid.  
 
Related to the above is the issue of whether State aid in support of the acquisition of exclusive 
sports rights are compatible with the Treaty, which was raised in the context of the investigation into 
the general scheme financing German public broadcasters. Private operators argued that buying 
exclusive rights with public money cannot benefit from the derogation under Article 106(2) TFEU 
for two reasons: first, exclusivity is not necessary to offer a wide range of programs.185 Second, the 
purchase of exclusive rights is contrary to the principle of thriftiness, since a non-exclusive right 
186 Again, the Commission did not proceed to an examination 
y is an accepted practice not only to maximize 
revenues, but also to be distinctive from other operators. Even though guaranteed State financing 
makes the choice of exclusivity by public service broadcasters less dependent on financial 
considerations, they would still seek exclusivity to attract large audiences and to promote their 
187 
 
Acquiring exclusive sports rights with State funds is not per se contrary to Article 106(2) 
TFEU.188 However, for the aids to be compatible with the Treaty, there must be evidence that the 
restrictions of competition resulting from the exclusivity are indispensable to the performance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ibid., paragraph 64. As a result of the launch of Sport Plus on 1 May 2006, sports broadcasting in 2006 was increased by one half 
compared to 2005. See paragraph 147 of the decision 
184 Van Rompuy, B. and Karen Donders (2013). The E
Rights: Unfinished Competition Business, Competition Law Review, 9(1), 
operators which are required to fulfill universal service obligations under their contract with the State. This is explicitly laid down in 
age by the 
different media and the widest 
http://www.olympic.org/documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf  




188 For an overview of the case law in the area of exclusive rights and State monopolies see Buendia-Sierra, J. L. (1999). Exclusive 
Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law. Oxford: OUP 
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public service tasks. This was addressed in EBU/Eurovision where the Court ruled that, instead of 
simple references to the mission public broadcasters must fulfill, the Commission should have based 
its finding upon a minimum of actual data that might have consisted of figures for the investment 
made and of specific calculations establishing a ratio between those investments and the potential 
gains from the transmission of sports events.189 As Buendia Sierra correctly remarks, this judgment 
economic analysis before being able to conclude that a given restriction respects the principle of 
190 Considered in light of EBU/Eurovision, the proportionality assessment in the 
German case should have consisted of balancing the amount of public money that had been spent to 
purchase sports rights against the accrued benefits, including advertising revenues generated as a 
result of sports coverage and the positive contribution of athletics events transmission to the quality 
 (the conditions under which the amount of 
money directed to the acquisition of sports rights may be regarded as proportionate to the costs of the 
public service mission will be discussed in more detail below).  
 
The Commission seems to have followed a stricter approach to the practice of the German 
public broadcasters to refrain from sublicensing sports rights that they could not use themselves (e.g. 
pay-TV rights). More particularly, the Commission noted that the holding back of unused rights 
which had been acquired on an exclusive basis resulted in market distortions that were unnecessary 
for the fulfillment of the public service mandate and could not therefore be justified under Article 
106(2) TFEU.191 It warned that if Germany did not create a clear and transparent system guaranteeing 
that public broadcasters would offer third parties sublicenses for unused rights, the scheme would be 
declared incompatible with the common market.192 The German authorities committed to establish 
 set up a sublicensing mechanism that would clarify the notion 
193 In addition, for the scheme to be transparent, any offers of unused rights would 
be published over the Internet.194 The Commission was satisfied with these undertakings.195  
 
Following the adoption of the decision, the German authorities took action to comply with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 CFI, Joined Cases T-528, 542, 543 & 546/93, Métropole télévision SA and others v Commission [1996] ECR II-649, paragraphs 
118 et seq. 
190 See Buendia-Sierra (1999), supra n. 188, 326 
191 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E 3/2005 [2007] OJ C 185/1, paragraph 299 
192 Ibid., paragraph 321 
193 Ibid., paragraph 355 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid., paragraph 395 
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live transmission are considered unused if ARD and ZDF do not intend to make a live transmission 
of the event. Rights are not to be regarded as unused if ARD and ZDF intended but did not manage to 
196 Moreover, they appointed an independent 
Trustee to monitor the effective implementation of the sublicensing scheme. 197  Yet, to my 
knowledge, no bids to purchase unused rights have been made thus far. In its 2007 report, the 
(Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der öffentlichrechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten, 
hereinafter referred to as KEF) noted that the public broadcasters did not manage to sublicense 
unused rights because private broadcasters showed no interest in buying them.198 This should not be 
understood to mean that commercial operators are no longer interested in the transmission of 
premium sports content. To the contrary, sports programming is still key to attracting German 
audiences. 199  The fact that it has never been implemented demonstrates that a sublicensing 
mechanism as the one envisaged in the German case is not adequate to open the market for sports 
rights acquisition to competition. There are mainly two reasons why this is the case: first, the scheme 
provides that access shall be granted to unused rights, that is, rights for the transmission of sports 
events that will not be broadcast live by ARD or ZDF. Clearly, ARD and ZDF have the incentive to 
keep for themselves the most attractive content and to sublicense rights to those events that have low 
consumer demand. Second, as explained in detail in Chapter 3, competitors that have traditionally 
acquired rights to major sports events are difficult to challenge. For example, in the most recent 
auction for the Bundesliga rights, in the free-to-air segment, ARD managed to acquire the rights to 
seven live matches per season whereas commercial broadcasters secured only some minor 
highlights.200  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Transparency of the business policy of the public service broadcasters in the field of sports rights in line 
with the commitments made to the EU Commission under the EU State aid proceedings ARD/ZDF
available through the Sport A website at: http://www.sporta.de/media/Umsetzung_des_EU_Beihilfeverfahrens_im_Sport_EN.pdf  
197 See http://www.sporta.de/media/Trustee_Web_EN.pdf  
198 Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten. Report of December 2007, 144 and 
188  
199 See, for instance, Deloitte (2014). Report on Broadcast Sports Rights, 1: In 2014 about three quarters of the total value of premium 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technology-Media-Telecommunications/gx-tmt-2014prediction-
broadcast-sports-rights.pdf Earlier, in December 2005, Premiere, the German media group, lost 42% of its market value and a large 
part of its subscriber base, after it released a statement that it had not managed to purchase the rights to the Bundesliga, while the new 
Hatton, C., Christoph Wagner and 
Hector Armengod (2007). Fair Play: How Competition Authorities have Regulated the Sale of Football Media Rights in Europe. 
European Competition Law Review, 28(6), 346 
200 The real winner was pay-TV operator Sky Deutschland which acquired the live rights to all Bundesliga matches. See Briel, R. Sky 
Deutschland wins all live Bundesliga rights. 18 April 2012, Broadband TV News. Retrieved from: 
http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2012/04/18/sky-deutschland-wins-live-bundesliga-rights/  
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Inevitably, the above analysis gives rise to the following question: if the transmission of sports 
content is a public service task, how should the Commission determine whether public broadcasters 
distort competition in the market for sports rights acquisition?  
 
A good point of departure for examining whether the amount of compensation does not exceed 
the net costs of the public service mission is to determine whether the prices paid by the public 
broadcaster are far above market prices. To do so, we need to calculate the prices that private 
operators would be willing to pay. For example, in Ad hoc financing of Dutch public broadcasters, in 
an attempt to substantiate the claim that the bid made by the public provider for the rights to the 2002 
Champions League was substantially higher than the one made by commercial operators,201 CLT-
UFA submitted a formula on the basis of which commercial broadcasters calculate the potential 
revenue which can be earned from the transmission of a certain sports event. This formula includes 
the expected growth of expenditure in the whole television market, the expectations regarding 
potential advertising revenue following meetings with advertisers, the impact of the transmission of 
the sports event on the market share of the licensee and the number of national football clubs 
participating in the event in question.202 In light of technological developments, additional factors 
now need to be taken into account, for instance, whether the public broadcaster is, based on the 
entrustment act, entitled to expand into neighboring media markets, thereby having the incentive to 
exploit the sports content across different platforms (e.g. DTT, IPTV, etc.) using different 
distribution modalities (e.g. catch-up TV, archive TV, etc.). A consultation with the industry will 
undoubtedly allow the Commission to identify the parameters used in the model as well as the weight 
that should be given to each of them.  
 
Once the market price is defined, it should be compared against the price paid by the public 
broadcaster but, since the transmission of sports events has traditionally been part of the PSB public 
service mission, the former does not need to match the latter. In other words, this should not be a 
strict application of the market economy investor principle, which needs to be respected in the 
development of purely commercial activities.203 However, the Commission should strike a balance 
between prices paid to acquire rights to programs of major importance to the public and prices paid to 
push competitors out of the market. This balance cannot be struck by determining ex ante an arbitrary 
threshold above which it is presumed that overcompensation has taken place. The issue of whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Commission Decision Ad hoc financing of Dutch public service broadcasters, C 2/2004 [2006] OJ L49/1, paragraphs 72 and 120 
202 Ibid., fn. 28 
203 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 93 
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public funds spent to acquire sports rights exceed the net costs of the public service mission should 
be assessed on a case-by-
interest considerations. One way to do that is to run consumer surveys that aim to gather data about 
whether, and if so to what extent, sports coverage is valued by the citizens that the broadcaster is 
meant to serve.204 For example, while the vast majority of the license fee payers may wish to watch 
the Olympic Games or the matches of the national football team on public (free-to-air) television, this 
is not so clear about competitions such as the UEFA Champions League or the Tour de France. The 
contribution that consumer surveys can make to informing a competition analysis and the role they 
may play in enhancing media pluralism by, inter alia, enhancing exposure diversity have already 
been discussed in Chapter 4, to which I refer.205 The approach proposed here moves within the 
competence limits of the balancing exercise the Commission must conduct when exercising State aid 
control in the broadcasting sector because it respects national cultural traditions with regards to sports 
events whilst ensuring that public broadcasters do not empty the market for premium content.   
 
As for the acquisition of premium program rights on an exclusive basis, it was mentioned 
above that, for the exclusivity to justify the derogation from the rules on competition, the possible 
distortions of competition should be outweighed by the benefits accrued from transmission of the 
content concerned. These benefits can be both economic and non-economic. Economic benefits are 
translated into advertising revenues generated from the transmission of the sports event. These 
revenues will be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the net public service costs thereby 
reducing the public service compensation level.206 When it comes to measuring the non-economic 
benefits gained from sports events transmission, it must be borne in mind that exclusivity does not 
necessarily incentivize broadcasters to invest in diverse or more original content. To the contrary, 
acquisition of broadcast sports rights in most cases implies spending large amounts of money 
precisely because successful bidders are granted exclusivity. This may be to the detriment of a 
balanced and varied programming which public broadcasters are expected to provide.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 As will be seen in greater detail below, a solution similar to the one proposed here has been adopted by the Commission in cases 
where public broadcasters intend to launch a new media service 
205 See Chapter 4, Part 4. It is worth, however, making an additional remark with regard to State aid proceedings. As opposed to 
merger investigations, the Commission does not need to conclude a State aid investigation within strict time limits. See European 
Commission. Code of Best Practice for the conduct of State aid control procedures [2009] OJ C 136/04. Hence, if the Commission can 
conduct consumer surveys in merger cases, this means that it has plenty of time to do so also in the context of an Article 106(2) TFEU 
analysis 
206 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 67 
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A detailed analysis of whether the proportionality criterion is met may go a long way towards 
keeping the market for the acquisition of premium sports content open to competition. It may be 
particularly beneficial for free-to-air television that has traditionally been dominated by public 
service providers insofar as sports coverage is concerned. In other words, if the Commission 
demonstrated the willingness to conduct thorough assessments that could lead to the conclusion that 
the public value created by the purchase of sports rights does not outweigh the harm to competition, 
public broadcasters might be forced to introduce reasonable limits to the amount of money they 
would be prepared to spend in order to acquire these rights. In their turn, these limits would allow 
commercial operators to outbid public broadcasters. An example is the Norwegian market where 
public broadcaster NRK traditionally broadcasts domestic football. When the rights covering the 
period 2006-2008 were auctioned, NRK found them to be too costly and did not make a bid. This 
decision resulted in the rights being acquired by commercial free-to-air broadcaster TV2.207 While 
not the outcome of State aid proceedings, this example illustrates why, to the extent that they afford a 
private operator the opportunity to access premium sports and hence attract audiences, expenditure 
ceilings may enhance supply diversity. Thriftiness in the acquisition of these rights may also promote 
content diversity. Solberg, who conducted empirical research in this area, found that public 
broadcasters which have engaged in aggressive strategies in the market for sports content have been 
forced to reduce programs that have the characteristics of merit goods and create positive 
externalities.208 On the contrary, other broadcasters, which have refrained from using the license fee 
to purchase rights to major sports events, have not lost their relevance to the public. One example is 
the BBC, which has not transmitted live football matches of the Premier League since 1988209 when 
broadcast rights to this competition started to be very expensive.210  
 
The above analysis shows that the assessments of whether the proportionality criterion is met 
have been rather superficial. For example, while having often referred to the role that premium 
content plays in driving audience demand, the Commission paid little to no attention to the 
, 
should not be understood to mean that State aid control had no impact on the national PSB systems 
State aid rules has led to the application of the Transparency Directive to public broadcasters in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Solberg, H.A. (2007), supra. n. 115, 303 
208 Ibid., 302 
209 Ibid., 303 
210 For an overview of the reasons why prices of premium content in the UK skyrocketed see, for instance, Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2006). 
Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. College of Europe Working Paper Series 
7/2006  
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Germany and to the establishment of a clearly defined cost-allocation procedure in Ireland. These 
amendments reduce the ability and incentive to engage in anti-competitive practices, thus 
strengthening the overall legitimacy of the public broadcasting system. The same holds true for cases 
where, as a result of State aid proceedings, independent authorities have been established to exercise 
financial supervision. Overall, however, the Commission has by no means made full use of the State 
aid law toolkit to ensure that the public funds directed to PSBs are indeed limited to the net costs of 
the public service mission.    
 
6. Defining the online remit: The introduction and implementation of the Amsterdam 
test  
 
This part will examine the role that State aid control has played in the expansion of public 
broadcasters into new media markets where PSBs compete with a larger group of content providers. 
Hence, the research question is now reformulated into: has the right balance between public 
broadcasters and private operators, including newspapers, magazines, blogs and IPTV providers that 
are advertising and/or subscription-based been struck? To answer this question I will first examine 
how the Commission dealt with the diversification of the public broadcasting offer in State aid cases 
concerning the definition of the online remit, and in particular the decision to call upon the Member 
States to conduct an ex ante (after the Amsterdam Protocol on 
PSB), of new media services sought to be provided by the public broadcaster. Subsequently, I will 
discuss whether Member States that undertook to introduce the Amsterdam test have indeed 
respected the commitments they made to the Commission and if so, whether the test has been 
effectively implemented.  
  
211 
The BBC PVT consists of two parts, a Public Value Assessment, which is conducted by the BBC 
Trust,212 and a Market Impact Assessment, conducted by Ofcom.213 The Trust studies the outcome of 
both procedures and approves the provision of the service if the impact on the market is sufficiently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 The PVT was introduced alongside other changes that took place in the context of the BBC Charter review. For more information 
on the  BBC Charter review see, for instance, UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2006). A Public Service for all: the BBC 
in the digital age. Retrieved from:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/have_your_say/white_paper/bbc_whitepaper_march
06.pdf The Future of 
Public Service Content in the United Kingdom. Journal of Media Law, 1(1), 1-13 
212 The BBC Trust is the governing body of the BBC consisting of 12 Trustees and assisted by a team of independent experts, the Trust 
Unit. For more information on the BBC Trust see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/who_we_are/index.shtml  
213 BBC Trust (2007). Public Value Test (PVT): Guidance on the conduct of the PVT, 4 
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justified by the public value the new service is likely to create.214 The reports of both the PVA and 
the MIA are published215 for the sake of transparency, whereas the test also involves a consultation 
with interested stakeholders, including license fee payers.216   
 
Before the Amsterdam test was introduced in the 2009 Broadcasting Communication, 
negotiations in the context of State aid investigations had already led to the commitment by the 
Member States concerned to conduct an ex ante assessment. The first case in which the design and 
implementation of a prior evaluation procedure was made legally binding is the one dealing with the 
German PSB scheme.217 The reasons that prompted the Commission to export the BBC PVT are not 
entirely clear. Two factors seem relevant though. First, in the beginning of the 2000s, the 
activities, which were allegedly not covered by the public service mandate thereby potentially 
distorting competition in the markets for online services.218 Complainants were not only private 
broadcasters, but also cable operators219 and newspaper associations.220 It was therefore obvious that 
as the PSB offer expanded into online markets, so did the group of competitors that were potentially 
affected by the relevant aid measures.221 The UK was the only Member State that had, at the time, 
made legislative changes to reposition its PSB in new media markets. Second, the discussions with 
Germany about the possible introduction of an ex ante assessment for new media services appear to 
have coincided with Commission initiatives aimed to reform State aid policy. The State Aid Action 
Plan, a consultation document which was presented by the Commission in 2005 and initiated this 
elements of State aid policy modernization.222 The BBC PVT, which is meant to assess the provision 
of services beforehand and which involves interested stakeholders, including competitors and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Ibid., 18. Several criteria are taken into account in the context of the PVA, for instance whether the new service stimulates 
creativity and cultural excellence and whether it sustains citizenship and civil society. For more information on the factors that are 
considered in the framework of the PVA see ibid., 13  
215 Ibid., 17 
216 Ibid., 12 
217 It is worth noting that when the Commission initiated the discussion about the need to establish an ex ante procedure to align the 
German PSB legal framework with Article 106(2) TFEU, the BBC PVT had not been implemented yet. This discussion started in 
2005 whereas the first BBC PVT was conducted in 2007. See Donders, K. (2011). The Public Value Test: A Reasoned Response or 
Panic Reaction? In Donders, K. and Hallvard Moe (eds.). 
new media services across Europe. Göteborg: Nordicom  
218 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraphs 67 et seq.  
219 Ibid., paragraph 71 
220 Commission decision E2/2008, Financing of the Austrian public service broadcaster ORF [2009] OJ C309/1, paragraph 1 
221 See, for instance, European Commission. State aid: Commission consults on revised rules for state funding of public 
. Press Release IP/08/1626. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1626_en.htm?locale=en  
222 European Commission. State Aid Action Plan 2005: Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005 - 2009, 
Consultation Document COM (2005) 107 final, 5-6 
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have therefore thought that an instrument similar to the BBC PVT could be a good option for 
streamlining the State aid review process in cases of PSB expansion into neighboring media markets.    
 
Before I discuss in detail the issues that have arisen from the introduction and implementation 
of the Amsterdam test, I will outline the main steps of the procedure as it is described in the 
Broadcasting Communication and explain what services need to undergo the test to benefit from the 
derogation under Article 106(2) TFEU.  
 
The Commission entrusts the Member States with setting up a mechanism whereby both the 
public value of the new service and its impact on the market must be appraised. The Commission 
refrains from providing detailed guidance on the public value assessment on the grounds that each 
Member State is in a better position to decide whether a new service substantiates the wording of the 
Amsterdam Protocol.223 As regards the effects on the market, the Commission refers to several 
factors that can be included in the analysis such as the existence of similar or substitutable offers, 
editorial competition, the market structure, the position of the public service broadcaster in the 
market, the level of competition and the potential impact on private initiatives.224 The Commission 
requires this market impact to be balanced against the public value of the service.225 The procedure 
must involve interested stakeholders by means of an open consultation.226 
 
Amsterdam test. It is up to the Member States to decide what qualifies as a 
service.227 
its content, but also on the modalities of consumption.228 
depend on the public funds required for its provision and the expected demand.229 If a significant new 
230 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 86 
224 Ibid., paragraph 88 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid., paragraph 87 
227 Ibid., paragraph 85 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid., paragraph 91. It is, however, not entirely clear whether the aid measure supporting the new service would qualify as existing 
or new aid. The Commission, arguably deliberately, refrained from addressing this issue in relevant decisions. For example, in the 
German case, it concluded that the new digital channels launched by ARD and ZDF were part of the existing remit, but conducted no 
analysis of whether new media services such as chats and online games provided the PSBs were new or existing aid. See, for instance, 
Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, State aid E 3/2005 [2007] C 185/1, paragraph 209 et seq. 
Similarly, the Broadcasting Communication, which i
issue (see paragraphs 25-
Commission, it should also be borne in mind that, as a result of the commitments that they made in the context of the relevant State aid 
  
	   	   331	  
(see above, Part 2). Of course, the Commission retains the right to verify, whenever it deems 
appropriate, whether Member States apply the test in line with the State aid rules. A final note on the 
scope of the Amsterdam test: the Commission leaves considerable room for services that do not need 
to go through an evaluation procedure. For example, the simultaneous transmission of TV news on 
other platforms231 and the online offer of program-related content, that is, content that is limited to 
serving and supporting the TV programming,232  
 
6.1. T Stretching competence to 
address market and consumer needs? 
 
evaluation procedure for the provision of new media services has been severely criticized on the 
grounds that it violates the right of the Member States to organize the public service remit as they see 
fit. More particularly, in the context of the consultation on the revision of the 2001 Broadcasting 
Communication, interested stakeholders argued that Article 106 TFEU does not establish the duty to 
conduct an ex ante assessment for new media services and that, as a result, an aid scheme that does 
uctions may not be declared 
incompatible with the common market.233  
 
This argument is not convincing. Article 106(3) TFEU broadly lays down that the Commission 
is bound to ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and to address, where necessary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proceedings, the Member States have made amendments to the provisions defining the public service remit. These provisions 
expressly lay down that the PSBs are entitled to have online offerings. This means in practice that, in case a complaint regarding a new 
service is filed with the Commission, the Member States will argue that the service in question was launched to fulfill the existing 
remit. And, as already explained in Part 2, the Commission has been willing to accept this argument. For example, in older cases such 
as BBC Digital Curriculum, which concerned new projects not included in the list of public services and which, similar to the 
under scrutiny were part of the existing remit.  
231 Ibid., fn. 51 
232 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 209 
233 See, for instance, European Federation of Journalists and European Region of UNI-MEI Global Union (2009). Position on the 
Commission's consultation on the second draft revised Broadcasting Communication, 3; European Broadcasting Union (2009). Review 
of the Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting-EBU Reply, paragraph 
14; Swedish Public Service Broadcasters (2009). Response of the three Swedish Public Service Broadcasters, Sveriges Radio AB, 
Sveriges Television AB and Sveriges Utbildningsradio AB to the draft Broadcasting Communication of the European Commission, 1. 
 to introduce an ex ante assessment see also Italy 
(2009). Proposta di comunicazione della Commissione relativa alla applicazione delle norme sugli aiuti di Stato al servizio pubblico 
di radiotelevisione, 1 and 2; Malta (2009). t Communication from the Commission on the application of 
State Aid rules to public service broadcasting, 1; BBC Trust (2009). BBC Comments on the Draft Communication from the European 
Commission on the application of State aid rules to Public Service Broadcasting, 4; Denmark (2009). 
consultation on the draft communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, 2; EEA EFTA States 
(2009). EEA EFTA Position on the draft communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, 2, and 
France (2009). 
, 2 and 3. The comments on the first and second drafts of the Broadcasting Communication are 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_broadcasting/index.html and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_broadcasting_review/  
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appropriate directives or decisions to the Member States so that aid measures in support of SGEIs are 
in line with the Treaty. Provided that one accepts that a legal norm must be construed consistently 
with present social and economic circumstances, a -mediality is a sine-qua-non for the 
234 the wording of Article 106 TFEU is flexible enough to support the 
interpretation that the Commission has the power to call upon the Member States to introduce a prior 
evaluation procedure as a means to ensure that the operation of public service media does not 
disproportionately harm competition.  
 
In addition to strong doubts about whether the Commission has moved beyond the sphere of its 
competence, concerns have been raised about whether the test can indeed make a positive 
contribution to the development of public service media. For example, the ex ante assessment of new 
services, conducted on a case-by-case basis, has been argued to introduce a market failure logic into 
public broadcasting which will inevitably lead to the marginalization of public broadcasting 
organizations.235 Related to the above, the view has been expressed that a case-by-case assessment, 
which must take account of existing offers, almost dictates how the online remit should be defined, 
al independence.236 Moreover, given how different 
the public broadcasting systems across the Union are, it has been questioned whether a uniform 
requirement to establish a prior evaluation procedure is appropriate;237 the BBC Public Value Test is 
said to have been designed for a specific organization that operates in a specific media market. As a 
result, it should not be imported into other Member States, in particular smaller Member States, 
which may lack the necessary resources to conduct the ex ante analysis.238 
 
There are solid grounds for the above concerns. Yet, condemning the introduction of the 
Amsterdam test without placing it in the wider context in which its introduction was decided would 
obscure a full understanding of the needs of the consumers/citizens, public broadcasters and 
commercial operators. While not attempting to advocate for sweeping State aid controls in the 
broadcasting sector, a question is worth asking: in view of the financing of many new media services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Pauwels, C. Television Beyond Frontiers: Reflections on public service broadcasting in a digital Europe. 22 November 2010, 
Lecture given at the London School of Economics. Retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wy1G1aFWnc 
235  Donders, K. (2009). State Aid and Public Service Broadcasting. How future Proof is the Remit of Public Broadcasting 
Organizations?, 206. In Pauwels, C., Harri Kalimo, Karen Donders and Ben Van Rompuy (eds.), Rethinking European Media and 
Communications Policy. Brussels: VUB Press 
236 See, for instance, Czech Republic (2008). 
, 8. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_broadcasting/cs.pdf 
237 See, for instance, Danish Broadcasting Corporation (2008). Review of the Communication from the Commission on the application 
of State aid rules to public service broadcasting-The Reply of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, 21. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_broadcasting/dbc.pdf  
238 See, for instance, European Broadcasting Union (2009), supra. n. 230, paragraph 18 
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out of the license fee, can a prior evaluation procedure contribute to a legitimate transition from 
public service broadcasting to public service media? This question may be answered as follows: a 
case-by-case assessment may increase transparency in the market. As a result, the launch of a new 
service is not based on all-encompassing remit definitions, but a specific act of entrustment. Hence, 
the test is in principle a useful tool for providing clarity to commercial providers regarding the 
services that may or may not be provided by the broadcaster, thereby establishing a degree of 
certainty. In Part 3.1. I have extensively discussed why certainty is key to leveling the playing field 
between public broadcasting and competition. Furthermore, taking account of existing commercial 
offers does not imply the introduction of a market failure approach to public broadcasting; similar 
commercial services are only one out of many parameters that determine whether the public 
broadcaster should provide the service or not. This parameter does not subject the provision of the 
service to market offers, but implies that the service must be distinctive enough to convey an added 
public value, which is one of the main rationales for financing a media organization out of State 
resources Public Broadcasting, Why? How?
other services are not interested in, aiming at audiences neglected by others, or dealing with subjects 
239 Taking 
genres, set the pace in the audiovisual world and pu 240 
Finally, competitors are no longer limited to waiting for lengthy State aid proceedings to address 
their concerns. Through the consultation that forms part of the test, they may actively participate in 
the process leading to the decision approving or rejecting the scheme. If the test is indeed applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner and the concerns are well-founded, they will play a role in the balancing 
exercise conducted by the competent authorities. Finally, the test also envisages citizen participation 
in the consultation process. This novel aspect may stimulate citizen involvement in the formulation of 
public broadcasting policies, promoting exposure diversity.241  
 
Technological developments and the Member 
service broadcasting to offer quality programming and services to the public must be maintained and 
242 have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239  World Radio and Television Council (2000). Public Broadcasting Why? How?, 11. Retrieved from: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001240/124058eo.pdf  
240 Ibid. 
241 See Donders, K. (2011), supra n. 217 
242 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on 
public service broadcasting [1999] OJ C 30/1, paragraph 6 
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initiated the shift from public service broadcasting to public service media. This means that the areas 
in which public broadcasters operate have expanded. To the extent that the Amsterdam test can 
contribute to balancing public service media against a larger number of commercial content 
providers, competence disputes seem to get hold of the wrong end of the stick. Research should 
rather focus on whether the Member States that have made relevant commitments to the Commission 
have indeed implemented the Amsterdam test and if so, whether there are indications that the test has 
been a useful tool to reposition PSBs in digital markets in a more legitimate manner. The following 
section will attempt to answer these two questions, shedding some light on the issues that have arisen 
in the application of the Amsterdam Protocol in certain Member States.  
 
6.2. How did the Member States attempt to reposition PSB in new media markets? The 
introduction and implementation of the ex ante test in Germany, Spain and Ireland 
 
The above section discussed 
obligation to introduce an ex ante evaluation procedure to ensure that the provision of a new media 
service by public broadcasters justifies a derogation from Article 106(2) TFEU. It concluded that the 
prior evaluation procedure may in principle be a dynamic tool of public sector governance. This 
section looks into whether three Member States, namely Germany, Spain and Ireland have introduced 
and applied the test and if so, to what extent implementation has been effective. These countries were 
selected for mainly two reasons. First, in all three cases, the Member States seem to have introduced 
the ex ante test in order to address concerns that were raised in the context of State aid proceedings. 
In other words, this was not a voluntary implementation. Therefore, this selection serves the purpose 
of the Chapter which looks into how State aid control may influence national public broadcasting 
policies that seek to, inter alia, protect media pluralism. Second, each Member State examined here 
represents each of the three models of media systems identified in the seminal study of Hallin and 
Mancini, that is, the North-Central European/Democratic Corporatist model (Germany), the 
Mediterranean/Polarized Pluralist model (Spain), and the North Atlantic/Liberal model (Ireland).243 
Comparative studies of modern media policies of the EU Member States follow the same 
approach.244  
 
This section will seek to answer the following questions: have the Member States complied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Hallin, D. C. and Paolo Mancini (2004). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Having studied whether and if so, how the test has implemented in other countries, I acknowledge, however, that 
even in Member States belonging to same group different issues may arise. Reference to other States, where appropriate, will be made 
244 See, for instance, CMPF (2013, December). The CMPF selected the nine countries to conduct the pilot-implementation of the 
Media Pluralism Monitor. The implementation is still underway: http://cmpf.eui.eu/News/All/131211MPMninecountries.aspx  
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with the requirements set by the Commission? If so, has the Amsterdam test managed to reposition 
public service broadcasting in new media markets in a manner that is in line with Article 106(2) 
TFEU? If not, what are the main drawbacks? Answering these questions is key to drawing 
conclusions on whether the Commission, through the enforcement of the State aid rules in cases 
dealing with the expansion of public broadcasters into new media markets, has indeed struck the 
desired balance between public service and private media. The analysis does not attempt to discuss 
all the issues that have arisen in the implementation of the three tests. It will, however, highlight 
some of the main concerns that emerged during their implementation and reflect on whether the 
decisions of the competent bodies establish a degree of fairness vis-à-vis commercial operators.  
 
6.2.1. Germany: The Drei-Stufen test245 
 
Since 2002, the Commission received a number of complaints against several aspects of the 
German scheme supporting public broadcasting services.246 The complainants alleged, inter alia, that 
online activities offered by ARD and ZDF were not covered by the public service remit. 247 In 
December 2006, Germany submitted commitments to amend the scheme.248 More particularly, to 
services that could form part of the remit could distort competition in online content markets,249 the 
German authorities proposed to introduce an evaluation procedure ensuring that a new media service 
sought to be provided by ARD or ZDF is assessed beforehand.250 Germany undertook to incorporate 
this procedure, also known as the Drei-Stufen (three-step) test, into the 12th Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty,251 the cornerstone of German broadcasting regulation.252  
 
The amended Broadcasting Treaty expressly lays down that ARD and ZDF are entitled to offer 
non-program related 253  electronic information and communications services, 254  referred to as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 For an analysis of how this procedure was implemented in other States that belong to the Democratic Corporatist model see, for 
instance, Donders, K. (2011). Superficial Harmonization Versus One-Size-Fits-All: The Implementation of European State aid 
principles in Flanders and the Netherlands. Journal of Media Law, 3(2), 237-261 
246 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraph 1 
247 Ibid., paragraphs 68 and 70 
248 Ibid., paragraph 4 
249 Ibid., paragraphs 229-236 
250 Ibid., paragraph 327 et seq. 
251 Schulz, W., Thorsten Held, Stephan Dreyer and Thilo Wind (2008). Regulation of Broadcasting and Internet Services in Germany. 
A brief overview, 19. Working Papers of the Hans Bredow Institute, 2nd edition, No. 13. Retrieved from: http://www.hans-bredow-
institut.de/webfm_send/124  
252 ELIAMEP (2010). MEDIADEM Background Information Report on Media policies and Regulatory Practices in a selected set of 
European countries, the European Union and the Council of Europe: The case of Germany, 19. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Germany.pdf  
253 12th amendment to Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), Article 11d(3). Retrieved from: http://www.uni-
muenster.de/ITMCATR/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Interstate-Treaty-on-Broadcasting.pdf  
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telemedia  from a journalistic or editorial point of view .255 
This is an improvement in the definition of the public service remit because, prior to the 
, PSBs would base the supply of new media services such as traffic, 
weather and stock exchange data, chat rooms and telegames on the provision of the Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty that allowed them to offer on online platforms only program-related content.256 
Private operators were, arguably justifiably, dissatisfied with this practice. 257  However, while 
clarifying that non-program related content is part of the public service mandate, the definition of 
telemedia is still broad. As already seen, an expansive remit is generally considered, in view of the 
interpretative provisions of the Amsterdam Protocol and the editorial independence of PSBs, 
legitimate under Article 106(2) TFEU.258 Yet, expansive does not mean vague; a loose definition in 
the Treaty means in practice that the protection of the interests of commercial operators, and in 
particular the certainty they must be able to enjoy to make investment decisions, depends on the 
effective implementation of the Drei-Stufen test, which requires a clear description of the significant 
new service concerned. As will be seen in greater detail below, it is questionable whether the Drei-
Stufen test has indeed been effectively implemented.  
 
Before discussing in detail the issues that arose in its implementation, two remarks need to be 
made as regards the scope of the Drei-Stufen test. First, under Article 11d of the Treaty, not all 
telemedia must undergo the prior evaluation procedure. More particularly, public broadcasters may 
provide their linear content (or content relating to a specific broadcast program) on demand for up to 
seven days following transmission.259 Events of major importance to society, including World Cup 
matches and matches of the 1st and the 2nd German football divisions, may be offered on demand for 
up to 24 hours after the event.260 Second, the Treaty lays down a list of services that may not be 
regarded as telemedia fulfilling the public service mandate. This list includes acquired feature films 
and acquired episodes of television series.261 The time limits that apply to sports content and the 
exclusion of feature films and acquired TV series from the online public service remit imply that the 
 It is unclear whether these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Ibid., Article 2(1) 
255 Ibid., Article 11d(1) 
256 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraphs 214, 120, 18, 14 
and fn. 4 
257 See, for instance, paragraph 120 of the decision  
258 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 47 
259 See 12th amendment to Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), Article 11(d)(1) and (2) 
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the license fee payers from accessing content they have already paid for. See Dörr, R. (2011). The ZDF three-step test. A dynamic tool 
of governance, 80. In Donders, K. and Hallvard Moe (eds.), supra n. 241  
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limitations were introduced as a result of the negotiations that had taken place between the 
Commission and the German authorities. However, given that the amount of time and funds PSBs 
devoted and directed respectively to premium content was one of the main issues addressed in the 
decision, State aid control seems to have played a role in this legislative change. This is a positive 
development from both a competition and a pluralism perspective. From a competition perspective, 
commercial providers are certain about the activities PSBs may develop to attract mass audiences to 
their online content. From a pluralism perspective, aids in support of the expansion into new media 
markets must be directed to more original content.262 Put simply, if public broadcasters wish to 
reposition online, they need to provide content other than Hollywood blockbusters and football 
matches.  
 
All other new media services need to undergo the prior evaluation procedure. The Drei-Stufen 
test is established in Article 11f(4) of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty, which reads as follows: 
§4. For a planned new offer or the planned modification of an existing offer pursuant to 
(1), the broadcasting corporation must demonstrate to its competent council that the 
planned, new or modified offer is covered by its remit. Details shall be given on the 
following:  
 1. To what degree the offer conforms to the democratic, social and cultural 
needs of society, 
 2. To what degree the offer contributes to editorial competition in a qualitative 
manner, and 
 3. What financial expenditure is required for the offer. 
The details should also take into consideration the quantity and quality of the existing, 
freely accessible offers, the impact of the planned offer on the market and its function 
regarding the formation of opinion in the light of existing comparable offers including 
those of public service broadcasting. The expected duration of the offer must be specified. 
§5. Prior to the realization of a new or modified offer, the competent council shall offer 
the opportunity to third parties to comment on the specifications pursuant to (4) in a 
suitable manner, especially via the Internet. Comments shall be possible for a minimum 
period of six weeks following publication of the planned offer. The competent council of 
the broadcasting corporation must analyze the comments received. For the purpose of 
preparing its decision, the competent council may commission opinions by independent 
experts at the expense of the respective broadcasting corporation; expert opinion must be 
sought regarding market impact. The name of the expert must be published. The expert 
may seek further information and comments; comments may be forwarded directly to the 
expert . 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 The general remit of German PSBs is defined in Article 11(1) of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty which reads as follows: 
their remit, the public-service broadcasting corporations are to act as a medium and factor in the process of the formation of free 
individual and public opinion through the production and transmission of their offers, thereby serving the democratic, social and 
cultural needs of society. In their offers, the public service broadcasting corporations must provide a comprehensive overview of 
international, European, national and regional events in all major areas of life. In so doing, they shall further international 
understanding, European integration and the social cohesion on the federal and state levels. Their offers shall serve education, 
information, consultation and entertainment. They must in particular provide contributions on culture. Entertainment should also be 
provided in line with a public-  
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The Drei-Stufen 
evaluation procedure all online services that public broadcasters were already providing and would 
continue to provide after June 1, 2009 (when the 12th amendment to the Treaty entered into force).263 
This process was concluded in August 2010 and proved to be a very costly exercise.264 Yet, even 
before the Treaty entered into force, there was a strong indication that the completion of the prior 
evaluation procedure would require considerable (State) resources to complete: In 2008, a Drei-
Stufen test for a website for pre-school children, www.kikaninchen.de, was voluntarily 
implemented.265  266 To state the 
obvious, this is far from a negligible public expenditure. However, this figure must also be 
considered against the fact that the production costs of kikaninchen were estimated at around 
267 This raises the question of whether an ex ante assessment undermines one of the main 
objectives it seeks to achieve, that is, a more rational use of public funds directed to the performance 
of democracy-enhancing tasks. However, the high cost that the completion of the test entails is no big 
the implementation 
of the Drei-Stufen test.  
 
As already mentioned above, the first step of the Drei-Stufen test consists in identifying to what 
degree the offer conforms to the democratic, social and cultural needs of German society. The 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty does not provide any further details on the parameters that may guide 
the Broadcasting Councils, the bodies entrusted with applying the test, when deciding whether or not 
the service fulfills the public service remit. Nor is this uncertainty resolved by the Treaty provision 
that defines the objectives that public broadcasters must pursue through the supply of telemedia; the 
telemedia offer is subject to the fulfillment of the vaguely worded mission 
society to participate in the information society, offer orientation and foster technical and content 
 268 Avoiding a straightjacketed delineation of the 
mandate, which may limit the potential of a public service media organization, and protecting the 
PSB a principle which in Germany is sacrosanct,269 seem to be the rationales 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 12th amendment to Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), fn. 25 
264 MEDIADEM Case study report 
Does media policy promote media freedom and independence? The , 23. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Germany.pdf  
265 For a comprehensive overview see Katsirea, I. (2011). The Three-Step Test  Three Steps Forwards or Backwards for Public 
Service Broadcasting in Germany?, 59-67. In Donders, K. and Hallvard Moe (eds.), supra n. 241 
266 See, for instance, Burhardt, K., Dreistufiger Unsinn: Die Drei-Stufen-Tests gefährden die Glaubwürdigkeit der Medienaufsicht. 9 
March 2009, CARTA. Retrieved from: http://carta.info/6097/dreistufiger-unsinn-drei-stufen-test/  
267 Ibid.  
268 12th amendment to Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), Article 11d(3) 
269 Article 5 of the German Constitution establishes freedom of the media. Additionally, the German Constitutional Court has stressed 
the right of public broadcasters to form their programming free from any State influence. See, for instance, BVerfG, BvR 2270/05 
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behind this potentially all-encompassing mandate. However, as I mentioned above, even if on a 
Treaty level a broad definition of the online remit is acceptable, on a specific entrustment act level, 
the new service must be defined in clear and precise terms. If not, this means that the legal 
framework fails to achieve certainty. A good example illustrating this problem is NDR Mediathek, a 
decision dealing with the provision of a live streaming and podcasting service.270 In this case, the 
Broadcasting Council found that the first condition set by the Drei-Stufen test was met on the 
grounds that the service, which included, inter alia, programming on politics, the economy and 
culture, constitutes a comprehensive offer to the population as a whole.271 Applied in this way, the 
test hardly clarifies the online remit and falls short of addressing the problems that were identified by 
the Commission in the context of the State aid investigation. 272  The (admittedly provocative) 
argument may be raised that if the Broadcasting Council sweeps every service under the rug of 
service concerned may create, then the service may as well be launched without an ex ante 
assessment; spending public money in a superfluous manner would be avoided and the resources that 
would be used to conduct the assessment, including expensive market reports, could be used for other 
purposes.  
 
As regards the requirements that must be fulfilled for the service to pass the second step, the 
Treaty stipulates that the offer must contribute to editorial competition in a qualitative manner. In 
examining whether this is the case, the Broadcasting Councils must consider, in the wording of 
impact of the planned offer on the market and its function regarding the formation of opinion in the 
273 It bears noting 
that while Germany committed to adopt a more detailed definition of the qualitative concept of 
Treaty repeats verbatim the relevant paragraph of the State aid decision.274 In the absence of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from 11/09/2007. For an overview of the German legal framework applicable to PSBs see, for instance, Schulz, W. (2009). The Legal 
Framework for Public Service Broadcasting in Germany: Procrustean Bed or Hammock? Journal of Media Law, 1(2), 219-241 
270 Rundfunkrat des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks, Abschliebende Beratung und Beschlub uber sad Angebot der NDR Mediathek, 27 
March 2009, paragraph 2 
271 Ibid. 
272 Commission decision Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, E3/2005 [2007] C185/1, paragraphs 229-236 
273 12th amendment to Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), Article 11f(4) 
274 Commission decision E3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany [2007] C185/1, paragraph 328 which reads as 
The Interstate Treaty will also contain a further explanation of the concept "editorial competition" (in the explanatory 
memorandum to the future Interstate Treaty), taking into account the following elements: the scope and quality of already existing 
frei zugänglich
offer for opinion s meinungsbildende Funktion - which can also contain elements of entertainment - in light of overall already 
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guidelines on the elements that may be considered in the assessment of whether the second 
requirement of the Drei-Stufen test is met, decisions (or parts thereof) of the Broadcasting Councils 
have occasionally not been based on sound reasoning. For instance, in Kikaninchen, which, as 
already mentioned, concerned the launch of an Internet portal for pre-school children, disputes arose 
as to whether the fact that the service would be advertising-free was a quality parameter or not.275 
ter of 
276 This ignores empirical research that has demonstrated that, in free-to-air television, 
viewers regard the lack of advertising and the amount of advertising minutes broadcast as key quality 
parameters.277  
 
Moreover, Article 11f(4) of the Treaty does not include any instructions on how to balance the 
public value that the service under scrutiny is likely to create against its impact on the market. Again, 
there are indications that the Broadcasting Councils failed to fill the lacunae the German legislator 
left open: For example, in the case of NDR Mediathek, the analysis concluded that the provision of 
the service could generate effects on private VOD services, but that these effects would be 
stics,278 without, however, further substantiating 
which were these quality characteristics that could compensate for the harm to competition.279  
 
With regard to whether the Broadcasting Councils, internal bodies of the ARD and ZDF, are 
indeed appropriate to carry out the ex ante assessment, I refer to Part 3.2. where I discuss in detail the 




In 2009, the Spanish broadcasting system underwent significant reform following the 
sing and other commercial activities (e.g. teleshopping, pay-
per-view services, etc.)280 developed by the Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (hereinafter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Katsirea, I. (2011), supra n. 265, 62 
276  Ibid. referring to Rundfunkrat des Mitteldutschen Rundfunks, Beschluss über die Genehmigung des neuen Angebots 
www.kikaninchen.de, 21 September 2009, 29 
277 See, for instance, Wilbur, K. C. (2008). A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television Advertising and Viewing Markets. Marketing 
Science, 27 (3), 356-378 and Jeziorski, P. (2011). Merger enforcement in two-sided markets. Working Paper, John Hopkins University 
278 Katsirea, I. (2011), supra n. 265, referring to Rundfunkrat des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks, Abschliebende Beratung und Beschlub 
uber sad Angebot der NDR Mediathek, paragraph 4 
279 Katsirea, I. (2011), supra n. 265, 62 
280 The Spanish authorities argued that the measure would safeguard the economic independence of the public broadcaster and that it 
would further relieve pressure from private undertakings because it would eliminate a potential source of market distortion. See Ley 
8/2009, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 210, 31.8.2009, p. 74003, 
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RTVE) and to replace these sources of income by taxes on TV and telecommunications providers.281. 
The Commission was called upon to decide on the compatibility of the measure introducing this tax-
based funding system, Law 8/2009 of 28 August 2009 on financing RTVE.282  
 
The Commission was particularly concerned with (and hence focused on) whether, following 
the reform of the financing system, Spain had established sufficient and adequate safeguards against 
a possible overcompensation.283 This is not surprising given the nature of the measure.284 However, 
some concerns about whether Spain had indeed taken appropriate measures to ensure that RTVE was 
not distorting online content markets were raised in the decision. More particularly, the Commission 
noted that on the basis of the information submitted by Spain in the context of the investigation, it 
could not examine whether the Spanish authorities had established a procedure for assessing 
beforehand the new services of RTVE.285 Spain argued that General Law 7/2010 of 31 March 2010 
on Audiovisual Communication 286  had introduced a prior evaluation procedure. Moreover, it 
undertook to establish an independent supervisory and regulatory body for public broadcasting, the 
State Council for Audiovisual Media, Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales, which would be in 
charge of implementing the procedure in question.287 Spain also mentioned that it planned to sign a 
program contract (contrato-programa) with RTVE by 1 November 2010 in which it would define in 
288 
Commission concluded that the State authorities complied with the obligation to establish an ex ante 
test, whereas the commitment to include in the revised contract a definition of the services that would 
need to undergo the test addressed the concerns relating to the lack of a clear and precise definition of 
289  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Preamble, and Commission decision New Tax-Based Funding System for Public Broadcasting in Spain, C 38/2009 [2011] OJ L 1/9, 
paragraph 9 
281 European Commission. State aid: Commission approves new tax-based funding system for Spanish public broadcaster RTVE. Press 
Release IP/10/978. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/978&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
282 Ley 8/2009, de 28 de agosto, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 210, 
31.8.2009, p. 74003 
283 Commission decision New Tax-Based Funding System for Public Broadcasting in Spain, C 38/2009 [2011] OJ L 1/9, see in 
particular paragraphs 67-73. The other major concern was whether the new financing system was hypothecating the aid to the taxes. 
See paragraphs 19 et seq. and 61 et seq. of the decision 
284 l 
European Commission decision-making on Southern public broadcasters, aiming to ensure more accountability, efficiency and 
Ex Ante Assessments for Public Broadcasters in Southern Europe: Delayed Europeanization?, 
177. In Donders, K. and Hallvard Moe (eds.), supra n. 241 
285 Commission decision New Tax-Based Funding System for Public Broadcasting in Spain, C 38/2009 [2011] OJ L 1/9, paragraphs 23 
and 26 
286 Ley 7/2010, de 31 de marzo, General de la Comunicación Audiovisual, Official State Gazette 79, 1.4.2010, p. 30157 
287 Commission decision New Tax-Based Funding System for Public Broadcasting in Spain, C 38/2009 [2011] OJ L 1/9, paragraph 75 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid., paragraph 76 
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41(3) of General Law 7/2010 on Audiovisual Communication, which introduced the ex ante test, 
reads as follows: 
[T]he competent audiovisual authorities shall assess whether new significant services 
are in line with the entrusted public service mission and whether their provision distorts 
competition in the audiovisual market. During the procedure, a consultation with the 
various stakeholders shall take place. The results of the consultation shall be published . 
This provision may outline the main steps of the prior evaluation procedure as described in the 
Broadcasting Communication, but it lays down no details on how the test is to be conducted, 
including the parameters that must be taken into consideration when evaluating the public value that 
the service is expected to deliver and the impact of the service on the affected markets, and 
establishes no timeframe within which the consultation must be completed. Compared against the 
German case which we discussed above, the Commission inexplicably follows a far more lenient 
approach to the measure allowing the Spanish PSB to expand into new media markets. It is also 
worth noting that the State Council for Audiovisual Media was never established. Almost two years 
after the conclusion of the State aid investigation, in the context of the reforms that took place to 
address the current financial crisis, the Spanish government announced that it would not set up the 
Council.290 Finally, the contrato-programa, the entrustment act which would, inter alia, define what 
constitutes a significant new service, and which the Spanish government undertook to sign by 
November 2010, has not been signed yet.291 In view of the above, an implementation of the ex ante 
test in Spain is not likely to take place in the near future.292  
 
6.2.3. Ireland: Public Value/Sectoral Impact Assessment 
 
In March 1999, TV3, a commercial broadcaster, submitted a complaint to the Commission 
alleging, inter alia, that the aid measure in support of Irish public broadcaster RTÉ did not contain a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 See, for instance, Gil, X. El Gobierno siete millones de euros al anular la creación del Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales. 
22 January 2012, Voz Barcelona. Retrieved from: http://www.vozbcn.com/2012/01/22/100013/gobierno-ahorrara-crear-cema/ The 
Comisión Nacional de Mercados y 
Competencia Spain's CNMC: The Story So Far. 17 June 2014, Competition Policy International. 
Retrieved from: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/spain-s-cnmc-the-story-so-far 
291 See Comisión Mixta para las Relaciones con el Tribunal de Cuentas (2014). Resolución de 8 de abril de 2014, aprobada por la 
Comisión Mixta para las Relaciones con el Tribunal de Cuentas, en relación con el Informe de fiscalización de la Corporación RTVE 
y sus Sociedades, correspondiente a los ejercicios comprendidos entre el 01/01/2010 y el 31/12/2011, paragraphs 5.2. and 5.3, in 
Boletín Oficial del Estado, Núm. 161, Pág. 51635. Retrieved from: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2014/07/03/pdfs/BOE-A-2014-
6978.pdf  
292 A similar remark can be made with respect to Italian public broadcaster RAI. The prior evaluation procedure has not been 
introduced in Italy yet. While the Contratto di Servizio (Service Contract), the entrustment act which is currently in force, lays down 
that RAI may expand its offer into new media markets in order to provide content fulfilling a public service mission it does not clarify 
what types of services RAI may offer as new services. See RAI Contratto di Servizio 2013-2015, Article 8(2), and point n) at p. 3 
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proper definition of the new media services the PSB was offering.293 The Commission upheld the 
complaint294 and, following negotiations, Ireland proposed to introduce a prior evaluation procedure 
for new audiovisual services.295 More particularly, Ireland committed 
audiovisual services would be subject to Ministerial consent prior to which the Minister would need 
to publicly consult with the PSB, other interested stakeholders and in particular the Broadcasting 
Authority of Ireland (BAI) as to the public value and sector impact assessment of the service 
concerned.296 
 
Indeed, the amendments that were introduced after the State aid decision was adopted were in 
line with what was promised.297 Articles 100 and 103 of the Broadcasting Act, which lay down the 
parameters that the BAI and the Minister must consider when evaluating a new service, read as 
follows: 
100. (1) The Authority [read: the BAI] shall, within 3 months of receiving a written 
request for advice from the Minister in respect of the sectoral impact of a proposal 
under this Part, prepare and submit such advice to the Minister.  
(2) The Authority, in advising the Minister on the sectoral impact of a proposal under 
this Part, shall consider the following matters   
(a) the extent to which the proposal impacts on  (i) the availability, choice, quality and 
accessibility of services for audiences, and (ii) existing sectoral services,  
(b) the impact of the proposal on sectoral development, innovation and investment,  
(c) the impact of the proposal on related markets, and  
(d) such matters as the Authority may decide.  
(3) In reviewing the sectoral impact of a proposal under this Part, the Authority shall 
consider such impacts as may arise within a 5 year period of the receipt of a written 
 
103. (4) Where the Minister proposes to give his or her consent under this section, the 
Minister shall  
(a) consult with the corporation concerned and such other persons as he or she 
considers   appropriate, 
(b) consult with the Authority as to the sectoral impact of a proposal under this  section, 
(c) consider the public value of such proposal, and 
(d) publish in such manner as he or she considers appropriate a statement outlining the  
 
(8) The Minister, in deciding on the public value of a proposal under this section shall 
consider the following matters  
(a) the importance of the proposal in respect of the pursuance of the public service 
objects of  the corporation,  
(b) the compatibility of the proposal with the Council Directive and recommendations 
of the Council of Europe in respect of public service broadcasting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraphs 1, 41, 43-44 
294 Ibid., see paragraphs 88 et seq. 
295 Ibid., paragraph 142 et seq. 
296 Ibid., paragraph 143 
297  See paragraphs 149-150 of the decision and compare to Articles 100 and 103 of the Broadcasting Act, available at: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0018.pdf 
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(c) the costs and revenues associated with the proposal and any impact on existing 
public service provision, 
(d) the extent to which the proposal contributes to meeting the democratic, cultural, 
linguistic, educational, and social needs of Irish society, of individual groups within 
Irish society, and of Irish communities outside of the island of Ireland, 
(e) the extent to which the proposed service will be accessible by the public, 
(f) the extent to which the proposed service will reach under- served audiences, 
(g) the contribution of the proposed service or activity to raising the level of familiarity 
of the general public, or of individual groups within Irish society, with new forms of 
services and technologies, 
(h) the contribution of the proposal to media plurality, and (i) such matters as the 
Minister may decide. 
(9) The Minister may attach to any consent granted under this section such particular 
terms or conditions as he or she considers appropriate in the circumstances . 
 
Before discussing how the test was implemented in Ireland, we may note that, compared 
against the provisions introducing the ex ante test in Germany and in Spain, the above provisions are 
far more detailed. Hence, in the Irish case, de jure compliance with the commitment to incorporate 
into the PSB system a prior evaluation procedure seems to be in line with what the Commission had 
in mind when it decided to leave it up to the Member States to design a test that balances the public 
value of the service against its 
de facto. 
 
The first (and only) Public Value Test conducted in Ireland at the time of writing298 concerned 
the launch of a package of five services, which consisted of four digital television channels and a 
digital teletext service.299 The contribution that the ex ante test may make to increasing transparency 
and certainty is illustrated by the fact that RTÉ drafted a seventy-five page document which 
explained how the proposed services would satisfy each one of the criteria the Minister was expected 
to take into account in order to decide whether or not to approve the services.300 For example, to 
demonstrate that the amount of money directed to these services was a legitimate public expenditure, 
RTÉ conducted audience research and consultations which concluded that there would be demand for 
the new services. 301  Moreover, RTÉ attempted to explain the added public value the proposed 
services would create (e.g. with RTÉjr there would be a service for Irish children under the age of 
seven for the first time ever).302 In certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 For all relevant documents see: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Broadcasting/Consents+for+new+RTE+Channels+and+Services/  
299 For a more detailed description of the new services see RTÉ (2010). Public Value Test - Proposed RTÉ Channels and Services, 3. 
Retrieved from: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/78AC6373-B3EE-4E17-92D8-
A4A25E17F588/0/PVTDCENR04OctRequest151110EDIT.pdf  
300 Ibid.  
301 Ibid., 4 
302 Ibid. 
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rather than concrete objectives,303 but, considered against the provision which was applicable prior to 
the State aid proceedings and which let RTÉ  (other than a broadcasting service) for 
the benefit of the public 304 this proposal was arguably a step towards repositioning RTÉ in digital 
markets in a more legitimate manner. 
 
The following tables contain the main concerns that were raised by Perspective (the 
independent consultancy instructed by the BAI to prepare a report on the public value and sectoral 
impact of the services),305 the BAI306 and interested stakeholders,307 the suggestions that were made 
to address them, and the proposals that the Minister ultimately accepted,308 making them legally 





If RTÉ makes services available on DTT only, the net 
neutrality principle is undermined and the public value reduced     
Lack of provision for any significant amount of new 
content   
 
- 






RTÉ Plus, an exact replica of the RTÉ One mixed-





The net cost of the proposition may have been 
understated   
 
- 
RTÉ Plus depends on content acquisition by other 
more aggressively competitive channel 
   
News Now may build the online presence via the TV 
service, to the detriment of newspapers     
If advertising sold for the News Now online platform is 
visible via the video stream, it will distort competition in online 
news markets 
 -  
The provision of free content to consumers increases 
traffic to www.RTE.ie which, in turn, increases the appeal to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Perspective (2010a). Guidance on the Public Value of . A goo example is the section addressing how the 
new services will contribute to media plurality in the Irish media landscape, 63-67. The report is available at: 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/3C80AEA3-E82C-4214-ADB7-8475D91A4AF5/0/Guidanceonthepublicvalue.pdf 
304 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraph 35 
305 Perspective (2010a), supra n. 303, and Perspective (2010b). 
services. Retrieved from: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/B57989B6-21FD-4DC2-A553-
876D61E92EEE/0/Assessmentofthesectoralimpact.pdf  
306  Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (2010). Sectoral Impact Assessment and Public Value Review. Retrieved from: 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/9540DC81-FB55-4053-9CE7-4BDAAB198F96/0/20101222_SIAMinisterLtr_vfinal_AR.pdf  
307 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011a). Submissions to Public Consultation on New RTÉ 
Service Proposals. Retrieved from: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/1F85220F-B727-49C2-B34D-
12AB767CAD07/0/submissionstoPVTConsultationDocumentfin.pdf  
308 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011b). New RTÉ Service Proposals - 
Analysis and Consideration. Retrieved from: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/C349E873-5E7A-4925-BB21-
73DCC9B0CF32/0/MinistersDecision.pdf  
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advertisers    
 
 
: The issue was raised by the actor to which each column corresponds  
- : The issue was not raised by the actor to which each column corresponds 
	  	  
The procedure that led to the Ministerial approval as well as the approval itself give some 
indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the Irish Public Value Test.  
 
The above table makes clear that the Minister addressed only a few of the concerns that were 
raised by the BAI. This appears to be related to the fact that the Minister enjoys a wide margin of 
discretion in balancing the public value of the service against its market impact; the provisions 
introducing the prior evaluation procedure provide that the Minister must consult with the BAI, but is 
Proposals Pers
pective 




RTÉ could be pressed to commit more 
investment for new content on RTÉ News Now 






RTÉ could be asked to explain how it 
would balance home produced and acquired 
content and to provide a timetable for 






RTÉ Plus could be asked to commit to a 
more ambitious ratio of home produced to 








was approved for a 
period of four years 
RTÉ services should be made available 
across all platforms.  RTÉ should be asked to 
provide more detailed cost projections to 







RTÉ could be required to first show 
programs on RTÉ One and show them on RTÉ 
Plus only after a specified time lag; RTÉ could 
be asked to introduce a limit to the percentage 







News Now approval could be made 







News Now could be required to provide 
outward links from its News Now site to third 






RTÉ could be required to provide a 







RTÉ News Now should carry no 








RTÉ News Now should provide 
subtitling, foreign language news bulletins and 
a forum for debate on current affairs, and 
increase coverage of the Oireachtas (House of 
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not bound by the reports the regulator submits for his/her consideration.309 Not only is the Minister 
given sufficient room for manoeuvre in the evaluation of services, he is also in charge of appointing 
the RTÉ Chair and Board Members.310 In view of the above, it is doubted whether the Minister, not 
between public service and private media. Three further remarks are worth making here: first, the risk 
that the outcome of Ministerial decisions would not reflect fairness existed at the time of the State aid 
investigation (the provision entrusting the Minister with conducting the test is identical to the 
amendment the Irish authorities proposed to the Commission),311 but the Commission did not address 
the issue in the decision. Second, refraining from addressing the issue in the decision contradicts the 
Broadcasting Communication which explicitly lays down that the ex ante 
objective if carried out by a body which is effectively independent from the management of the 
312 
Third, as the example below will demonstrate, the Commission has sufficient grounds to call upon 
the Member States to ensure that the body conducting the ex ante test is independent from both the 
broadcaster and political actors, especially when the latter are involved in appointment procedures: 
interested stakeholders and the regulator were skeptical about the public value of the News Now 
repeating the news provided on the main RTÉ channels. 313  Participants in the procedure made 
concrete recommendations which were arguably appropriate to ensure that News Now would 
News Now invest in new content and submit public value-related commitments, including specific 
scheduling promises and a timetable for their implementation.314 The Minister approved the launch of 
315 The 
decision, however, neither provides guidance on how RTÉ would fulfill this condition nor refers to 
the parameters against which the BAI could monitor whether RTÉ  indeed complied with this 
obligation. This example strengthens the argument put forward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Broadcasting Act 2009, Head 103(4)(a) 
310 See, for instance, Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources. Minister White nominates RTÉ Chair and 
Board Members. Press Release of 04/11/2014. Retrieved from: 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Press+Releases/2014/Minister+White+nominates+RTÉ+Chair+and+Board+Members.htm  
311 See in particular Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, paragraphs 146 et 
seq. and compare with Broadcasting Act 2009, Head 103(4)(a) 
312 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 89 
313 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011a), supra n. 307, 76 
314 Perspective (2010a), supra n. 300, 5 
315 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011b), supra n. 308, 5 
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body conducting the ex ante test should be understood to mean independence from all forces that 
may undermine the legitimacy of the public broadcasting offer.  
 
Similar remarks can be made with respect to the concerns expressed by the industry. For 
example, the association of Irish newspapers (National Newspapers of Ireland) put forward 
convincing arguments that if News Now, including the online exploitation of its content, provided 
advertising services the online news market would be badly hit.316 The Minister may have approved 
the launch of the channel subject to the condition that News Now would not carry advertising,317 but 
y 
the broadcast offer. This was not a significant modification to what was originally proposed by RTÉ, 
which suggested the introduction, to a limited extent, of some vignettes such as travel updates and 
entertainment news.318 Moreover, no ex ante evaluation of the News Now mobile app, on which RTÉ 
apparently provides advertising services,319 seems to have taken place. This app (launched in early 
320 is now 
 321 Surely, an application that provides 
and especially the obligation to enhance media pluralism. However, the Broadcasting Act explicitly 
lays down that non-broadcast non-linear audiovisual media services must undergo the Public Value 
Test.322 Moreover, the 2010 RTÉ Public Service Statement, a document which RTÉ is required to 
publish on an annual basis and which includes more specific commitments on how to deliver its 
public service mission,323 made no reference to a mobile app.324 Hence, the industry had legitimate 
grounds to request a prior evaluation procedure for the launch of this service.325 In any case, if that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011a), supra n. 307, 54 
317 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011b), supra n. 308, 10 
318 RTÉ (2010), supra n. 299, 92 
319 See http://www.rte.ie/mediasales/digitalsales/advertising-channels/rte-news-now/  
320 First, the news mobile apps provided by News Now and the Irish newspapers are advertising-based, i.e. they can be downloaded for 
free. Second, while I do not have market data o
Get instant access to extensive local, national and international news 
coverage from Independent.ie. The Independent.ie mobile app brings you quick, free, up-to-date access to breaking news, as well as 
quality TheJournal.ie is the future of news in Ireland. The multi-award 
winning news website provides up-to-the-minute breaking news, all day, every day. We tell our stories through word, video, pictures, 
This free app offers all the latest national and 
international headlines, top stories, live news bulletins, latest sport results, entertainment updates, audio, video, weather & more
 just 
newspapers. It therefore seems that mobile apps of news channels are demand-
See https://itunes.apple.com/ie/app/irish-independent-news/id335158729?mt=8; https://itunes.apple.com/ie/app/thejournal.ie-
news/id409359491?mt=8 and https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ie.rte.news&hl=en  
321 See http://www.rte.ie/extra/app/news-now/  
322 e broadcasting service within the meaning of 
that provision because News Now is not part of the core broadcasting services as defined in (a), (d), (f) and (g) 
323 Commission decision State aid financing of RTÉ and TNAG (TG4), E4/2005 [2008] OJ C121/5, Paragraph 29 
324 RTÉ (2010). Public Service Statement. Retrieved from: http://www.rte.ie/documents/about/rte-pss-2010v1.pdf  
325 Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011a), supra n. 307, 56 
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assessment concluded that the service could have a major impact on the advertising market, the 
Minister could still approve it subject to the condition that it would not sell advertising space. As the 
Broadcasting Communication puts it, tly negative effects on the market, 
State funding for audiovisual services would appear proportionate only if it is justified by the added 
value in terms of serving the social, democratic and cultural needs of society, taking also into account 
the existing 326 
 
On a positive note, the ex ante test was completed in less than five months.327 This should be 
considered against the fact that it took the Commission nine years to complete the State aid 
investigation and is of significant importance because the assessment did not result in the proposed 
services losing their relevance to the public. It further bears noting that the requests or proposals of 
most citizens and civil society associations became conditions subject to which the approval was 
granted. For example, following their recommendations, the Minister asked RTÉ to include in RTÉ 
News Now increased coverage of the Oireachtas and to provide subtitling and foreign language news 
bulletins.328 The replies to the consultation submitted by citizens and civil society associations were 
less than twenty. While the opinions expressed were possibly not representative of Irish society as a 
proval illustrates that the ex ante 
assessment, a result of a State aid decision, is a step towards a more democratic public broadcasting 
 
 
We may not tell with certainty whether the Amsterdam test may prove to be an efficient tool of 
public sector governance. There are Member States that do not seem to have implemented the test 
effectively. As the German and the Irish examples demonstrate, ineffective implementation translates 
into broad definitions of the service sought to be provided or the lack of independence of the body 
conducting the test. Transparency may have increased as a result of the test, but it is strongly doubted 
whether the concerns of private operators have been accommodated. Moreover, the Commission has 
not looked into whether the Member States indeed respected the commitments they made to have 
their PSB measures declared compatible with the Treaty. Finally, it bears noting that there are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (the Broadcasting Communication) [2009] OJ C 
257/1, paragraph 88 
327  published in February 2011 
328 Compare Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011b), supra n. 308, 8 with Irish Department of 
Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011a), supra n. 307, 8 and 68 
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Member States, most notably the Southern European Member States, 329  which still struggle to 
reposition public broadcasting in the digital era.  
 
The above analysis shows that striking the right balance between competition and public 
service media, a task which has traditionally been carried out by the Commission but which has 
recently been decentralized, is far from settled; the introduction of a clear-cut evaluation procedure as 
well as its effective implementation require reflection on the role of public broadcasting 
organizations in the current media landscape, legislative changes, considerable financial resources 
and expert bodies entrusted with conducting the relevant remit and financial controls.  
 
Can we therefore say that the Amsterdam test is a useful instrument to strike the desired 
balance between competition and public service media? In principle, yes. However, several actors 
need to meaningfully contribute to the transition from public service broadcasting to public service 
media to achieve this objective rities and the 
public broadcasters themselves; the latter still need to reflect on how the diversification of the 
broadcasting offer serves a public mission and the former need to establish clear criteria under which 
such diversification may justify public expenditure. Where the national system does not create the 
above conditions, undermining the public service mission and unnecessarily distorting competition, 
the Commission should subsidiarity does not mean a blank cheque. Someone has to 
assess the market impact and if Member States do not do it, the Commission would be obliged to 
carry out the full assessmen .330 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This Chapter examined the role that State aid control may play in striking the right balance 
between competition and aid schemes in support of media organizations, to the benefit of rivalry and 
media pluralism. Similar to what Chapters 4, 5 and 6 attempted to do, the present Chapter sought to 
establish whether the Commission has enforced State aid law in a way that protects competition 
effectively and if not, to what extent a proper enforcement of the State aid provisions would also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329  See supra. for a remark on Italy. For developments in Greece see Bania, K. Undermining democracy to save money: The 
unexpected and illegitimate closure of the Greek public service broadcaster. 3 July 2013, Media Laws: Law and Policy of the Media 
in a Comparative Perspective. Retrieved from: http://www.medialaws.eu/undermining-democracy-to-save-money-the-unexpected-and-
illegitimate-closure-of-the-greek-public-service-broadcaster/  
330 European Commission (2008). State aid: Commission consults on revised rules for state funding of public service broadcasting - 
frequently asked questions. MEMO/08/671. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/671&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
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enhance media pluralism. The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the practice 
the Commission has developed in assessing aid measures supporting public service media 
organizations.  
 
In spite of the fact that the Commission has a limited margin of discretion in assessing whether 
a PSB distorts competition, it has not made full use of the tools it has at its disposal in order to level 
the playing field and to ensure that PSBs operate within a framework that obliges them to fulfill their 
public service remit. I reached this conclusion by comparing the outcomes of relevant decisions 
against the approach the Commission could have legitimately followed when examining whether 
each one of the conditions set by Article 106(2) TFEU are met. More particularly, as regards the 
mandate, I showed that, on several occasions, the Commission did not push for the introduction of 
amendments to broad remit definitions that allow PSBs to expand beyond what the market thinks is 
permissible. Moreover, the Commission appears to have been rather inconsistent as to the conditions 
under which PSBs may be considered to move within the limits of the entrustment act. This, I said, 
falls short of achieving the certainty that private competitors must enjoy to make investment 
decisions, thereby potentially depriving citizens of new content services. I reach a similar conclusion 
with respect to the approaches it has followed to establish whether the supervision criterion is met; it 
is still not clear whether the Commission believes that the body in charge of monitoring if the public 
service obligations are respected must be independent from the broadcaster or not. The analysis 
showed that not only should the Commission follow a less tolerant approach to aid schemes that do 
not explicitly provide that the broadcaster and the supervisory body should be structurally separated, 
but, to ensure that the PSB is indeed eligible for an exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU, it may 
also require the Member States to establish a mechanism that safeguards the superv
independence from political forces. As regards proportionality control, it appears that the 
Commission has not been particularly diligent in assessing whether overcompensation has taken 
place. I illustrated this latter point by discussing its superficial approach to private sector complaints 
that concerned the transmission by PSBs of major and multiple sports events and proposed an 
alternative approach that would be more appropriate to protect competition in the market for the 
acquisition of premium content. The same approach could also be a step towards guaranteeing that 
PSBs will comply with their obligation to provide a balanced and varied programming. The 
 decision to impose upon the Member States the duty to conduct a prior evaluation 
procedure for new media services is probably the best example illustrating how far the Commission 
may go to reconcile public service media and competition, therefore increasing transparency in the 
zing the expansion of PSBs into new 
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media markets should not be exaggerated. The test has not been implemented effectively on a 
national level and the Commission has failed to do the necessary follow-ups. Were the Commission 
willing to follow the stricter approach that was put forward in this Chapter, State aid control would 
go a long way towards addressing certain shortcomings inherent in several public broadcasting 
systems (e.g. all- cies, and 
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8. Conclusions 
 
The objective  
 
This study set out to explore to what extent EU competition enforcement can contribute to the 
protection of media pluralism, a value that has long been acknowledged as a condition for and a 
corollary of democracy.  
 
EU law offers multiple avenues for supranational intervention, including the adoption of 
incentive measures under Article 167(5) TFEU, action against a Member State under Article 7 TEU, 
and the enactment of instruments containing provisions that seek to ensure that the internal market is 
not realized at the expense of media pluralism. The strengths and weaknesses of the aforementioned 
types of action have been extensively discussed in the scholarly literature. However, the potentiality 
held by EU competition law has received limited attention to date. Either due to the shift to a more 
economics-based approach that has taken place over the past few years or by virtue of the 
competence restrictions facing the Commission when dealing with the media, it is generally believed 
that EU competition law can do little to nothing to safeguard pluralism. But, EU competition law has 
been ascribed this negligible role without having examined whether the Commission has indeed 
managed to achieve its main goal, namely to protect undistorted competition, and if not, whether an 
alternative approach that respects the Treaty boundaries would first and foremost benefit competition 
and possibly, by extension, pluralism. The study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by attempting 
to answer the following three questions:   
a. Has the Commission applied EU competition law to media markets properly, that is, by duly 
taking account of the parameters that drive competition in the media and by using the full 
toolkit it has at its disposal?  
b. If not, what would be an alternative, proper application of EU competition law to media 
markets?  





The study sought to answer the above three questions by examining how EU competition law 
has been and may be used in cases that concern some of the most widely used platforms through 
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which Europeans access information, such as television, newspapers and online search. The analysis 
attempted to cover the main issues the Commission has encountered in older, as well as more recent, 
cases under all four pillars of competition law, namely merger control, Article 101, Article 102, and 
State aid control. For that purpose, the decisional practice the Commission has developed in media 
markets in each pillar was assessed by reference to a specific sector in a way that reflects a business 
strategy (M&As in broadcasting), pricing model (RPM in books and newspapers), practice 
(algorithm manipulation, scraping, data portability restrictions) or revenue mechanism (State aid to 
public service media) that has been a major competition and media policy matter in the sector 
concerned. The common core issue in all the above cases was to determine how EU competition law 
has been or may be applied to an entity that controls an asset or factor, namely premium content, 
retail prices, a popular information gateway, and public funds, that may somehow affect competition 
and media pluralism in the affected sector. 
 
Main findings  
 
The main findings regarding the contribution of EU competition enforcement to the protection 
of media pluralism are Chapter-specific, that is, related to the provision and sector examined in each 
Chapter, and were summarized within the respective Chapters. Nonetheless, the following general 
as assessed against 
economic theory and the applicable legal framework.  
 
First, in applying competition law to media markets, the Commission has ignored to a large 
extent sector-specific economics, including the two-sided nature of advertising-based media markets, 
demand uncertainty and the resulting tendency to content homogenization, the inelastic price demand 
for certain media products, and the heterogeneity of consumer preferences. This is mainly attributed 
to an unjustifiably strong focus on price competition, including and especially in cases where price is 
not the only and perhaps not the most relevant parameter that drives competition in the market 
cases involving free-to-air broadcasters, and the assumption that price is the key element in the 
agreements governing sale for print books. Failure to take account of the sector-specific economics 
imperils the accuracy of the competition decision, for it falls short of identifying and measuring the 
competitive constraints exercised on the entities concerned. As a result, the decision is condemned 
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from the outset for containing flaws that may range from neglecting an entire market that is relevant 
for a competition analysis (e.g. the market for audiences) to miscalculating the impact of the 
transaction or conduct concerned on (price and non-price) competition. This is also problematic from 
a media pluralism perspective. For example, in the case of free-to-air television, 1  
on advertising prices whilst ignoring altogether the effects on the provision of niche programming, 
the latter being a key aspect of content diversity. Similarly, in the case of books, the assumption that 
consumers care more about price than they do about diversity results in a decision that has not 
properly assessed whether the RPM agreement might generate qualitative efficiencies in the form of 
a broad range of books or an extensive network of retailers, which would serve content and supply 
diversity respectively.   
 
Second, it is striking that the Commission has avoided dealing with numerous issues that would 
determine the outcome of the decision. In the case of mergers in television, for example, it has 
other TV content
types of content that are not substitutable for one another. In the case of mergers in newspaper 
publishing, the Commission has refrained from considering whether online news providers exert 
competitive constraints on print newspapers. In Google Search, it appears inclined to accept remedies 
without having considered key legal and factual issues that should underpin their design. For 
example, it is likely that the Commission will prevent Google from displaying snippets of newspaper 
articles in Google News without 
despite obvious conflicts of interest, 
the Commission hesitated to declare incompatible with the common market certain measures that 
allow the managing body of the public broadcaster to monitor delivery of the public service mission.  
 
enient approach to 
complex and controversial matters, the effects are essentially the same as those resulting from failure 
to consider media-specific economics: the competition decision is based on inaccurate premises with 
negative implications for media pluralism. For example, in the case of broad market definitions in 
merger cases, the decision underestimates the market power of the undertakings under scrutiny. As a 
result, concentrations have been cleared despite the fact that the merged entity would have the ability 
and incentive to distort competition in the affected markets post-merger. As regards pluralism, where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Or any other advertising-based market where content is provided for free and where indirect network effects between the advertiser 
and the consumer need to be taken into consideration 
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provision is not subdivided into smaller markets that would accurately reflect how citizens consume 
news nowadays, the decision will most likely not address issues that would deliver a pluralism-
friendly outcome (e.g. the possible need to divest news assets due to the acquisition by the merged 
entity of significant power in news markets). In the same vein, an aid scheme that does not stipulate 
that the management of the public provider must be structurally independent from the supervisory 
body facilitates anti-competitive practices, which may range from undercutting prices in the 
advertising markets to cross-subsidizing commercial subsidiaries. With respect to media pluralism, in 
 
the latter will not respect its obligation to provide a balanced and varied programming.  
 
decision-making, and, after identifying the loopholes that have been left open, it demonstrated that 
EU competition law offers plenty of tools which, if used, result in a decision that properly reflects the 
dynamics of media markets. Moreover, by comparing the drawbacks of the relevant practice against 
the pro-competitive results that could have been achieved had the Commission applied competition 
law properly, the study also showcased the potential contribution of competition enforcement to the 
protection of media pluralism. The study proposed, inter alia, a method on the basis of which the 
Commission may define the relevant free-to-air broadcasting markets (and other markets where 
luding niche programming. It further developed a theoretical framework 
within which the Commission may measure the effects of a transaction or conduct on non-price 
competition. By doing so, it shed light on the circumstances under which RPM agreements may 
deliver qualitative efficiencies in the form of a broad range of book and newspaper titles, the 
conditions under which a merger between broadcasters may adversely affect the variety or quality of 
the content broadcast, and the parameters against which to assess a number of business practices 
potentially harmful to competition and pluralism, such as demotion of competing content of higher 
quality, restrictions that prevent consumers from seamlessly switching from one content provider to 
another, and, where news markets are affected, interference with the ability of news outlets to 
generate (advertising and subscription) revenues. The study also developed a framework within 
which the Commission must conduct State aid assessments in order to ensure that the scheme under 
scrutiny is designed in a way that prevents the public service media organization concerned from 
unnecessarily restricting competition and from neglecting the duty to provide pluralistic 
programming. Drawing on the possibilities offered to the Commission by the applicable framework, 
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the study put forward a number of proposals for dealing with all-encompassing public service remits, 
lack of independence of the authority that checks compliance with the entrustment act, and 
inappropriate or quasi-non existent proportionality assessments.  
 












Recommendations for future research 
 
broad and multifaceted. It involves a number of different product and geographic markets, each of 
which has its own distinguishing features (size, structure, etc.). Moreover, new business models for 
the sale of media content have surfaced, the relationship between the consumer and the media content 
provider has undergone significant changes, and new (potentially anti-competitive) business practices 
have emerged. In view of the above, competition law is challenged in many respects. To produce 
sound policy strategies, there is need for more empirical and legal research which would allow 
further assessment of the various parameters that determine supply and demand in the modern media 
landscape. Exploring the following can facilitate the attainment of this goal:  
a. Further empirical research on demand-side substitutability: One of the main drawbacks of the 
s that it is not based on 
empirical data that would enable it to properly measure demand-side substitutability and assess 
the anti-competitive effects against what the consumer values the most. As a result, the 
outcome of relevant decisions was flawed on a number of occasions. Consumption patterns 
have changed over the past few years and so has the information economy. The user engages in 
multi-sourcing and media multitasking, attaches importance to functionalities that were not 
available a few years ago (e.g. availability of programming on catch-up TV), and may access 
content in exchange for personal data. These developments give rise to a number of questions 
that are relevant for a competition analysis, including whether the user is aware of information 
asymmetries between the provider and herself, what are the parameters that make a provider 
more attractive than others, etc. In view of the above, further empirical research on how the 
media content consumer reacts to changes in quality, variety, and price would undoubtedly 
benefit decision-making in this area. 
b. Research on the role of privacy in the enforcement of EU competition law in data-driven 
markets: Exchange of personal data for content is increasingly becoming one of the most 
in the modern information economy. In fact, many believe that data is 
the new raw material for business. But, what role has the accumulation of large reserves of data 
played in competition enforcement? While conducting this study, I noticed two issues that arise 
from the decisional practice that has been developed in competition cases touching upon 
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privacy. First, firms involved in these cases either 
unconditionally allowed to fulfill their consolidation plans. A -
around the globe largely ignored the economics of data-driven markets and the implications of 
data gathering and retention for a healthy competitive market. Second, while competition 
authorities make occasional references to data as a matter of concern to competition (e.g. as a 
source of market power or as an input leading to consumer lock-in), we have still not seen a 
complete competition analysis where use of personal data was indeed an issue to consider. To 
avoid controversy, competition authorities have preferred commitments decisions to a full-
blown assessment, thereby significantly undermining legal certainty. Given the growing 
importance of access to personal data as a parameter driving competition in an abundance of 
 and the limited 
attention the arguably problematic practice that competent authorities have developed in this 
area, a study of how data-related considerations may impact competition assessments has 
become imperative.  
c. Further empirical research on the impact of RPM on price and non-price competition: In 
Chapter 5, it was mentioned that, while economic theory supports the argument that RPM may 
generate a number of efficiencies, empirical research dealing with the impact of RPM on price 
and non-price competition is scarce. This topic is undoubtedly worthy of immediate attention 
policies are currently in a state of flux; certain Member States have recently abolished RPM 
laws whereas others have extended their applicability to digital titles. Moreover, NCAs are 
more and more taking cases involving RPM arrangements for the sale of publications. Hence, it 
is becoming increasingly important to resolve the uncertainty over the effects of fixed prices on 
the competitive process and media pluralism.  
 
Limitations of EU competition law in safeguarding media pluralism and how to address 
them  
 
The thesis put forward in the present study is neither that competition enforcement can remedy 
all the threats currently facing media pluralism nor that competition assessments may substitute 
pluralism reviews. The study identified the following four limitations, which can be mitigated if 
relevant assessments are conducted within the framework developed herein. First, competence 
restrictions prevent the Commission from taking action that would be to the benefit of media 
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pluralism only. For example, the Commission may not block a merger that does not raise competition 
concerns, but is likely to raise pluralism concerns. Nonetheless, if the Commission incorporates in its 
analysis variety and quality considerations and if it acknowledges that in many cases behavioral 
remedies will not manage to protect undistorted competition in the affected markets, there is a strong 
likelihood that the outcome of the decision will be friendly to pluralism. Second, there are 
weaknesses inherent in the design of EU competition law. For example, from a pluralism perspective, 
centralization of market power, which is the presumed equivalent of opinion forming power, would 
be sufficient to trigger the application of media ownership restrictions. Article 102 TFEU, however, 
does not prevent an undertaking from acquiring and holding, on its own merits, a dominant position 
but only the abuse thereof. Yet, it bears noting that in most cases this dominant position is not 
acquired through internal growth but through M&As and agreements with key market players that 
may contain exclusivity restrictions. By applying stricter criteria in exercising merger control and by 
keeping an eye on deals between powerful operators, which are no longer subject to notification, the 
Commission may go a long way towards addressing the acquisition of significant market power by a 
handful of entities that interfere with the free dissemination of information. Third, the focus of 
competition assessments and the scope of pluralism reviews are different. This is so for the reason 
that an authority entrusted with deciding on the impact of a conduct or transaction on pluralism has 
the power to examine whether the firms or individuals under scrutiny may misrepresent facts and 
marginalize opposing viewpoints, in violation of the applicable media laws and principles. The EU 
competition watchdog is not entitled to carry out these tasks. It may, however, design solutions that 
would greatly alleviate related concerns. For example, structural remedies, which have been 
particularly successful in stimulating competition, reduce opinion-forming power, thereby 
safeguarding supply diversity. The final limitation has to do with the fact that information markets 
are fast-moving, complex and with a natural tendency to concentration. Hence, by the time 
competition proceedings are concluded, the harm to competition and media pluralism may already be 
done. Given the central role that the Commission can play in setting the conditions under which these 
markets develop, it is crucial to monitor how the practices market players engage in may affect 
competition and consumer welfare. Addressing anti-competitive conduct at an early stage may 
significantly influence how these markets will evolve. It is worth noting that one of the main points 
raised in the Report prepared by the EU Media Futures Forum, an expert group assigned by the 
Commission to analyze the future of media in the EU, is that one of the major problems in digital 
content markets is the emergence of new, often fabricated by the market players themselves, barriers 
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-to-
innovation is threatened.2  
 
 Concluding remark  
 
 Contrary to general belief, this study demonstrated that EU competition enforcement may go 
a long way towards protecting media pluralism without stretching the boundaries of the Treaty. It did 
so by challenging long-standing assumption
decisional practice, but also by showcasing how EU competition law may be instrumentalized to 
address problems that have emerged in more recent years. Given the likelihood that action with far-
reaching implications under other branches of EU law is low, the normative suggestions put forward 
in this study may form the only realistic proposal on the contribution that the EU can make to 
safeguard diversity in the media.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  EU Media Futures Forum (2012). Fast-forward Europe - 8 solutions to thrive in the digital world, 4. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/forum_final_report_en.pdf  
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